France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (54 page)

A first blow came as early as February 20, when Anthony Eden resigned from the Foreign Office. Corbin was aware of the fact that the disagreement stemmed from Chamberlain’s desire to negotiate a “gentleman’s agreement” with Italy.
¹⁴

Eden was much more concerned than Chamberlain about events in Austria and, furthermore, had an excellent relationship with Delbos, who was disheartened by his British colleague’s departure and was thinking of resigning himself.
¹⁵
Lord Halifax, the new head of the Foreign Office, was one of the big four of
appeasement
along with Chamberlain, Sir John Simon and Sir Samuel Hoare.
¹⁶
Even without Halifax at foreign affairs it was easy to predict that the French proposal would not succeed in London, where working in concert with France was strongly disliked and unilateral initiatives were preferred. This was in fact the meaning of the British reply of February 25: How could Germany be threatened with “just words” that weren’t followed by any action? Should Schuschnigg find out he “would have increased hope for French and British military help that will not take place.” His Majesty’s government wanted to pursue broad negotiations with the German government regarding central Europe…as well as disarmament. These would naturally be unilateral initiatives.
¹⁷

One could only accept the situation with resignation. A foreign policy debate took place in the Chamber the next day. Delbos, according to British journalist Werth,
¹⁸
“tired and disappointed,” again expressed his apprehension about Austria and France’s commitment to the alliance with Czechoslovakia. The government won by a vote of 438 in favor to 2 opposed and 163 abstentions.

Two weeks later a very weakened Chautemps government, which had requested full powers, resigned on its own.
¹⁹
It was March 10, 1938.

In fact, independently from any French involvement, Schuschnigg announced on March 9 that a plebiscite would take place in Austria to confirm the country’s desire to remain independent. It is also a matter of record that during the dramatic day of March 11 a series of German ultimatums forced Schusschnigg to cancel the plebiscite. There was no French reaction since, as chance would have it, the country was without a government, President Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart as chancellor and then proceeded with an appeal to the Germans who entered Vienna on March 12. It was the Anschluss.

By the hour Puaux kept Delbos informed of those happenings. It was only as of 9:15 p.m. by phone and at 10:25 p.m. by telegram that Delbos issued instructions to François-Poncet along the same lines “in
concert with your British colleague join the initiative he has been ordered to take.”
²⁰
The initiative in question was naturally taken unilaterally. The idea was “to protest in the strongest terms against such coercive methods based on the use of force.” Such action could “have the most serious consequences.” Halifax added, “I am informing the French government of this protest in case it wishes to do the same.”
²¹

François-Poncet therefore undertook a “parallel” initiative rather than a concerted effort by a letter to the Wilhelmstrasse dated March 12 at 11 a.m. He simply restated the language of the British note. As for British Ambassador Nevile Henderson, that night at 11 p.m. he was attending a party hosted by Göring.
²²
Mrs. Dollfuss, the former chancellor’s widow, was able to leave Austria on March 12 with the help of French Minister Puaux. Schuschnigg, on the other hand, became a prisoner.
²³

On the evening of March 12 Delbos sent a telegram to all the major diplomatic representations explaining the background of his actions, not forgetting to mention Britain’s refusal of any concerted efforts. “The situation we must face from now on is no doubt serious; but it doesn’t mean anyone should panic.” No obligations toward Austria existed. However, “the situation would be entirely different the day German expansion were to attack the independence or the very existence of countries having special agreements with us.” In the final analysis “the first task of the next government will be to persuade England—whom we hope has learned from these events—to lend its support to our efforts without the reservations it has displayed until now.”
²⁴

That was to be Delbos’ testament. He was not wrong. But the British call that “wishful thinking.”
*

2.

