No Lack of Courage (10 page)

That impression was widespread and conclusions about the effectiveness of the bombardment were drawn and reinforced by local perception.
“We had reports that the Taliban were actually leaving,” acknowledged Schreiber. “That they were actually running away . . . The locals said yeah, they're [Taliban fighters] abandoning their positions, they're leaving . . . And the enemy could get out, because they had covered routes in and out of the area.”
³

The prospect of the large concentration of Taliban fighters escaping unscathed concerned senior NATO commanders. Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber revealed:

The pressure was redirected to the battle group. “We [MNB] directed Omer [CO 1 RCR BG] to do the crossing earlier,” asserted Schreiber. “We wanted him to go under the cover of darkness on the night of 2/3 September, [but] he wanted to wait until the morning of 3 September.” The MNB operations officer acknowledged, “In the end, there was a bit of a compromise made. We originally said 0100 hours, Omer said 0600 hours, so we settled at 0400 hours.” However, Schreiber revealed that “in reality, by the time he started his crossing it was 0600 hours.”
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Nonetheless, based on the pushed timelines, “C” Coy Gp had no choice but to use the only existing crossing point leading into the killing fields that the brigade commander had previously described. On 3 September 2006, at 0445 hours, engineer elements crept out to clear the route that the infantry was to use. Efforts were slightly delayed because of the darkness and the necessity of waiting for the air-support package.
Sprague recalled, “I gave combat team orders on the fly over the radio.” But he lamented that “half of the combat team wasn't even with me at 0545 hours.” The orders for the attack were basically “single file, order of march and follow me,” stated the OC.
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At 0620 hours, the leading elements of “C” Coy Gp crossed the Arghandab River under cover of A-10 “Thunderbolt” and B2 fighter bomber aircraft.
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Map by Chris Johnson.

They were also supported by overwhelming artillery support. The battery commander, Major Ivey, stated, “We conducted a deliberate fire plan to get the guys across. The ‘C' Coy FOO was Captain Dan Matheson and he went across with Charles Company.” Ivey and the CO, as well as an anchor OP, remained on the dominating ground of Ma'SÅ«m Ghar.

Under cover of the overwhelming fire the mission proceeded smoothly. “We crossed and got into a descent defensive posture and established a good foothold,” explained Sprague. “We were in a half circle with 8 Platoon facing West, 7 Platoon facing North, the ANA and their American EMT team facing North-East and the engineer, Zettlemeyer, and bulldozer and other support elements in the flat area behind us.”
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To Lieutenant Jeremy Hiltz, the 8 Platoon commander, the whole scene upon crossing was eerie—the landscape was completely still. “We knew deep down inside, we knew they [Taliban] were there . . . but it's still quiet and there's no indication that anything's wrong, except for guys are looking at each other, there's that feeling.”
¹⁰
He added, “The guys were definitely on high, high alert and heightened senses, but to that point we weren't seeing any type of activity or any, anything that would indicate that there was any issues.”
¹¹

To get through to the suspected enemy positions “C” Coy Gp had to traverse a farmer's field that had been ploughed out. To make things worse it had a series of ditches and berms that had to be breached. The ditches, in the middle of a huge marijuana field, were approximately three to four feet deep and about eight feet wide. The engineers took the dirt from the berms and simply filled in the ditches to make crossing points. Sprague sent 8 Platoon, and dismounted to clear some buildings on his left flank. He sent the ANA, also dismounted, off to his right flank
to keep an eye on the main road. Shortly before 0800 hours he sent 7 Platoon, mounted in their LAV IIIs, straight up the middle through the breach. “Initially,” reported Sprague, “we all thought this is too easy.”
¹²

Despite the initial progress, some had concerns. “Unfortunately, there was a lot of confusion due to lack of significant orders and being pushed forward quickly,” asserted Lieutenant Hiltz. “It was my impression when we stepped across the river that we were to just push over onto the far side and secure it. And then all of a sudden it seemed like we were breaching and starting to push into Objective Rugby, significantly the white bunker, white school complex.” Hiltz described, “The engineers were able to make their first breach and then they pushed forward with the bulldozers and started the breaching of the canal itself . . . They pushed through a second breach through the berm, down in between my Bravo and Charlie call signs [LAV IIIs] and then we again secured that . . . the initial order was that 7 Platoon would go through and with the engineers move in on the white school and bunker. They [7 Platoon] went across the canal and basically fanned out four abreast and advanced on the white school.”
¹³

