France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (50 page)

Logically, the French Popular Front was inclined to help its Spanish counterpart,
⁵⁰
based on political sympathies, many personal friendships and quite simply international law, which did not forbid delivering arms to a legitimate government. That was Léon Blum’s initial reaction. As early as July 20, following a request from the Spanish government, Léon Blum promised Spain’s chargé d’affaires, that airplanes, guns and ammunition would be delivered. A Franco-Spanish agreement of December 1935 had set aside 20 million francs for such an occurrence. On the 21st
Blum informed Delbos, Daladier and Air Minister Pierre Cot. Fernando de Los Rios, a special envoy of the Spanish government, was responsible for drawing up the list of goods to be purchased.

As early as July 22 a few right-wing newspapers discussed French intervention in the war but then limited their comments to arms shipments. They objected, arguing that it would further weaken national defense. Furthermore, would this not encourage Hitler into sending arms to the “nationalists”?

Blum and Delbos, as we know, were in London on July 23 and returned on the evening of the 24th. In London Blum told Pertinax, a journalist at
L’Écho de Paris
, that he wanted to ship arms to Spain and told Eden as well.

Everything changed on the 24th and 25th. Spanish envoy Fernando de Los Rios took part in a meeting of several ministers at Blum’s private residence. Pierre Cot was in favor of making the shipments. Delbos was against it. He did not want the 25 Potez airplanes promised to Spain to be delivered by French pilots. The council of ministers met on the afternoon of July 25. What decisions did it take?
⁵¹
François-Poncet reported that in Berlin “it was being implied that should France back Moscow’s side in Spain it would be taking a serious step.”
⁵²
The political affairs section of the Quai d’Orsay feared that the fascist countries might be driven into recognizing the rebel government.
⁵³
On July 23 Delbos informed Auriol that French customs had to stop war supplies from being shipped into Spain. He informed Herbette,
⁵⁴
the French ambassador to Madrid, of this decision taken at “a cabinet meeting on July 25.” Only civilian airplanes supplied by private industry to the Spanish government would be authorized. On July 30 Blum and Delbos declared to the foreign affairs committee of the Senate that no armaments were being supplied to Spain. Delbos did so again at the Chamber on July 31. They were both congratulated.

Yet the matter came up again on August 1. There was news of Italian planes on their way to Spanish Morocco. Two of them were forced to land on July 30 in French Morocco
⁵⁵
(it was thought for a long time that they had orders to fly before July 17, which would have been proof of Italian collusion. We now know that this was not the case). Therefore, following a meeting of the council of ministers on the evening of August 1, the French government decided to resume its deliveries but the ambassadors in London and Rome were asked to propose to the two governments a common non-intervention policy to avoid the creation of
any “power blocs.” Seventeen Dewoitine airplanes were actually shipped between August 5 and August 8. The objective was to exert pressure on Italy and Germany soon after.
⁵⁶

The British agreed as early as August 4 but on condition that the Germans, Italians and Portuguese do the same.
⁵⁷
Delbos doggedly pursued the issue from then on. The German response appeared to be positive but only if the USSR took part in the planned agreement.
⁵⁸
On August 5 Admiral Darlan went to London for a meeting with Admiral Chatfield. Darlan feared Italian plans for the Balearic Islands and German plans regarding the Canary Islands. The British admiral was worried. Why had Darlan taken such a trip rather than go through diplomatic channels? It would seem that Darlan had acted mostly on his own initiative. He would do so on various occasions later on.
⁵⁹

The USSR agreed to the principle of non-intervention on August 6.
⁶⁰
Ciano replied that he also agreed, with some reservations, on the same day.
⁶¹

France then changed its position for the third time. Following a council of ministers meeting during the night of August 8 to 9, France returned to a tougher version of its July 27 position whereby even the exportation of civilian aircraft was prohibited. This position was to be firm, except if the non-intervention agreement was signed quickly.
⁶²

On August 15 the French proposal became a Franco-British plan and on September 8 the International Control Commission held its first meeting in London. Germany, Italy, the USSR, France, Great Britain—twenty-five countries in all—agreed to the principle of non-intervention, which was detrimental to the legitimate government of Spain. Three more countries, including Portugal, joined later on.

By mid-October since the non-intervention agreement failed to prevent the totalitarian countries—Italy and Germany to Franco and the USSR to the loyalists—from shipping weapons and “volunteers” (for the USSR the Comintern set up the International Brigades), France then began a form of “relaxed non-intervention.”
⁶³
By delivering spare parts and some weapons through Mexico, France was able to reduce the disadvantages of the system for the beleaguered loyalists. However, the alibi of the “security curtain” had been created.

We shall examine the effects of this policy on public opinion further ahead. It remains to be explained how Léon Blum, “torn and anguished” as his son described him,
⁶⁴
ended up accepting a policy that was contrary
to his feelings. Pierre Renouvin’s previously mentioned study examines the issue very thoroughly.

First of all there was the resistance of the right—which was against Blum on almost every issue—but also from parts of his own majority. The top representative of the radicals was the minister of foreign affairs, Yvon Delbos. Within the cabinet Chautemps, Paul Bastid and Daladier were also opposed. Outside the government important public figures such as Jules Jeanneney, the president of the Senate, and Edouard Herriot the president of the Chamber, were also opposed. Among the socialists Spinasse, Paul Faure, Jardiller, Rivière, and Bedouce favored non-intervention. Backing the shipment of arms to Spain within the cabinet were the socialists Vincent Auriol, minister of finance; Roger Salengro, minister of the interior; Marius Moutet, minister of colonies; Georges Monnet and Lebas; among the radicals Pierre Cot, Jean Zay, Gaston Violette and Gasnier-Duparc.
⁶⁵
The non-interventionists were the most vocal. To pursue the delivery of weapons would most probably lead to the break-up of the first Popular Front government after just two months in office and in the midst of deep social change. A torn Léon Blum thought of resigning but then decided against it.