T
HE
F
INAL
R
EACTION OF THE
P
OPULAR
F
RONT

Since January 1938 the idea took hold to create a “National Union” government. But what kind of union? A total one “from Thorez to Louis Marin?” A partial one “from Blum to Reynaud?” The right wanted no part of it. Léon Blum, designated by President Lebrun to form a government, plus the majority of the Socialist Party and many radicals,
supported that possibility. In the end Blum decided to form a Popular Front cabinet with the support of the communists but not their participation. A growing number of radicals like Georges Bonnet and Marchandeau were increasingly distancing themselves from the Popular Front. The cabinet—as it was quickly known—was destined to be fragile. Yvon Delbos, now totally discouraged, refused to join it. Blum offered the Quai d’Orsay to Paul-Boncour. Daladier was remaining at National Defense.

Blum historians have all remarked on the originality of this government. With Georges Boris and Pierre Mendès-France, Blum was very much determined to go firmly in the direction of a controlled and “left-leaning” economy. He was planning to tax capital and perhaps to impose exchange controls.
²⁵
He was to fail in the Senate on precisely that program.

As Paul-Boncour said, there existed without a doubt a strong spirit of “resistance” in France in the foreign policy area examined in this book. Despite the fact that the Blum cabinet was short-lived, we shall devote a few words to its policy since it differed from that of Delbos and soon with Georges Bonnet’s.

Following the disaster represented by the Anschluss that Hitler accomplished so easily, France had to take stock and prepare for the future. Paul-Boncour called for
²⁶
a meeting as early as March 15 of the Permanent Committee of National Defense, chaired by Daladier as minister of national defense and war along with the ministers of the two other branches of the armed forces, the chiefs of the general staff and their deputies, Pétain, and Controller General Jacomet with Léon Blum, Paul-Boncour, and Alexis Léger as guests.
²⁷

Few illusions were possible. The superiority of the German army—with the additional Austrian divisions—was obvious:
²⁸
900,000 men versus 400,000, according to Gamelin. The confident optimism of Pierre Cot in December 1937 regarding the air force was replaced by dire pessimism. A legitimate reason for the British to reject a very firm position was their estimation of the weakness of the French air force.
²⁹
Gamelin was so acutely aware of the fact that he annotated in his own hand a document of March 16, “Regarding the current weakness of our air force I feel there is no reason to admit as much to England.”
³⁰
The deep changes that took place on February 4 within the German high command—the “sacking” of Generals von Blomberg and von Fritsch, making Hitler commander in chief and the Armed Forces High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht—OKW) now being headed by pro-Nazi General Keitel—
all consolidated the German command structure. That same day the Nazi Joachim von Ribbentrop replaced Konstantin von Neurath at foreign affairs as previously mentioned.

On March 14 and 15 Gamelin had himself written notes regarding the general conduct of the land war. It was now obvious that since the Belgians refused to open their territory, an offensive toward Germany was no longer possible.
³¹
“France alone, if she can still hope to effectively defend its metropolitan territory and her African empire, can only engage in a victorious war through
alliances
. More than ever it becomes absolutely necessary to have England and Poland on our side; then the Little Entente reinforced by the Balkan Entente.” The total incompatibility between a
diplomacy
of smaller alliances and a defensive
strategy
had still not dawned on General Gamelin. Lord Halifax, whom most observers fail to credit with any earth-shaking vision, appears much more realistic. “Of course,” wrote Corbin, “he is stubbornly convinced that shows of strength can only accelerate the conflict rather than dampen it.”
³²
He prefers “to spare no effort to help erase the causes for friction.”
³³
He felt that the smaller allies were a burden more than a help and in the impeccably courteous manner of the Foreign Office asks by which method the French would act to help Czechoslovakia: “It is…an issue His Majesty’s government has thought about and cannot deny that the conclusions it has reached are far from being encouraging.”
³⁴

All these and other issues were examined at the March 15 meeting. Daladier concluded that no direct help could be given to Czechoslovakia. Léon Blum felt that Russia would step in. However, Gamelin and Vuillemin, who displayed nothing but contempt for the Red Army, were also asking about an issue that would reappear over and over again in 1938 and 1939: Where would Soviet troops transit since neither Poland nor Romania—which had a defective and hardly usable railway system—wanted any such transit?

