No Lack of Courage (8 page)

Courtesy 1 RCR BG.

The infamous white schoolhouse.

Courtesy 1 RCR BG.

Pounding Objective Rugby.

T
HE FIGHT FOR
P
ASHMUL
, or more accurately for Afghanistan, as Brigadier-General Fraser and other senior NATO military leaders described, no longer rested with Hope and TF Orion. Their tour was quickly coming to an end and by early August they were already conducting a relief in place (RIP) with the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group (1 RCR BG) or Task Force 3-06 as it was officially termed. At 1600 hours, 19 August 2006, a small ceremony, the Transfer of Command Authority (TOCA), was taking at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) between Lieutenant-Colonel Hope and Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, the CO of TF 3-06. Within hours of the TOCA, before Operation Medusa could even be launched and with portions of his force having only been in theatre for a few weeks, Lavoie was fighting his first major battle.
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Reports from locals indicated a continuation of the infiltration of insurgent fighters, as well as new leaders, into the Panjwayi District. More troublesome was the reporting that a large portion of the reinforcements moving into Pashmul were assessed as the more experienced Taliban fighters from out of area who were likely augmented by foreign fighters. They continued to reinforce their defensive positions in Pashmul but also began conducting noticeably more and better coordinated attacks. They demonstrated a large improvement in their use of fire and movement, and their ability to coordinate and concentrate their fire. The insurgents began to conduct almost daily ambushes along major routes targeting ISAF and ANSF elements.

The new TF reacted quickly and pushed out its companies to monitor enemy activity. On 19 August, which was actually Afghan Independence Day, with the TOCA ceremony barely finished, “A” Coy, 1 RCR BG was deployed to the dominating high ground at Ma'SÅ«m Ghar to observe the enemy. They arrived at approximately 1730–1800 hours and linked up with the ANP, who maintained a presence on the high feature. This activity initiated a prompt response from the enemy. At approximately 1845 hours the Taliban launched a major assault against the Bazar-e-Panjwayi District Centre. “I had not anticipated having my first command combat experience within hours of transfer of command authority,” conceded Lavoie.
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But he had no say in the matter as an estimated 300–500 insurgents, armed with small arms and RPGs and using disciplined section fire and movement, began to manoeuvre to overrun the ANP and “A” Coy positions on Ma'SÅ«m Ghar. Their assault entailed dismounted coordinated attacks from the three different directions. Lavoie recalled, “The first thing that struck me about ground combat was the absolute chaos that reigned when the bullets started flying.” He explained, “Within a span of a few hours, ‘A' Coy came under attack at night by an enemy that seriously outnumbered them.” And true to combat throughout the ages “everything that could have possibly gone wrong, seemed to; the enemy was attacking from all directions, serious confusion occurred with regard to identifying friendly Afghan Security Forces in the same battle, ammunition was beginning to run low, there was only one way on to and off of the position, numerous vehicles broke down or got stuck and one LAV III even rolled over.”
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Major Mike Wright, the OC of “A” Coy, actually a PPCLI sub-unit seconded to the 1 RCR BG for rotation 3-06, arrived at Ma'SÅ«m Ghar and abruptly noticed that the ground was dramatically different from what he had expected from his map study. He promptly set about positioning his FOO and sent his company battle captain, Captain Mike Leaky, to site his LAV III on the south side of the position to protect their rear flank. “At about 1845, I sat down to do my confirmatory orders,” recalled Wright, “and then that's when we got into RPG problems.” The first of
many RPG rockets sailed three feet over his vehicle. “And basically that's when the contact began,” he explained.
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On arrival, Captain Leaky and several of the platoon commanders quickly liaised with the ANP and ANA who had observation posts (OPs) and machine gun positions set up on the various peaks on Ma'SÅ«m Ghar and began incorporating themselves into the defensive plan. Warrant Officer Michael Jackson remembered, “The platoon commander just got off the hill and up to the OC when the rockets started flying and the RPGs hit all over the perimeter.” Jackson reacted immediately. “I placed one section on the east side of the hill we were occupying and another section on the west side with me . . . We brought the C-6 [GPMG] up into the saddle and we started engaging about 20–30 Taliban on the bottom south side of the hill.”
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Everyone expected the main threat from the north, the direction of the infamous white schoolhouse. However, the insurgents were infiltrating from every other direction. The enemy was engaged at up to distances of 3,000 metres but they pushed on relentlessly. In the growing darkness, “A” Coy found it increasingly difficult to differentiate the enemy that was swarming over the adjacent peaks as they overran the ANP observations posts from the ANP who were quickly abandoning their positions. Major Wright, the OC, described, “Our first clue that the ANP no longer had control of the high feature was when we had the RPGs fired at us.”
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The situation became tenuous. “We had to get our guys off the hill out of contact,” described Jackson. “And then the section on the west side got pinned down by enemy fire.” Jackson manoeuvred another section up on his the western flank to provide suppressing fire to allow his soldiers, who were pinned down, to withdraw from the death trap they found themselves in. But the enemy had arrived in force. “Every time we popped our heads up to take well aimed shots, the bullets were ricocheting off the rocks in front of us,” explained Jackson. “But we had to get that section down because we saw enemy off to the far west flank and Taliban off on the far east flank and then we started seeing flashes of light to our north. So it was very apparent that they were starting to surround us.”
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By that time the ANP were streaming down from their positions on the high ground, abandoning the dominating terrain to the Taliban.
“Next thing you know,” pronounced Jackson, “we started taking rocket fire from that OP.” The company LAVs were now hammering the mountain tops with their cannon and machine guns, allowing Jackson some manoeuvre space. Under the blistering fire of the LAVs, he was able to pull his sections off the hill. A C-9 light machine gunner and Jackson were the last two men off the position. “We suppressed the Taliban to a point where we could get off,” he reminisced.
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Concurrently, Captain Leaky was fighting a war of his own. Leaky and his LAV were singularly positioned on the south flank to protect the rear of the company position in the unlikely event of enemy infiltration from the south. It soon proved to be one of the Taliban's primary assault routes as they attempted to skirt the mountain and approach from the rear using the grape fields as a covered approach. “A lot of fire came in our direction and I couldn't identify an enemy so I jockeyed forward to get a better position of observation,” declared Leakey. For the next three hours Leakey and his crew fought back the Taliban, who engaged them from two grape hangers and the surrounding fields. The enemy, in formed groups of up to 15 fighters, attempted no less than five times to conduct section attacks on Leaky's lone position. Fortuitously, he fought back each attempt.
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The assaulting insurgents proved to be nothing less than tenacious. The fight had lasted over three hours when “A” Coy pulled off the feature in darkness and under contact. “You just couldn't tell who was who,” revealed Jackson, “and we were very lucky we didn't have any blue on blue [casualties].”
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Moreover, “A” Coy could no longer secure their position and were running low on ammunition. Major Wright decided to pull back to more defensible ground about three kilometres outside of Bazar-e-Panjwayi to resupply and regroup. At that point the “Quick Reaction Force” (QRF) platoon from Patrol Base Wilson met up with the sub-unit and delivered the much-needed ammunition. Once they were “bombed-up” Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie ordered “A” Coy to link up with the ANA and retake Ma'SÅ«m Ghar.

