France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (68 page)

The probability in case of war of not being encumbered by a third front, “the Pyrenees front,” and the certainty of not being threatened by
Axis bases in the Balearic Islands—all this was reassuring for France. No doubt the circumstances and the exhaustion of Spain did more to reach those results than the diplomacy of Daladier, Bonnet and Pétain. Yet it must be said that French diplomacy was cleverly engaged. Daladier would suffer morally from it. The left-wing press didn’t mince words in accusing him of “dishonor,” and “national humiliation.” For him the end certainly did justify the means.

2.

I
TALY
R
EMAINS
O
UT OF
R
EACH

Did security in the western Mediterranean warrant going further? For a long time this remained part of Chamberlain’s thinking. The agreement between England and Italy (the Easter Agreement) was dated April 16, 1938. One year later, on April 8, 1939, Mussolini annexed Albania—on Good Friday! And yet Chamberlain intended to pursue his quest: In order to separate Italy from Germany the Anglo-Italian agreement needed to be completed by a Franco-Italian agreement.

On this point the French government was divided. Bonnet was in favor. François-Poncet, who had been announcing a catastrophe where Italy was concerned during the first three months of the year, changed his mind to thinking that a rapprochement was possible as of March 22.
⁴⁴
Mussolini’s March 26 speech, while extremely violent, seemed to him to be a maneuver “to push us toward having discussions.”
⁴⁵

Daladier, with the support of Léger, felt much less in favor of a rapprochement. He told Baudoin on March 20 that there was no reason to pursue discussions. Yet he agreed for him to go and say so in Rome
⁴⁶
and he did not close the door on discussions regarding an Italian free port in Djibuti. Two Cabinet meetings on March 27 and 29 had prepared his March 29 speech. Bonnet was preaching for conciliation and had the support of de Monzie, who was always pro-Italian, and of Chautemps and Marchandeau. On the opposite side was Campinchi who “displayed a Corsican’s vigilant and punctilious passion against Italy.”
⁴⁷
Paul Reynaud, his longtime friend and a lawyer from the same graduating class, Mandel, Champetier de Ribes and Jean Zay all favored a firm approach.
⁴⁸
Daladier made it clear above all that France refused to give up even an inch of territory. But London felt he was not closing the
door on the Italians.
⁴⁹
On March 30 François-Poncet thought that Ciano was worried about German influence and wished “to hear from France and England.”
⁵⁰
He thought that no doubt Mussolini was seeking “a reasonable agreement with France.” The takeover of Albania on April 7 (announced by François-Poncet as early as April 2)
⁵¹
made the ambassador grow pessimistic once again. He thought that Italy would not evacuate Mallorca
⁵²
and that she intended to “play the Spanish card.”
⁵³
The Italians were taking advantage of the gullibility of Chamberlain and Halifax.
⁵⁴
Italy was threatening the Balkans.
⁵⁵
François-Poncet was complaining that he had no contacts with Ciano.
⁵⁶
When he finally did meet with him on April 25 to sign a commercial agreement, it was to learn that there had been a second Baudoin mission that failed. For the first time Ciano officially communicated to him the very moderate demands he had presented to Baudoin.
⁵⁷

On the same day Phipps delivered a note to the Quai d’Orsay requesting information on the status of Franco-Italian relations; Corbin met with Halifax who discussed the same issue with the latter, offering to act as go-between.
⁵⁸

French policy was still disoriented and disorganized. In a note dated April 17, Daladier wrote in pencil, “Should we not move and wait for Mussolini’s response; should we begin negotiating with M.; should we let it go?”
⁵⁹
According to him, Léger was “against” the second and third points. Bonnet complained about Baudoin, about Daladier who thought that Mussolini had made a bad speech and called Léger and Baudoin to say so, and he was miffed at not having been invited to a lunch at the home of Bois, the editor-in-chief of
Le Petit Parisien
with Daladier and Léger. He feared a maneuver without his knowledge against a rapprochement with Italy.
⁶⁰

Finally, on May 2, Bonnet noticed a change. Several telegrams from François-Poncet repeated the idea that the time was right to reopen talks with Italy. On April 26 he summoned Léger who, he said, was coming around to his point of view. A telegram drafted in part by Bonnet and by Léger was sent to François-Poncet on May 3, authorizing him to restart negotiations.
⁶¹
Some discussions then took place.
⁶²
But on May 7 it was learned that a political and military pact between Germany and Italy was about to be signed.
⁶³
It was the Pact of Steel of May 22, 1939.

