France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (60 page)

We have noted the anti-Munich stance in the Catholic right with Louis Marin.
La Croix
was very much opposed to Chamberlain.
²¹¹
Jacques Bardoux,
²¹²
who had been elected in October 1938 as senator from the Puy-de-Dôme, immediately took a militant position within the foreign affairs committee.
²¹³
Part of the press followed them, especially
L’Époque
edited by Henri de Kérillis, Raymond, and André Pironneau.

Le Figaro
was to wait until March 1939 before taking a position of resistance.
L’Ordre
, edited by Émile Buré, was the strongest among the right-wing newspapers, and Pertinax, who had been at
L’Écho de Paris
, was now pleased to be publishing his column there.

Finally, we must also mention Georges Mandel, the most noteworthy of the right-wing resisters, and a disciple of Clemenceau.

Curiously enough, there was the violent reaction of many young militants of the
Action Française
who broke with the movement once they discovered the beginnings of a right-wing pacifism that they found revolting. For example, the attorney Jacques Renouvin, who slapped Flandin at the congress of the
Alliance Démocratique
as he was laying a wreath as tradition had it at the Arc de Triomphe, his friend Guillain de Bénouville, who would become a general in the Resistance, that same Resistance that led to Renouvin’s death in a concentration camp. Henri d’Astier de la Vigerie and Honoré d’Estienne d’Orves belonged to the same group.

The French were somewhere between those four positions, a sometimes vigilant or wait-and-see “mass”; but they were more and more attracted to the idea, despite the legend to the contrary, of resisting Hitler.

8.

T
HE
C
OLLAPSE OF
F
RANCE
’
S
P
RESTIGE
A
BROAD

Whether to save the peace or play for time, France lost the moral high ground at Munich and a prestige that had already been seriously damaged in March 1936 and March 1938. Foreign reactions relayed by French diplomats on the issue were significant. “The entire world was amazed at our retreat,” wrote Léon Noël.
²¹⁴

In one country, Czechoslovakia, the honor of France was being questioned. Students were returning their diplomas; officers were doing the same with their decorations. Several of the
Alliance Française
shut down. In an eloquent letter addressed to Daladier on October 6, 1938,
²¹⁵
General Faucher, head of the French military mission to Czechoslovakia, vigorously condemned, in the name of honor and efficiency, the policy of the government and sent in his resignation to the prime minister. He recalled “the indignation” of the Czechs on September 22 and then at Munich. “We cry about the treason of France, a country we love,” many Czechs told him. “France has embraced the doctrine of the scrap of paper. “Why,” wrote Faucher, “did you declare that you would fulfill your side of the agreement? If for any reason you felt you could not fulfill
your obligations why didn’t you say so clearly? The resentment of the Czechoslovaks is not a passing phenomenon but something that goes deeper.”

Of all the dramatic reports describing the unhappiness of the Czechs, and the violent feelings they had toward France, the most vivid was the one written by Lacroix on October 5: “My greatest mistake in the eyes of History,” Beneš told him, “will be that I was loyal to France.”
²¹⁶

A loss of prestige is not, as it is too often thought, to simply be deprived of useless vanities. Prestige is a component of strength. Its loss creates unfathomable consequences.

For example, the USSR, beyond its displeasure at having been kept out of Munich, drew conclusions from the whole matter, which Ambassador Coulondre experienced as of October 4 and the importance of which would become clear during the months ahead. If, he said, the Soviet press was increasingly sarcastic about Chamberlain, it expressed “commiseration for France, which it viewed as diminished.” Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs Potemkin spoke of the need now to reach an understanding with Germany. His words were revealing: “Poland is preparing its fourth partition.”

“Our international prestige,” Coulondre concluded, “is very seriously damaged by this crisis and our morale, already shaken, will suffer.”
²¹⁷

The same applied to France’s smaller allies. “I can’t hide the fact that France’s prestige didn’t emerge unscathed from the Munich conference,” said Colonel Merson, military attaché in Belgrade.
²¹⁸
From Bucharest Minister Adrien Thierry wrote, “We must not hide the fact that since the Munich agreement Romanian opinion is very much divided regarding France. In private conversations those with left wing ideas say that our influence has ceased in Central Europe and they attack us violently, while extreme right wing elements proclaim that by calling for a close collaboration between Romania and the Reich they are backing a policy that reflects the country’s true interests.”
²¹⁹
In Greece, the followers of Venizelos who were pro-French feel that “she had abandoned the democratic cause.”
²²⁰

The British themselves, even though “deeply impressed by the conditions of the partial mobilization of the French army,” were insisting on the country’s drift. France “enjoyed only a shaky stability” internally. Abroad it was the failure of the European system that France had built in 1919. “Most British viewed it as an inevitable change, many felt even that it was desirable, some of them feel it means a weakening of France’s
position in Europe and in the world.” “Confusion,” “dark acceptance of defeat,” wrote
The Economist
. “Tragic weakness of French democracy,” according to
The Manchester Guardian
.
²²¹

The loss in prestige was felt far beyond Europe. Much of American public opinion reacted that way. However, a Gallup poll taken during the first half of October yielded the following results to the question, “Do you feel that Britain and France acted for the best in giving in to Germany rather than going to war?” Yes, 59%—No, 41%.
²²²
Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles met with Bonnet, Chautemps and Daladier and he did not hide his worries. This prompted an initiative by Bonnet via Ambassador de Saint-Quentin at the end of November. He wished to justify French policy seeking—unsuccessfully in any case—American approval. “The American government cannot at the same time not give us any assurance of help in the event of a conflict and not approve our attempt at a European understanding.”
²²³

