France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (77 page)

In the
Channel
the system called for a very close Franco-British collaboration. The British would place mines in the waters of the Pas-de-Calais.

In the
North Atlantic
the fear of German submarines had not yet appeared. Hitler had not shown much interest and there were only 22 able to patrol the ocean. On the other hand, there could be destructive raids by surface ships. It was decided that France would watch the area—Ouessant-Azores—Cabo Verde Islands (based in Brest). The British would be based in Halifax, the Antilles, Plymouth, and possibly Dakar. The British would be escorting most of the convoys.

The western Mediterranean was set aside for the French navy (its advantage in strength over Italy was 1.25 to 1). But some kind of British collaboration was necessary. Gibraltar was almost depleted. The British fleet would be based at Malta and Alexandria. Admirals Connigham and Ollive met in Malta on July 27 and 28 and decided to “coordinate” their operations in a flexible manner.

Elsewhere a defensive posture would prevail. In the Red Sea or in the Far East, in case of war against Japan, the bulk of forces would fall back to Indochina and Malaysia, practically abandoning Hong Kong.

On August 8, 1939, Fleet Admiral Darlan and Admiral Dudley Pound met at Portsmouth on board the
Enchantress
.
⁸⁷
They agreed to the final details. It should be pointed out that Darlan wanted a preventive operation against Spain through the conquest of Spanish Morocco, but Dudley
Pound was against it, just as he opposed a French proposal that had been discussed with the Turks to send a French division to Salonika in order to “be ahead of the Axis in the Balkans.”

Finally, as Reussner
⁸⁸
concluded, “the Mediterranean was a secondary theater within British strategy…And on the eve of war, while Franco-British naval discussions achieved complete success in dividing operational zones and naval responsibilities, an agreement on strategy was still far from being reached.”

Finally we should mention relations with two neighboring countries that were potential passageways for Germany, namely Switzerland and Belgium.

Strangely enough,
Switzerland
, a country that was voluntarily and legally neutral, wanted to reach an understanding with the French.
⁸⁹
Thanks to the military attaché Colonel de La Foirest-Divonne, there were ongoing conversations regarding international constraints preventing France from fortifying the region near Huningue and Basel. After that unofficial discussions on possible cooperation could take place. There were meetings among officers as early as 1937. The press was openly mentioning the issue. The high point came on July 31, 1939, when Colonel Petitpierre, representing Corps Commander Colonel Guisan met secretly with Gamelin in Paris. Petitpierre presented what the Swiss wanted: the immediate intervention by the French army, reinforcements in artillery, air force, and liaison between the two armies. Technical agreements were reached and the entire matter would remain completely secret.

However, where
Belgium
was concerned, due to internal politics and also the fear of “provoking” Germany, there were no staff talks, even in secret, from 1936 to September 1939. During the meeting of the chiefs of the general staff that took place on April 22, the Belgian issue was discussed:
⁹⁰
“General Gamelin upheld his previous viewpoint. It would be absurd to engage the French army piecemeal in a type of battle amounting to a frontal clash.” In other words, nothing would be done if the Belgians do not request it. If they do call, two possibilities should be considered: 1. They do it in time. Then we move behind the Belgian deployment “ready to shore it up should it threaten to break;” 2. They call us too late. In that case we occupy the Escaut with major forces because it is the only position after the Albert Canal.

It so happened that General Weygand enjoyed a good relationship with Belgian Minister Devèze. Was it through him that a liaison was established?
⁹¹
In any case, “the head of the Belgian general staff asked
whether we were still thinking along the lines of the previous agreement.” We answered yes but on condition that the Belgian call came before Belgium was attacked.

Clearly the ambiguity remained—on the defensive but with a planned movement into Belgium. Nothing was certain should the Belgians not call but in any case there would be no extension of the Maginot Line.

4.

T
OWARD A
U
NIFIED
C
OMMAND
?

Gamelin’s greatest dream was to establish in advance what took four years to achieve during the First World War, namely a commander in chief of the allied forces. But it would not have been in character for him to strongly request it.

The initial idea was of a permanent organization. At a meeting of the heads of the general staff on June 16, 1939, Gamelin brought up a recent conversation he had with Admiral Lord Chatfield. The British, he said, were not too far removed from wanting to revive the Versailles “High Military Committee” in other words, the body made up of political and military leaders to which Foch reported.
⁹²

Three weeks later, on July 13, General Gort, the British army chief of the general staff, met with Gamelin who explained the French organizational structure to him, his own role as coordinator of defense and commander in chief of the army and with General Georges, the commander of the armies in the northeast, reporting to him.
⁹³

Was it a follow-up to this meeting? In any case, on July 26 Chamberlain wrote to Daladier offering the immediate creation of an “Interallied General Staff.” To discuss this he would send General Ismay to Paris on July 29. Later a “Supreme War Council” would be set up similar to that of 1917–1918. But it would not be created before the beginning of hostilities. It could be located either in France or England; but the General Staff would have a fixed location in England.
⁹⁴

Daladier forwarded that letter to the Army High Command, which offered its opinion that a single command of operations was required as of July 28. A “Supreme War Council” should be created; that was “a government matter”—Gamelin liked to clearly divide responsibilities. But a “commander in chief of interallied forces” with a staff was required.
The headquarters were to be in France. There was an “
obvious advantage that the Chief of Staff of the Interallied forces would be the general chief of staff of French national defense
.” [Emphasis added.] Obviously, but let’s not get ahead of ourselves! We should assemble staff officers in Paris; draw up in peacetime initial operational plans. Later on there would always be time.
⁹⁵
On August 1 during a new meeting of chiefs of the general staff, Gamelin quoted the letter from Chamberlain, whom, he said, was confusing the “general direction of the war” and the “supreme conduct of operations.” He rejected the Interallied High Command and proposed a simple committee of military studies to which “top level leaders” would purposefully not be appointed. We should note that Darlan was not for it. Regarding the “Supreme War Council” Darlan wanted it to include the commanders in chief because he said “in time of war, the ministers of national defense are only order carriers.”
⁹⁶

