France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (24 page)

The Quai d’Orsay answered on January 26
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that “it wasn’t at all opposed to military conversations.” But it wished to find out beforehand about Italy’s attitude towards appeasing Yugoslavia and including Czechoslovakia in the planned consultations. In other words, the French were in less of a hurry than the Italians. During a meeting with Parisot on January 29, Badoglio told him that he’d met with Mussolini the day before: “Did Parisot give you an answer?—No, but I’m expecting one any day.—When you see him, you must ask him the general question; we must be prepared with High Command agreements, as to what we want to do in case of
German mobilization.
” Parisot explained the French position and said that he would go to Paris. Badoglio went beyond what he said on January 12 and spoke of the case of German aggression against France,
which implied Italian intervention. He also discussed the possibility of German mobilization and of riots within Austria, with or without German intervention. The discussions “are clearly starting,” said Badoglio and added, “Nothing could be more pleasant to him as the crowning of his career than to be able to seal an agreement that he had always vigorously supported.”
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Laval explained his policies on February 20 to the High Military Committee.
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During a meeting on January 23 he had stated that: “at this time Italy is offering more than its neutrality.” On February 20 he would be much more precise: “It’s important not to answer Rome’s advances too quickly. We must keep the conversations going and Marshal Badoglio hoping that they will reach a conclusion…our position with Italy is excellent, she’s ready for every military, naval and economic agreement; but we must be cautious with Belgrade.”

It must be pointed out that General Maurin, the Minister of War, felt that such conversations were useful and were coming at the right time.

Returning from Paris, Parisot met with Badoglio on February 21 and mentioned “the urgency felt in Paris to consider military discussions” but also that “such decisions couldn’t be taken as quickly in France as in Italy due to the differences in our institutions.”
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General Roatta, head of intelligence, told Parisot that he had “demobilized” Italian intelligence operations targeting France. For the time being, a French intelligence officer was sent to Rome.
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Parisot was complaining that everything was now “stalled.”

On March 12 the French government took the initiative and agreed to a preliminary discussion in Nice at the end of March or the beginning of April.
⁵⁴
By March 29 the discussions between Parisot and the Italians had made considerable progress. Five Italian officers were to be sent to French military schools. Both sides agreed to reduce their troops on the front in the Alps. The Italians preferred that Yugoslavia not intervene in Austria should the situation arise; however, they didn’t make it a requirement. They wished to go further and reach a “coalition plan.” France was once again slowing down the momentum.
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At that point there was a bolt from the blue—Germany announced it was reinstating conscription. The issue would play a role in politics for some time.

On March 22 there was a meeting of the High Military Committee in Paris,
⁵⁶
preceded by a memorandum regarding comparative military
strength of France and Germany,
⁵⁷
which was not known with any accuracy. It was “total darkness,” with “few tangible pieces of information,” wrote the author. The conclusion was that, at the start of a potential conflict, Germany would have an advantage that would then fade “because of our trained reserves”; but in the case of an extended war Germany would tend to take the lead because of its greater manpower and stronger industrial base.

Italy wasn’t viewed as an effective help. “The immediate assistance of Great Britain must be sought and organized.”

During the meeting of the High Military Committee, Laval brought up a phone call to Mussolini a few days before. “What Marshal Badoglio wants is to get a military commitment from us regarding Austria.” Laval didn’t like to consider such commitments. “Let’s be cautious,” he said.

So France was once more basing its entire strategy on Great Britain while ignoring the pressing calls of the Italians for what could be referred to as an alliance. At another meeting of the High Military Committee on April 5 there were fewer political discussions and the focus was on strategic matters. Pétain and Gamelin felt that France could not engage in a ground offensive without a long delay and, therefore, could only rely on naval or air operations unable to produce decisive results.
⁵⁸

