France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (56 page)

At this point Hitler came to Rome to pay a state visit to Mussolini from May 5 to 9. As early as May 14, Mussolini gave a speech in Genoa using a “particularly harsh tone” meant to cut off the conversations with France: “I don’t know if they will reach a conclusion because in a very contemporary event such as the war in Spain we are on opposite sides of the fence.” And Stresa in any case was “dead and buried.”
⁷⁰

France was therefore quite isolated. It was best, in the French minister’s view, to avoid taking any strong initiatives and let the British forge ahead. Did London want a French initiative in Prague? France would certainly proceed.
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Did the British wish to send observers to the Sudetenland? Fine, France would then abstain from doing so.

On the same July 20 when Bonnet told Osusky rather roughly that France would
in no way
help Czechoslovakia, he and Daladier met Lord Halifax. “Confidentially, Lord Halifax announced that he had just sent Beneš a note asking the Czechoslovak government to accept the good offices of Lord Runciman.” We underscore: Lord Halifax “announces” an initiative. He was not asking the French whether or not they agreed to it.
England was running the whole show
, with France following rather far behind. Was it in the hope that the British would get caught in a trap of their own making?
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4.

P
RELIMINARIES TO THE
G
REAT
C
RISIS

France continued to play a passive role until Hitler’s Nuremberg speech on September 12, 1938. The statement by Deputy Director of Political Affairs Charvériat at a weekly liaison meeting on August 3, describes it like this: “We must wait for the results of the Runciman mission.”
⁷³
In fact, through the vigilant activity of the diplomats at their posts, above all Lacroix and François-Poncet, the Quai d’Orsay was able to form a broad opinion regarding the situation. There are no instructions from Paris to be found if only to encourage the Czechoslovaks to caution and to make
rapid concessions.
⁷⁴
As usual the British were late in providing the French with precise information regarding the recommendations coming from their envoy. The first official note was dated August 30.
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Whatever Paris knew came from meetings between Runciman and Lacroix;
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the confidential conversations with Beneš
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or Prime Minister Hodza.
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There were to be no initiatives taken by Prime Minister Daladier during the month of August. On July 12 at the Provencaux’ banquet in Paris he had mentioned the May crisis and its resolution, “thanks to the good will and peaceful determination of Great Britain, of France, and also of Germany.” He had taken the opportunity to reiterate that France would remain faithful to its commitments.
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He gave another speech on radio on August 21 addressing public opinion. He justified the exceptions to the 40-hour work law in the face of German armaments. Otherwise, he was waiting.

French ambassador to Berlin François-Poncet and his military attaché, General Renondeau, were both fervently scrutinizing all the signs whereby they could detect German intentions. While greatly exaggerating the moral victory of the western countries during the pseudo-crisis of May 21 and predicting, as he had been constantly since 1935, the worst kind of economic collapse for Germany if it went to war, the ambassador, using his inside knowledge of the Nazi milieu, proved that with the armaments at his disposal Hitler could take violent action at any moment. In that sense he did not share any of the illusions of his British colleague Nevile Henderson who felt that through negotiations Hitler’s attack could be delayed for one year. Beginning on June 22 (Göring’s decree instituting civilian conscription) he warned Paris that Germany was mobilizing without announcing it, calling up reservists, filling out regular army units, requisitioning workers, vehicles, and horses, and stockpiling supplies. The system consisting of individual summons made the basis of any evaluation difficult.
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François-Poncet did not believe the Runciman mission would succeed in any case. He felt the Nazi leaders would reject any accommodation and feared that, even with British support, France would be unable to stop Hitler. He was anxiously expecting the Nazi party rally at Nuremberg and Hitler’s speech, no doubt proclaiming, “his determination to no longer allow that his ‘blood brothers’ be subjected to Czech ‘oppression.’”
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The trip Air Force Chief of Staff General Vuillemin took to Germany (from August 16 to 21) played an exceptionally important role. As
a fellow officer he received an excellent welcome.
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He met with Hitler and Göring. who was full of praise for Daladier, “whom we view as a firm and strong man.”
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The Germans cunningly put on a Luftwaffe display “of truly impressive power,” and of industrial production, the quality of the aircraft and their weaponry, the enthusiasm and “moral strength” of the crews.
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How could the unfortunate French air force, which Vuillemin knew only too well, stand up to that huge and forbidding machine? Captain Stehlin could see how “troubled” he appeared. As he was leaving Berlin “he told the ambassador he feared seeing our air force melt down in two weeks if faced with intensive operations against the Luftwaffe… He would repeat it to Daladier about one month later just before the Prime Minister left for Munich.”
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Making a show of one’s superior strength is not such a bad device. This explains why the Germans allowed General de Geffrier, the air force attaché and his deputy Stehlin, to fly over German territory.

Victor de Lacroix, the minister to Prague, would also spend the month of August in anguish. He had the unfortunate assignment to badger Beneš, Hodza, and Krofta, and pressure them to reach agreements, insisting that they must make further concessions.
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He undertook that task as a dutiful government official would, but did so unhappily, allowing himself at times to make suggestions and reporting back all the reasons provided by his Czechoslovak counterparts. He feared British policy more than anything, sensing it was ready in order to keep the peace to sacrifice “the integrity and the actual independence of Czechoslovakia.” Great Britain, as always, was constantly providing suggestions that would weaken the Czech position, a plebiscite in the Sudetenland for instance, which Beneš was strenuously rejecting.
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“I am perhaps too impressed by this British pressure of which Your Excellency showed me proof, it must be known to Germany and would appear to encourage German intransigence and consequently that of the Sudeten population… I know that my thoughts are going beyond the limits of the political area that is my responsibility. The confidence Your Excellency places in me…makes me duty-bound in any case to volunteer my opinions.”
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As for the issue that was obviously haunting everyone, would Hitler be satisfied with Sudeten autonomy within a Czechoslovak federal state or would he want to annex the Sudetenland? Lacroix was among the first to ask the question and always remained skeptical of the “goodwill mission.”
⁸⁹
He did not hesitate repeating that Beneš was wary of Lord
Runciman. Beneš presented his concession plan to Lacroix on September 6 so that France would be informed before England; the Czechoslovak president, alluding to the British mediator, said sadly, “They always wants me to feel pessimistic and then they deceive me.”
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* * * *

