France and the Nazi Threat: The Collapse of French Diplomacy 1932-1939 (22 page)

The strongest opposition came from the monarchist or pro-fascist far right, where
L’Action Française
was the most vocal. All of its star writers took part. Jacques Bainville ironically voiced the fact that France “must go to war singing
May God Save Stalin
.”
¹⁵⁴
J. Le Boucher, who filled in when Bainville went on vacation, used the same arguments as
Le Matin
—Russia was no ordinary nation.
¹⁵⁵
Finally, the polemicist Léon Daudet stated in a series of articles
¹⁵⁶
that he was not surprised to see Barthou, “a well-known sex maniac of record, who recovered and fell once again, therefore an unbalanced person,” along with “the more than shady Saint-Léger,” engaging in such a destructive policy. “An alliance that is a triple disaster that will cost us our colonies,
Indochina in particular
, just to please Karl Marx.”
¹⁵⁷
“For anyone who knows Barthou, the Soviet operation is a move tied to internal politics…his goal is to become Prime Minister…he wants to attract Herriot’s leftists, a grotesquely pro-Soviet character, to the Red Front of Blum-Cachin…” “The alliance with the Soviets is, under any circumstances, an insane undertaking.”
¹⁵⁸
We should add this strange point, made by the leader of integral nationalism, that the very large Red Army lacked qualified staff officers. She wanted the alliance to bring in French instructors, possibly even a general, to play the same role as Weygand in Poland in 1920.

Pierre Gaxotte, like Daudet, was full of irony in
Je Suis Partout
, regarding the weakness of the Red Army, “The silly point is being made repeatedly that the Soviets are a force for peace. Lies! They are a powerless [force] for war.” The same thinking appeared in less vivid terms in
Le Journal
and
Les Débats
(Pierre Bernus).

* * * *

Barthou, who knew French public opinion well, was aware that a vast majority approved the increasing rapprochement with the USSR. But he wasn’t pushed into the alliance by public opinion or any pressure group. He came up with his plan alone, in secrecy and in close cooperation with Litvinov. It was even rather late (June 1934) when he asked for cabinet approval, but he had to consider the existing forces. Within the four groups we mentioned, Barthou knew there could be no opposition from the communists. He knew he never would gain the support of right-wing die-hards. He needed the backing of both the pacifist left and the right-wing realists and to break down their objections—that of the pacifists opposed to any alliance system, and that of the realists who opposed such a close rapprochement with the USSR. The method he used was clever—to wrap up the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance pact within the complicated machinery of the Eastern pact. Even though he harbored some illusions about Poland joining in, he could not imagine Germany considering it. The Polish and German refusal, therefore, brought down the entire fragile construction except for its solid base. The pact was reassuring to the supporters of “collective” security and, to those who were suspicious of the Soviet Union, that assemblage also appeared reassuring. The Eastern pact may be viewed as a psychological tool to effect the deep change that Barthou wanted to bring to French policy. He died too soon.

Chapter IV

T
HE
L
AVAL
E
RA

B
arthou’s death was the last straw for the Doumergue government, which was barely surviving. Flandin became prime minister on November 8, 1934. However, Pierre Laval had already taken over Barthou’s position as of October 13. Laval would remain as minister of foreign affairs for fifteen months. What was the reason for such a choice? Laval had some experience of the Quai d’Orsay during his brief time as prime minister in 1932. In October 1931 he had traveled to the United States where everyone, including President Hoover and Secretary of State Stimson,
¹
found him charming. Herriot, Tardieu and Piétri all wanted the job but Doumergue preferred Laval. Less flashy that the two state ministers, he was much more popular, providing better continuity, it was believed, to Barthou’s policies. Flandin kept him on in November, as he later wrote,

As far as I was concerned I was determined to pursue Mr. Barthou’s foreign policy. In many ways it didn’t match that of Monsieur Laval. But I didn’t find it inconvenient because Monsieur Laval’s policy of rapprochement between France and Germany would shield me from my ultra-pacifist pro-German Anglo Saxon critics and allow
me to pursue not the policy of encirclement of Germany but rather that of opposition to German ambitions.
²

But was that really the case? Flandin was writing after the experience of Vichy where Laval had obviously become the “collaborator” with the Nazis. This was not the case in 1934 when, on October 30, the new minister told the Chamber that for the most part he intended to follow the policies of his predecessor.

