No Lack of Courage (4 page)

Not surprisingly, TF Orion conducted a large number of operations in Kandahar Province. “We were the ‘fire battalion' for the brigade,” quipped Captain Kevin Barry. “We would be sent out to put down a contact somewhere and would do it and then another fire would start up somewhere else and we would be sent there.”
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But ominously, the “troops-in-contact” (TICs) in the Pashmul area took on a ferocity that was foreboding.

Operation Mountain Thrust, mounted between 15 May and 31 July 2006, initiated the looming showdown. It was a major coalition offensive that spanned the five southern and several eastern provinces. “Operation Mountain Thrust,” explained Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber, the operations officer for the Multinational Brigade Headquarters (MNB HQ), “the precursor to NATO's Regional Command (South) (RC [S]) HQ, was [intended] to defeat the Taliban in their traditional areas.” The scope of the mission, he lamented, “was like digging a hole in the ocean—it was difficult to secure an area. Once an area was secure we hoped that
the ANA would [continue to] secure it—but once we left the Taliban filled back in.”
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Not only did the Taliban slip back in, but they did so in increasing numbers.

Nonetheless, the operation demonstrated 1 PPCLI BG's manoeuvrability and aggressive spirit. On numerous occasions the BG spun on its axis and responded to urgent calls for assistance. The task force certainly impressed their superiors. “To be able to turn a BG around in less than 12 hours and cover 160 kilometres through hostile territory in order to link up with the Afghan National Police and reinforce those district centres,” asserted the brigade commander, “that is no small feat and it showed great agility on the part of Task Force Orion.”
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The CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Hope boasted, “We demonstrated the capability of an all-arms force.” He added, “We have taken every task given to us, and proven that we can operate anywhere in southern Afghanistan, with anyone.”
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But the ability of the TF to conduct its operations with the speed and flexibility they demonstrated was due to their light armoured vehicle (LAV) III, 17 ton, eight-wheeled armoured personnel carriers, which were built in London, Ontario, by General Dynamics Land Systems. The approximately seven metres long and 2.81 metres high monsters entered CF service in 1999. The vehicles require a crew of three and carry seven soldiers with all their equipment. The powerful LAV has a top end speed of 100 kilometres per hour and a range of 500 kilometres. It was also heavily armed. The LAV boasts a 25 mm Bushmaster chain gun, a 7.62 mm general-purpose machine gun (GPMG), a 5.56 mm pintle-mounted machine gun, and eight smoke grenade launchers. The robust vehicle, called the “Dragon that shits white men” by the Taliban, also proved capable of repelling amazing amounts of enemy fire. Its sloped hull was designed to deflect the blast of mines and IEDs, saving numerous lives. In all, the vehicles have been proven capable of withstanding the punishing terrain, dust, and constant use of Afghan combat, and were held in the highest esteem and trust by the Canadian soldiers who use them.

Despite the TF's aggressive posture and fighting spirit, the situation did not improve. Between May and June there was an alarming increase in the number of TICs. In addition, the Taliban began to confiscate cellphones from local nationals as a counter-intelligence measure. They also
established plans for setting up checkpoints and moving into Kandahar City. On 30 June 2006, the task force received reports indicating that the Taliban were issuing night letters directing Afghan locals to leave the Panjwayi and Zhari areas immediately as Taliban elements were planning to engage GoA forces and CF elements.

The state of chaos and violence reached such levels that by June 2006 the Senlis Council reported, “In Kandahar, Canadian troops are fighting increasingly deadly counter-insurgency operations under Operation Enduring Freedom against the resurgent Taliban . . . Kandahar now is a war zone, with suicide bombings, rocket attacks, ambushes and repeated outbreaks of open warfare, resulting in numerous Canadian fatalities and many more injuries.”
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They concluded, “Kandahar is a province at war: there is no peace to keep.”
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Statistics backed their assertions. By June 2006, there was a “600 % increase in violent attacks in the last six months, and terrorism is now a pressing concern in Kandahar; the majority of terror attacks in Afghanistan occur in Kandahar and bordering provinces.”
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In July, due to the increasing Taliban presence and activity, Lieutenant-Colonel Hope developed a concept of operations in Pashmul to “disrupt the Taliban in Zhari District through concentration of combat power and isolation and clearance of objective Puma in the vicinity of the village of Pashmul.” He explained, “The clearance of Puma will be conducted by deliberate cordon and searches of areas assessed to contain Taliban and/or their caches based on previous intelligence and current HUMINT gained by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) partnered with TF Orion for this operation.”
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The Taliban, however, refused to go quietly. “Well we know we're heading into the shit now,” exclaimed Sergeant Mike Denine when he witnessed the procession of civilians fleeing the town with their meagre possessions.
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Captain Andrew Charchuk, the FOO for “C” Coy Group, 1 PPCLI, drew the same conclusion. “As we arrived closer to the objective area we saw the women and children pouring out of the town,” described Charchuk. “Not a good sign,” he added, describing that they “pushed on and about 3 kilometres from our intended line of departure to start the operation [at around 0030 hours] we were ambushed by Taliban
fighters . . . I saw about 20 RPGs [rocket-propelled grenades] all bursting in the air over the LAVs. It was an unreal scene to describe. There was no doubt we were in a big fight.”
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That contact initiated a larger sequence of events. The TF fought hard in the 50° Celsius heat in a running battle that lasted for days. As embedded reporter Christie Blatchford summarized, “July was a daily diet of long battles that went on for hours and stretched the battle group thin over six hundred kilometres in seven separate districts over some of the most treacherous terrain in Afghanistan.”
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By August, intelligence reports continued to paint a picture of ongoing Taliban activity, namely key leader engagements and increasing TICs, all of which indicated that the enemy was massing forces in the Panjwayi Valley. The Taliban focus on the area was not hard to understand. Panjwayi has always been critically important to the Taliban because it is a fertile, densely populated, and economically lucrative area. It has also been the traditional staging area for attacks against Kandahar City, as well as a resupply area for troops staging in Zhari District.

