France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (55 page)

3.

T
HE
F
ALSE
C
RISIS OF
M
AY
1938

In the midst of the postwar atmosphere when the hunt was on for those “responsible” and “guilty,” it was natural to target the Daladier-Georges Bonnet team that took over on April 12, 1938. It is not our purpose here either to accuse or defend them. Anyone can make mistakes and while this can affect the political effectiveness of a leader, it does not impinge upon his moral integrity. The latter does become an issue and is under harsh attack once treason, bad faith, lack of dedication and character all come into play. We shall reject the accusation of treason, which would be stupid to consider.

Daladier and Bonnet were serious, hard-working and competent men. It was often said of Daladier that, for all his insight and great energy, he would become paralyzed when faced with a crucial decision. His integrity, however, has never been questioned. Everything about Georges Bonnet proves that he knew what he wanted and was not one to back off. In 1938 he did not want to commit France without England. Toward the end of the year for a time, he wanted to disengage France from its alliances in the east. In the spring of 1939 he wanted to enter into the “grand alliance” of France, Great Britain, and the USSR as quickly as possible. Following the coup of August 23, 1939, he wanted to avoid a war with France and Great Britain standing alone against Germany.

On the one hand, Georges Bonnet was not that concerned with issues of international morality and the respect of commitments. He believed in “sacred egoism.” On the other, he gave others enough ammunition to castigate him by publishing his insincere memoirs, using truncated documents and offering a different set of explanations from one volume to the next. He was used to acting in secrecy, creating the impression on several occasions that he was doing so without the knowledge of Daladier, his superior, or of Léger, the man who reported to him.

Above all there was a surprising ambiguity between promises and intentions. Paul-Boncour seems to have found the right words in this case: “The mistake of Mr. Georges Bonnet and Mr. Daladier was to not say that the policy would change and even to reassure Mr. Beneš that nothing had changed… Beneš mistakenly believed it in April 1938, or he rather pretended to believe it despite the warning by his minister in Paris, Mr. Osusky, who told him that my leaving implied negative consequences for his country’s future.” And he added, “The French government’s excuse for not telling Czechoslovakia earlier that it should not count on us was that it was itself unsure. It was divided on that critical point.”
⁴³

We shall revisit these divisions later on. We may say right away that Daladier hoped he was being sincere when on several occasions he publicly announced that France would stand by its commitments, while Bonnet waited at first to be sure of what the British attitude would be and then worked with every ounce of energy, veiled by an obvious flexibility, in order to disengage France. The fundamental document appears to be the note he drafted on July 20 following his conversation with Czech Minister Osusky.
⁴⁴
The document is part of the Daladier papers rather than those of Bonnet. Furthermore, it bears annotations in Daladier’s handwriting, as we shall see. “The objective,” wrote Bonnet, “was to clearly
indicate to Mr. Osusky once again what the
French position
was… The Czechoslovak government must be made clearly aware of our position: France would not go to war over the Sudeten issue. Publicly we will certainly reiterate our solidarity as the Czechoslovak government wishes—but that statement of solidarity should enable the Czechoslovak government to seek an honorable and peaceful solution.
Under no circumstances
should the Czechoslovak government think that if a war breaks out we shall be at its side, all the more since on this issue our diplomatic isolation is virtually complete.” Osusky answered that he had already explained at length to Beneš what Bonnet’s point of view was and spoke to him about it extensively during a trip to Prague.
⁴⁵
This had probably taken place just a few days before because earlier documents are not as clear.
⁴⁶
Osusky requested that this revelation remain secret. Bonnet concluded by again insisting, “The Czechoslovak government
must be convinced that France, like England, would not go to war
.”

As far as Beneš was concerned, this was actually quite new. On July 21, once he received Osusky’s telegram describing the conversation, he summoned Lacroix. He was “extremely emotional” and discussed the matter with him for three hours.
⁴⁷
But Daladier’s three handwritten annotations are just as interesting.