We already have seen that British initiatives were practically identical to the general views of Georges Bonnet. However, he was not the only one in charge. During a speech he gave on September 4 at the Pointe de Grave he stated that France “will remain committed to the pacts it has entered into.” This seems to contradict every step he took. But one must remember that in any case the Czechs demanded the appearance of taking a firm stand. Georges Bonnet attended the inauguration of a monument commemorating the United States’ entry into the war. American Ambassador William Bullitt told him something ambiguous: “Should war break out once again in Europe no one can tell whether or not the United States would be drawn into such a war.” Part of the French press saw this as the sign of a move by the Americans toward intervention; Roosevelt, however, quickly denied that interpretation. In any event, as of September 4 it appeared that a firm attitude prevailed.
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According to Bullitt, “Bonnet thinks that Germany will not risk a war with France and England during the month of September, but many other cabinet ministers believe that Hitler has already decided to strike in September.”
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That opinion was shared by Georges Scapini, a moderate deputy from Paris, blinded during the war, who had met with Ribbentrop on September 3 and reached the conclusion that for Hitler “the negotiations between the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs presided by Runciman were only…a device to gain some more time.”
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François-Poncet was also convinced that on the German side there was no longer “the slightest desire to seek a conciliation.” Germany would soon have the reserve division mobilized. “There is every indication that the middle or the end of September, meaning following the Nuremberg Rally, will be the time of the fateful
X Tag
or
Day X
when Hitler will mount the attack he has been contemplating.”

Bonnet had also met with German Ambassador von Welczeck on September 2, and told him “that France was definitely determined to actually stand by its commitments.”
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According to the German ambassador,
⁹⁵
he also said that once the autonomy of the Sudetenland was
achieved, its return to Germany—“the only satisfactory solution,” in von Welczeck’s words—“would happen as matter of course.” The ambassador added that Bonnet’s aim, once the Sudeten issue was satisfactorily resolved, was to invite us to general negotiations where our wishes not just in the economic, financial but also the colonial field would be considered in a spirit of fairness.
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Georges Bonnet disputed that document later on.
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In any case, he felt certain that England persisted with its intention to not intervene.

On September 7 Henlein and the Sudeten German Party decided to break off their negotiations with the Czech government. Bonnet immediately phoned Halifax.
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The conversations between Lord Halifax and French Ambassador Corbin on September 9 caused a curious incident that is indicative of how consistent Bonnet’s attitude was. Sir Eric Phipps read the British summary of that conversation
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to Alexis Léger on September 11,
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and transmitted the text to Bonnet on the 13th. Corbin was requesting that Halifax take a strong position, at least openly. Léger complained on the 11th that the British government was refusing to do so. On the 12th Chamberlain met the British parliamentary and political correspondents, according to Corbin, telling them “that England had no commitments in Central Europe or toward Czechoslovakia but that she would not be indifferent to a general European conflict.”
¹⁰¹
Even though those listening provided several versions, the basic thrust was in that direction. Publicly, England was going further than she ever had toward intervention.

Georges Bonnet was furious about that statement. He was going by the British note of May 22 and now “public opinion was being told that England readily accepted the idea of going to war on the Czechoslovak issue.” Bonnet felt this was going much too far. He feared that “public opinion in our two countries, mistakenly convinced of the superiority of our weaponry, would blindly pressure the governments to engage in a war that could turn out to be a disaster.”
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Bonnet’s angry display against the apparently excessive energy England showed may probably be explained by Daladier’s involvement. Daladier had met the German chargé d’affaires on September 2 and the British ambassador on the 8th.
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He felt optimistic about the strength of the Maginot Line, the weakness of the Siegfried Line and France’s good internal situation. He was hopeful of Soviet help and basically felt certain that France would intervene which didn’t sit well at all with Bonnet who wanted exactly the opposite. And now the British seemed to be encouraging Daladier!

5.

F
RANCE
A
BANDONS
C
ZECHOSLOVAKIA

On September 12 Hitler gave his big speech in Nuremberg, and the Sudeten Germans began a series of demonstrations that the Czechoslovak police suppressed rather easily. Daladier then retook the initiative. On September 13 he sent Chamberlain a message proposing “a meeting of the heads of government of England, Germany and France,” in order to “safeguard every opportunity toward an amicable resolution.”
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But Chamberlain did not like to see France becoming directly involved in the Anglo-German negotiations. He answered immediately (at 3:20 a.m.) that “tonight he was examining another opportunity to exert direct action on Berlin.”
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Early that morning Sir Eric Phipps informed the Quai d’Orsay that Chamberlain would meet Hitler at Berchtesgaden. A communiqué was immediately issued to the press. Daladier had not been consulted about this crucially important initiative which Hitler had immediately accepted.
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For three days there was nothing to do but wait. Bonnet was certainly very satisfied.
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The Germans even more so.
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Beneš issued a “supreme call” to France through Lacroix who could only support his point of view.
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An unhappy Beneš was even proposing to hand over some territory along with 800,000 to 900,000 Germans.
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To this end he even secretly sent his minister of health, the Social-Democrat Jaromir Neczas, a friend of Léon Blum, to meet with Daladier.
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Bonnet strongly insisted that Czechoslovakia not mobilize its troops.
¹¹²