Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (129 page)

After much discussion and some apparent setbacks to the alliance, the British prepared a draft of the proposed treaty and asked for a prompt Japanese reply.
⁴⁹
Japanese revisions to the text, telegraphed to London on November 30, mainly concerned language. The telegram mentioned that when shown the proposed treaty, the emperor had asked it be shown to the
genr
ō
and to It
ō
for their opinions.
⁵⁰

After a heated debate the
genr
ō
approved of the treaty as revised and recommended that it be made effective as soon as possible. Only Inoue Kaoru, who had favored an alliance with Russia rather than England, expressed dissatisfaction on the grounds that It
ō
’s opinion had still not been heard. The awaited telegram from It
ō
, received on December 8, raised objections to the treaty. He declared that the wording left many points obscure and noted that it was not known what Germany would think of an Anglo-Japanese alliance. It was possible also that negotiations with Russia would result in a treaty. He urged extremely careful consideration and requested that his opinions be conveyed to the emperor.
⁵¹

Prime Minister Katsura took It
ō
’s telegram to the emperor the next day. The emperor always placed great value on It
ō
’s opinions, but he said now that in view of the treaty’s approval by both the cabinet and the
genr
ō
, he thought that Japanese consent could not be delayed. He asked Katsura to ascertain the reactions of the
genr
ō
to It
ō
’s message. Katsura went to the
genr
ō
but, before asking their views, pointed out that there was no guarantee that a treaty would be concluded with Russia and that any delay might cause the British to withdraw its offer of an alliance. On December 10 he reported to the emperor that the majority supported the treaty with England. With the authorization of the emperor, a telegram was sent to Hayashi on the twelfth stating that Japan had accepted the revised treaty.
⁵²
On January 30, 1902, Hayashi and Lansdowne signed the treaty in London., and it was announced to the public on February 12.

It is difficult to appraise the benefits to Japan brought by the treaty. Hayashi believed that the alliance enabled Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War.
⁵³
It accounted for Japan’s participation in World War I and its acquisition of an overseas empire when it captured former German colonies in the South Pacific. More important than material benefits was the joy felt by the Japanese, from the emperor on down, that Japan had been recognized as an equal partner of the strongest nation in the world, a nation that in the past had humiliated Japan again and again.
⁵⁴

Chapter 52

The year 1902 opened with a minimum of ceremonial. The one-day postponement of the New Year banquet, normally held on January 5, typified the steady erosion of New Year rituals: that day was a Sunday, and it was judged to be more important to observe the Christian day of rest than Japanese tradition. A few days later, the emperor heard the usual three New Year lectures, one each on Japanese, Chinese, and Western history. The lecture on the West this year was devoted to parliamentary reform in England, possibly because of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

On January 10 the court lady Muromachi Kiyoko died in her sixty-third year. Soon after entering palace service in 1856, she had been appointed as governess to the future emperor, then a child of four. On his accession to the throne in 1867, she had been given the position of
tenji
(lady-in-waiting) and had served the emperor in this capacity for forty-six years. If ever she disapproved of anything the emperor said or did, she did not hesitate to scold him. He would invariably reject her advice, calling her
otafuku
, a Ky
ō
to word for an ugly woman; but there was affection in his tone. To this rebuke she would respond, “I was born an
otafuku
. There’s nothing I can do about it, no matter what Your Majesty may command. But I beg you to take the advice I offer.” The emperor would not reply but in the end did what she suggested. In recognition of Kiyoko’s long service, the emperor and empress donated 2,000 yen for her funeral, an unprecedented amount for someone of her position.
¹

So few of Meiji’s “human” contacts with the people who served him have been recorded that this trifling anecdote is endearing. The use of the word
otafuku
suggests also that the emperor in private used Ky
ō
to language, even though other anecdotes always transmit his words in standard Japanese.

The one traditional ceremony observed that spring was the first poetry meeting. The emperor did not like the two topics (“Cockcrows Herald the Dawn” and “Prayers to the Gods”) proposed by the head of the Imperial Poetry Office, Takasaki Masakaze, who then had to supply a more conventional topic. The emperor composed this
tanka
on the theme “New Year Plum Blossoms”:

The poem is felicitous but hardly memorable. All the same, the emperor was about to enter his most fruitful period as a poet, as most of his best-known poems were composed from this time until the end of his reign.

The festive New Year mood was harshly interrupted when on January 28 a report was received that a battalion of the Fifth Infantry Regiment had been buried in a blizzard. The emperor had retired for the night when the news arrived, but a chamberlain immediately went to inform him.