1. On top of the document, where Bonnet mentioned “the French position,” Daladier wrote, “It was made by the Council and not by the decision of one minister.” Meaning that Bonnet went too far because the Council had not yet taken a position;

2. Next to the words “France will not go to war on the Sudeten issue,” Daladier wrote, “F. would go to war if aggression?”

3. Next to the words “in no case,” Daladier wrote, “what about the Council of Ministers?”

* * * *

We beg forgiveness for dedicating so much space to this crucially important document. We must now examine how things reached that point from April 12 to July 20. We shall only highlight the main events.

The first concerned the Franco-British discussions in London on April 28 and 29. Chamberlain, Halifax, Vansittart, Cadogan, Sir Orme Sargent, Strang and Roberts represented the British side; Daladier, Bonnet, Corbin, Léger, Rochat, and de Margerie the French.
⁴⁸
Chamberlain was extremely clear. He kept to the points of a speech he gave on March
24 in the House of Commons. England had obligations toward France, but would not extend them should France go to war to help her ally Czechoslovakia. Neither public opinion nor the Dominions would allow it. Furthermore, the military risks of such an operation would be enormous. France and England together must obtain the necessary concessions from Beneš that would be satisfactory to Germany. Chamberlain did not think that Germany wished to annex three million German speakers in the Sudetenland, even though these were individually hoping for such an annexation. At a congress of the German Sudeten Party led by Konrad Henlein in Carlsbad, he limited his demands to the transformation of Czechoslovakia from a minority to a national state. Reluctance on the part of Beneš must be overcome to ensure peace in Europe.

Daladier had a very different viewpoint; he felt that pressure should be brought upon Beneš, who was a very wise man, in order for him to go very far by way of making concessions. “But if renewed pressure must be brought to bear on Prague, France and Great Britain have to at least be determined, if no agreement can be reached following that initiative, to support Czechoslovakia and prevent its dismemberment or disappearance.” Because Hitler will not stop there. “The action Germany is pursuing aims at eliminating the last vestiges of European equilibrium, imposing a domination of the continent that would dwarf the ambitions of Napoleon.” France felt that its alliance with Czechoslovakia “is of vital importance” and “it is determined to enforce its obligations.”

A spirited discussion took place on these two concepts. Chamberlain was to admit “his blood boils when he sees Germany extending its domination over Europe.” But can we speculate with human lives? “It is doubtful that both countries would be strong enough to impose their will on Germany even at the cost of terrible suffering and losses.” Daladier stated that he fought in the infantry for four years, that “he had but one thought: to prevent the return of such atrocities.” But for that we must stand firm. Chamberlain declared we couldn’t “bluff” (he reminded everyone that this was an American word). Wasn’t Hitler the one who was bluffing? answered Daladier. Bonnet said he didn’t think Hitler could be satisfied with the autonomy of the Sudetenland. He wants “to wipe Czechoslovakia off the map of Europe.” Bonnet added, “France must live up to its word and its signature. Great Britain, which teaches the importance of that duty to its schoolchildren, would be the first to not be surprised about it.” Neither side changed its position.

In the course of the three weeks that followed, France carefully monitored the situation. Bonnet even dispatched the ambassador to Poland, Léon Noël, his former colleague at the
Conseil d’État
and also a former minister to Prague, to Czechoslovakia on a fact-finding mission.
⁴⁹
“Hitler could act boldly once again and quickly place… Czechoslovakia in front of the dilemma, to either surrender or go to war.” On the other hand, instructions were sent to Lacroix asking, at the same time as his British colleague, how Beneš planned to respond to the Sudeten demands.
⁵⁰

Suddenly around noon on May 20, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Krofta informed Lacroix that there were German troop concentrations in Saxony.
⁵¹
The news reached the Quai d’Orsay at 1:40 p.m. Then a telegram from General Renondeau, military attaché in Berlin, arrived bearing the same information as his Czechoslovakian colleague. Other informers were telling him of convoys to Silesia and Austria.
⁵²
Ambassador François-Poncet was aware of the news but remained skeptical.
⁵³
Then he was informed by the consul general in Dresden that troops garrisoned there had apparently left their barracks.
⁵⁴
The Germans denied the news, but the
Deuxième Bureau
—using Czech intelligence—confirmed it.
⁵⁵

