Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (134 page)

During these months of increasing tension, the emperor’s thoughts were preoccupied by the possibility of war. He probably had little time to think of his family, although the crown prince’s behavior may have worried him. The prince was promoted in October (after two years in grade) to colonel in the army and captain in the navy. His military duties were minimal, but he traveled that month to Wakayama, Kagawa, Ehime, and Okayama Prefectures. In addition to the obligatory visits to schools and displays of local products, the crown prince enjoyed seeing Yashima, the site of the great battle between the Heike and the Minamoto, the hot springs at D
ō
go, and various temples. Before returning to T
ō
ky
ō
, he recuperated at his villa in Numazu.
³⁰

The education of his daughters continued to concern the emperor. Sasaki Takayuki, who was entrusted with the upbringing of Princesses Masako and Fusako, proposed at this time that science and classical Chinese be added to their studies. The emperor did not object to classical Chinese but thought that science was too elevated and might interfere with more necessary studies.
³¹
He also maintained that they needed most to study the geography of the world and European languages. Perhaps the emperor had in mind the possibility that one or more of his daughters might marry foreign princes, in the manner of European royalty.

The only novel feature of New Year’s Day 1904 was that because the crown prince and princess happened to be in T
ō
ky
ō
, they paid their respects to the emperor. They also held a court of their own for the first time.
³²
On the following day Konoe Atsumaro, the most promising member of the high nobility, died in his forty-second year. This must have been a particular blow to Meiji, who worried about the future role of the nobility in governing Japan.

On January 6 Rosen delivered to Komura the Russian response to the third set of Japanese proposals.
³³
The Russians still demanded the establishment of a neutral zone within Korea (but not within Manchuria) and insisted that the Japanese not use Korea for strategic purposes. If both these conditions were met, within Manchuria, Russia would not “impede Japan, nor other powers in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges acquired by them under existing treaties with China, exclusive of the establishment of settlements.”
³⁴
This was a concession, but the Japanese considered that the Russians had not responded to key issues and saw little reason to continue the negotiations.

On January 12 a conference attended by sixteen men, including
genr
ō
, cabinet members, and high-ranking army and navy officers, was held in the presence of the emperor. Although Katsura and Komura had concluded that there was no room for further negotiations and that the issue would have to be decided by military means, naval preparations for a war were not yet complete. The transports needed to carry men to the continent could not be assembled at Sasebo before the twentieth of the month. It would therefore be disadvantageous to Japan if war broke out earlier. Katsura had Komura prepare one last revised proposal; even if it failed to win Russian concessions, it would at least give the Japanese needed time before commencing hostilities.
³⁵

The final proposals opened with the request to suppress the clause in article 5 stating Japan was “not to use any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes” and to suppress all of article 6 concerning the establishment of a neutral zone. The Russian proposals concerning Manchuria would be modified to include an agreement by Russia to respect the territorial integrity of China in Manchuria.
³⁶

The Japanese could have had little hope that Russia would agree to these changes. The Russians found the language so provocative as to constitute an ultimatum that did not allow for further discussion. Their reply, as usual, was slow in coming. In the meantime, preparations were initiated by the Japanese for the war that would follow if negotiations broke down. On January 16 orders were given to the army to ready four battalions of infantry for transport to Inch’on, the port of Seoul. Japan planned to occupy Seoul and make it the center of operations during the war.
³⁷

On January 18 the annual lecture on European history delivered before the emperor was devoted to reading an extract from David Hume’s
History of England
describing the defeat of the Spanish Armada by the British, a curiously prophetic choice.
³⁸
The emperor’s
tanka
, composed on the theme of “Pines on the Rocks” at the first poetry meeting of the year, was ambiguous enough to be interpreted as a prayer of safety for Japan in the war that threatened.
³⁹

By this time, both Japan and Russia seem to have resigned themselves to war, but in France efforts continued to avert a conflict. The French were in a difficult position, being tied to Russia by an alliance but having recently become close also to England, an enemy of Russia and an ally of Japan. The French had enormous investments in Russia that they were determined to preserve. On January 23 Maurice Paléologue, the deputy director of political affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Paris, wrote in his diary:

[Foreign Minister Théophile] Delcassé is skilfully continuing his efforts to bring St. Petersburg and T
ō
ky
ō
near together. He has hit upon certain ingenious formulae which would simultaneously solve both the Manchu and Korean problems. He has been equally skilful in exploiting the support he has managed to get from London. Lansdowne, Komura and Lams-dorf have been showering thanks upon him.

“I think I’m going to bring it off,” he said to me this morning.

His face was radiant and his eyes positively sparkled.

I told the Minister of the latest revelations which make me feel certain that Russia wants war, or at any rate is putting herself in a position to send Japan a threatening ultimatum which will almost inevitably result in war.

