No Lack of Courage (2 page)

The Canadian response was also immediate, if somewhat slow to actually galvanize. Ships were deployed within weeks, special operations forces were on the ground by the end of December 2001, and a light infantry BG was deployed to Kandahar Airfield in February 2002. All
were deployed to assist their American counterparts in operations that supported OEF.

Accordingly, the Canadian decision to support the Americans in Afghanistan seemed simple enough, as did Canada's continued contributions to the region. Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's decision to deploy Canadian Forces (CF) personnel and equipment to Afghanistan as part of OEF in 2001–2002 was linked to Canada's commitment to NATO's solidarity and to fighting international terrorism as authorized by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368.
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Chrétien decided to return troops to Afghanistan in August 2003, after a brief one-year hiatus, to assist the newly established NATO ISAF mission in Kabul. Two years later, in August 2005, his successor, Prime Minister Paul Martin, approved the redeployment of troops from Kabul in the north to the more volatile and dangerous Kandahar Province in the south as part of ISAF's expansion throughout Afghanistan. Subsequently, Canada assumed command of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for the area, as well as responsibility for an infantry BG that was tasked with providing security in the region.

By the spring/summer of 2005, Canadians were heavily engaged in combat with the Taliban. That level of commitment, particularly the loss of soldiers in heavy fighting, earned Canada the respect of its coalition partners. It also secured Canada's position as a major player in Afghanistan. At no time was that role more evident than in the summer and early fall of 2006, when Canadian troops fought pitched battles in the Taliban heartland of Pashmul in Kandahar Province to destroy insurgent forces were poised to launch a major attack to capture Kandahar City, thereby threatening the tenuous hold the central Government of Afghanistan (GoA) held over the country.

Operation Medusa, from 1–17 September 2006, represented the climax of that struggle. This epic combat engagement was NATO's first battle in its nearly 60 years of existence. Importantly, it was fought primarily by Canadians. As one senior officer acknowledged after the operation, “we were basically told, you're on your fucking own for while.” General Rick Hillier, the chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), later acknowledged, “With the Taliban resurgence, we didn't have the troops on the ground to do the job the way it had to be done.” He explained, “Canada was in the middle
of a life-and-death firefight in the south, and few in the alliance were willing to step up and help.” Hillier lamented, “We were essentially in it by ourselves, with Americans and British troops, and that made me angry.”
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Certainly, Operation Medusa was a significant Canadian benchmark. It signalled to Canadians and allies that Canada was once again ready to engage its personnel in combat operations. The nation finally put to rest the peacekeeping myth that it had acquired in national and international psyches since the 1950s and once again overtly proved itself as a warfighting nation within the international defence community. In fact, Admiral Mike Mullen, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, had confided to the CDS that the Americans “had written off Canada as a serious player, a contributor, to anything that was going to happen around the world.” However, Operation Medusa and the follow-on Canadian efforts in Afghanistan had changed all that. “Now you guys are at the forefront of everything positive,” Mullen stated. “You're setting the example for countries in Europe to follow, for other Western countries, for any country around the world to follow, and you guys are doing it. It's absolutely incredible.”
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The high praise was certainly welcome, but it should not have been a revelation. After all, Operation Medusa merely confirmed that there is no lack of courage when it comes to the Canadian soldier.

T
HE SKY WAS A
clear blue and the leaves were just beginning to change colour. It was another beautiful early fall day in northern Ontario as the commanding officer (CO) of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR), drove into the training area of Canadian Forces Base (CFB) Petawawa to do a range reconnaissance for an upcoming exercise. As his vehicle meandered deeper into the heavily forested rolling hills his cellphone erupted, shattering the calm stillness of the vehicle.

“Colonel, you have to come back—something's happened, I think it's important that you be here,” was the cryptic message passed to the CO. Trusting the judgment of his highly intelligent and perpetually calm operations officer, the CO told his driver to return to base. Upon arrival, he was able to watch the second commercial airliner plough into the south tower of the World Trade Center. The battalion was the immediate reaction unit for Land Forces Central Area (LFCA) and without delay began preparing for whatever mission would follow. Little did the “Royals” in 1 RCR know that the events unfolding in New York on the tragic morning of 11 September 2001 would lead to the killing fields of Panjwayi five years later, and would cost so many of them their lives.

The brazen attack by terrorists who, armed solely with cheap, 99-cent box cutters, hijacked fully fuelled commercial airliners and used them to strike not only the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York, but also the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. A fourth hijacked jetliner heading for Washington, D.C., slammed into the ground in Pennsylvania,
short of its objective due to the bravery of its passengers. In total, almost 3,000 people were killed in the attacks.