As Wright led his company back along the main route to the objective they ran into multiple ambushes. To add to their troubles, as the rear platoon turned onto the dirt road leading to the mountain, one of
its LAVs tipped over, prompting a recovery operation under enemy fire. Concurrently, the OC was receiving information from higher headquarters, gleaned from various technical means, that there were a number of Taliban platoon-sized units deploying in the vicinity of their intended location. Wright became concerned and called the CO. “At this point,” Wright recalled, “I said, you know we're basically doing an advance to contact by night into the enemy's terrain.
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Lavoie relented and directed Wright to pull back to the outskirts of Bazar-e-Panjwayi and form a leaguer for the last few remaining hours of darkness.

In the end, the defence of Ma'Sūm Ghar, which represented the outer perimeter of the district centre, had blunted the attack against the ANP headquarters (HQ) inside Bazar-e-Panjwayi. Coalition battle-damage assessment indicated that approximately 80–100 insurgents had been killed. In fact, local security forces recovered the bodies of at least 37 insurgents, a remarkable feat in itself as the Taliban were always meticulous in policing the battlefield so as not to leave any indication of their losses.

In the aftermath of the attack, events had once again reinforced that the Taliban build-up in the Panjwayi/Pashmul region represented a significant threat to ISAF and ANSF movement along Highway 1. The build-up also presented a formidable obstacle to the establishment of the Kandahar ADZ. Not surprisingly, the upcoming Operation Medusa took on an even greater importance.

Having beaten off the Taliban attack, Lavoie now focused his task force on the approaching mission. However, he still had to ensure that the Taliban were kept in check until he was ready to launch Operation Medusa. Between 22–29 August, Lavoie's task force undertook deterrence patrolling to prevent the Taliban from attacking the district centre. Meanwhile, the planning for Operation Medusa was in its final stages.

Lavoie gave formal orders for Operation Medusa on 27 August 2006. “TF Kandahar [designation of TF 3-06 for the operation],” he detailed, “will secure Pashmul in order to set the conditions for the Kandahar ADZ.”
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The CO outlined that he intended to achieve his mission by denying the enemy freedom of movement or action within the Panjwayi-Zhari-Kandahar-Arghandab greenbelt, which had historically served as a significant sanctuary and transit route in past efforts to seize Kandahar City.

The operation was to be a joint ANSF/ISAF initiative, with the ANSF leading wherever possible. Lavoie explained, “The key to success of this operation lies in our ability to match our strengths against enemy weaknesses in order to constantly disrupt his decision cycle and prevent his C2 [command and control] assets from being able to react to our manoeuvre.” He directed that the BG would “make maximum use of joint fires, ISR, EW, [electronic warfare] superior direct firepower capability, mobility and C2 to dominate the three dimensional battle space and overwhelm an enemy capable of operating on only one plane of the battlefield.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Lavoie planned on tricking the enemy into believing that a major assault on their lines of communication, as well as on their command-and-control nodes, was imminent. He hoped to achieve that by advancing aggressively from east to west on two separate axes with two respective balanced company group (Coy Gp) teams—one advancing from the north and the other from the south. The plan was premised on the notion that once the Taliban understood that their critical vulnerabilities were being threatened by a major ground force they would mass to defend themselves. That would allow ISAF assets to destroy them using precision fire from CAS, aviation, and artillery.

Lavoie and his BG were originally given eight days to clear the objective. The precursor to the operation began on 1 September, when the Coy Gps moved to their waiting areas, located close to their objectives, and conducted battle procedure in preparation for their opening roles. “B” and “C” Coy Gps were responsible for conducting feints north and south of Pashmul respectively, with a view to drawing the enemy out of their defensive positions. Concurrently, “A” Coy Gp was to isolate Bazar-e-Panjwayi in order to provide flank protection to “C” Coy Gp due to the nature of the threat and terrain. If successful in their actions, the enemy would be pummelled and annihilated by precision guided munitions and indirect fire.
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