Halifax came to Paris on May 20 and 21. Daladier wanted to discuss relations with the USSR (see below). Halifax was mostly interested “in using Italian influence over Germany to avert the final catastrophe.” To
reach that goal it would be good for France to offer Italy “reasonable satisfaction,” something that the Duce could “show his people.” We should note that the Pact of Steel was only two days away.

Daladier answered that he would agree to improved relations with Italy but only if these were reciprocated.

Italy must offer something in exchange, otherwise France would lose its prestige “in the eyes of the Muslim world.” Finally, Daladier “was convinced that this would not lead to any results” because “Italy is in the hands of Germany.”
⁶⁴

The Pact of Steel once again made François-Poncet feel pessimistic. “Mussolini is hesitating and trying to find his way,” he said on May 21.
⁶⁵
But on May 22 he thought that “the two partners will take new initiatives that will accelerate the course of events.”
⁶⁶
Coulondre agreed. Italy “may soon become only an instrument in the hands of its too powerful ally.”
⁶⁷
“It appears that since Lord Perth’s departure the British embassy has returned to its original optimism,”
⁶⁸
François-Poncet also wrote. On May 31 he met with Ciano who was strongly against “the Franco-British encirclement moves.”
⁶⁹
Mussolini was to announce that by the end of August “there would be changes in the political map of Europe.”
⁷⁰

Chamberlain, meanwhile, had not yet said his final word.

On July 13, as negotiations with the Soviets were becoming increasingly complicated, Chamberlain wrote to Daladier that he kept on hoping that Mussolini would influence Hitler. The Franco-Italian negotiation “would help gain time.” The same idea would recur in the British attitude toward the USSR.

As proof that the British felt this matter was much more important than the Moscow negotiations, Sir Eric Phipps, in handing the letter to Daladier on July 14, stated that
“the issue of war or peace probably depended on those negotiations.”
⁷¹
[Emphasis added.]

On July 17 Daladier ordered that an answer be drafted.
⁷²
He thanked Chamberlain “for his friendly trust,” recognizing as he did “that the situation in general was improving” thanks to “the determination shown by our two governments.” He recalled the initiatives taken by François-Poncet on April 26, May 11 and recently on July 5. “I feel that I have anticipated and even gone beyond the suggestion you have been kind enough to make.” But Mussolini would see a new French initiative as a “sign of weakness.” Italy would need to offer “guarantees of neutrality.” Daladier agreed to British participation in the negotiation.

When he actually sent the letter itself on July 24, Daladier became much more reserved. The entire section on British participation was cut. Daladier clearly refused to reopen a dialog with Italy. At the end he simply stated he would be willing to trust the “wisdom” of the British government.
⁷³
Chamberlain would stop insisting. There was to be no Franco-Italian rapprochement and yet Italy did not go to war in September 1939.
⁷⁴

3.

T
OWARD THE
“G
RAND
A
LLIANCE
”—T
HE
P
RELIMINARY
N
EGOTIATIONS

The history of the negotiations between the USSR, the United Kingdom and France has been written many times. In the absence of Soviet documents we still do not know exactly which objectives Moscow was pursuing and, more precisely, whether the secret parallel negotiations between the USSR and Germany were viewed by the Kremlin leadership as a possible alternative or as the real goal. This, however, is not part of our subject.

