France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (81 page)

In France and Great Britain purely political considerations had the opposite effect; from the viewpoint of the navy it was best to immediately take security measures at sea that could include acts of war. On land it was obvious that operations could not start for some time and that the declaration of war, being rather platonic at first, it was therefore preferable to ensure the protection of convoys, communications junctions, the evacuation of women and children from any surprise from the air and allow our troop concentrations to progress.
⁹¹

Corbin faced up to the anti-French wave that was developing and spoke with Sir John Simon and Churchill. He had to “be very aloof” with some journalists. Around fifteen minutes past midnight Corbin was summoned to number 10 Downing Street following the Cabinet meeting. He was told that on the 3rd, at 9 a.m., Henderson would be instructed to inform Ribbentrop that if England did not receive a satisfactory answer within two hours, it would be war. The timing was dictated by the session at the House of Commons. Halifax wished, should a simultaneous action not take place, that France undertake a similar initiative at noon.

Georges Bonnet, now reconciled, cabled Coulondre at midnight, asking him to take the steps with the Wilhelmstrasse on Thursday September 3 at noon (three hours after the British). Then at 10:20 a.m. on September 3 he explained that this step was intended to say that the French government, not having received an answer to its communication of September 1, was now compelled “to fulfill its commitments, as of today September 3 at 5 p.m., that France had with Poland, which are known to the German government.”
⁹²
Coulondre had phoned the Quai d’Orsay between those two cables to ask him to explain some points and had spoken with Léger. Bonnet explained his plan to him verbally at that time.

Coulondre had a lot of difficulties in securing an appointment. Ribbentrop could only see him after twelve noon; he demanded to meet with State Secretary von Weizsäcker. At 12:30 p.m. he was received by Ribbentrop himself at the Reich Chancellery. Judging that his answer was negative, the ambassador then made the prescribed declaration. “Well
then!” answered Ribbentrop in a toneless voice, “France will be the aggressor.” “History will judge,” I told him, and withdrew. Mr. von Weizsäcker, who was present, shook my hand at length. I had not attempted to shake hands with Ribbentrop. We looked into each other’s eyes. Even better than if he were speaking, I knew he was saying: I did not want this.”
⁹³

The fact that France went to war at a bad time and in adverse conditions is a fact that subsequent events would prove. That, following Munich, there was still time to disengage from the Polish alliance was not at all certain. The fact that France at the time, as we have shown, followed the “British line” seems obvious as most politicians of the time accepted. That the British, after years of often blind
appeasement
, finally took a firm stance appeared to meet with the wishes of the French. The final attempt by Georges Bonnet at the beginning of September 1939, therefore, appears futile. On two occasions he tried to avoid war despite the German aggression against Poland: 1) By encouraging Ciano on September 1 to pursue his conference project in spite of the fact that on August 31 the French government had deliberated before the aggression; and 2) On September 2 by trying to delay the ultimatum by forty-eight hours. It was the firm attitude of the British cabinet, encouraged by the House of Commons, that during the night of the 2nd to the 3rd led Ciano to give up and Bonnet to end his initiatives.

At 5 p.m. France was at war. Notwithstanding what was said later the French people were sad, yes, but determined. A volume to follow will show what happened to the millions of men that Gamelin wished to keep disengaged. It should be said that for this peaceful people war itself was a first defeat.

* * * *

As an afterword to this volume I shall quote Montesquieu in Chapter XVIII of
Grandeur et décadence des Romains
:

There are general causes whether moral or physical at work in every monarchy, elevating, maintaining or knocking it down; all the accidents are subjected to those causes; and if the fate of a battle, meaning a particular cause, destroyed a State, there existed a more general cause to have that State perish in the course of a single battle.

A
BBREVIATIONS

N
OTES

Important note:
The current status of the French archives that are being reconstituted and reorganized makes it impossible to have a separate presentation of the sources. As the collection nears completion, a special volume with sources and bibliography will be published. We therefore invite the reader to consult the notes below to trace the sources of the articles and books used.
The asterisk (*) indicates the first mention of a book or article
.

I
NTRODUCTION

    
1
.
    
