France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (64 page)

Now to the most important part: from that day forward the Germans would always claim that on December 6 France, through Bonnet, had stated that it had no further interest in Eastern Europe that was part of the German sphere of interest. Bonnet was clearly hoping for this in October. He possibly still did. But it was certainly not an element of French policy on December 6. But did he say so? The French text drafted by Léger makes no mention of the fact. What does the German text say? The term “Eastern Europe” does not appear, only “that part of Europe.” Ribbentrop stated, “If France were to recognize once and for all this German sphere of interest, he would then be fully confident in the possibility of a final agreement in principle between France and Germany…” “Bonnet answered that since Munich the situation had changed
radically from that point of view.” But the next part of the sentence appears to indicate that he was thinking only of Czechoslovakia. Interpreter Paul Schmidt thought that Bonnet meant a disinterest in
all of Eastern Europe
and that he mentioned Czechoslovakia by itself only afterwards. However, he recognized that the translation of that sentence from French to German could have created some confusion. Alexis Léger replied in a letter written in 1952 to Amédée Outrey, director of the archives at the Quai d’Orsay, that he and not Schmidt was present in Bonnet’s office. Schmidt could only have obtained his information later on. “My memory is clear… Never in the course of that conversation did I hear the French Minister of Foreign Affairs say or infer in any way possible that France could be expected to take the position that the German Foreign Minister stated later on.” I dictated, he said, the December 7 note myself. The conversation “of a very general and superficial nature never reached the level of true negotiations.”
⁸¹

Yet the issue would resurface several times in 1939. On February 6, 1939, Ribbentrop expressed his surprise to Coulondre at a reference Bonnet made in Parliament (January 26) regarding “France’s commitments in Eastern Europe,” which he considered to be “off limits.”
⁸²
On March 19 Bonnet answered “the extravagant statement by Mr. von Weizsäcker,” according to which on December 6 he, Bonnet, was said to have expressed his lack of interest in Czechoslovakia.
⁸³

At the beginning of July 1939, after Bonnet reiterated that France had never lost interest in Eastern Europe, Ribbentrop wrote to him on July 13, 1939, “Contrary to what is stated in your report which you have now underscored… a radical reversal had taken place in France’s attitude since the Munich conference towards the issue of Eastern Europe.”
⁸⁴
It was obvious how far Ribbentrop was stretching the German text quoted above. Bonnet answered on July 21, “At no time either before or after the declaration of December 6 could it have been possible for the German government to think that France had decided to become disinterested in the East of Europe.” Furthermore, hadn’t the issue of guarantees to Czechoslovakia been discussed at length?
⁸⁵

Whether or not Ribbentrop believed or pretended to believe in this French abdication, Bonnet’s position is strong. He ended up complicating it by providing differing and, as he was apt to do, repeatedly twisted statements. Even if he had
said
as much—and everything leads to conclude that he did not say it, including the German report—it was in any case a conversation and not a negotiation. The bulk of the French archives
also confirm this.
⁸⁶
To take the matter any further is to issue an indictment without providing any proof.

On the other hand the Franco-German declaration of December 6 was to remain inconsequential. Just as Hitler had violently attacked England in his speech at Sarrebrück barely ten days after the Anglo-German declaration, the breakup in this case came just as quickly. On December 20 Coulondre observed that, despite the declaration of December 6, there was strong German propaganda in Alsace, and he remarked that it was a “worrisome contradiction for the future.”
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The rapprochement between Great Britain and Italy, evidenced by the agreement of April 16, 1938, was supposed to lead, in Chamberlain’s mind, to a similar agreement between Italy and France. We have noted that Georges Bonnet was rather favorable. In May, however, Mussolini was noncommittal. Following France’s request, England had withheld the implementation of the agreement, without specifically subordinating it to the signing of a Franco-Italian accord.
⁸⁸

After Munich, on October 26, and without consulting France, the British government decided to implement the agreement. When Chamberlain and Halifax came to Paris on November 26, the potential rapprochement between France and Italy was hardly mentioned, less than the planned pact with Germany. France had actually made the key move. Mussolini had told Daladier in Munich, “I hope that now you will no longer forget my address.”
⁸⁹
As early as October 3, Bonnet told Italian chargé d’affaires Renato Prunas that after three years France was sending an ambassador to Rome, implying recognition of the Italian conquests in Africa. He would be accredited to the “King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia.”