The situation therefore was that: 1) France had promised to help its ally Czechoslovakia—as Paul-Boncour clearly told Czech minister Osusky on March 14;
³⁵
2) France could do almost nothing militarily by itself; 3) England was clearly refusing to commit itself to helping France in a war it would enter in order to help Czechoslovakia; and 4) The role played by the USSR remained unclear in such a venture. The latter did propose a coalition of countries opposed to aggression but it was an indirect proposal made by Litvinov in a statement released to the press on March 17. Given the thinking in the west, it did not stand a chance.
³⁶

During the short month he spent at the Quai d’Orsay, Paul-Boncour was actively engaged in every effort. The best-known event was the conference he held on April 5 with the ambassadors and French ministers posted in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania.
³⁷
The conclusions were disappointing, especially regarding Poland. Léon Noël was convinced Poland would not help Czechoslovakia—which it hated—in the event of a German attack.

Two entangled issues were still open. Blum had reluctantly backed non-intervention in Spain. Paul-Boncour had always opposed it and felt that the Quai d’Orsay had failed to give enough credit to loyalist Spain.
³⁸
This was due to Delbos and the “ridiculous committee” in London. Could this be reversed? On March 15 at the Permanent Committee of National Defense, Blum and Paul-Boncour posed the question of an ultimatum to Franco or an operation on Spanish Morocco or the Balearic Islands. These were only questions. Gamelin and Admiral Darlan protested that this was impossible. Alexis Léger said it would be a
casus belli
for Germany and Italy. The discussion ended then and there.

But there was a leak, about which Paul-Boncour would file a complaint. Some newspapers printed a story announcing that France was about to intervene. News reporters rushed to the border on the Pyrenees to watch the invasion; Minister of the Interior Marx Dormoy was nervous. The German and Italian newspapers were incensed; British ambassador Sir Eric Phipps was upset. It became very difficult to prove that nothing was going on.
³⁹
In any case on March 10 the nationalists undertook a victorious offensive in Aragon. It took all the energy of Spanish Prime Minister Juan Negrin, who shuffled his cabinet and got rid of the “defeatists,” to stop the disintegration. The Spanish republican territories were cut in two.

The Anglo-Italian negotiations were the other issue. Paul-Boncour wanted a similar rapprochement with Italy. Could she possibly be separated from Germany? Every dispatch from Blondel, the chargé d’affaires in Rome, showed that Italian public opinion was furious about the Anschluss and that Mussolini was the only one making a show of agreeing to it. The British also wished that a Franco-Italian agreement follow the Anglo-Italian one. In their own way the British preferred to have direct negotiations and did not want France to be involved—for other reasons Ciano didn’t want it either. But they were careful to keep the Quai d’Orsay well informed. Everything was linked to recognizing the conquest of Ethiopia. Paul-Boncour wanted to begin negotiations as soon as
the British had finished.
⁴⁰
Massigli also agreed.
⁴¹
But then the Blum government fell on April 10.

Edouard Daladier, the leader of the radical-socialists, appeared as best suited because of his centrist position to form a government that would expand further to the right without the communists—whom he hated. The socialists refused to take part; the communists supported him at first. He simply added to a radical majority a few representatives of the moderate right, namely Paul Reynaud and Georges Mandel. This was not quite the official end of the Popular Front, but it was very close at hand. National defense overshadowed every other issue. Daladier was defense minister since June 1936 and no one was complaining about his performance. He had an excellent reputation for being dedicated and energetic.

Paul-Boncour was hoping to keep foreign affairs. He recorded his meeting with Daladier on April 10 in dramatic terms. “Your position towards Czechoslovakia has people worried,” said Daladier. Paul-Boncour explained his position, saying that they must be firm. Daladier, who as a man was “in good faith,” hesitated, then answered, “I’ve thought it over: the policies you have outlined are fine, worthy of France, but I don’t think we can carry them out. I shall take Georges Bonnet.” If this anecdote recounted by the former minister many years later is correct, it means that Daladier had decided in advance to seek a compromise because, as Paul-Boncour added, that Georges Bonnet, whom he thought of as “keenly intelligent, who kept his cool…had tactfully and discreetly opposed the policy of resistance that I had pursued.”
⁴²