France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (69 page)

The British, as we know, began by proposing a joint four-power declaration (the United Kingdom, France, the USSR, and Poland) whereby those countries agreed to consult each other in the event of “action taken against the independence of a European State.” Corbin clearly told Sir Alexander Cadogan that such a procedure—a simple consultation—would be an admission of weakness.
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On the other hand, Soviet Ambassador Suritz proposed a conference to include representatives from the USSR, Poland, Turkey, Romania, England and France.
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The British, who did not favor a conference, which they viewed as too spectacular, concluded that a British guarantee be given to Poland and Romania. The French government was informed on March 28.
⁹⁰

The Poles in their pride did not like the idea of being “guaranteed.” But Polish ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, had just been negotiating with Ribbentrop. Ambassador Léon Noël was unable to obtain any definite information; finally on March 29 he found out that Ribbentrop had demanded the annexation of the free city of Danzig and the creation of an extra-territorial highway through the corridor—which corresponded to what actually happened.
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The Poles refused and would hang on firmly to that position all the way to the war. France agreed with the new British stance and on March 31 Chamberlain issued his momentous declaration of a guarantee to Poland and Romania, stating that he was also speaking for France. Litvinov, the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, answered the initial British approaches with bitterness—the Western powers were not impressed by “the latest Soviet moves in favor of an effective collective
resistance to aggression.” This led to an evasive but highly significant conclusion. “After all a policy of isolation would probably best suit the USSR.” Was it a joke? Payart, the French chargé d’affaires, asked himself. Or was it the sign of “alternating directions in the leadership’s thinking?”
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The Tass news agency denied information provided by
Le Temps
and
L’Œuvre
, according to which the USSR was committed to providing war materiél to Poland and to refuse to ship raw materials to Germany in case of war.
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Would it not be possible, asked Bonnet to Ambassador Suritz, to find a way, “in a form to be determined” for the USSR to promise its assistance to Poland and Romania?

However, the inescapable issue of the passage of Soviet troops remained as relevant as in 1938. Georges Bonnet discussed it once more with Suritz. “It was obvious that there had to be an agreement between the USSR and Romania or the USSR and Poland in order for the Franco-Soviet Pact to come usefully into play.” But, Suritz answered, those two countries had until then refused any Soviet help. The French minister stated that he was convinced he could change their mind. He felt that in accordance with the consultation clause of the Franco-Soviet Pact it was appropriate to “begin immediate discussions between France and the USSR in order to precisely determine the help that the USSR could provide to Romania and Poland in the event of German aggression.”
⁹⁴
Chargé d’affaires Jean Payart (who was serving in that post since 1931, enjoyed a personal relationship with Litvinov and was considered by Jean Laloy to have “a keen mind”)
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discussed the issue with Deputy Commissar Potemkin who refused to make any commitments as long as Poland and Romania showed no interest. A collective defense, yes; but nothing else.
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A conference among interested parties intending to show good will on the part of Poland and Romania, yes. But no negotiations outside the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. General Palasse, the military attaché in Moscow, took an initiative in that direction. He was told that any contact with the High Command had to be preceded by “an agreement in principle that was to be reached at the diplomatic level.”
⁹⁷

The general pattern of the coming negotiations with the USSR—first a political agreement followed by a military accord
—
was now clear
.

At first it appeared that the Soviet government wanted to conduct negotiations in Paris. On April 13, 1939, Georges Bonnet and Ambassador Suritz had what the minister described as a “moving,” long conversation.
He offered a document whereby the USSR would provide immediate help and assistance to France “in the event [France] would be in a state of war with Germany due to assistance it provided to either Poland or Romania.” Since Suritz noted that the USSR would not accept such a document if it did not mention reciprocity, Georges Bonnet added a new paragraph on April 14, whereby France promised help and assistance in the same manner. Georges Bonnet “pleaded eloquently.” “The independence of those countries is of prime interest to the Soviet Union.” Should Poland and Romania vanish, wouldn’t it have a common border with Germany? Suritz agreed to transmit those proposals to his government, but he felt that if “it wanted the possibility to intervene in a conflict it would still not be willing to enter into an automatic commitment.”
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The USSR informed the British that it would be ready to possibly offer a guarantee to Romania
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but preferred a solution whereby it would “issue a general declaration giving assistance to all (neighboring) countries…desiring the benefit of that assistance.”
¹⁰⁰

Three positions therefore emerged.

The United Kingdom was offering three unilateral guarantees limited to Poland and Romania
.

France was offering to the USSR a mutual assistance and help pact focused on Poland and Romania
.
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As for the USSR its views were known as early as April 18, 1939. It wanted
a “plurilateral” assistance treaty that would include political and military mutual assistance between England, Franc and itself; an agreement of those three countries to provide assistance to the Eastern states neighboring Russia, Romania, Poland, Latvia, and Estonia); extending the Polish-Romanian alliance in the event of German aggression; the commitment of the three to not sign a separate peace
.

On the French side it was noted that the USSR, contrary to 1935, did not mention the League of Nations. It did not want to simply assist Poland and Romania but extended its interest to the Baltic States, showing no interest in countries neighboring France or Holland.
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Lord Halifax did not hide the fact that he was “suspicious”
¹⁰³
with Corbin. The thinking at the Quai d’Orsay was why not limit matters to a commitment among the three powers to begin with, without making reference to others? It was a way to reach the French proposal of an automatic Franco-Soviet alliance by enlarging it. But the British wanted no part of it.
¹⁰⁴
The result was the exasperating slowness of the little game where each one attempted to hold on to its own point of view.