There was little hesitation as to the choice of the ambassador. Léon Noël badly wanted the appointment that had been mentioned to him back in January 1935. Georges Bonnet, whom he knew well, offered it to him in the spring of 1938. But Léger, who was an inveterate anti-Italian, was against it. There were other candidates, including Mistler, the president
of the foreign affairs commission at the Chamber, François Piétri, even Flandin, but most of all François-Poncet, who did not wish to see Tardieu’s prophecy of 1931—“So you want to be the Benedetti of the last war”—come true. He requested the transfer to Rome. Léon Noël bowed out and refused Léger’s proposal to replace François-Poncet in Berlin.
⁹⁰
François-Poncet arrived in Rome on November 7 and was given a warm reception by the crowd, something that irritated Mussolini who told Ciano, “I dislike him.”
⁹¹

François-Poncet did not know Italy as well as he knew Germany. At first he thought things were going well. Mussolini gave him a good reception,
⁹²
and Ciano even appears to have said, “There are only ‘a few mosquitoes’ between us except for the Spanish issue.”
⁹³

The ambassador would soon be disappointed. The cloudburst took place as early as November 30 and did not concern the Spanish problem. On that day François-Poncet had been invited to attend a session of the Chamber of Fasces and Corporations meeting at Montecitorio. Ciano gave a rather moderate speech where he praised the Anglo-Italian agreement. But suddenly, following a sentence where he spoke about “the defense of the interests and national aspirations of his people,” a demonstration broke out. The “deputies” began shouting “Tunisia! Corsica! Djibuti!” There was also a cry for “Savoy.” There were throngs of fascists forming outside, screaming the same slogans and even “Savoy! Nice!” The minister of police,
*
Starace, prevented the demonstrators from going to the Farnese Palace where the French embassy was located. Mussolini watched the demonstration “impassively”—obviously he was not surprised! “Actually he did make signs that it should not last.”
⁹⁴

Georges Bonnet was informed during the afternoon of December 1 and immediately sent two important telegrams, one to François-Poncet, instructing him to request an immediate meeting with Ciano—“Such behavior may appear rather unusual in the presence of the French ambassador and immediately following the unconditional recognition of the Italian Empire.”
⁹⁵
The second went to London, as Chamberlain and Halifax were supposed to travel to Rome in January, “It is essential that there be no reason given to Rome to hope in the success of maneuvers seeking to demonstrate, through a new worsening of Franco-Italian relations, a disassociation between French and British interests.”
⁹⁶

What did Mussolini want? François-Poncet and the Quai d’Orsay pondered the question for several months. The date of November 30 coincided with the general strike, proving in his mind that France was weak in facing an Italy that was dynamic and sure of herself, reinforced by the Rome-Berlin Axis. Ciano received the ambassador on the evening of December 2. He was courteous, alleging that the Italian government was not responsible but coming to the conclusion that the 1935 agreements should be reexamined. “I am not asking that you hand Tunisia over to us,” he said but “in any case he caught himself immediately.” The “mosquitoes,” said François-Poncet, had now turned into “elephants.”
⁹⁷
With a note of December 17, Ciano formally declared that the Laval-Mussolini accords were now “historically irrelevant.”
⁹⁸

The key dilemma was the following: Did Italy wish to
negotiate
and, having asked a lot, agree to settle for less? Or was she really seeking
annexations
, and using the Axis to start a war with the support of Germany? Had this happened with Germany’s backing? No! said the Germans, starting with Ribbentrop during the December 6 discussions in Paris. And on December 10, 1938, “a person close to the Führer” told Coulondre, “Do you believe that the Führer would be ready to risk for the Italians of Tunisia what he is refusing to risk for the Germans of Alsace?”
⁹⁹
Daladier, encouraged by a virtually unanimous French public opinion, spoke at the Chamber and the Senate on December 13 and 19. “France will not give an inch of its territories to Italy even if it means an armed conflict.”
¹⁰⁰

Daladier’s trip to Corsica, Algeria, and Tunisia (January 2–6, 1939) was approved by most Frenchmen and by many of the local populations. But up to mid-January it was not the real source of worry for France. The main issue was the trip that the British were taking to Rome. Would they, as they had done so often before, distance themselves and, rather than reaffirming Franco-British solidarity, seek to play the role of “referees”? French diplomacy was intensely focused on that point, even more so since Lord Perth, the British ambassador to Rome, was the opposite of an aggressive personality. Perth was instructed to undertake an initiative with Ciano on December 3, to express his worry regarding the November 30 demonstrations. François-Poncet termed the initiative as probably “not having been very strong.”
¹⁰¹
Lord Perth was someone he found deeply irritating, as noted by Hubert Lagardelle, who for years had been fulfilling an obscure mission at the Farnese Palace. In a personal letter dated November 30 he wrote, “Not only did
Lord Perth fail to have any kind of friendly relations with our ambassador, but we are kept totally in the dark about the discussions…that British diplomats are having with Count Ciano in Rome.”
¹⁰²

