France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (25 page)

Laval met with the British at Stresa, where the development of security in Eastern Europe was discussed. The British were even hopeful of getting Germany to join some kind of Eastern Pact. Laval, however, went to Geneva right after Stresa, where he made a statement to the Council on April 16 that was opposed to the German position. France, Great Britain and Italy passed a resolution condemning Germany’s “unilateral action.” And so the Eastern Pact faded, as Barthou had already foreseen, in favor of a Franco-Soviet pact. But in contrast to Barthou—and the difference was considerable in itself—Laval was attempting to weaken the pact by requesting that mutual assistance be subjected to a decision of the Council of the League of Nations. Litvinov was not too favorable to that statement but accepted it grudgingly. On April 19, at another cabinet meeting, Laval read his draft text. Herriot was more or less satisfied and “pleased to see Laval happily changing in the right direction.”

The cabinet approved, despite some misgivings coming from President Lebrun, who pointed out the absence of common borders between Germany and the USSR and had doubts about the value of the Red Army. Minister of War General Maurin shared this opinion. It is worth noting that Louis Marin, even though he was a right-wing politician supported the pact and the military agreements.
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The issue that everyone worried about concerned the internal repercussions such a treaty would have. Wouldn’t it encourage communist propaganda, especially in the army? On the other hand, was it not a way of pressuring the French Communist Party into toning down its permanent and violently anti-militarist campaign? The Cabinet approved and authorized Laval to sign, but a last minute problem cropped up and delayed the signing by two full weeks. The Quai d’Orsay (most probably influenced by Léger) thought the wording was much too automatic and added another clause stating that to come to the help of the other party, it would be required to wait for the recommendations of the League of Nations. On April 30 Herriot intervened between Laval and Potemkin, saying, “The Russians want to take us further than we wish to go.” Like Barthou earlier, they wanted a real alliance with a military agreement, something much too precise for Laval, who preferred things to be kept vague. In convoluted language that is not easy for the layman to understand, the two countries promised:

1. To consult one another in the event of the threat of war or danger of aggression;

2. To come to one another’s immediate aid and assistance in case of unprovoked aggression “according to the conditions described in article 15 paragraph 7 of the Covenant of the League of Nations”; and

3. To come to one another’s immediate aid and assistance acting under article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Furthermore, article 4 stated that nothing would prevent the fulfillment of the mission of the League of Nations, and an additional protocol interpreted article 3 as allowing help and assistance, even if the council hadn’t made any recommendations.

The treaty would in no way contradict already existing commitments toward third-party states. The possibility of entering into an Eastern Pact was also mentioned.

On May 2 Laval and Potemkin signed this masterpiece of confusion in Paris. Any international law expert can find under any pretense twenty potential escape clauses. “Pactomania” had never reached such heights of hair splitting niceties.

On May 7 Laval provided the Cabinet with some explanations and decided to travel to Moscow on May 13, 14, and 15. Léger and Rochat, as well as Ambassador Alphand, of course, went with him. He met with Stalin, Molotov and Litvinov. They were given a friendly and elaborate welcome. Stalin was jovial and his French counterpart liked him. The
final communiqué approved of the treaty, but at Laval’s request, a sentence was added: “Mr. Stalin understands and fully approves of the national defense policy France is pursuing so that her armed forces are at the level of strength her security requires.” Those words, said Herriot, were to cause “strong reactions within extreme left groups.” But the communists immediately halted their attacks on the army, which was the desired outcome.

Laval traveled from Moscow to Warsaw to attend the funeral of Marshal Pilsudski, where he joined Marshal Pétain the official representative of the French government. He also met with Göring with whom he had a long talk, witnessed by Léger and Rochat. Göring came right out saying that Germany was opposed to the Franco-Soviet pact. Hitler would say so publicly in a long speech on May 21. It signaled the beginning of a long dispute. We shall examine its consequences in the next chapter. Scott correctly contrasts the “bold policies” of Barthou to the “subtle policies” of Laval.

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The British had watched Barthou’s bold moves with considerable amazement. He was determined, in spite of their negative reaction, to pursue his goal of a Franco-Soviet rapprochement that would include an alliance. Laval, on the other hand, reverted to the old ways, which meant that in spite of having rather different objectives, he followed the tradition of Franco-British entente. The British persevered with their plans for European reconciliation, which meant bringing Germany back to Geneva and reopening disarmament negotiations. That was the “great task of 1935” and it implied that France would have to “swallow a bitter pill” with the cancellation of part V of the treaty of Versailles concerning German disarmament.
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The French stood by the memo of April 17, 1934; such negotiations appeared superfluous to them. They were irritated to see that London held them responsible for German rearmament. A “negative” responsibility seemed insignificant compared to the obvious “positive” intentions of Hitler to arm himself to the teeth. They disliked seeing England so determined to play mediator between their country and Nazi Germany.
What they wanted was to get the British to back Democracy vs. Dictatorship, which appeared to be a distant, but strong desire.

French attempts at a rapprochement with Germany and Italy were viewed by London as good marks for France. But there were bad marks as well, for example, when the French openly rejoiced at Japan’s decision to withdraw from the 1922 naval disarmament agreement signed in Washington.

There was a strange clash during this episode between the French navy, supported by minister of the navy, F. Piétri, and Pierre Laval. Laval said: let’s wait until Japan actually pulls out of the treaty. If the Japanese do nothing by December 31, 1934, we can state that the Washington agreement is not satisfactory to us.
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The naval officers replied that this was a cowardly attitude. Captain Decoux told the naval attaché in London, “I strongly feel that it’s shameful for a great power (which I assume we still are) to hide behind Japan in as crucial an issue as the Washington agreement for our naval policy.”
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In the end, France let Japan take the initiative, but the British were to complain about it.