His main publications are:
From Wilson to Roosevelt: Foreign Policy of the United States, 1913–1945
(translation of
De Wilson à Roosevelt: politique étrangère des États-Unis, 1913–1945
) trans. by Nancy Lynn Roelker (London: Chatto and Windus 1964);
France and the United States: From the Beginnings to the Present
(translation of
La France et les États-Unis des origines à nos jours
, Paris: Seuil 1976) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978;
Le Conflit de Trieste 1943–1954
(Brussels 1966);
Itinéraires: Idées, Hommes et Nations d’Occident xix–xx siècles
(Paris 1991);
La Grande Guerre des Français 1914-1918
(Paris: Perrin 1994);
L’Europe, histoire de ses Peuples
(Paris: Perrin 1990);
Clemenceau
(Paris: Fayard 1988);
Histoire diplomatique de 1919 à nos jours
(Paris: Dalloz, 10ed 1990);
Introduction to the History of International Relations
, with Pierre Renouvin, trans. by Mary Ilford (London: Pall Hall 1968);
L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours: vie politique et relations internationales
(Paris: PUF 1964);
La France et les Français, 1914–1920
, 2 vols (Paris 1973);
Tout Empire périra :une vision théorique des relations internationales
(Paris 1981);
L’Abîme
, 1939–1945 (Paris 1982).

    
2
.
    
Cited in G. M.Young,
Victorian England: Portrait of an Age
(New York 1954), 155.

    
3
.
    
J. B. Duroselle, “L’Histoire des relations internationales vue par un historien,”
Relations internationales
, 83, automne 1995, 296.

    
4
.
    
Histoire des relations internationales
, tome 1 (Paris 1953) Introduction générale, (Paris 1953) xv.

    
5
.
    
Two standard texts published in the 1980s showed no awareness either of Annales or Renouvin’s
Histoire des relations internationales
: F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen,
The Great Powers and the European State System, 1815–1914
(London: Longman 1980); Graham Ross,
The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System 1914–1945
(London: Longman 1983)

    
6
.
    
Introduction to the History of International Relations
(London, 1968, viii).

    
7
.
    
Relations internationales
, 83, automne 1995, 278.

    
8
.
    
With two exceptions: Anthony Adamthwaite,
France and the Coming of the Second World War
(London: Frank Cass 1977) and Robert J.Young,
In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning 1933–1939
(1978). For my own work Renouvin allowed me advance access to the documents selected for publication in the series
Documents diplomatiques français 1932–1939
.

    
9
.
    
France and the Nazi Threat
, 20.

  
10
.
    
Marc Bloch,
Strange Defeat
(New York: Norton & Company 1968), ix.

  
11
.
    
France and the Nazi Threat
, 358.

  
12
.
    
O. H. Bullitt (ed.),
For the President: Personal and Secret
(London 1973), 308–10.

  
13
.
    
Documents diplomatiques français 1932-1939, 2 série, t
. xiv, no. 248.

  
14
.
    
For strategy, intelligence and the mesentente cordiale see Martin S. Alexander,
The Republic in Danger: General Maurice Gamelin and the Politics of French Defense 1933–1940
(1992); Peter Jackson,
France and the Nazi Menace: Intelligence and Policy Making 1933–1939
(Oxford 2000); Martin Thomas,
Britain, France and Appeasement
(Berg 1996); Elisabeth Du Réau,
Édouard Daladier 1984–1970
(1993).

  
15
.
    
Robert Young, 3, 150.

  
16
.
    
France and the Nazi Threat
, 20.

  
17
.
    
For this approach see Anthony Adamthwaite,
Grandeur and Misery: France’s Bid for Power in Europe 1914–1940
(London Arnold 1995).

  
18
.
    
Valentine Lawford,
Bound for Diplomacy
(London 1963), 267–8.

  
19
.
    
Georges Bonnet,
Dans La Tourmente
(Paris 1971), 66–7.

P
REFACE

    
1
.
    
Le Temps
, 22 septembre 1931, quoted by Sauvy (Alfred),
Histoire économique de la France entre les deux guerres
, 1965-1972, Vol. II, p. 17.

    
2
.
    
*Sauvy, op. cit., Vol. I. p. 119.

    
3
.
    
Ibid., Vol. II, p. 28.

    
4
.
    
*Sieburg, Heinz Otto,
Deutschland und Frankreich in der Geschichtsschreibung des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts
, 2 Vols., 1954 and 1958.

    
5
.
    
*De Gaulle, General Charles,
Mémoires de guerre
, 1954–1959, Vol. I,
L’Appel
, p. 1.

    
6
.
    
See for instance *Olle-Laprune, Jacques,
La stabilité des ministres sous la Troisième République
, 1962.

    
7
.
    
*Nicolson, Harold,
Journal des années tragiques
(1936–1942), French translation, p. 227: English edition,
The War Years: 1939
–
1945, vol. 2, Diaries and Letters
(New York: 1967), p. 79.

    
8
.
    
*Herriot, Édouard,
Jadis
, 1952, Vol. II, p. 440.

    
9
.
    
Ibid., pp. 465–467.

  
10
.
    
Blum, Léon,
A l’échelle humaine
, 1946, p. 95.

  
11
.
    
*Bariéty, Jacques,
Les relations franco-allemandes après la première guerre mondiale
, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1977.