France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (46 page)

René Massigli, who later became Commissioner for Foreign Affairs under General de Gaulle, was one of the stronger personalities in the Quai d’Orsay. For many years he held both positions as adjunct director and deputy director for the League of Nations. He was constantly traveling from Paris to Geneva. His memoirs and papers stored at the Quai d’Orsay show his ceaseless activity and a perfect knowledge of the files. Massigli was the main advocate of active resistance to Hitler, and we have seen the initiatives he took in 1936. He was also loyal to the League of
Nations and agreed with Léger on that issue. However, he also disagreed on many other points; he was, for example, less hostile than the secretary general to a rapprochement with Italy. Their disagreement was complete at Munich, leading Bonnet to appoint Massigli as ambassador to Ankara.

There was not only a group of Protestants around Massigli. The backers of the League, especially André de Laboulaye, gave him complete support.

Emile Charvériat, born in 1880, was one of the rare examples of an official who had practically never left the Department. He was Léger’s most loyal follower and not at all close to Massigli. “A conscientious functionary, reliable and loyal to his friends. He adopted all of Léger’s views on the issues and even imitated his phraseology.”
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He had “a white face, was completely aloof, saying so little as to remain almost silent,” in the end proving to be rather passive.
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Charles Rochat, born in 1892, had a much stronger personality. He was also a disciple of Léger and would become his indirect successor as secretary general under Vichy. Armand Bérard penned an excellent portrait of Rochat when Yvon Delbos was minister. “A solid man from Savoy, a bit on the heavy side… Charles Rochat had already been cabinet director of the previous minister and had specialized in that position. He had a perfect knowledge of the files that he kept in impeccable order so that the minister would have the right document instantly in hand, committing the previous ones to memory. He prepared the diplomatic meetings and was on top of his work…(he) had the minister’s full confidence as well as that of the secretary general, Alexis Léger. He knew everything, watched over every detail, always moving from his office to the adjoining office of the minister who called him incessantly. He was a born administrator. It was in any case the whole life of that childless man.”
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Charvériat and Rochat both represented the most solid core of the “Léger team.” They were not too favorable to Massigli, friendly to Beneš, opposed Colonel Beck, were anti-Italian and said to be connected to the Freemasons. Henri Hoppenot and Etienne de Croy were its standard-bearers, along with André Ganem, a high official of the League of Nations in the cabinet of Yvon Delbos.

Without an extremely detailed study of the notations on the documents, it is difficult to assess the role played at the various levels between the secretary general and the deputy director for Europe.
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No doubt Alexis Léger, who did not communicate enough with his deputy directors,
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was in constant contact with Charvériat and Rochat, whatever position they were holding—their importance was increasing steadily within the hierarchy. Since Rochat had been the cabinet director of men as different as Laval and Delbos while maintaining his regular duties—in 1936–1937 he was also deputy director for Asia—this enhanced the harmony between the administrative services regarding most important matters. Were other issues being neglected? Among Léger’s papers we found an eloquent personal letter from Albert Bodard, minister to Ethiopia,
dated August 8, 1935—a time when that country was at the center of world attention: “I have been in Ethiopia for the past ten months where I am working heartily. I have still not received a single word of appreciation or encouragement from the Department.”
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As we have already noted, the Department doesn’t at all appear to have been “creative.” Its officials understood the world system as set up by the League of Nations perfectly. They appeared overwhelmed by the deep changes Hitler brought to their ways. Only Massigli and his group seemed to be truly aware of the unfolding tragedy.

2.

T
HE
A
MBASSADORS

Besides the Vatican Nuncio, there were twelve embassies, forty-six legations and four consulates general in Paris handling diplomatic relations with France. Overseas, France had fourteen embassies and thirteen legations, plus eight consulates general having diplomatic status (as in Bolivia, Ecuador, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Liberia, Panama, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan). A single legation handled all of Central America.

Only those legations located in Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania really played a key role. The important work was done by the embassies, which were divided into various categories. In Rome the Vatican was a unique case occupied by François Charles-Roux throughout our period. Two embassies were created for the small neighboring countries of Belgium and Switzerland. Two countries in Latin America—Brazil and Argentina—also had embassies. The former Ottoman Empire, now Turkey, kept its traditional embassy, as did Spain. The other embassies were reserved exclusively for the great powers: the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, the USSR, the United States, Japan, and Poland that was added later.

French ambassadors were prestigious officials. The
Annuaire diplomatique
gave them the title of “excellency.” At official ceremonies they wore a sumptuous embroidered uniform and since they represented the president of the Republic himself to foreign countries, protocol gave them theoretical rights of precedence over their own minister. About thirty men occupied these posts from 1932 to 1939. A few, like Alexis Léger, who had the title of ambassador even though he had not left the Department
since 1921, and Paul Claudel were among France’s literary giants. Ambassadors rarely career diplomats but actually politicians like Henry de Jouvenel, ambassador to Rome in 1933, and Georges Bonnet, ambassador to Washington from 1936 to 1937. No one remained at the same location as long as Camille Barrère (in Rome from 1898 to 1925), Jules Jusserand (in the United States from 1902 to 1924) or Paul Cambon (in Great Britain from 1898 to 1920). The longest stay during our period was André François-Poncet (in Berlin from October 1931 to October 1938). Faster rotations were introduced with the result that Paul Claudel was ambassador to Tokyo (five years), to Washington (seven years) and to Brussels (three years.) Charles Corbin was in Madrid (two years), Brussels (two years) and London (seven years). Jean Herbette was in Moscow for seven years, then in Madrid for five years.

Some of these men played a key role. Besides François-Poncet whom we have already discussed, others also deserve our attention, like Charles Corbin, Léon Noël, Emile Naggiar and Robert Coulondre. While not attempting to draw their “portrait,” we can nevertheless show what they had in common and what their individual contribution amounted to.