Chamberlain did nothing to reassure the French. “During the debate this afternoon,” states a note dated December 12, “he declared that in the event of an Italian attack against French territory or possessions there was no specific military commitment to France in any treaty, pact or Franco-British agreement.”
¹⁰³
And Colonel Beck, France’s “great ally,” did not hesitate to say “that France would be forced to cede Tunisia to Italy.”
¹⁰⁴
Bonnet wished that Chamberlain, who was scheduled to speak at the foreign press banquet would at least recall that the Anglo-Italian agreements guaranteed the status quo in the Mediterranean, and said as much to Ambassador Sir Eric Phipps. Chamberlain refused to do so for a trivial reason because the text of his speech had already been distributed!
¹⁰⁵
Chamberlain’s visit to Rome was therefore “dangerous to us.”
¹⁰⁶
Corbin felt that “the entire Italian effort would be concentrated on London in order to get Chamberlain to react in Rome, at our expense this time, taking the same attitude as in Godesberg.”
¹⁰⁷

Besides Bonnet’s instructions to Corbin to go and see Chamberlain “to warn him loyally but categorically of France’s unshakable resolve,”
¹⁰⁸
much was expected of the conversation with British leaders in Paris on their way to Rome. But as Corbin said, Neville Chamberlain was purposefully avoiding revealing any personal inclinations. He seems to have turned the rapprochement with Italy “into his thing.”
¹⁰⁹
Halifax appeared to be much more understanding. There was a sense of relief on January 12 and 13. The Rome meeting was a failure. Mussolini remained aloof, did not state his demands toward France and revealed very little, as Halifax told François-Poncet.
¹¹⁰

The French felt reassured from then on. Only François-Poncet kept on bringing up disasters originating in Italy. The Italian matter was once more reduced to the civil war in Spain, which we shall discuss in the next chapter. In truth the ambassador’s pessimism appeared to be a reaction to the optimism of his colleague Lord Perth. According to François-Poncet, Mussolini was calling up reservists, was behind the Gallophobic violence of the Italian press, was sending reinforcements to Libya and engaging in an intensive propaganda effort in Tunisia. It all amounted to a “war psychosis.”
¹¹¹

The Franco-Italian matter was to have two lesser consequences, while Mussolini’s diplomacy was secretly and actively preparing an offensive
and defensive alliance with Germany and Japan—the secrecy of which had been broken in any case.
¹¹²

The first was when Bonnet and Daladier sent Paul Baudoin as an emissary to attempt to find out the true extent of Italian demands. At the beginning of January, Daladier requested during a phone call that Bonnet come to see him. Bonnet found Baudoin with Daladier. He had received a letter from the diplomat Terruzzi, stating that Italy had no territorial demands where France was concerned. Baudoin was the general director of the Banque d’Indochine and on his way to attend the board of directors meeting of a company in Italy. He had proposed to Daladier to have a meeting with Ciano. Daladier and Bonnet both approved of the idea. Baudoin arrived in Rome on February 1.
¹¹³
François-Poncet saw him briefly at his arrival at the railroad station but he did not pay a visit to the embassy.
¹¹⁴
On February 2 he saw Ciano who then drove with him to meet with Mussolini. According to his report, Italian demands were minimal: an Italian free trade zone in Djibuti; the purchase of the Addis Ababa railroad from the French company that owned it; several seats on the Suez board of directors; keeping the status of the Italians in Tunisia unchanged; and absolutely no Italian ambitions over Spanish territory, including the Balearic Islands. France, therefore, was not being asked to cede any territory.
¹¹⁵
Upon his return, Baudoin brought his report to Daladier’s private residence in the rue Anatole-de-La-Forge. This unofficial diplomacy was undertaken with the agreement of the Quai d’Orsay. Yet the news was leaked and a press campaign began in
L’Humanité, Le Populaire
, and
L’Ordre
, edited by Émile Buré. Even though Daladier and Bonnet found those conversations “extremely interesting,” all the commotion put a stop to the negotiations.
¹¹⁶
All this took place without the knowledge of Ambassador François-Poncet.