4.

T
HE
P
OLITICAL
N
EGOTIATIONS

Starting on April 18, the date of the Soviet proposal, the negotiations became extremely simple, despite what they appeared to be. The Soviets did not change their position. The British, under pressure by France, came closer to it very slowly but firmly in May, vigorously in June and in a frenzy in July, because the French wanted a three-party alliance and needed British acceptance. The Soviets were simply waiting and once their proposal was nearly agreed to they would add a new condition.

The Soviet proposals were dated April 18. The Foreign Office studied them and “felt that the study would take several days and will certainly consult with us once it has reached its conclusions.”
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It is interesting to note in passing that the method of consultation would take place only after reaching one’s decision. On May 7 the British rejected the Soviet offers despite France, which—to mention only the basics—had as of April 24 rejected the British proposal for “a unilateral declaration of assistance by the Russians parallel to the public declarations by France and England but without any guarantee nor any obligation of direct or indirect assistance by the three powers toward each other.” In other words, the French position was very close to that of the USSR since it tended toward a larger three-way alliance. The USSR added a list of third-party countries that were to receive guarantees. France was not too favorable since it feared Polish objections, but most of all it rejected the British system that promised no reciprocity to the Soviets.
¹⁰⁶
The Soviets were waiting for the British mediations to bear fruit. The ambassador was surprised by the delay—and took advantage to slip in a key element: The political accords would have to be completed “by staff agreements without which any understanding would be deprived of any practical value.”
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“Danzig is not worth a war,” wrote the
Times
on May 3.
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At this time Molotov replaced Litvinov as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. “It was a serious matter,” commented Payart. “It seems attributed, in part at least, to the hesitations by the British government during the last negotiations.”
¹⁰⁹
The day before Marcel Déat had published his famous article in
L’Œuvre
, stating that the French people did not want to die for Danzig. This was absolutely true but was it only about Danzig? Three days later a communiqué announced the imminent
signature of what would be referred to as the “Pact of Steel.”
¹¹⁰
Then on May 7 the British counterproposals arrived in a leisurely manner. England remained with its initial proposal. Ambassador Sir William Seeds handed that answer to Molotov on May 8. Molotov “complained on that occasion about the slowness of the methods of British diplomacy.” He was also surprised to see the difference between the French response (three party alliance) and the British proposal (unilateral guarantees to Poland and Romania). On May 10 the House of Commons also expressed concern regarding the delays.
¹¹¹

An article published by
Izvestia
on May 11 stated that “a single front of mutual assistance” should be created, that this project had not “been welcomed with sympathy by England and France,” that the British proposals required immediate assistance by the Soviets to France and England if Poland or Romania were attacked but nothing about assistance to the USSR by France and England. “Within such a setup the USSR would be in a position of inequality.”
¹¹²
This article, said Payart, forgets the French counterproposals and “sets up an abusive solidarity between France and England.”
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On May 13 Moscow rejected the British proposals and renewed its offer of a mutual assistance pact.
¹¹⁴

From May 14 to 26 the British government would slowly give in and adopt the idea of a tripartite alliance. Bonnet insisted as early as the 15th “on the fears of the French government in seeing the Anglo-Soviet misunderstanding continue under the present circumstances.”
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A hard negotiation took place in London between Lord Halifax and Ambassador Maïsky.
¹¹⁶
If the British were giving in, it was because “the British government was being constantly prodded by the French government that didn’t stop reminding it of the absolute need to conclude a tripartite pact.” It was also due to “the fear both in Paris and in London, of a rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow.”
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The main explanation for the British change was the key meeting in Geneva between Halifax, Daladier, and Bonnet on May 20 and 21, 1939. Chamberlain, said Halifax, was thinking of “the powers threatened by an aggression; to slide from there to a triple alliance meant going in a totally different direction with the possibility of provoking on the part of the German government, the kind of madness that it is precisely attempting to avoid.” This was very much like Chamberlain who seemingly still failed to understand that it wasn’t at all necessary to provoke Hitler for him to go on the attack. To which Daladier responded that Germany “will only be stopped when he will be convinced that he will face effective resistance
by a bloc where there are no cracks.” It should be noted that Bonnet and Léger, who took part in the discussions, backed the prime minister’s point of view.
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On May 24 the British cabinet agreed to the principle of “a tripartite mutual guarantee accord.” It would consult with the French government and, if it agreed, would then transmit the wording to Moscow.
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The signing of the “Pact of Steel” between Germany and Italy probably had something to do with that about-face.
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The French government naturally agreed and Bonnet, who summoned Suritz on May 26, spoke of the need for staff discussions in order “to reach a definite military plan that could save Poland.”
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On May 28 the British ambassador, Sir William Seeds, and French chargé d’affaires, Payart, brought to Molotov, who was with Potemkin—the latter not uttering a word—the text of the British note that the French had approved. “Much to our surprise he did not hide that his first reaction was a negative one.”
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His objection came from the fact that the text mentioned the League of Nations! This was to be the first of Molotov’s delaying maneuvers. “What can be the Soviet government’s objective?” Payart
¹²³
wondered why was there “this bias of suspicion mixed with malice?”
¹²⁴
Did Seeds inform Molotov that England accepted the military accord? His answer was that the Anglo-French project was “unclear.”
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