Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (132 page)

When the emperor left Ky
ō
to to return to T
ō
ky
ō
on May 10, he was seen off by all the nobles and other great dignitaries. The visit had been a happy interlude, but two days later, back in T
ō
ky
ō
, the emperor learned from
Ō
yama Iwao, the chief of the general staff, of the critical situation developing in Korea. According to reports received from the army attaché in Korea, Russia had occupied Korean territory on the left bank of the Yalu River estuary and had begun to construct military facilities intended to block any Japanese advance. It was clear that the Russians had no intention of withdrawing from Manchuria;
Ō
yama believed that their aim was permanent possession of the three eastern provinces.

Ō
yama compared the relative military strength of Russia and Japan. Although the completion of the Trans-Siberia Railway had made it possible to transport Russian troops to East Asia more quickly than before, the railway was still not functioning adequately. All the same, troops would be steadily reinforced. At present, Russian naval strength was only about three-quarters that of the Japanese, but it was likely to surpass Japanese strength in a few years if current plans for expansion were completed.

In view of this situation,
Ō
yama concluded, Japan must act now in order to control the boundless greed of the Russians, to preserve the independence of China and Korea, and to maintain the rights of the Japanese. The longer Japan waited, the harder it would become to realize its objectives. If Japan yielded Manchuria to the Russians and allowed them to extend their long arms into Korean territory on the other side of the Yalu River, it would mean that Korean independence was no more and China was in danger. If these two countries perished, how could Japan alone hope to remain safe?

Ō
yama revealed that he had warned Korea of the Russians’ moves, but the Korean government was powerless to act, and the Japanese government therefore had no choice but to convey to the Russians its determined opposition.
⁴²

The emperor’s reactions to this report are not known, but surely he must have been startled by the likelihood that war with the most powerful country in the world was imminent. After the idyllic visit to Ky
ō
to where he had relived the past, he was suddenly faced with the shock of the present.

Chapter 53

On June 1, 1903, seven doctors of law sent Prime Minister Katsura Tar
ō
a memorial concerning Japan’s future policy with respect to Russia.
¹
The tone was hard-line, interpreting the current tension between Japan and Russia as the latest in a series of crises and all but calling for war if Russia failed to meet Japanese demands. Their arguments were typical of those expressed by many Japanese leaders during the following eight months of negotiations with Russia.

The first crisis, said the doctors of law, was occasioned by Japan’s inability after the Sino-Japanese War to retain the Liaotung Peninsula in the face of the demands of the three powers (Russia, Germany, and France); this was the ultimate cause of the present crisis in Manchuria. Next, Japan had lacked the sea power necessary to repulse the Germans when they were casting covetous eyes on Kiaochow Bay. If Japan had been able to prevent the Germans from seizing Chinese territory, the Russians would not have found it so easy to demand leases of Port Arthur and Dairen. Finally, the failure to establish a detailed schedule for the withdrawal of troops from Manchuria after the Boxer Rebellion had given the Russians the chance to procrastinate over their withdrawal.

The new crisis arose from the Russians’ failure to carry out the promised second phase of withdrawal. If Japan let this pass unquestioned, it would be tantamount to missing a golden opportunity for action. The seven doctors of law believed that Japan had already missed three such opportunities, and they were anxious not to let this happen again. They pointed out that Russia had steadily encroached on Manchuria, strengthening its position on land by building railways, ramparts, and batteries and, on the sea, by devoting immense efforts to its fleet. Recent reports made it clear that the purpose of these armaments was to intimidate Japan. Every day of delay increased the danger. Japan could maintain its military superiority for less than a year at the longest.

At present, they said, Russia could not match Japan militarily, but once the Russians felt confident in their forces, it could hardly be doubted that, not content with Manchuria, they would turn their attention to Korea. Once Korea was in their hands, it is obvious where they would look next. Unless the question of Manchuria was resolved, Korea was doomed, and if Korea was doomed, Japan could not hope to defend itself.

But there was hope for Japan; in fact, there was a Heaven-sent chance. The Russians still did not have a firm base of operations in the Far East. Japan had the geographic advantage. Forty million and more Japanese were as one in their secret hatred of Russian actions. If the Japanese failed to take advantage of these factors, the heritage from their ancestors would be endangered, and the happiness of their descendants would be destroyed.

The seven doctors, urging prompt action, rebutted those who said Japan must act cautiously in foreign relations, first studying the attitudes of England and America and the intentions of Germany and France. But the attitudes of these countries were clear. Although Germany and France would not support Japan, they also would not support Russia, because in accordance with Japan’s alliance with England, making an enemy of Japan meant making an enemy of Britain. And Britain would not be willing to face this danger for the sake of Manchuria. The Americans’ objective was the Open Door, and as long as the door was kept open, they did not care whether the sovereignty was Chinese or Russian; all that interested them was commercial profits. To wait for the Americans to make up their minds—to assume that they were Japan’s steadfast comrades in a foreign policy aimed at ensuring peace in the Far East and the security of China—would be to deprive Japan of its freedom to act.

People say that under no circumstances should Japan lose Korea. This is correct, but to protect Korea, Japan must not let Manchuria fall into the Russians’ hands. Therefore it is essential in diplomatic disputes that Japan not allow the Russians to limit the discussion to Korea, as if Manchuria were already acknowledged to be under Russian influence.

In legal terms, the seven doctors of law continued, Russia must withdraw its troops from Manchuria, which does not mean moving troops from place A to place B in Manchuria. The railway guards must also be withdrawn. Japan has the right to demand that Russia fulfill its part of the agreement. Above all, Japan must be wary of Russian politicians who with honeyed tongues propose an exchange of Manchuria for Korea or any similar temporizing measure. Japan must take definitive measures to solve fundamentally the problem of the return of Manchurian territory and to maintain peace in the Far East.

Although the seven doctors did not say so plainly, they obviously believed that Japan should present Russia with an ultimatum, and if the Russians refused to comply with Japanese wishes on Manchuria, Japan should declare war while it held the upper hand militarily.

The seven doctors had sympathizers, but war did not seem imminent. Soon after the presentation of this memorial, the Russian minister of war, General Alexis Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, and nine other high-ranking officers who had made a tour of inspection of Vladivostok and Port Arthur, visited Japan. They were treated as state guests and on June 13 had audiences with the emperor and empress. The luncheon given by the emperor for the Russian visitors and legation personnel was attended by Yamagata Aritomo,
Ō
yama Iwao, and members of the cabinet. On the same day Kuropatkin was decorated with the Order of the Rising Sun, First Class, and members of his suite received lesser decorations. Kuropatkin’s visit, made by command of the czar, was for the purpose of observing the situation in Japan and learning Japanese intentions, but the Japanese felt honored.

The Japanese naturally avoided discussing military matters with the visiting Russians, but in casual conversations they expressed regret that the two countries were constantly opposed on questions relating to the Far East. Kuropatkin expressed the hope that war could be avoided and the situation dealt with peacefully. Before he left T
ō
ky
ō
to return to Russia, he conveyed the czar’s verbal message to the emperor: “Your country, unlike other countries, is a neighbor, and for this reason I hope that the relations between our two countries will be particularly close. I hope also, now that the Siberian Railway has been completed, that our future relations will be increasingly intimate.”
²

Despite these friendly words, the war parties in both countries became ever more vociferous. On June 22
Ō
yama Iwao, the chief of the general staff, expressed his conviction to the emperor that the question of Korea urgently required settlement, by military force if necessary. He submitted to the cabinet on the same day a written opinion declaring that if Japan let things take their natural course, the Korean peninsula would become Russian territory in three or four years. This would leave Japan with nothing more than narrow strip of water separating it from a country that was as ferocious as a tiger or a wolf.
Ō
yama favored efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement with Russia through negotiations, but if, unfortunately, war broke out, the Japanese army was a fair match for the Russian army. Now was the best time to settle the Korean question in such a way as to guarantee national security for a hundred years.
³

On June 23 at the request of Katsura and Komura, the emperor summoned nine of the country’s outstanding men to discuss in his presence Japan’s future policy toward Russia.
⁴
Komura read a statement that, like the memorial by the seven doctors of law, declared that Russia’s failure to live up to its promise of withdrawing troops from Manchuria presented the Japanese with an opportunity for settling the Korean question, which had hung fire for several years. First of all, Komura insisted, Korea must not yield territory to Russia, regardless of the reasons. But some concessions might be made to Russia with respect to Manchuria, where it had the preponderance. He suggested that a conference be held in T
ō
ky
ō
.
⁵
Katsura was equally determined not to allow Russia to take any part of Korea, but he believed that if Korea were openly made a Japanese possession, this would invite a clash.

The Japanese minister in St. Petersburg was instructed to ask if the Russians were willing to attend a conference with the Japanese. However, the show of unity during the discussion before the emperor was deceptive. It
ō
’s party, the Seiy
ū
kai, though conciliatory on this occasion, continued its attacks on Katsura, especially concerning the property tax. On the following day Katsura invited It
ō
, Yamagata, and Navy Minister Yamamoto to his residence. He informed them that because he felt incapable of dealing with the crisis, he wished to resign his office. He believed that only a
genr
ō
was capable of assuming leadership and asked either It
ō
or Yamagata to form a cabinet. He himself, although he would withdraw to the sidelines, would cooperate in every way. It
ō
and the others protested, but Katsura nevertheless submitted his resignation, alleging illness.
⁶

No solution being found to this impasse, the matter (as so often) was left for the emperor to decide. He summoned Katsura and informed him that at a critical time, when negotiations were about to begin with the Russians on Korea and Manchuria, he could not permit the resignation. He urged Katsura to remain in office while recuperating from his illness.

On July 13 the emperor appointed It
ō
Hirobumi as president of the Privy Council. There can be little doubt that the emperor valued It
ō
’s opinions more highly than those of anyone else in the government. On July 6 he had sent for It
ō
to discuss relations with Russia. The emperor said that Japan might be on the brink of war with Russia over Manchuria and Korea. The prospects were by no means reassuring, and he wanted It
ō
to serve in the Privy Council so that he might advise him on major national issues. It
ō
asked for a few days to think it over. On the eighth, the emperor sent It
ō
a message in writing explaining that it was because he needed It
ō
’s frank opinions that he was imposing on him by asking him to take an additional position: “I have depended on and trusted your service over the years, and I hope that with your sound advice and faithful assistance we shall successfully accomplish the task ahead.”
⁷