Not surprisingly, Washington responded quickly to the 9/11 attacks in order to protect the American homeland and U.S. facilities and installations abroad. The Americans suspected that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network were responsible for the attacks. They realized that they would need to strike their antagonists overseas. On 14 September, the American Congress authorized President George W. Bush to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attack on September or harboured such organizations or persons.”
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The Americans also called on their NATO allies for help. NATO's North Atlantic Council met on 12 September to discuss the U.S. request to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty that defines “an armed attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America” as “an attack against them all,” and thereby requires each ally to “assist the Party that has been attacked by taking such action as it deems necessary.”
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This was the first time that the Article 5 clause had been invoked.

By 2 October the Americans provided their allies with “clear and compelling evidence” that the AQ had, in fact, been behind the 9/11 attacks. Two days later, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson announced that the Alliance would take collective actions to assist the United States. As such, it dispatched an Airborne Early Warning component (an aircrew consisting of 22 Canadians, 55 Germans, and 74 Americans) to assist with the campaign against terror, and it deployed elements of its Standing Naval Force to the eastern Mediterranean Sea.
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In accordance with Treaty requirements, NATO also notified the UN that it intended to invoke Article 5 under the framework of the United Nations Charter provision affirming the inherent right of member states to individual and collective defence. However, the UN Security Council had already met to address the 9/11 attacks on 12 September and urged all states to work together “to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the attacks.” In essence, the UN had already given its approval to NATO on 28 September, when they invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which authorized the use of military force.
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Then, on 7 October 2001, the United States and the United Kingdom informed the Security Council that they were taking military action in self-defence, specifically that they were undertaking operations to strike at al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist camps and training and military installations in Afghanistan.

Canada reacted quickly as its southern neighbour and its European allies mobilized for war. On 9/11 Canada, in accordance with its obligations under the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) treaty, became immediately involved.
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Moreover, on 7 October, the day the Americans launched Operation Enduring Freedom, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that Canada, “standing shoulder to shoulder with . . . the American people” would deploy sea, land, and air forces to assist the United States.
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The Standing Committee on National Security and Defence affirmed, “in those early days the Committee saw two good reasons for Canada to play a role in Afghanistan. One was supporting our long-time American ally in a time of need. The second was that any initiative that our Government could take to counter international terrorism, as called upon by the United Nations, had merit.”
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Shortly after the prime minister's announcement, the deputy chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) responsible for CF operations, issued his intent for Operation Apollo, the code name given to the CF's support to the American war on terror. On a national level, the strategic aim was to protect Canada, specifically to prevent future attacks on Canada or its allies by eliminating the threat of terrorism. As a result, the government set a number of national objectives:

To ensure that the overarching objectives were achieved, the government also established a set of immediate military objectives that would be undertaken in cooperation with the U.S. and other coalition partners and countries within the region. Those objectives were articulated as:

Mid-term objectives were also articulated. Once again, working in conjunction with its allies, Canada set the reconstruction of Afghanistan as its mid-term objective priority.

By October the Department of National Defence (DND) had earmarked an initial conventional Canadian contribution. It included:

The CDS provided a clear mission for the deploying troops. He affirmed that the “CF will contribute to the elimination of the threat of terrorism as a force in international affairs by contributing [Canadian] Joint Task Force South West Asia (CA JTFSWA) to the commander-in-chief (CINC) CENTCOM in support of the U.S.A. led campaign against terrorism in order to protect Canada and its allies from terrorist attacks and prevent future attacks.” His intent was to support the international campaign through an initial six month commitment of military forces, the role of the CF being further refined as the coalition military campaign plan evolved and matured.
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However, the Americans did not wait for the Canadian commitment to be fully mobilized. They utilized special operations forces (SOF), CIA paramilitary forces, and air power to help the Northern Alliance anti-Taliban coalition to quickly cut through the Taliban forces. Kabul fell to the Northern Alliance on 13 November. Priority then shifted to the south, namely the Taliban heartland of Kandahar. Within 63 days of commencing the offensive the Americans and their Afghan allies captured Kandahar.
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On 14 November, the day after the fall of Kabul, the UN Security Council once again condemned the Taliban government “for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the al-Qaeda network and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden.” More importantly, to fill the imminent power vacuum, the UN created a transitional government that would establish a “multi-ethnic and fully representative” government.
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To achieve that goal talks were held in Bonn, Germany, on 27 November 2001. The Bonn Agreement called for an interim authority to be established in Afghanistan on 22 December 2001. This body was to provide leadership for Afghanistan until a representative government could be elected through free and fair elections. To ensure a smooth transition, and to provide security until Afghan National Security Forces could be established, UNSCR 1386 was tabled on 20 December 2001. The newest resolution called for a peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan to develop national security structures, assist in reconstruction, and organize and train future Afghan security forces. It also created the British led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was stationed
in Kabul.
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Canada opted not to join the largely European initiative at that time.