Access to the French archives allows us to first of all correct a legend disseminated mainly by British historian A.J.P. Taylor.
⁷⁵
In studying the time lag between British and Soviet notes he found that the British would take a longer time to respond while the Soviets were, on the contrary, very quick to reply. He deducted that “the Russians were anxious to reach a conclusion,” and that “the delays came from the West.” He forgets that the Soviets were always replying by saying “no” or added new demands which does not necessarily indicate a clear intention to reach an agreement. He also lumps together by using the expression “the West,” a hesitant England, desperately slow and undecided, and a France that of the three seems to have been the
only one in a hurry to come to a conclusion
.

It appears for once that, in this haste, Daladier, Bonnet, and Léger were all in complete agreement and that the military shared their point of view. While agreeing to make haste they may not have agreed with the ultimate goal. Everything actually points to the fact that Daladier and the military leaders wanted
an alliance
, meaning the addition of the Soviet forces to the other allied forces in the event, which appeared increasingly likely, of a war, while Georges Bonnet, whose later attitude was to indicate that he continued to not want war but rather
deterrence
. In his view—
and he was absolutely correct on this point—a firm attitude on the part of France and Britain
alone
would not save Poland. Hitler was not bluffing; he had the “West Wall,” he was aware of the weakness of the French air force and of the British army. However, if a strong triple entente were to challenge him, then he would probably not move forward. Deterrence, while impossible with two partners, could work if there were three.

Even though the thought of canceling the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935, something that was on Bonnet’s mind more than in passing in October 1938, was shelved, until March 15, 1939, the document remained dormant with the Soviets, who made no secret they no longer believed in it, as they took a “detached” attitude toward the Westerners
⁷⁶
while discreetly offering airplanes to France
⁷⁷
and getting closer—also rather discreetly—to Poland since November.
⁷⁸
When Jules Basdevant, the Quai d’Orsay’s legal expert, published an article in the journal
Politique Étrangère
in February 1939 expressing doubts about the current validity of the 1935 pact, Ambassador Naggiar informed the Soviet leadership that, based on his verbal instructions, the treaty remained valid as far as France was concerned.
⁷⁹
Naggiar felt that the USSR was “at crossroads,” having based its policies on collective security; Russia was ready to return to that policy. Otherwise, “we run the risk of seeing it pursue along all its western borders the organization of its own security system. Such a system could include, with Germany assisted by Poland and possibly Italy, an economic and technical collaboration which would free up the Reich from any worry on that end and…provide the raw materials and freedom of movement that are indispensable required for a final settling of accounts with the West.”
⁸⁰

Like his colleague Coulondre, Naggiar was fully aware of the possibility of a German-Soviet understanding.

During the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, followed by that of Memel, France could obviously not react. Bonnet instructed Coulondre rather late on March 17 of an initiative of “formal protest” against that “blatant violation of Munich.”
⁸¹

The sudden change in attitude by the British toward the USSR was to impress the French much more. Meeting with Lord Halifax on March 18, Corbin found out that he had “explored” Russia’s availability.
⁸²
Georges Bonnet met with Soviet Ambassador Suritz on the same day. “England and France have decided to intervene;” in the event of a new aggression, “they would be happy to know what the attitude of the Soviet government
would be.”
⁸³
It was therefore on March 17 and 18, 1939, that the negotiations began
.

It must be pointed out that the future target of the threat remained uncertain.
⁸⁴
The British, just like the French, thought above all that Romania was in the greatest danger. Polish Ambassador Lukasziewicz told Bonnet on March 19 that he had no present fears even regarding Danzig. Romania, on the other hand, appeared to be in danger.
⁸⁵
Couldn’t the Polish-Romanian alliance of 1921 against Moscow also be targeted at Germany? That issue was discussed throughout the spring. But it was useless because the two countries were suspicious of each other. Lukasziewicz would entertain such an alliance only on condition that Hungary also take part (it had just annexed Carpatho-Ukraine or Ruthenia).
⁸⁶
The Polish and Western concern would only surface on March 23.
⁸⁷