The Czechoslovak government immediately decided to mobilize one military class and technicians as of May 20, a total of 170,000 without France being involved in any way. François-Poncet recommended no mobilization, saying “It would be a mistake.”
⁵⁶
The Germans were lodging strong protests because of incidents in some border areas (two Sudeten residents had been killed). Georges Bonnet’s only reaction was to recommend caution.
⁵⁷

The part played by France in the whole matter, both as far as information and action were concerned, was virtually nil. This was rather fortunate since
there had been no troop movements
. It was far better to see for oneself than to rely on contradictory news coming from the Czechs or the Germans. General Renondeau sent his deputy Colonel Réa to the relevant areas. The result was very clear.
⁵⁸

While unimportant in practical terms, these events had a very important psychological effect. England was actually the only country to react. Its ambassador, Nevile Henderson, took several steps at the Wilhelmstrasse seeking moderation. François-Poncet did not receive similar instructions.
⁵⁹
England was not changing its position at all as shown in a memorandum that Sir Eric Phipps delivered to the Quai d’Orsay on May 22.
⁶⁰
However, the press magnified and naturally distorted those events. Germany had backed off! She had retreated because of Czechoslovakia’s determination
and a stand by Great Britain close to French positions, as Geneviève Tabouis wrote: “The masterful way whereby Great Britain enacted the promises it had made to France during the last conversations in London—promises that were renewed relating to Czechoslovakia—allows us new hope for keeping the peace.”
⁶¹
A more fundamental misreading of the facts would be difficult to imagine. England would be at France’s side; she was committed to it. Vladimir d’Ormesson in
Le Figaro
and
Le Temps
were saying the same thing. “Prague’s resistance along with the resistance of London and Paris” had prevailed, declared Henri de Kérillis.

These triumphant statements must have infuriated Hitler who was well aware of not having backed off since he never advanced in the first place. It is very unlikely that this played any role when he signed the general order to the Wehrmacht on May 30 to be ready to invade the Sudetenland by October 1. However, it had exacerbated his hatred of the Czechs and his determination to put an end to the issue.

Georges Bonnet kept cool throughout the incident. Undoubtedly he was more affected by the British note of May 22 than by the “crisis.” The document in question was extremely to the point and its language was even authoritarian: “The British government has given Berlin the most serious warnings… But it would be very dangerous if the French government were to exaggerate the scope of those warnings.” England would not intervene. France should be cautious. “The British government… absolutely expects that before taking any action making the situation more critical or that could result in exposing France to a German attack, the French government undertakes to consult with the British government. The measures that the French government must consult with the British before undertaking them include partial or general mobilization.”
⁶²

Bonnet also knew that he could not count on Poland,
⁶³
that the backing of the USSR was doubtful and probably ineffectual, that Russo-German collusion was possible,
⁶⁴
and that, finally, any hope of closer relations with Italy had vanished. Regarding the last point as soon as the Italian-British agreements of April 16, 1938, also known as the Easter Accords, were signed, Bonnet had initiated negotiations. The Quai d’Orsay instructed Blondel, the chargé d’affaires, to request a meeting with Ciano and tell him that the French government “would be in favor of beginning Franco-Italian negotiations on short order either in Paris or in Rome.”
⁶⁵

The next day Blondel saw Ciano, who indicated his preference for the
talks to be held in Rome “as a sign of sincere belief that they would be successful.”
⁶⁶
The discussions began on April 22.
⁶⁷
They “are coming along well,” Ciano told a French diplomat on April 28. “There is no major disagreement between France and Italy.”
⁶⁸
Ciano was still “very satisfied” on May 1.
⁶⁹