France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (70 page)

Finally, on June 2 the Soviet counter-project came in a six-article document. From then on negotiations would focus on that document and be held in Moscow. For one month, until July 3, a confused negotiation took place regarding Article 1, meant to clarify general objectives of the alliance. The Soviet draft stated that the alliance would come into play: 1) In the event of aggression by a third party against one of the three contracting parties; 2) In the event of an aggression by a third party against one of the following eight countries: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Greece, Turkey (countries that neighbored or were close to the USSR), and Belgium; 3) In the event of assistance given by one of these three states to another European state having requested such assistance in order to resist a violation of its neutrality.”
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Ambassador Naggiar, who was back in Moscow at the end of May, preferred that description and so did Bonnet.
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It is worth mentioning that he did not get along too well with his deputy Payart, who left for France until the end of August. Naggiar, however, was “a methodical and serious person.”
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An agreement could be reached although Molotov was a difficult and suspicious man.

His suspicion appeared in the form of statements so rude and hasty that they not only showed contempt for diplomatic custom. This kind of rough simplicity was so different from the ways of Mr. Litvinov that it appeared to be a tactical approach. It tended to show that Mr. Molotov, as a loyal collaborator of Stalin, was not content with the advantages of reciprocity that had been refused to the USSR during Mr. Litvinov’s tenure…the new Commissar for Foreign Affairs now was seeking even greater advantages.
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The month wasted between June 2 and July 3 can be attributed to the British. On June 5 they rejected the Soviet draft of Article 1. The French government, ready to accept it, was becoming impatient. The June 6 Council of Ministers “unanimously recognized the extreme urgency of reaching an agreement in the Franco-Anglo-Russian negotiations.” There remained, of course, one source of worry: Would the USSR use Article 1 to intervene in the Baltic States? On the other hand, Article 6 stated that the political agreement would only be enacted after a military agreement had been reached.
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But it was necessary to reach a conclusion. On June 9 Corbin noted that the British counter draft was not yet ready. He was getting impatient.
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The draft would be ready only on June 12. To complicate things further the British Cabinet, rather than transmitting it to Sir William Seeds, had it delivered to Moscow by a top Foreign Office functionary, Sir William Strang. This would have been understandable had he been given special powers, but he did not have any and was constantly forced to consult with the Foreign Office, something Seeds could have done just as well.

The British wished that the list of eight countries not be mentioned in the treaty itself but only in an appended document that would also include Holland and Switzerland. They were offering a new draft of the second paragraph of Article 1. It must be quoted to understand its exceptionally obscure language and how little it differed from the Soviet draft. The three contracting parties would intervene “once an aggression had taken place…against a European State having asked and received assistance from the interested contracting party or as a result of an earlier commitment in accordance with the wishes of the said contracting party or independently of any commitment.”

The Quai d’Orsay had prepared language that was closer to the Soviet draft, but in order to underscore the solidarity between France and England refrained from presenting it.
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On June 15 Strang, Seeds and Naggiar solemnly handed the British draft to Molotov. On June 16 he rejected the draft stating that it created “a humiliating and unequal situation for the Soviet Union.”
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Naggiar was under the impression that the reason behind sending Strang was meant to stiffen rather than soften the British position.
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Was it related to the June 8 debate in the House of Commons that had made such a dismal impression on Moscow, in which Chamberlain, Halifax, and Sir John Simon announced that England was ready to examine the German and Italian demands for living space? Naggiar wrote that in Moscow “what is singled out…is that England, despite appearances, is not yet fully committed to the policy of resisting aggression.”
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Naggiar was irritated. The conversations were stalled on some subtle changes, which he said “appeared to be useless and even out of place in that they were encouraging the suspicion of the leaders of the USSR.” There were, for example, endless discussions on whether or not to replace the Soviet formula of “immediate and effective assistance” with the proposed British language “all the assistance immediately at its disposal.”
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Molotov rejected a French compromise on June 22. Seeds agreed with Naggiar that the “aide-mémoire prepared in London only complicated the negotiations and perpetuated a dispute.”
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Why not accept the Russian proposal? Why not send a military and technical mission “without waiting for the results of the ongoing discussions?”
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Bonnet felt that it was essential “that the political agreement not be subordinate to the military agreement,” because in that case “we will once again enter a period of endless difficulties.”
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Finally on June 23 London agreed to the Soviet draft of June 2 practically unchanged. But we should not anticipate. That decision included a draft proposal for Article 1. It was submitted to the French government on June 27, four days later. Then four days lapsed when finally the draft reached Molotov on July 1. Four more days and yet Bonnet had done his best. “I feel we must conclude as quickly as possible. I have strongly insisted with the British government.”
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On July 1 there was more discussion with Molotov regarding the list of countries. Bonnet cabled that the objective is “the mutual solidarity of the three great powers…in those conditions the number of countries guaranteed is unimportant.”
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Molotov never gave an immediate answer.
He needed Stalin’s approval. Strang, Seeds and Naggiar therefore went back to see him on July 3. From then on the delay again came from the Soviet side. Before a conclusion could be reached, Molotov said that 1. To have a perfect symmetry the USSR must sign bilateral pacts with Turkey and Poland; 2. On the other hand, he was proposing that in Article 1 to the word “aggression” be added the adjectives “direct or indirect.” Bonnet protested. If point 1 was agreed to, it meant “to delay until an undetermined date the guarantee to be given by the USSR.” As for point 2 it was a device for the USSR to take over the Baltic States following a series of internal coups d’état.
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Molotov quickly forgot the first demand, but the second once again prompted every existing British subtlety.
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Naggiar feared “that due to the influence of the Foreign Office the negotiations might once more get bogged down in discussions about draft changes many of which, while they did affect the heart of the matter, elicited renewed Soviet counter-changes.”
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Molotov, therefore, upon meeting with his three counterparts on July 8, offered a definition of indirect aggression. Naggiar felt that it was completely satisfactory.
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The British began discussing it in great detail.
We may state that this discussion would never reach a conclusion
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More importantly, beginning on July 8, Article 6 was to become the star issue: no political agreement would be signed without a military agreement.
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Bonnet, having attempted to avoid that Soviet demand,
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resigned himself to accepting it, fearing that it could be a breaking point.
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He could foresee the difficulties. The acquiescence of Poland and Romania was required, which, he said, “was less than certain.” Once more they were getting into uncharted territory. But on July 9 Molotov proved unmovable. “As long as the military agreement is not signed we cannot consider that we have a treaty.”
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This was all the more embarrassing since the press had started to write about the “grand alliance” as though it were already consummated. “We are reaching a critical moment,” wrote Bonnet to Halifax, “where we find it necessary to do everything possible to succeed.”
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At the same time he complained to Corbin about “the hesitations of the British government on the threshold of a decisive moment in the negotiations,” and of its “too formal an attitude at the eleventh hour.”