André François-Poncet, Jean Herbette, and Léon Noël had all entered the diplomatic service rather late in life, having skipped the lower echelons. Herbette was the son of an ambassador and worked as a laboratory technician at the Paris Science University, then as a news reporter. He was picked to go to Moscow in 1924 because of his connections to certain Soviet circles.

Léon Noël was an attorney at the
Conseil d’état
before becoming prefect of the department of Haut-Rhin and later director of the Sûreté générale (the police). He was the director of the cabinet of André Tardieu at the time the latter was both prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in February 1932; the same year he had entered the diplomatic service as minister plenipotentiary heading the French Legation in Prague. He was appointed ambassador to Warsaw on February 15, 1935.

All five belonged to the same generation: Corbin was born in 1881; Naggiar in 1883; Coulondre in 1885; François-Poncet in 1887; and Léon Noël in 1888. They were all, therefore, about fifty years of age—younger than the generals leading the army. Without mentioning Pétain (born in 1856) and Weygand (born in 1867), Gamelin, born in 1872, was nine years older than Corbin and sixteen years older than Léon Noël.

They were all first-class observers of the countries they covered, being particularly interested in getting to know the society of their posting
as well as the character of the top leaders. Corbin, a former director of political affairs and “one of our most distinguished and subtle diplomats as well as the best informed…always smartly attired, discreet and not very talkative,”
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was passionately expecting, with a kind of sad realism, the slow signs of Britain’s change toward an attitude of firmness. He carefully analyzed the debates in the House of Commons, the newspapers, at trade-union conventions and even, starting in 1938, the public opinion polls. His distinguished appearance and elegance made him a favorite of the aristocracy, the class of many conservatives in the government.
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He clearly favored Churchill, Eden, Leo Amery, Duff Cooper, Harold Nicolson, and, above all, Vansittart—all Francophiles. His telegrams contained courteous but stern opinions of the “big four”—Neville Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Halifax—who favored
appeasement
. His love of precision led him to dislike the constantly evasive explanations offered by the British. He was very friendly with Vansittart and would get him to discuss confidential matters,
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speaking with him very openly and not hesitating to be strongly critical of British policy.
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“Corbin’s diplomacy was tenacious beneath a bland surface,” as Eden wrote.
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Franco-British negotiations, as a result, took place mostly in London rather than in Paris. Corbin opposed Munich and the fact that he was not present at the airport when Chamberlain returned was widely noticed.

Corbin’s dispatches were not literary pieces such as those from François-Poncet, and while he was a good writer he preferred precision to colorful images. His minister, Councilor Roger Cambon, who was the same age, and the first secretary, Roland de Margerie, who was posted there almost during the entire period we are covering, seconded him very well in London. Corbin was also on good terms with Alexis Léger, even though his personal correspondence was strictly confined to business. He was too discreet to criticize Léger for not being firm enough. The relations between Corbin and Léger could be described the same way Naggiar spoke of his relations with the secretary general: “loyal and critically affectionate.”
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Before becoming ambassador to the Soviet Union, Emile Naggiar had been consul, then consul general, in the Far East and in Montréal, deputy director for Asia-Pacific, minister plenipotentiary to Belgrade and ambassador to Chiang Kai-Shek. He certainly did not possess the stature of the others, yet his telegrams and reports show a deep understanding of the politics of the Far East and the Soviet Union. He did
not attempt to describe Russian society and, in any case, it was virtually impossible for him to travel within a country where France had no consulates. Yet he was very aware of a possible rapprochement between Germany and the USSR.

The younger diplomats didn’t think as highly of Robert Coulondre as of François-Poncet, Corbin or Léon Noël. Neither Chauvel
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nor Armand Bérard
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in their memoirs seems to have liked him very much. When Chauvel went seeking “advice from experienced colleagues”
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under Vichy, he turned to Léon Noël, Corbin, Charles-Roux and Ponsot. The strength of Coulondre rested in his ability to predict certain events a long time in advance, for example, the annihilation of Czechoslovakia and the fourth partition of Poland. The mistakes he made—just like anyone else—in his assessments originated mostly from General Didelet, his military attaché in Berlin.
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The description given by Captain Stehlin, the air attaché, seems closest to the truth: “Robert Coulondre was different from his predecessor in physical appearance and seemed friendlier when you first met him. He looked shy with pleasant smiling eyes in a square face and a high, willful forehead. His moral, intellectual qualities and his compassion were of the same stuff as his predecessor.”
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While François-Poncet wrote broad descriptions where he examined every possible scenario, Coulondre in much less flamboyant prose would limit himself only to one possibility.

As a great servant of the state, he attempted in the USSR to give meaning to the Franco-Soviet alliance and, upon leaving, was well aware that he had failed.
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In accordance with government policy he at first attempted a rapprochement with Germany. But “very quickly [he] became convinced that matters wouldn’t remain frozen in the situation created by the Munich agreements for very long.”
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Coulondre was above all a man who possessed a lot of common sense and a healthy understanding of his German counterparts, who couldn’t help being doubtful when Gamelin told him that the French army was very powerful or when Daladier said that Gamelin and Georges were “admirable leaders.” Having been deputy political director of economic affairs (Massigli was in charge of the political side), he was a good observer of the German economy. Like Léon Noël, he tried to keep informed regarding France’s power and was also disappointed by the weakness or even the mythical character of the information he was given.
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As Léon Noël wrote, “At that time—and the other French representatives around the world were in the same situation—I was far from knowing…the true
extent of disarray within our army, navy and air force… Our High Command and the government itself had worked at keeping up the illusions that permeated French public opinion… Under the pretense of providing overseas propaganda we were being misled as well regarding the true situation of our armaments.”
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