The Ethiopian affair progressively overshadowed this background. Until May 1935 it didn’t yet appear to be “virulent.” The British were still going after their perpetually unfinished grand design, namely, the attempt to restart disarmament talks. At this time the key moment was Prime Minister Flandin’s trip to London with Laval on February 1 to 3, 1935. Léon Noël, General Secretary of the Government, René Massigli, Ambassador Charles Corbin and his councilor Roland de Margerie, also accompanied them. Léon Noël has written a vivid and revealing account of that meeting.
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According to him, Flandin and Laval were not very well prepared for a discussion. Noël was flabbergasted to hear the British propose a debate on the final communiqué: “The negative effect of such an approach was obvious. It would force the participants to focus much more on the effect the statement was to have rather than on the issues themselves.” And the issues were important enough: German rearmament and the threat to Austria.

Noël noticed the extremely friendly attitude toward France on the part of Baldwin and even of Eden. Baldwin would soon become prime minister. He could also see that the British were “shocked” by Laval’s bad manners.

The main issue being debated was the British proposal for an “Air Force Pact” that was intended to acknowledge but limit German rearmament as well. The French experts had come with impressive files regarding
German rearmament. The British preferred reaching an agreement to just filing a complaint. We must recognize that either method was useless with Hitler.

Once Hitler made his massive rearmament “official” on March 16, Sir John Simon became momentarily discouraged. However, he shrugged it off and—as we have seen previously—the French had the unpleasant surprise of finding out that he was nevertheless going to take his planned trip to Berlin. This all goes to show the vast misunderstanding that permeated Franco-British relations.

The Ethiopian issue would complicate everything. We shall recall that it really began when, after several border incidents, a more serious one took place on December 5, 1934, at Ual Ual.
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It was an Ethiopian attack on a unit of Italian colonial troops in the Ogaden, an Ethiopian territory that Mussolini’s army had been occupying for several years. The importance was not in the incident itself but Mussolini’s determination to find an excuse for a vast colonial conquest.

Bodard, the French minister at Addis Ababa, sent many interesting cables on the Ual Ual matter and its consequences. “If Ethiopia doesn’t bend the conflict could get bigger.”
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But during the Franco-Italian romance and whatever Laval may have told Mussolini during the Rome meetings, the main point for France was to get Ethiopia to give in with apologies, payments for damages, etc., and, above all, once Ethiopia tried to file its complaint with the League of Nations to “avoid getting the League of Nations, council involved.”
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And do as little as possible about anything else. Once the British offered to act as mediators, they asked the French to join them. Laval politely turned down the offer that, as Léger explained, “was meaningless following the Rome agreements” where we had reaffirmed our respect of Ethiopia’s independence.
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Just as when the Ethiopian minister to Paris requested France’s support, he was told, “It looks as if the main role is to be played by the British delegation.”
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Parker has aptly characterized this policy: “The easiest solution was to let the Italians, the League of Nations, the British and the Ethiopians handle the Ethiopian problem while expressing support to everyone involved. Unfortunately Mussolini and the British government made such a solution impossible.”
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The conflict kept on growing without the French government—anxious to keep its “special relationship” with Italy—making any serious contribution. At the beginning of November, Italian troops garrisoned in Eritrea and Somalia were estimated at 8,500.
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By February 15 the
French consuls and the deputy military attaché, Catoire, signaled the mobilization of the class of 1911 and the creation of two divisions.
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On the 16th Suvich stated that those divisions were meant to be sent to Eritrea, while Marshal Graziani was appointed commander in chief in Africa.
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From then on every week would bring troop transports and warships through the Suez Canal—which the British couldn’t close because of the 1888 agreement.

Yet it was still possible not to believe the worst would happen and the Stresa conference in April took place without Ethiopia being mentioned even once.

As we have seen, it was on May 19 that Mussolini told the British ambassador that he intended to have it out with the Negus. From then on the British could no longer keep the issue “in brackets” as they had done at Stresa. We shall not describe in detail the momentous events in Great Britain in June:

1. The change of government: Baldwin replaced Macdonald as prime minister, Sir Samuel Hoare took over at the Foreign Office from Sir John Simon; Anthony Eden became minister for League of Nations affairs;

2. A huge newspaper poll called the “Peace Ballot” brought some 12 million responses in favor of strong action by the League of Nations against the aggressors but short of war (the results were published on June 27); and

3. The British-German naval agreement of June 18, 1935, whereby the British unilaterally allowed Germany, the Treaty of Versailles notwithstanding, the right to build a fleet equal to 35 percent of their own. They had informed the French but didn’t ask for their views. A strong complaint was therefore issued.
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What policies were being considered to counter the threat? In absolute terms two possible positions emerge:
resistance
and
appeasement
. Resistance meant starting the collective security process in the event Italy were to attack Ethiopia. Aggression would be acknowledged and the League of Nations would decide on sanctions—military if there was the will, but in any case economic and financial. Appeasement, by contrast, meant an effort to avoid war or put an end to it once it had started by offering enough to satisfy Italy while preserving Ethiopian independence. There were many possible solutions but they were divided into two groups: either the concession to be made to Italy of a more or less large portion of Ethiopia; or the establishment over all of Ethiopia of a sort of League of Nations mandate that would be given to Italy. It
was a device to accept Italy’s protectorate over a country that Mussolini was coveting.