Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (133 page)

This was probably the most unambiguous statement of esteem that the emperor ever gave to any of his subjects. It
ō
replied that he would accept His Majesty’s gracious command, but in his heart he was by no means pleased, suspecting that Yamagata had suggested this tactic to the emperor. Yamagata himself met It
ō
and used all his eloquence to persuade It
ō
to accept the appointment. In the end It
ō
agreed, provided that both Yamagata and Matsukata also become members of the Privy Council. Finally, the emperor summoned Katsura, supposedly from his sickbed, and informed him that It
ō
would accept his new post only if Katsura remained in office. It
ō
confirmed this later that day when Katsura visited him, and Katsura, after long deliberation, withdrew his resignation.

The Japanese government was now unified. On July 28 Foreign Minister Komura asked Kurino Shin’ichir
ō
, the minister to Russia, to deliver to the Russian foreign minister, Count Vladimir Nikolaevich Lamsdorf, a verbal message indicating that the Japanese hoped to open negotiations concerning Manchuria and Korea. If the Russians were in general agreement, the Japanese government would send proposals concerning the nature and scope of the negotiations. Kurino was also asked to relate that in the interests of friendship and amity, the Japanese hoped that such negotiations could be opened without delay.
⁸

On August 12 Kurino delivered to Lamsdorf the text of the Japanese proposals. They were in six articles:

1. The two countries promise to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea and to maintain a policy of equal commercial and industrial opportunities for all countries.

2. Russia and Japan mutually recognize the special interests of Japan in Korea and of Russia in the railway administration in Manchuria.

3. Japan and Russia mutually promise not to interfere with the development of each other’s commercial and industrial enterprises—Japan in Korea and Russia in Manchuria.

4. In the event that disturbances in Korea or Manchuria require the expedition of troops, they should not exceed the number actually needed, and once they have completed their mission, they should be at once withdrawn.

5. Russia recognizes that Japan has the exclusive right to aid and assist (including militarily) Korea in the interests of good government.

6. This treaty is to take the place of all previous agreements reached by Japan and Russia with respect to Korea.
⁹

The Japanese government submitted this plan with confidence that it could serve as the basis for an agreement between Japan and Russia, and it was hoped that the Russian government’s modifications or contrary views would be made in a friendly spirit. Although these proposals were telegraphed to Kurino on August 3, he was unable to meet Count Lamsdorf until August 12. The excuse was that he was busy. The real cause was a major change in the administration of Russian territories in the Far East. On August 12, the day that Kurino was at last able to deliver Komura’s proposal, the czar signed a ukase establishing the viceroyalty of the Far East, which unified all military, economic, and diplomatic affairs of the Russian possessions in the provinces and territories east of Lake Baikal under Viceroy Evgenii Ivanovich Alekseev.
¹⁰

The change came as a great and painful surprise to Count Sergei Witte, the minister of finance and the most able man in the Russian government. On August 28
¹¹
when he delivered his regular monthly report, the czar suddenly informed him that he had been transferred from the position of minister of finance to the eminent but meaningless position of chairman of the committee of ministers. Witte believed that he was being removed from an active role in the government because he opposed policies that, he was sure, would lead to war with Japan.
¹²
When Witte learned that Alekseev, a man he despised as an “egregious careerist” with “the mentality of a sly Armenian rug dealer,”
¹³
had been appointed as viceroy, he interpreted this as meaning that the czar had accepted the views of hard-line extremists that the Russians could obtain whatever they wanted in the East because the Japanese would not dare to fight. He added that the czar “in his heart thirsted for the glory that would come from a victorious war. I am convinced that had there been no war with Japan there would have been a war with India [over Afghanistan] or, more likely, war with Turkey, over the Bosphorus, and such a war would, of course, have turned into a larger war.”
¹⁴
The czar, for his part, wrote laconically in his diary on the day of Witte’s dismissal, “Now I rule.”
¹⁵
Witte recalled the Japanese proposal in these terms:

Not long after my return to Russia, Kurino, the Japanese minister to Russia, came to see me. In July 1903, while I was still minister of finance, he had presented a proposal to me and Count Lambsdorff that would have made a peaceful settlement of our differences possible. I favored acceptance, but to no avail, because it was sent to Viceroy Alekseev and became the subject of endless and fruitless discussion.

This intelligent man [Kurino] told me how my country was dragging out negotiations while his was acting with dispatch. Japan would make a proposal, Lambsdorff would say that matters were in Alekseev’s hands, while Alekseev and [Roman] Rosen [the Russian minister to Japan] would say that their hands were tied because the Emperor [czar] was away. To Japan this sort of tactic meant that we wanted war, and he felt it a matter of honor to do what he could to prevent conflict. Time was short, he argued. Japanese public opinion was becoming increasingly aroused and was therefore difficult to keep under control. After all, he declared, Japan was a sovereign state, and it was humiliating for her to have to negotiate with some sort of “viceroy of the Far East,” as if the Far East belonged to Russia and Japan was but a protectorate.
¹⁶

Kurino’s comments were perceptive. He was aware, of course, that Komura’s proposals could not be accepted unchanged by the Russians. The second item was perhaps the least acceptable to them. All that was given to Russia in return for recognizing the preponderance of Japanese interests in Korea was the administration of railways in Manchuria. This was clearly an unequal bargain, but when Komura advanced this proposal, he no doubt expected to make further concessions. The Russians’ failure to respond promptly to Komura’s proposals was interpreted by the Japanese as a deliberate insult, and this, on top of their failure to fulfill their promise of a second-stage withdrawal from Manchuria, had inflamed Japanese public opinion. Patriots, headed by the seven doctors of law, now openly called for war.
¹⁷

The Japanese had to wait fifty-two days for a counterproposal from Russia. Count Lamsdorf gave as reasons the absence of the czar and the need to discuss some points with Alekseev. He suggested that negotiations take place in T
ō
ky
ō
.
¹⁸
This was originally proposed by the Japanese but now was unwelcome because of the establishment of the viceroyalty: in T
ō
ky
ō
the Japanese would have to negotiate not with the highest echelon of Russian command but with the Russian minister Baron Rosen, an underling of Alekseev, and this would represent a loss of face for them.
¹⁹
In the end, the Japanese yielded, and on October 3 the first Russian counterproposals were delivered to the Japanese government.