Telegrams sent back and forth between T
ō
ky
ō
and Aomori gradually revealed the terrible story. The battalion of more than 200 men, out on a winter maneuver, had been caught on January 23 in a sudden fierce snowstorm near Mount Hakk
ō
da. Maneuvers at more clement times of the year had familiarized the soldiers with the terrain of the region, but they were not equipped for such weather and lost their way in the blinding snow and lacerating wind. Rescue parties, sent out when the battalion failed to return to its base, were hampered in their search by the unrelenting storm. On the twenty-seventh, a survivor was found, all but dead from exposure. He described to the rescuers what had happened, and they battled their way through the snow to reach the site of the disaster. They found a handful of survivors and the bodies of about three-quarters of the victims. It was not until the snow melted in May that the last bodies were found.
³

The emperor, deeply distressed to learn of the tragic event, at once sent his military attaché, Miyamoto Teruaki, to the scene. Word came from Miyamoto on February 7 that ninety-four rifles had been recovered, but only much later was the full extent of the disaster known: 199 officers and men had perished, and only eleven had survived.
⁴

The first reaction when the tragedy became generally known was an outcry against the military for its recklessness in subjecting troops to maneuvers in a raging storm without proper winter uniforms, but when the full details of the tragedy were released, the prevailing sentiment shifted from anger to sympathy. The families of the victims were even said to have rejoiced, convinced that the deaths of their sons or grandsons were not in vain but would contribute to future victories of the imperial forces.
⁵

On April 8 Foreign Minister Komura Jutar
ō
reported to the Diet that Russia and China had signed an agreement providing for the restitution of Manchuria to China. This development was highly welcome to the Japanese, especially because they themselves had been forced by the Three Power Intervention, headed by Russia, to return the Liaotung Peninsula to China.

Negotiations on Manchuria between Russia and China went back to 1896, when Li Hung-chang traveled to Moscow to attend the coronation of Nicholas II.
⁶
A secret treaty signed between Russia and China provided for (1) mutual assistance in the event of aggression by a foreign power, (2) the use of Chinese ports by Russian warships in emergencies, and (3) the construction of a railway, administered by Russian personnel with extraterritorial rights, through northern Manchuria to Vladivostok, to be used by Russia to transport troops and supplies. The treaty was to remain in force for fifteen years.
⁷

Although the framers of the treaty had assumed that aggression against China would be Japanese, the German seizure of Kiaochow Bay in 1897 was clearly aggression and therefore (under the treaty) involved the Russians as well as the Chinese. Ian Nish described the situation:

China reacted to Germany’s action in the only way she knew, by calling on Russia to neutralize and discourage the Germans. When news reached Peking that the Germans had landed at Kiaochow, Li Hung-chang issued under the Russo-Chinese alliance of 1896 a direct invitation to Russia to occupy temporarily a Chinese port as a countermeasure to German action.
⁸

This was exactly what the Russians had hoped for, and they soon forgot their own claim to Kiaochow. The Russians secured from China the right to lease Port Arthur and Dairen and to build a railway through southern Manchuria. They now possessed the long-desired ice-free harbor on the Pacific. By the end of the year, the Chinese realized that their tactic of setting one barbarian off against another had failed.
⁹

On April 25, 1898, Japan and Russia signed a protocol confirming the independence of Korea and agreeing to abstain from interference in that country’s internal affairs. In the event that Korea requested counsel and assistance on military or financial matters from either Japan or Russia, that country should not take any measures without consulting the other. Russia agreed not to obstruct commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. The agreement was the first to recognize the particular role of Japan in the economic development of Korea.
¹⁰

Two years later, in 1900, destruction of the tracks of the Trans-Siberian Railway in Manchuria by Boxer insurgents gave the Russians an excuse to send an army to occupy three eastern provinces of Manchuria. They insisted that they had no intention of annexing Manchuria and that once order had been restored, they would immediately withdraw their troops.
¹¹
The Russian occupation naturally upset the Japanese. In February 1901 they warned China not to yield to further Russian demands, but Li Hung-chang seemed willing to sacrifice Chinese rights in Manchuria in exchange for the Russian alliance. In the autumn of 1901, other countries that had participated in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion withdrew their troops from Peking, but the Russians continued to occupy Manchuria.

The Japanese and British repeatedly protested. At first the Japanese protests were muted because It
ō
Hirobumi and Foreign Minister Nishi Tokujir
ō
(who had studied at the University of St. Petersburg) believed in the importance of an understanding with Russia. They continued to hope that if Russia’s ambitions in Manchuria were satisfied, it would recognize Japanese preeminence in Korea.

It
ō
visited Russia in November 1901 and was received cordially by the Russians. He was presented with the Gold Cordon of St. Alexander Nevsky, and the czar urged him to return to Japan by the Trans-Siberian Railway. Count Sergei Witte assured It
ō
that Russia sought nothing in Korea and was glad to permit Japan to operate freely there. In fact, the Russians were willing to make only nominal concessions in Korea and wanted in return a free hand in Manchuria. It
ō
was much disappointed. He still hoped to obtain concessions from Russia, but the Japanese government decided instead to proceed with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and no longer sought an alliance with Russia.
¹²
All the same, both Japan and Russia still wanted to preserve the peace.

During 1902 the Japanese continued to strengthen their position in Korea, building up a nucleus of pro-Japanese Korean politicians. A large number of Japanese decided to settle in southeastern Korea, and Japan gradually took control of mines, the post, and telegraph. At this time Japan acquired a new ally, the United States, which had traditionally refused to become entangled in foreign affairs. Early in 1902, Theodore Roosevelt, who had become president a few months earlier, sent a message to Emperor Meiji expressing his friendship. He joined with Japan and Britain in warning China that special rights granted to Russia would be in contravention of the Open Door policy.
¹³
The chief reason for American participation was the fear that the Russification of not only Manchuria but also North China would seriously hamper American trade with China.