Let us just say that Laval had promoted himself vigorously. He had the unanimous support of all the major Parisian morning and evening newspapers. He was reassuring. As Claude Jeantet wrote in
Le Petit Journal
, “His diplomacy follows two guidelines: he is wedded to the French earth by his entire being but his ardent patriotism blends with a mystical belief in peace.”
³
The chief editor of
Le Petit Journal
happened to be Alfred Mallet, who would later become Laval’s secretary and biographer.
⁴
The paper’s owner, Raymond Patenôtre, was an extremely wealthy politician, and very close to Laval. He owned four major regional dailies and many local newspapers, all of them supporting Laval.

Furthermore, the ties between Flandin, Laval and Patenôtre were not just personal. They truly represented the right-oriented business groups in power, and were driven more by the pressure of interests than by ideas. The French General Secretary of the League of Nations, Avenol, in a long report from late January 1935, described the new team as “neo-opportunist.” He quoted radical-leaning writer Albert Thibaudet in calling them “post-war industrialists.” Following the short-lived Doumergue period, the industrialists had regained their influence,

In a shaky regime with a dislocated majority and a weak or accommodating government with easy access to the offices and commissions wouldn’t they be able to seize power at the source and channel the national economy to serve their interests?… Laval was to carry out their foreign policy.

In seven months under Barthou a new policy had been launched, no longer consisting of empty words, but backed by action. Laval “
had to first gently cushion the Barthou experiment
.”
⁵
[Emphasis added.]

There is little doubt that Avenol’s anti-Laval insights came to him as a top official of an international organization, from the fact that Barthou had strengthened the Geneva organization. It was well known that Laval
disliked the League of Nations, the followers of Briand at the Quai d’Orsay and Alexis Léger in particular.
⁶
Laval brought into his cabinet Léon Noël, the minister to Prague and a former staff member from 1931, who would make only brief appearances at the Quai d’Orsay.
⁷

Laval was very intelligent but he was also more cunning than competent. He wasn’t a man of clear-cut decisions but rather “everybody’s friend.” To one “good old alliance” like Barthou wanted, he opted for half a dozen
almost-but-not-quite
alliances. He preferred imprecision. There was a total contrast with Barthou and we shall have no problem in proving it.

It is clearly impossible to interpret all of French history during the 1930s through the murder of Barthou. Doesn’t the fact that France went from a policy of firmness to one lacking any substance demonstrate that the country was uniquely predisposed to easy solutions? Laval was extremely popular in France in the fall of 1934 and would become extremely unpopular in 1935 as the man of government by decree. Abroad he was constantly accommodating everybody.

1.

A S
MALL
S
TEP
T
OWARDS
G
ERMANY

Fifteen years after the Treaty of Versailles was implemented, a plebiscite was to take place in the Saar—on January 13, 1935. The population of the Saar was offered three choices: to be incorporated into Germany; into France or to retain its international status. Even though Tardieu in his 1919 report had mentioned 50,000 residents of the Saar who felt they belonged with France, it was very clear that the population of the Saar was German. The option of becoming part of France was in effect not even considered. On the other hand, since Germany had become Nazi, the National Socialist Party had brutally eliminated all other political parties. It was a reasonable possibility that the Saar, being 72% Catholic with many socialists and a large number of refugees, could opt in favor of the international solution, versus incorporation into Germany, as a temporary measure.

The League of Nations had been careful to take every precaution to guarantee freedom of choice for the people of the Saar, despite the awesome propaganda and pressure by the Nazis at every level. Since France had never accepted giving back the territory ahead of time and without a
plebiscite, the outcome of the vote had to be clear. The Council of the League of Nations had set up a three-member commission headed by an Italian diplomat, Baron Pompeo Aloisi, to oversee the entire operation. He was the head of Mussolini’s cabinet and “the vivid image of a Venetian Doge of the golden age.”
⁸
France was, therefore, not directly involved and had also signed an agreement with Germany on June 2, 1934, whereby the two countries pledged not to influence the voters directly or indirectly.