The counterproposals amounted to an almost complete rejection of the original Japanese proposals. The first article in the counterproposals guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Korea but not of China, and there was hardly a mention of Manchuria in any of the articles, implying that Russian control was not to be discussed. The eighth article, the only one that did mention Manchuria, demanded that Japan recognize that Manchuria and its littoral were completely outside its sphere of influence. A new element was a proposed neutral zone to be established in Korea north of the thirty-ninth parallel into which neither country should introduce troops, thus limiting Japanese powers in that country.
²⁰
The differences between the two countries’ proposals were so great as to make compromise seem impossible.

Komura met with Baron Rosen in an attempt to reconcile the Japanese and Russian proposals and find a basis for a settlement, but Rosen said he was not empowered to make any alterations. On October 30 Komura handed to Rosen the second set of Japanese proposals, in eleven articles. The first article, as before, was a mutual affirmation of the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea. Articles 2 to 4 called for Russia’s recognition of Japan’s preponderance in Korea. Article 5 was a promise by Japan not to erect fortifications that might interfere with free passage through the Korea Strait. Article 6 provided for a neutral zone of thirty miles on both sides of the border between Korea and Manchuria. Articles 7 and 8 stipulated that Manchuria was outside the Japanese sphere of influence and that Russia had the right to take necessary measures to protect its interests there. The remaining articles dealt with trade and railways.
²¹

The Japanese waited for more than forty days for the Russian reply, which finally arrived on December 11. The Russians attributed the delay to the illness of the czarina, who had been stricken while traveling with the czar. At such a time his ministers did not dare to approach the czar with such “trifles” as the situation in the Far East which, the czar supposed, had already calmed down. The new Russian proposals were even more one-sided than the old ones: those concerning Korea were reiterated, but every mention of Manchuria had been deleted. The Japanese, believing that they had made many concessions in the spirit of compromise, were dismayed by what they interpreted as a display of Russian arrogance.
²²

Not every Russian was so intransigent. On December 10 General Kuropatkin transmitted to the czar a long memorandum on Russian aims in the Far East that recommended:

To give Kwantung back to China with Port Arthur and Dalny [Dairen]; to hand over the southern branch of the Chinese Eastern Railway to China, but in return to receive all the rights in northern Manchuria, in addition to 250,000,000 rubles in compensation for the Russian expenses incurred in the building of the railroad and Port Arthur.
²³

Witte was in general sympathy with Kuropatkin’s plan, but he wrote in his memoirs:

Manchuria could not be ours. We should have been content with the Kwantung Peninsula that we had taken so perfidiously and with the Chinese Eastern Railroad. Not America, not England, not Japan, nor any of their open or secret allies, nor China would have ever have agreed to let us have Manchuria.
²⁴

Even the czar, for all his yearning for military victory, telegraphed Alekseev in October: “I do not want a war between Russia and Japan and will not allow it. Take all measures so that war will not occur.” At the special conference called by the czar on December 28, 1903, he observed, “War is unquestionably undesirable. Time is Russia’s best ally. Every year strengthens us.”
²⁵

By this time, however, Japanese patience was exhausted, and they felt humiliated by the Russian lack of diplomatic courtesy. On December 16 at a meeting of the prime minister, the
genr
ō
, and members of the cabinet, two decisions were reached: (1) that a solution by diplomatic means should be sought first to last with respect to Manchuria, and the use of “ultimate means” should be avoided; and (2) that with respect to Korea, Japan would maintain the principles enunciated in the revised proposal of October 30, but if the Russians refused to accept these principles, they themselves would resort to arms to achieve their objectives.
²⁶

The meeting decided to make one more, final, attempt to reach a diplomatic solution. Katsura felt uncomfortable at the idea of a “final step,” but on December 18 he called a meeting of cabinet ministers and informed them of the decision. Afterward, he and Komura went together to the palace to report to the emperor and ascertain his views. From this point on, although Komura continued to devote every effort to the negotiations, Katsura repeatedly met with the ministers of the army, the navy and the treasury, and these men prepared for war.

On December 21 instructions were sent to Kurino to present orally the third Japanese proposal.
²⁷
The most noteworthy change was the elimination of article 6, which had provided for the establishment of a neutral zone. The Japanese were willing to create such a zone, even though it would encompass about one-third of Korea, provided that the Russians would create a similar buffer zone on the Manchurian side of the frontier; but the Russians had not deigned to respond to this suggestion.

The new Japanese proposals were pessimistically received in Russia. On December 23 Admiral Alekseev addressed the czar: “The new Japanese proposals, transmitted to me by telegram from Baron Rosen on December 22, are tantamount to a demand for formal recognition by the Russian government of a protectorate of Japan over Korea.”
²⁸

Naturally, the Russians were unwilling to grant this, although the possibility of referring to Manchuria in their next proposal was seriously considered. In T
ō
ky
ō
, however, more and more members of the government thought that war could not be avoided. On December 28 a special cabinet council was called to discuss the final preparations for war.
²⁹