The same was true in Latin America. For example, in Bogotà, Colombia, Minister d’Aumale wrote, “Regarding recent events, Germany’s prestige has increased noticeably.” The press “is friendly toward us and pleased to see that our country has avoided war, but one senses a slightly patronizing tone that is more upsetting than an out and out attack.”
²²⁴

Finally, in the Far East the Franco-British surrender prompted Japan to withdraw on November 18 from the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 regarding China. Munich only increased the feeling of the weakness of the help provided by the Western democracies to China. Japanese extremists became increasingly convinced that “we can do anything to them,” and in particular establish Japan’s “Asian domination.”
²²⁵
“The attitude of France and England,” wrote Georges Picot, chargé d’affaires in Chungking, “was interpreted in the Far East as the desire by both powers to avoid conflict at any price by giving in to the threats and demands of the totalitarian countries.” The Japanese took advantage of this and “to the Japanese the simple act of lodging a protest rather than resorting to force, as was done in the past against China, is in the eyes of every nation in the Far East an admission of powerlessness by the democratic countries and a tribute to the power of Japan.”
²²⁶

*
In English in the original. [NDT]

*
Le Muséum d’histoire naturelle
(Museum of Natural History). [NDT]

Chapter XII

A
FTER
M
UNICH
: E
XPECTATIONS AND
U
NCERTAINTIES

B
ecause the Munich decision came suddenly in the wake of a brief moment where war seemed inevitable, it created an extraordnary shock in France.

The government was well aware that France had abandoned an ally strategically placed in a difficult position but well armed nevertheless. In the formal sense it had not betrayed the alliance. Morally, things looked much worse, however, since France had demanded that the ally agree to its own surrender. A number of problems arise that we shall immediately examine: the weakness of the air force; the alliances in Eastern Europe; the possibility of a long-term agreement with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy; the future role of the USSR; and the issue of Germany’s economic dominance over part of the continent.

In light of these issues there could have been a major reversal of France’s foreign policy: to accept decadence and a German Europe where France, only too pleased to keep its colonial empire, would have played second fiddle along with Italy. But was this compatible with the ideals and traditions of Daladier and Bonnet, both of them radical socialists, a
Chamber where the radicals were putting an end to the Popular Front, but that included 155 socialist SFIO deputies and 73 communists?

One could also imagine a great reversal of positions by basing France’s security on a complete alliance with the USSR. Aside from the communists, however, no one was really considering it. This would have meant their coming to power at a time when their influence was clearly receding. The USSR itself was barely emerging from the great purges, especially the one affecting the Red Army in 1937. No one saw it as being strong enough to establish a useful counterweight.

The only remaining solution was
to strengthen the policy of solidarity with England
. While Chamberlain was triumphant following Munich, Daladier on the contrary understood the magnitude of the damage done. To prevent the disaster from becoming irreparable, Franco-British solidarity had to be maintained even at the cost of decisions thought to be out of the question until then, such as the recognition of Italy’s conquest of Ethiopia and the signing of a peaceful declaration with Germany similar to the one Chamberlain had acheived on September 30.

It would therefore be mistaken to think that Daladier or even Bonnet were attracted to a “pro-German” policy or a British-style
appeasement
. The French were unhappily adopting appeasement because they needed England which was pressuring France to take the same attitude until Chamberlain opened his eyes.

The three men at the center of this debate—Daladier, Bonnet, and Léger—certainly agreed on this “English line.” There were some sharp differences between them in the details of that policy.

Daladier viewed the need for British support as something obvious. “Not a single Frenchman will agree to go against Germany and Italy without at least the assurance of having immediate British help,” he had stated at the dramatic meeting of the Council of Ministers of September 19, 1938.
¹
While his main areas were internal and defense policy, Daladier “was unfamiliar with foreign policy issues.” He “excelled at making statements of principle…but whenever practical and concrete issues arise he allows himself to be led by his British partners who were very clever at hiding their determination to reach an accommodation passed along as practicality.”
²
He hated the dictators and was much less attracted to a rapprochement with Italy than Bonnet. As for Hitler, Daladier harbored a kind of sentimental dream of reconciliation “among war veterans.” Had they not both fought gallantly in the war? Daladier, on the other
hand, was wary of Bonnet. Just like the British, he disliked his secrecy, his intrigues and his maneuvers.
³
But he needed him inside the Radical Party and feared him more outside than within the government. This all stemmed from Bonnet’s burning desire to follow Daladier as prime minister.
⁴

Léger’s position was no doubt close to that of Daladier. Inasmuch as we know the precise reactions of this very mysterious man, he also viewed Munich as a necessary evil but, on the other hand, he played a key role—with London’s approval—in eliminating René Massigli, director of political affairs and the most outspoken backer of resistance.
⁵
On October 12 Massigli was appointed ambassador to Turkey. Another anti-Munich official, Pierre Comert, head of the press office, would be given the same treatment. Léger supported strong Franco-British ties in the hope that the British would come to a more realistic view of the German and Italian menace (he had always hated Italy).
⁶