There was a final hope as far as “deterrence” was concerned, no doubt harbored by Bonnet: the publication of a joint communiqué by the three parties announcing to the world that they “agreed on the main points of the political agreement.” Bonnet prepared a simple and clear text.
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The British immediately proposed changes to tone down the language and Molotov rejected any communiqué. There would never be a communiqué at all!

On July 23 Molotov had at least accepted that the military negotiations should begin immediately. On the 24th Bonnet told Naggiar that the French delegation was basically ready. On the same day Corbin told him that the British would require ten days to set up their delegation.
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5.

T
HE
F
AILURE OF THE
M
ILITARY
N
EGOTIATIONS

On July 27, four days after Molotov agreed, the French government appointed General Doumenc, an eminent specialist of motorization, to head the military delegation. On the same day Gamelin gave him instructions that were rather vague.
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The negotiations were to begin only on August 12.

Once more we find that the French were very much in a hurry and that the British were not at all. But there is a document proving that their slowness was by choice. On August 3 the British government’s instructions to its negotiators reached the Quai d’Orsay,
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which transmitted them to Gamelin. It states, “
The British delegation is to conduct negotiations very slowly
, keeping closely abreast of the political discussions.” [Emphasis added.] It was to be driven by an extremely suspicious attitude toward the Soviets. “It is aware of the danger that the information it passes on may be leaked to Germany.” Since everyone knew that military plans were dependent upon the Polish and Romanian attitude, this should “encourage the Russians to engage in direct talks with Poland and Romania.” It must speak “in the most general terms possible.”

Bonnet met with Doumenc as he was about to leave. “I drew his attention,” he said, “on the need to reach the military agreement as quickly as possible.” According to Beaufre, when Doumenc visited Daladier on July 31 the latter had said, “Get us an agreement at any price.”
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Two crucial points explain the French attitude. First, there was the information coming from Germany, unrelated to what was taking place in Danzig,
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that Germany was mobilizing. Production was increasing “the war machine keeps on being wound up and improved as if the decision
to use it very soon had been made.”
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On July 25 the chargé d’affaires, Tarbé de Saint-Hardouin, noted “a mobilization of sorts” that he estimated at 1 million men, very different from that of September 1938, which was “ostentatious.” A clear attempt at camouflage could be detected.
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General Le Rond, who had played an important part at the Peace Conference and in Upper Silesia, met with Bonnet on July 27 after a trip of one month to Germany and spending eight days in Danzig. This “excellent observer of things German” was clearly pessimistic.
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On August 1, Saint-Hardouin informed the government that there was a noticeable acceleration in preparations—movements to the “West Wall,” call up of reservists of the classes 1902 to 1910, requisitions, etc. Regimental numbers, shoulder boards, and badges had all been carefully removed.
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After a period when everyone felt safe, he noticed a return to the concept that a “lightning action” could be launched against Poland during the second fortnight of August.
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The other French motivation was the growing fear of a German-Soviet rapprochement. There is a well-known document by Robert Coulondre, who had been ambassador to both Moscow and then Berlin. As he paid his farewell visit to Litvinov on October 16, 1938, he wrote:

We must expect…an imminent and undoubtedly unofficial and indirect initiative by the Kremlin to approach Berlin… It is obviously difficult to know what the offers and the response will be. Yet I can see only one proposal susceptible of awakening Germany’s greed, and that is a division of Poland.
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Based on information gathered by the SR, the army’s
Deuxième Bureau
was even more explicit: “The possibility of a secret German-Soviet agreement toward a division of Poland requires our attention.”
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This message is only the first in a long series coming with increasing frequency from the embassies in Berlin and Moscow, as they got closer to August 1939. Of particular interest were the commercial negotiations between the Soviets and Germans that Dr. Schnurre was directing for Berlin. On January 27, 1939, Payart still believed that they would not extend beyond the economic area.
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Naggiar mentioned the issue on February 22 following a conversation with Litvinov.
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Vaux-Saint-Cyr, the chargé d’affaires in Berlin, reported on April 22 that “some Hitlerian officials” have said that “after all Germany could seek an understanding
with Russia at Poland’s expense and offer a share of that country to the Soviets.”
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