Having received these opinions Daladier answered Chamberlain on August 3.
⁹⁷
He retained the idea of a “Supreme War Council” meeting alternately in France and in England. On the other hand he rejected the immediate creation of a High Command. Without revealing Gamelin’s ambitions regarding the
command
, he adopted his idea of a sort of “Interallied Military Studies Committee” that would meet in peacetime with the mission of creating the wartime organizations, to prepare external fronts, elaborate common plans, and—which was eloquent enough—to organize interallied theaters of operations. Gamelin had also discussed it with Ismay when he came to Paris.

Until the beginning of the war, matters would go no further. In any case, would we not force Germany into a long war? On this, as on other points, Gamelin thought that time was on his side.

Chapter XV

T
OWARD THE
I
NESCAPABLE
C
ONCLUSION

August 22–September 3, 1939

“T
he bogeyman will deflate,” as poet and diplomat Paul Claudel wrote in
Le Figaro
as late as August 18, proving to be neither much of a poet nor a diplomat on that occasion.

From August 22 onward even the most optimistic Frenchmen lost whatever high hopes they still had. The about-face by the USSR made even the thickest minds understand that this was giving Hitler license to attack Poland. It took a strong faith to say, like Aragon in
Ce soir
or
L’Humanité
, that this was a grand gesture toward peace. Many people suspected, and rightly so, that there was some kind of secret agreement, a promise for the partition of Poland.
¹

However, the idea of a Hitlerian “bluff” had not completely disappeared. France, which had paraded the most impressive army in the world on July 14, and England, the rich and all-powerful ruler of the sea, both displayed their cold resolve. Would anyone attempt to take action against such a coalition? On the other hand, it would take Hitler a long time to understand that the two decadent democracies were not about to agree to a new Munich.
²

1.

F
RANCE
R
EMAINS
P
ASSIVE
(August 23–31, 1939)

During the eight days following the German-Soviet pact French diplomacy, interestingly enough, appears to be one of the most passive in Europe.

England
was intensely active. Its position was absolutely firm and made sure that this was clearly understood. Sir Nevile Henderson in Berlin and Sir Percy Lorraine in Rome were in the limelight. They excluded the idea of a “conference” that was on everyone’s mind since Munich. British policy was completely oriented toward what seemed to be the final opportunity for peace, namely, direct German-Polish negotiations.

Italy
took a realistic position. Italian diplomatic documents
³
show, 1) During his conversations on August 12 in Salzburg and Berchtesgaden with Ribbentrop and Hitler, Ciano understood that the latter had decided on war;
⁴
2) That Ciano—as opposed to Hitler until August 23—was absolutely convinced that England and France were not bluffing; 3) That Mussolini, knowing that Italy was not ready, was concentrating all his efforts at getting out of the Pact of Steel (his first letter to Hitler on that subject was dated August 21);
⁵
4) That as of August 17 the Italians knew that Ribbentrop was going to sign an agreement in Moscow.
⁶

Poland
, despite warnings from England and France, continued to declare that it would make no concessions and would rather go to war. It was also known that Poland refused any change to Pilsudsky’s doctrine, to never under any circumstances grant passage to the Red Army. But was that an absolute certainty?

In France, more than in England, there was a lingering doubt that could be used by the pacifists. Going to war to help Poland was fine. But to go to war because the Poles considered that the forced seizure of Danzig was a
casus belli
seemed to be too much, especially if the Poles deep down were ready to make some sacrifices
⁷
that they would only reveal at the very last minute.

This made Ambassador Léon Noël’s position particularly uncomfortable. He had to assemble a huge amount of data relating to Polish military forces, the movements of German troops, the incidents in Danzig, and the alleged persecutions of the German minority created by Goebbels’
propaganda. With the assistance of military attaché General Musse, he transmitted detailed information on a daily basis. He noted the admirable calm of the population, the gallantry of the soldiers but also the dramatic lack of modern equipment. Like the other ambassadors, he had little information concerning France’s true strength, or potential military plans to bring help to the Poles. He could see the huge danger looming and the month of August went by for him in a kind of “breathless anxiety.”
⁸

The worse part was that he had to deal with the Polish government and Colonel Beck, whom he had never trusted. His instructions from Bonnet were to “moderate” the Poles, to tone down their uncompromising attitude, to encourage them not to take excessively provocative mobilization measures, but Beck’s proud confidence was enough to drive him crazy. When he met with Beck on August 22, immediately following Ribbentrop’s trip to Moscow, he found him to be “very calm.” “For him materially, nothing had changed”—that prompted Daladier or one of his staff to note on Noël’s cable: “Stupid tactics by Poland.”
⁹
The French ambassador found Beck’s display of confidence irritating. For example, Beck could not believe that the dangerous time would come at the end of August. Using the pattern of 1938 he felt it would be at the end of September.
¹⁰
He therefore tended to delay mobilization measures beyond the limit. But Léon Noël’s instructions did not allow him to exert pressure.

An initial mobilization had taken place in the spring. It was only on August 23 that more reservists were called up;
¹¹
then on the night between August 27–28 Poland was placed on war alert.
¹²
General mobilization would be seriously impaired by the start of the war.