On August 31, 1934, Barthou had sent a memorandum to the League, listing the guarantees France required should the Saar vote to return to Germany. The main point concerned the coalmines that were under a French consortium since the Treaty of Versailles. There would also have to be a number of assurances, since the Saar was within the demilitarized zone, that regular German army units would not be brought in, that the police forces would be limited, that no military forts nor airports would be built and even that the large number of “loading docks,” dating back to Kaiser Wilhelm II, would be destroyed, on the railway network.

It was reasonable to assume—and this was Barthou’s policy—a financial effort backing those in favor of the status quo to pressure Hitler and secure meaningful compensation. The majority of the French public was indifferent to the matter.
⁹
A few right-wing newspapers—
Le Figaro, L’Action Française
—were campaigning against incorporation into Germany for nationalistic reasons. A large part of the left-wing press, being against Hitler, reacted the same way. A few Catholic circles, as well as Count Jean de Pange,
¹⁰
originally from the Lorraine, was also particularly active with the support of the Vatican envoy, Monsignor Panico. There was also a French Association of the Saar, and some important industrial interests—mainly de Wendel and Peyerimhoff—were also involved. Peyerimhoff was pessimistic. “National passions will blow away all the road blocks,” he told de Pange.
¹¹
François de Wendel was still very hopeful. In discussing the issue on July 12 and October 15 the
Comité des Forges
was not as firm and would be ready to accept “an agreement allowing a franchise in France for some Saar residents.”
¹²

What could Laval do? At first he may have been attracted to the de Pange project to offer the people of Saar, if they voted for the status quo, ownership of all or part of the mines run by the consortium. However, he quickly went much further. He didn’t know much about the Saar, which was of no interest to him. Why not do the gentlemanly thing and simply bow out? In the course of two meetings on November 16 and 24, 1934,
de Wendel unsuccessfully attempted to get him to take a firm attitude. On November 7 Laval met with German Ambassador Köster, stating that, in his opinion, the Saar was 100 percent German and should return to Germany “as fast as possible.”
¹³
It was a policy of abandonment. Wendel viewed it as the result of the poisonous influence of blatantly pro-German elements such as François de Brinon and Jean Goy.
¹⁴

The situation, however, became clear only at the beginning of December. The Germans still feared the many French gendarmes stationed in Lorraine, and an effort was underway in the newspapers accusing France of seeking to grab the territory by force of arms.
¹⁵

On November 15 Laval secured the approval of his policies from the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs, stating that he intended “to remain faithful to Mr. Barthou’s policies.”
¹⁶
A Franco-British proposal was accepted by the Council of the League of Nations in December for the police at the plebiscite to be handled by an international force controlled by the Committee of Three. This eased tension considerably as François-Poncet was to note.
¹⁷

France’s passive attitude contributed to enlarge Hitler’s spectacular success. On January 13, out of 528,053 voters, 2,124 chose becoming part of France; 46,613 chose to keep the status quo and 477,119, or 90% percent, voted to return to Germany. It was a “huge triumph” for the Führer, wrote François-Poncet.
¹⁸
As of January 17 the Council of the League of Nations decided to set the date for the reintroduction of German administration at March 1, 1935.

But was this the Franco-German rapprochement Laval hoped for with so little effort? In the short term, the answer was yes. During a speech on January 13, Hitler stated that he no longer had any territorial demands toward France. Laval, in a statement on January 17, “duly noted” those words and, as far as he was concerned, “the people of the Saar have freely chosen their future.” Out of humanitarian concern, France welcomed as political refugees those persons escaping from Nazi domination in the Saar. However, he wanted a rapprochement with Germany and proposed to reopen negotiations to include her in the Eastern pact. Hitler was said to have answered in January, “If France and Russia want a military alliance let them go ahead! But I don’t see why we need to play the role of fig leaf.”
¹⁹