Delcassé’s face clouded over at once:

“You don’t expect me to believe
that
, do you? I’m corresponding daily with the Tsar. Only yesterday he thanked me for comprehending his views so well and working so hard in the cause of peace. And, according to you, he means war all the time! What next!”
⁴⁰

Delcassé was sure, on the basis of personal contacts, that Czar Nicholas II was extremely anxious to settle the quarrel between Japan and Russia by diplomatic means. But (as Paléologue elsewhere pointed out) he dreamed of extending his frontiers still farther and annexing not only Manchuria and Korea but also Tibet, Persia, and perhaps Turkey. Paléologue described the character of Nicholas II in these terms: “He is not very intelligent, but timid, credulous, slack, vacillating, very susceptible to occult influences…. And he lets himself be led by a gang of visionaries, speculators and filibusters who are absolutely set on war.”
⁴¹

Paléologue related how Nicholas II (whom he termed “shifty and a dissembler—like all weak creatures”) had got around ministers who opposed the collision course with Japan by creating the viceroyalty of the Far East without even consulting them. If the viceroy had been truly outstanding, the situation might have been remedied, but as Witte wrote of Admiral Alekseev, who during the ensuing war became commander in chief of the Russian armed forces, “he knew nothing about the army and little about the navy.” He had risen to eminence because when Grand Duke Alexis was interrogated by the police after behaving in a disorderly fashion at a Marseilles brothel, Alekseev had taken the blame, saying there had been a confusion between Alexis and Alekseev. The grateful grand duke, for this reason, recommended Alekseev as chief of the Kwantung region.
⁴²

It is astonishing that the czar chose such a man for a position of extraordinary importance. Witte attributed such unpredictable actions to Nicholas’s “feminine character,” quoting a remark that it was only by a whim of fate that Nicholas was born with the traits that distinguish male from female. Everyone who knew Nicholas said that he had fundamentally a good character and that he was passionately devoted to his wife and children, but his vacillation made him a difficult master to serve. His conviction that he derived his authority from God, to whom alone he was responsible, might account for his sense of the coming war with Japan as a holy mission. He was certain that Russia would win, even though it might require some effort.
⁴³

Nicholas was also under the influence of Wilhelm II of Germany. It is hard to imagine a worse influence. As early as April 1895, the kaiser wrote to his “cousin,”
⁴⁴
“I shall certainly do all in my power to keep Europe quiet and also guard the rear of Russia so that nobody shall hamper your action toward the Far East! For that is clearly the great task of the future for Russia to cultivate the Asian Continent and to defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow race. In this you will always find me at your side ready to help you as best I can.”
⁴⁵
Again and again in his letters to the czar, the kaiser vented his hatred of the Yellow Peril and his conviction that it was Russia’s mission to defend “the old Christian European culture against the inroads of the Mongols and Buddhism.”
⁴⁶
(In one letter, the kaiser sketched a drawing of the powers of Europe, represented by their respective genii called together by the Archangel Michael “to unite in resisting the inroad of Buddhism, heathenism and barbarism for the Defense of the Cross.”)
⁴⁷

“Willy,” as the kaiser signed his letters, had a vision of himself as admiral of the Atlantic and Nicholas as admiral of the Pacific. He encouraged Nicholas’s ambitions at every stage. On January 3, 1904, for example, he wrote, “It is evident to every unbiassed mind that Korea must be and will be Russian. When or how that is nobody’s affair and concerns only you and your country.”
⁴⁸

It is terrifying to realize that these two emperors were absolute masters of the lives of millions of their subjects. The third emperor to be involved in the approaching war, Meiji, was the only one deserving of his title.

As late as January 30, at an extraordinary council held in St. Petersburg, Foreign Minister Lamsdorf “vigorously and persistently emphasized that the present dispute in no way involves the vital interests of Russia and does not therefore justify the enormous risks of a war which, in any event, the Russian people would not understand. His conclusion was that the Tsar’s government should leave no stone unturned to find some peaceful solution of the crisis.”
⁴⁹
Lamsdorf was backed by all members of the council except Admiral Alexander Ageevich Abaza, described by Witte as a “knave and a scoundrel”
⁵⁰
—and a tool of the viceroy. Nicholas had allied himself with a band of political adventurers, and each day brought the opening of hostilities closer.

The Russian response to the Japanese “final” proposal was not approved by the czar until February 2. In the meantime, Komura repeatedly instructed Kurino to urge the Russians to reply promptly. Kurino reported that the Russians were stalling to gain time to strengthen military preparations.
⁵¹
On January 30 at a meeting in the prime minister’s residence, It
ō
drafted a memorandum stating that the time had come for Japan to reach a resolute decision. He was supported by all the
genr
ō
and cabinet ministers present. Two days later, the chief of the army general staff,
Ō
yama Iwao, advised the emperor that Japan should strike first.

The emperor’s most trusted advisers expressed no confidence about the outcome of a war but dwelled on only Japan’s desperate military and financial position. The army calculated that Japan had a fifty–fifty chance of winning a war; the navy expected that half its forces would be lost but hoped that the remaining half could destroy the enemy forces.
⁵²
Despite the pessimistic appraisal of Japanese chances, all the decision makers favored a war. They were convinced that it was futile to negotiate any further with the Russians, and they believed that the Russians were a serious threat to both Korea and Japan.

It is conceivable that if the Russian response to the Japanese fourth proposal had arrived earlier, the elimination of the clause “exclusive of the establishment of settlements” in the article concerning rights and privileges acquired by existing treaties from China might have induced the Japanese to reconsider the decision to open hostilities. But the message sent to Admiral Alekseev on February 3, which should have been received in T
ō
ky
ō
by February 4 or 5 at the latest, did not reach Baron Rosen until February 7.
⁵³

In the meantime, on February 3, at an audience with the emperor, Prime Minister Katsura and Foreign Minister Komura reported in detail why war with Russia was now inevitable. They asked him to summon a meeting of the
genr
ō
and cabinet ministers the next day and announce his decision. No Russian reply had been received, even after two weeks of waiting and numerous requests for prompt action. Katsura attributed this discourtesy to Russian contempt for the seeming Japanese lack of the will to fight. He advised that no more time be wasted.
⁵⁴
The Japanese minister in Paris was instructed to make no further attempt to obtain a reply from the Russian government.