The second factor had to do with British influence. The first non-intervention decision was taken after a trip to London. In official discussions with the British on July 23, Spain was never even mentioned. On the other hand, there were private conversations on the issue. Blum and his entire staff sensed the lack of enthusiasm displayed by the British Tories in power towards the Spanish Frente Popular. Léon Blum sought and maintained excellent relations with the British. It was difficult to “take the lead” without British support in helping the Republicans in Madrid. The idea of non-intervention, therefore, seems to have originated
from the French side
, but quickly gained the wholehearted support of the British.

During his deposition to the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry in 1945,
⁶⁶
Léon Blum underscored the dangers of a general conflict which the opposing parties could have started by intervening on opposite sides in Spain. From war by proxy through the Spaniards to a direct war there seemed to be a very short step indeed. That at least was what Léon Blum seriously believed. The excitement in France during the summer of 1936, the March 7 incident and the recent end of the war in Ethiopia should all be kept in mind.

A final explanation, weaker in a sense than the others may be possible. Did Blum fear a possible civil war in France in the event he openly
took sides in foreign policy? But even in times of great stress the French could not be compared to the Spaniards. Since December 2, 1851, the military
coup d’état
was not part of France’s heritage. The possibility cannot be entirely dismissed even though it has been rarely considered in this context.

3.

T
HE
G
REAT
D
EVALUATION AND THE
L
ESSER
O
NES
⁶⁷

During its first weeks in office the Popular Front made its mark through great social reforms—the forty-hour law, paid vacations, the Matignon agreements with a significant increase in salaries, collective bargaining laws etc. Even though purchasing power had increased, industrial production decreased (using 1929 as an index of 100, it reached 87 in May and 81 in September). Unemployment was also increasing. By September 1936 there were 34,000 more unemployed than in September 1935. Retail prices increased by 5.5 percent from May to September (1936), while the balance of payments improved slightly because of the slowdown in industrial imports. Gold on hand at the Bank of France went from 62.8 billion in April to 52.6 billion in September. The difference between French and foreign prices continued to increase.
⁶⁸

All this obviously had an impact on foreign affairs. As Paul Reynaud stated as early as June 1934, there was only one possible cure: devaluation. Opposition to the idea had been weakening since 1935. Emmanuel Mönick found that financial experts in New York and in London were advising France to devalue, as was Horace Finaly, the director general of the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas.
⁶⁹
Emmanuel Mönick, the financial attaché in London, “should be credited with having persuaded the Prime Minister of the need for a devaluation of the franc.”
⁷⁰
Blum met with Mönick following Herriot’s recommendation. He made the case for two possible solutions: to either hold the level of the franc like Germany, but then isolating it on the open market through autarchy and foreign exchange controls (“In the race with Germany it would be inevitably defeated”) or “enter the fray in agreement and with the support of the other two western democracies, Great Britain and the United States… France could then tap into all the international resources required for its activity and rearmament. However, the unavoidable condition would be the alignment of the franc on the dollar and the pound sterling.”
⁷¹

Blum answered, “I’m told that a devaluation of the franc will automatically bring about countermeasures from England and the United States.” Mönick replied, “I am absolutely convinced that the opposite is true.” Blum then asked him to sound out the British, since he was the financial attaché in London. However, Mönick thoroughly understood how things worked between London and Washington, where he had also served as financial attaché. The British would first consult the Americans. “We would be wasting time by starting with Great Britain. We also lose an opportunity to make our case in the best possible light with President Roosevelt. I know the President of the United States well enough to believe that he will say “yes”; and once President Roosevelt has said “yes” the British government cannot say “no.”
⁷²

After thinking it over for a week, Blum, who in the meantime had formed his cabinet, decided to send Mönick to Washington. To keep it completely secret, it was rumored that he was “going on vacation near his old posting.”
⁷³
In the United States he met with Roosevelt and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and by mid-June he had secured their agreement in principle. Back in London he met with Neville Chamberlain, chancellor of the exchequer, who also agreed. The discussion continued when Blum traveled to England on July 23. Blum was still hesitating. But Mönick knew that he could bring some pressure to bear on the prime minister. His reports were decrypted directly by Wilfrid Baumgartner, director of the
Mouvement general des fonds
.
⁷⁴
Later on Jacques Rueff, who was deputy director since 1934, would also become aware of those reports. Rueff replaced Baumgartner in April 1937 when the latter became director of the treasury. The president of the Republic, Albert Lebrun, had a copy of those cables. Jules Moch, the secretary general of the cabinet, was informed, but not his closest staff.
⁷⁵

The delay in Léon Blum’s decision was due to that summer’s activity, the social legislation being passed and the Spanish civil war. On the other hand, a law was enacted on August 11 allowing for the nationalization of war-related industries (it would be applied in part to the aeronautics factories). A four-year plan for national defense was adopted on September 7, increasing the funding allocated immediately from 9 to 14 billion francs. With these escalating expenditures the financial situation remained critical. The “wall of money” once again was opposing a left-wing government. Finance Minister Vincent Auriol appealed to those who controlled floating capital funds on June 23, asking them to buy
treasury bonds. However, the capitalists, anticipating a devaluation, preferred to invest in foreign currency. On August 10 Emile Labeyrie, the new governor of the Bank of France who favored a government-controlled economy and foreign exchange controls, requested that Vincent Auriol scrutinize the gold funds that had been withdrawn.
⁷⁶
In a speech at Muret on August 22, Auriol denounced the “cheaters” and gave them until September 4 to repatriate their capital funds. He announced publicly that he would not accept the alignment of the franc on the pound sterling.