It was against this background that the Stresa conference got under way on April 11–14, 1935, in the magnificent palace of the Isola Bella, the largest of the Borromee Islands. Léon Noël, who took part as secretary general of the French government provided the best available account on the French side. He took very detailed notes and devoted the central chapter of his book,
Les Illusions de Stresa
,
⁵⁹
to the conference. Flandin, Laval, Léger and Noël were involved in the negotiations. The British side included Prime Minister Ramsay Macdonald, Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon and the “Permanent Undersecretary,” Sir Robert Vansittart. Eden was not present. Mussolini had Suvich and Baron Aloisi along with him. Léon Noël considered Mussolini to be a “vulgar” man but with amazingly insightful views. He was “simple, natural and in a good mood” with the French and formal, “stiff, with the attitude of a conquering and domineering
imperator
,” toward the British. “What drew Laval and Mussolini toward one another at the time…was their shared antipathy towards England and I must add their misunderstanding of the British.” Macdonald was “tall, distinguished looking, self-assured and vain…”
⁶⁰
“His mental faculties were beginning to fail him,” said
Churchill.
⁶¹
Sir John Simon “between the two was clearly breaking every record for hypocrisy and underhandedness.” For the most part the French received a warm welcome from the Italian crowds.

The French proposed to submit a complaint to the Council of the League of Nations against the violation of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany with sanctions in case of a second violation. Mussolini agreed mindful of the Anschluss. The British refused. “Pacifist utopias” was Léon Noël’s comment… There was no real front at Stresa because of that issue, despite what was claimed. As military documents we cited were to demonstrate, Mussolini was “smoldering with rage…at Germany,”
⁶²
and would have wanted that kind of front. Mussolini spoke in favor of defending Austria and mentioned the development of the German air force.

Sir John Simon and Macdonald stated that they had promised the House of Commons to make no commitments.
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They would only be associated “from a moral point of view.” Flandin and Laval would have agreed to go much further but “for the sake of unanimity that makes almost everyone of those conferences pointless they wound up adopting the British viewpoint.”
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The final statement was therefore vague and very disappointing to Mussolini.

Ethiopia was not mentioned once during the seven meetings of the conference nor even in private conversation, according to Kirkpatrick.
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There was only a short private talk between Flandin and Mussolini and none between the Duce and Laval. It is possible that Mussolini felt he had been tacitly given a free hand for his Ethiopian ambitions when, coming to the final draft of the closing resolution, he spoke of “keeping the peace” and proposed adding “in Europe.” Later on he would paraphrase the anecdote, saying that Flandin made some comments on the wording in that he understood Mussolini’s decision “to make no commitments regarding Africa.” Flandin mentioned it later on in his memoirs.
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According to Noël, the adding of “in Europe” was agreed to without any discussion, possibly because the French and British didn’t think the Italians intended to go so far as to conquer Ethiopia.

The sense that war was possible came when, on May 19, Mussolini told the British ambassador that he had decided to solve the Ethiopian problem by force of arms if necessary.
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Actually, this progression of the Ethiopian issue did not prevent France from concluding the military
discussions with the Gamelin-Badoglio meeting of June 27 in Rome. We should note that the Flandin government had been toppled in the interim and Laval had replaced him as prime minister while remaining foreign minister as well. Was there a pro-Italian tilt in his policies? We should not forget that on August 20, Pierre Laval’s only daughter, Marie-José, married Count René de Chambrun, son of the general and nephew of the ambassador to Rome. Perhaps Fabry, the new minister of war, played a private role as well. Perhaps a strong anti-British mood appeared because of the naval agreement Britain signed with Germany on June 16 without consulting France.