Captain Derek Wessan, the 7 Platoon commander, gave a quick set of orders to his platoon, who then moved through the engineer's breach and shook out into a battle line consisting of three 7 Platoon, or call sign (C/S) 31, LAV IIIs (i.e., C/Ss 31A, B, C), and an engineer LAV C/S E32D. In addition, there was a light utility vehicle wheel (LUVW), the German manufactured
Gelaendenwagon
, more commonly referred to as the “G” Wagon, in which the platoon second-in-command (2IC) rode. The G-Wagon, C/S 31W, was jokingly referred to as 31 “woof” since that “was the last noise you'd hear as the vehicle was engulfed in flames.”
¹⁴

Although the landscape was still as 7 Platoon worked its way through the final breach, the enemy had not been idle. A variety of surveillance assets, as well as the deployed troops themselves, began to report on Taliban activities in the depth of the enemy position that began to respond to the initial stages of “C” Coy Gp's advance. Groups of 10–15 insurgents were reported moving about and occupying three-to-five-man ambush positions overlooking IEDs planted on the route leading to the enemy position. These targets were continuously engaged. In fact, it became clear that there were a lot of enemy and that “C” Coy Gp had stirred up a hornet's nest.

Map by Chris Johnson.

As 7 Platoon emerged on the other side of the breach, they found themselves in the middle of a marijuana field. There was an unnatural calm as the 7 Platoon LAVs pushed through the gap and took up an extended line facing the white schoolhouse complex, approximately 50 metres away. The Platoon second-in-command, Warrant Officer Rick Nolan, pulled up in his G-Wagon and took up his position.

The enemy displayed remarkable fire discipline. They allowed the Canadians to approach extremely close before they opened fire. But when they did it had a devastating effect. “It was dead quiet,” remembered Master-Corporal Allan Johnson, commanding the LAV III C/S 31A. Then he saw an enemy jump up on a roof and “all hell broke loose.”
¹⁵
Corporal Justin Young recalled, “We pulled up through the breach and then when we shook out to extended line and then the rockets started flying.”
¹⁶
Lieutenant Hiltz stated, “When 31 was approximately 50 metres from the white school, a pen flare went off and then it was a very concentrated, very rehearsed and well, well-organized ambush, almost 360 degrees around us.”
¹⁷

Regardless of how the ambush was triggered, what is certain is that without warning 7 Platoon was enveloped in fire from three directions. “The entire area just lit up,” described Johnson. “We were taking fire from at least two sides, maybe three, with everything they [enemy] had.”
¹⁸

Charles Company combat team was now ensnared in a horseshoe ambush. Worse off was 7 Platoon, which found itself in the very heart of the avalanche of enemy fire. Master-Corporal Justin O'Neil, the engineer, field section 2IC, recalled,

The engineer LAV, E32D, was the first vehicle casualty, hit by a munitions from an RPG or 82mm recoilless rifle. The heat round slammed into the turret ring of the LAV, spraying lethal shards of shrapnel everywhere in the interior. Sergeant Shane Stachnik, who was standing in the rear hatch, died instantly from a severed artery. Amazingly, the troop commander who was in the turret took only a minor wound with some shrapnel in the shoulder and beside him his gunner escaped completely unscathed. Both were leaning forward to look through their gun sights when the round came whistling in, missing them by inches. The explosion also destroyed the radios, so neither the OC nor the 7 Platoon commander knew what had happened to their engineer.

Shortly thereafter, Warrant Officer Nolan's G-Wagon suffered a catastrophic hit. A RPG slammed into the unarmoured vehicle, penetrating the passenger windshield. “We rolled up, crossed the river, waited till the engineers formed a breach,” recalled the driver, Corporal Sean Teal. “Then we rolled through the breach with the LUVW behind the centre . . . I was the driver, Warrant Officer Nolan was my front passenger, the doc [platoon medic] was behind him and the interpreter was right behind me.” He continued: