Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (128 page)

Hoshi was not chastened by his time in prison. He continued publishing his illustrated newspaper and waited for the chance to reestablish the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
, which had been dissolved while he was incarcerated. However, in 1888 he was again arrested, this time on the charge of having published secret documents dealing with the negotiations over treaty revision. He was sentenced to a year and a half in prison and had no choice but to sell his newspaper.
²⁶

Hoshi spent his time in prison studying. It was by no means a good place to read books, but from the crack of dawn until nightfall, he read books written in Japanese, English, German, French, and Italian. He was pardoned and released in the amnesty celebrating the proclamation of the constitution in February 1889.

After leaving prison Hoshi traveled to America and Europe to study their political institutions. What this meant in practice was that wherever he went he visited bookshops, buying books that seemed useful and then shutting himself up in a cheap hotel room to read them. He scorned to imitate politicians like It
ō
Hirobumi, who boasted of having sat at the feet of Rudolf von Gneist, Lorenz von Stein, and other eminences. Hoshi said that these men were not as famous in Europe as in Japan and that it was ludicrous to give oneself airs just because one had heard them lecture.

Hoshi visited almost every country of Europe and North America. The journey seems to have changed him. He disappointed his former associates in the Freedom and Popular Rights movement by delivering a speech after his return to Japan in which he urged strengthening armaments,
²⁷
acquiring colonies, encouraging Japanese emigration, and starting an active Japanese propaganda campaign abroad.
²⁸
His experience abroad, or perhaps the books he read, seems to have opened his eyes to the realities of the world situation, and he talked in terms of power politics.

Once back in Japan, Hoshi threw himself into refounding the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
as the Rikken jiy
ū
-t
ō
. At the party convention in March 1891, Hoshi’s faction won control. In the second general election in February 1892, Hoshi was elected to the House of Representatives and (with Mutsu Munemitsu’s help) was chosen as president. Everyone expected that Hoshi would take advantage of his position to advance bills favored by the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
, but in fact he was scrupulously fair and did not favor members of his own party.
²⁹

Hoshi was soon at loggerheads with Matsukata, the prime minister, whose authority was derived from backers in the Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
domains. Hoshi’s arrogance also alienated many members of the House of Representatives. The politics of the time are confusing and need not be treated at length here; suffice it to say that Hoshi was accused of improprieties. He was able to prove his innocence of all charges, but this did not erase the impression that he was guilty; an aura of corruption has clung to him ever since.
³⁰
Hoshi was removed from his position as president of the House.

In 1896 Hoshi was appointed as minister to the United States, mainly (it has been conjectured) because Itagaki and others of the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
found him an embarrassment and wanted him out of the way.
³¹
His two years as minister were successfully spent in dealing with two crucial issues, the threatened rise in import duties on Japanese products and the effects on Japanese in Hawaii of the impending American annexation.

Hoshi was able to dissuade senators who favored the higher tariffs sponsored by the Republican administration.
³²
With respect to Hawaii, Hoshi was determined to secure from the Americans the concessions granted earlier to the Japanese by the Hawaiian monarchy. At one point he moved to an extreme position of advocating the annexation of Hawaii by Japan, even if this risked war with the United States.
³³
Ō
kuma Shigenobu, the foreign minister, rejected the proposal as being provocative, but Hoshi succeeded in obtaining a guarantee that Japanese residents of Hawaii would enjoy the same rights as citizens of European countries.
³⁴

When Hoshi learned of the formation of a new political party (the Kenseit
ō
), he decided to return at once to Japan, hoping for the post of foreign minister in the next cabinet. He telegraphed the ministry that he was returning, only to be ordered by the ministry to remain at his post. Although Hoshi paid no attention to this directive, he failed in the end to obtain the coveted post of foreign minister, mainly because of
Ō
kuma’s opposition.

Hoshi later helped organize the Seiy
ū
kai and, as the strongest figure within that party, was rewarded in 1900 with the post of minister of communications in the fourth It
ō
cabinet. This was not a major cabinet post, but never before had a man of Hoshi’s birth, without domain connections, been appointed to such an exalted position. In addition to being a member of the cabinet, Hoshi was elected in 1899 to the T
ō
ky
ō
Municipal Assembly and served as its presiding officer. It was widely believed that he ran the city government mainly for the profit of himself and his faction.
³⁵
This rumor was not substantiated, but he had clearly built up a political machine, and some of his underlings did not hesitate to use strong-arm methods. Hoshi himself did not profit by his alleged crimes. Despite accusations by the newspapers that he made a fortune out of government contracts, he left only debts when he died.

Hoshi was forced to resign in October 1900 as a member of the T
ō
ky
ō
Municipal Assembly and in December as minister of communications, although he insisted to the end that he had committed no wrongdoing. All the same, public indignation against him continued to mount, and in June a fencing teacher named Iba S
ō
tar
ō
, a devout believer in Confucian morality, was so enraged by the corruption he sensed in the government that he waylaid Hoshi and stabbed him to death.
³⁶

Many people unquestioningly believed the rumors of corruption, but there were also many who still admired Hoshi, and thousands of them followed the funeral cortege as it advanced to the solemn strains of music provided by a company of the emperor’s guards. Hara Takashi and Matsuda Masahisa, two major politicians of the next generation, headed the funeral committee, and Itagaki Taisuke gave the eulogy.
³⁷
Despite the accusations (and the bad reputation that has lasted to this day), Hoshi, more than any other man, had shaped the future of modern, Japanese-style party politics. The emperor promoted Hoshi to the junior third rank and posthumously bestowed on him the Order of the Sacred Treasure.
³⁸

The emperor was kept abreast of the controversy surrounding Hoshi T
ō
ru, and on occasion his decision was sought. Even after the House of Representatives had passed a vote of no confidence in November 1893, Hoshi continued to occupy the president’s chair. On December 2 the vice president, Kusumoto Masataka, visited the palace with a petition reporting to the emperor the vote of no confidence and apologizing for having recommended Hoshi to the emperor. After reading the petition, Meiji summoned Kusumoto and said it was not clear what was being asked of him. Was he being requested to replace the president? Or were the members of the House apologizing for having made a mistake?

The emperor wished to avoid being put in the position of commanding Hoshi to vacate the president’s chair. His response had the effect of making Kusumoto abandon the hope that the emperor would personally expel Hoshi. It is not known what the emperor thought of Hoshi, but his decision to decorate him posthumously suggests that he recognized Hoshi’s contributions to the state.

On July 6 the emperor and empress visited the crown prince’s palace, where they inspected the wedding gifts the crown prince and princess had received the previous year. They also visited their grandson, Hirohito. On the following day the infant was taken to the residence of Admiral Kawamura Sumiyoshi in Mamiana. The emperor and empress gave 100 yen to the admiral, asking him to watch over the infant prince during his childhood. It was announced that the crown prince requested this arrangement, but in fact it was the emperor’s wish.
³⁹
This survival of an old practice perplexed Erwin Baelz, the emperor’s personal physician, who wrote,

At five to call on Count Kawamura. The crown prince’s son has been put under the care of this elderly admiral, who must be nearly seventy. What a strange idea! I hoped that the unnatural and cruel custom of taking little princes away from their parents and handing them over to strangers had fallen into desuetude. It is not so, however. The poor crown princess was compelled to hand over her baby, which cost her many tears. Now the parents can see their child only for a brief period once or twice a month…. Why can they not in this matter follow the example of the German or the English royal family as they do in so many others? Little Prince Michinomiya is a lively and good-looking youngster.
⁴⁰

On August 1 Baron Hayashi Tadasu (1850–1913), the minister plenipotentiary to the Court of St. James, sent a telegram to Sone Arasuke, the foreign minister, reporting that after conferring about China with Lord Henry Lansdowne, the British foreign minister, he had learned that the British government wished to conclude an alliance with Japan. He asked, “Is the Japanese government prepared to sign a treaty with them? If they are willing to accept our conditions, are we ready to enter an alliance with them? Please send the government’s reply as soon as possible.”
⁴¹

The proposal to create an alliance between England and Japan had its origins in Russian policy in the Far East. As noted earlier, after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese had been forced by three European powers to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China. However, Russia not long afterward leased this territory, signed a secret treaty with China, and began constructing a railway. The Russians now administered Port Arthur and Dairen and were steadily expanding their hold over northwestern China. Russian towns had been founded along the railway line. Other countries with interests in East Asia were concerned about Russia’s moves in Korea, and many believed that a clash between Russia and Japan was inevitable. However, the Japanese were by no means adequately prepared for such a conflict, and it was obvious that it would be extremely difficult for the country, unaided, to dislodge the Russians.

Japan had two possible courses of action. One (favored by It
ō
Hirobumi) was to reach an understanding with Russia whereby Manchuria would be yielded to the Russians. In return, Japanese predominance in Korea would be recognized.
⁴²
The other (favored by most other Japanese officials) was for Japan to act in concert with major European powers in order to contain Russia. It was unlikely that France would join an anti-Russian coalition, as France and Russia had recently concluded an alliance. Japan’s most likely partners were Germany and England, both of which were convinced that the Russians were infringing on their rights in East Asia. In April 1901, in conversation with Lansdowne, Hayashi had voiced the opinion that in order for there to be permanent peace in East Asia, a firm relationship between Japan and England was essential. Lansdowne agreed, but this was only the private opinion of the two men.
⁴³

Even before this time, men in Japan and England had advocated such an alliance. In 1895 Fukuzawa Yukichi had written an editorial proposing an alliance;
⁴⁴
and in England Joseph Chamberlain, the minister for the colonies, had informally discussed the subject with the Japanese minister.
⁴⁵
In 1898 the Japanese government, about to end the occupation of Weihaiwei, consented to the British proposal to lease the city from the Chinese, adding that it hoped that the British would in return be sympathetic and offer help if Japan needed to take action to ensure its security or promote its interests.
⁴⁶
A pro-Japanese mood swept England in 1900 after the Japanese army rescued British subjects in Peking besieged by the Boxers. Hayashi Tadasu, who became minister to Great Britain that year, concluded that England was the only country with which Japan could form an alliance against Russia.
⁴⁷

The discussions between Hayashi and Lord Lansdowne reached agreement on six points:

1. An open door must be maintained in China.

2. Apart from concessions already made by treaty, no further acquisition of Chinese territory was to be permitted.

3. Japan’s freedom to act in Korea was recognized because Japan had greater interests there than any other country.

4. If one member of the alliance engaged in hostilities with another country, the other member would preserve neutrality, but if a third power helped the enemy, the other member would enter the war.

5. The Anglo-German agreement on China would remain in force.

6. The alliance would be restricted to the Far East.
⁴⁸