In any case, after meeting with the military leaders of the Little Entente Gamelin traveled to Rome with lieutenant colonel Petitbon, who headed his cabinet (General Parisot was naturally also present at those meetings). He received a very warm welcome since he had met Badoglio previously in Brazil. The talks were “cordial and even affectionate,” involving only ground troops with no mention of the Anschluss and the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. “The decision to march in agreement with France had been irrevocably taken” by Mussolini. In the event of German aggression in Belgium or on the Rhine, Italy would send in nine divisions and some air force units. In case Germany attacked Italy, France would commit an army corps with two divisions. Then Gamelin, with Petitbon and Parisot, met with Mussolini, who clearly stated his intention of “solving the problem between myself and the Negus,” which—he added—would not prevent Italy from remaining strong on the Brenner Pass.
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Gamelin and Badoglio met one last time. The former suggested that Italy remain in the League of Nations, while the latter stated that Laval had given his country a free hand in Ethiopia. No truly final agreement was signed, only a record of the conversation.
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One may say that this was the high point of the Franco-Italian rapprochement. Even though no agreement was signed, it was at least clear that Mussolini favored a real alliance. Laval, however, for a multitude of reasons, did not want to go the rest of the way. The signs of the coming Ethiopian conflict were to darken the budding romance during the course of the summer. Yet Gamelin was to welcome Badoglio in September at French army maneuvers. The Italian Marshal expressed his “admiration for our defensive organization in the East as well as the strong showing of our troops.”
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3.

A S
MALL
S
TEP
T
OWARDS THE
USSR

Laval’s secretary, Alfred Mallet, felt that “Laval, the former revolutionary, wasn’t displeased to sign an agreement with a “proletarian” democracy. The word doesn’t scare him at all.”
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Yet the revolutionary was a man of the right and the treaty he was drafting was to be signed only after being stripped of everything Barthou wanted it to contain. One may legitimately wonder about the role played by internal politics in his decisions. The pact was dated May 2; Laval’s trip to Moscow took place from May 13 to 15; the Flandin government fell on May 30. Laval wanted to be his successor and would succeed in doing so. As of November 10, during a “useful and friendly” meeting,
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Laval assured Litvinov that the French government was committed to the policy, implying “the mutual assistance of France and Russia.”
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On November 23 radical socialist deputy Archimbaud, the chairman of the war budget committee, referred to the Franco-Soviet agreement as practically sealed in a speech at the Chamber of Deputies.
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Wasn’t it a military alliance after all?
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The French government issued a denial that displeased Litvinov. As long as the negotiations were ongoing, Litvinov wanted some guarantees.

On December 5, 1934, Laval and Litvinov met in Geneva and signed a protocol that was satisfactory to Litvinov. They agreed to avoid entering into any political pact that could risk compromising the Eastern agreements and to keep each other informed. This was intended to “contribute in general to reinforcing the spirit of mutual trust in government relations between the two countries.”
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Negotiations proceeded very slowly. Minister of Commerce Marchandeau went to Moscow at the end of November 1934 to revise the temporary commercial agreement of January 11, 1934. This failed because the USSR demanded a loan of 2 billion francs that France did not want to extend. The 1934 agreement was therefore cancelled.

Among all the government ministers, Edouard Herriot was the most interested and favorable to negotiations with the USSR. In his memoirs,
Jadis
, he conveniently provides some brief glimpses of cabinet discussions at the time. Herriot believed in the power of the Red Army and followed with interest Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense Tukhachevsky’s speech on January 30. “An agreement with the Soviet
Union is our best, our strongest guarantee,” but opposition remained very strong. “It makes me angry to see that the French press and public opinion are refusing to abide by this tremendous event. Every time I mention the Red Army in a speech I hear insults.”
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From the end of February to the beginning of April 1935 Franco-Soviet negotiations made no progress. The German rearmament coup was monopolizing everyone’s attention. But, as Scott points out, it forced Laval to speed up negotiations with the Soviets. The issue came up at the beginning of April. At a cabinet meeting on April 6, just before the Stresa conference, Laval—who was probably thinking that the Eastern Pact was now dead—spoke of “a multilateral non-aggression and consultation pact with bilateral mutual assistance pacts” and he read the text of a draft of a bilateral pact that he had offered to Ambassador Potemkin. The pact mentioned the League of Nations very frequently in order to avoid excessive
automatism
within the alliance.
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Potemkin was not very satisfied. During the April 9 cabinet meeting Laval was more specific: “Whatever happens at Stresa we will sign a bilateral mutual assistance pact with the USSR.”
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The government agreed and Laval would first have to consult with England and Poland.