In addition, Kandahar Province and its capital, Kandahar City, have always been of interest to the Taliban because the region has consistently maintained a kind of autonomy from any of the various central governments in Kabul. It is also the second largest province in Afghanistan, located in the harsh, barren, desert environment of the volatile southeastern corner of the country. It is bounded on the north and northeast by the mountainous Uruzgan and Zabul Provinces and in the west by Helmand Province, and it shares a very porous 402 kilometre-long border with the Pakistan province of Baluchistan. Kandahar City is situated at the junction of Afghanistan's main highways and is the major southern link to Pakistan. In fact, the highway system passes from Spin Boldak on the Pakistan border, through Kandahar City to Kabul. Moreover, Kandahar was the birthplace and continues to be the heartland of the Taliban itself.

Kandahar had become the centre of gravity for the Government of Afghanistan and the coalition, as well as the Taliban, in the fight for the confidence and support of Afghans. As Lieutenant-Colonel Schreiber explained, “[We] began to develop Afghan development zones (ADZ) to
create a secure bubble around a nucleus where we could push resources and redevelopment (i.e., ink spot method)”
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These efforts were all part of the governance, security, and reconstruction strategy for rebuilding a modern Afghanistan. For the Taliban, victory in Kandahar Province would discredit the GoA and coalition forces in the eyes of Afghans. Consequently, “We were convinced that the Taliban were massing in Panjwayi to establish a permanent base of operations there, with a view to attacking Kandahar City,” confirmed Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Hope.
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And the Taliban was intent on winning. “The Taliban emptied Quetta and other centres to conduct offensive operations in Regional Command (RC) South in 2006,” confided Schreiber. “It was a window of opportunity for them as we focused on elections and the hand-over from U.S. control in Kandahar to NATO control as part of Stage 3 expansion.”
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The American and NATO focus on these activities provided the Taliban with an ideal opportunity to achieve success. “Our intelligence,” revealed Schreiber, “estimated that they [Taliban] brought in, as a minimum, 12,000 foot soldiers.”
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In early August continuing reports of major enemy activity and massing of troops triggered yet another coalition foray into the area. On 3 August 2006, Lieutenant-Colonel Hope and his BG found themselves in the Pashmul/Panjwayi area once again.

The day started ominously. In the inky darkness of pre-dawn the lead assault platoon snaked its way silently through a wadi, using thermal sights. The objective was a bazaar comprised of eight to 12 buildings. Suddenly the assault platoon opened a concentrated fire shattering the early morning calm. They had identified Taliban fighters in early warning positions a scant 150 metres from their vehicles. As they rolled forward in their LAV IIIs, the lead vehicle struck a pressure-plate-activated improvised explosive device (IED) killing two of the soldiers inside. Evidence indicated additional IEDs, half-buried in the soft ground, covered the restricted axis of advance, leading to a narrow bridge that was surrounded by fighting positions.

“The enemy had emplaced five IEDs along a 100-metre stretch of road coming out of the wadi and up to a short bridge crossing a small canal,” described Lieutenant-Colonel Hope. “This was heavily canalized
terrain. The thick mud walls on the sides of the narrow roads had been loop-holed so that the enemy could fire upon us from multiple directions without exposing themselves.”
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In addition, numerous irrigation ditches (four to six feet deep, most covered with grass) provided even more cover for the enemy.

The task force plan was amended and a dismounted approach in conjunction with the ANSF was undertaken. Quickly, TF Orion soldiers advanced and seized a schoolhouse. In the process they had unknowingly sprung a Taliban trap. The Canadian soldiers soon found themselves hammered from three sides as the Taliban quickly tried to seize the opportunity to kill and capture them. “You know, I wouldn't say it was farmers dropping their shovels by the way they operated,” reminisced Master-Corporal Matthew Parsons. “They knew tactics, they knew how to get on our flanks, they knew how to use fire and manoeuvre.” Parsons concluded, “They were smart, they were a smart crew.”
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Another soldier noted, “These guys [enemy] know what they're doing. They know how to ambush, they know fire and movement. They know everything we do.”
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It had become apparent to these Canadian veterans of southern Afghanistan that the Taliban they were now fighting were different, more tenacious and experienced, than those they had fought on and off all summer in Panjwayi.

Hope recalled, “We trained ourselves to hold and fix the enemy with whatever we could bring in, including artillery as close as 100 metres . . . we resisted the tendency to withdraw back to last safe place.” The commanding officer shrugged, “You could drop as much ordnance as you wanted [but] in the end to finish the enemy you had to walk the ground—it was always a close quarter fight . . . Finishing the enemy was difficult. They [Taliban] were very good at slipping away.”
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But that day the Taliban had no intention of leaving. The fight became desperate. One soldier described it “as a well-planned ambush.” He recounted how stealthy Taliban forces formed a horseshoe around Canadian troops holed up in the tiny schoolhouse, surrounded by land mines, then launched a volley of rocket-propelled grenades. As the soldier poked his head out of a doorway a grenade swished by him and scorched his forearm. He turned to watch the grenade strike a wall; the
ensuing spray of shrapnel killed three of his comrades. “They were too organized,” asserted the soldier, “we had to pull back.”
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Another participant, Sergeant Patrick Towers, later acknowledged that the Taliban were determined to win and fought bravely.

Sergeant Towers was not the only one to have underestimated the enemy. The Taliban, conceded Brigadier-General David Fraser, the ISAF MNB Commander, “was more sophisticated at what he was doing than we had originally thought.”
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