Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (63 page)

Six or seven inches of snow fell on the day Saig
ō
’s army left Kagoshima, the heaviest snowfall in fifty years in that normally warm region. Although Saig
ō
’s troops had been well trained and maintained discipline, the army must have presented a curious appearance. Saig
ō
, Kirino, Shinohara, and the other top-ranking officers who had not resigned their commissions in the government forces wore the same uniforms as did the men they would fight. Others of Saig
ō
’s officers wore naval uniforms, police uniforms, or the dress of civil servants. Officers wore a white armband indicating the unit to which they were attached, and a crepe silk or white cotton sash over their coats. A sword dangled from their left hip, and they carried bright red flags in their right hand. The costumes worn by ordinary soldiers were even stranger. Strangest of all was Murata Shimpachi, recently returned from abroad, who rode into battle attired in a swallow-tail coat and a derby.
¹¹

The objective of the Kagoshima soldiers was the capture of Kumamoto Castle, the center of government military strength in the southern half of Ky
ū
sh
ū
. It was defended by conscripted soldiers, like those who had been slaughtered by the Shinp
ū
ren in the previous year. Morale was low, mainly because the men were intimidated by what they heard of the great Saig
ō
, whose fame extended throughout the country.

The garrison could not hope for support from the Kumamoto samurai, some of whom were secretly in communication with the Kagoshima forces. The defenders’ only hope was to entrench themselves inside the castle and wait for relief from government troops. Then a fire broke out in the castle’s storehouse, reducing almost all the reserves of food to ashes. The garrison had no choice but to requisition food from nearby villages in preparation for what was anticipated would be a siege of some weeks in duration. On February 19 messengers sent by the governor of Kagoshima arrived and attempted to show the commandant, Major General Tani Tateki, three documents—Saig
ō
’s original letter asking permission to go to T
ō
ky
ō
, the governor’s response, and a transcript of Nakahara Hisao’s confession relating to the planned assassination. The documents were rejected, and the messengers were informed that if Saig
ō
’s soldiers attempted to go by the castle, the defenders would have no choice but to stop them. The vanguard of Saig
ō
’s army was now a bare five miles away.

The first shots of the war were exchanged on February 19. Units of the Kagoshima army attempted to force their way into Kumamoto Castle but were repulsed by cannon fire from the defenders. General Tani sent a telegram to army headquarters (now in
Ō
saka) reporting the opening of hostilities, and Yamagata forwarded the message to Sanj
ō
Sanetomi in Ky
ō
to. A message was sent from Ky
ō
to to Tani urging him to hold firm and to destroy the rebels with one bold attack. The arrival of the first and second brigades was promised by February 25.

The main body of the rebel forces began their attack on the castle from two sides on the twenty-second. They stepped up the attack on the twenty-third but were unable to advance. This made them realize that the peasant-soldiers inside the castle were not as ineffectual as they had supposed, and they resigned themselves to a long siege.

On the night of February 22, in moonlight bright as day, the Kokura Fourteenth Regiment, commanded by Acting Major Nogi Maresuke (1849–1912), and rebel troops clashed. The rebels, raising war cries, fought at close quarters with drawn swords. The government troops fell back, unable to withstand the attack. Later that night in the midst of fierce fighting, the standard bearer of the regiment was killed and the regimental flag was lost. Nogi was horrified and tried, disregarding personal danger, to recapture the flag, but he was held back. The commander in chief of the expeditionary force never asked Nogi what had happened to the flag, preferring to overlook the incident, but Nogi did not forget it, and twenty-five years later he committed suicide to atone for the loss.

In the meantime, Kumamoto samurai began to desert in numbers to Saig
ō
’s army, citing the government’s addiction to Western practices and the neglect of Japanese traditions which, they believed, had prevented Japan from regaining its ancient glory. Desertions by samurai of this persuasion soon swelled the ranks of Saig
ō
’s army to some 20,000 men. The prevalence of
sonn
ō
j
ō
i
thought was not surprising in these samurai; they not only resented the changes that Westernization had brought to their lives but had been stirred by the heroic deaths of members of the Shinp
ū
ren. Saig
ō
himself was not anti-Western (George Washington was one of his heroes), but the private school students displayed a strong element of
j
ō
i
, as we can infer from the song they sang, which begins:

Though this is the Land of the Gods

Today as in the distant past,

People are dazzled by stupid foreign ways

And, paying no attention to the confusion in Japan,

They borrow their laws from abroad…

Not only was foreign influence decried, but the achievement of the Restoration was questioned:

When they wiped out the daimyos

They said they were returning to the past,

But now we know they were lying….

After singling out
Ō
kubo and Sanj
ō
for special attack, the song makes this accusation:

What happened then to their traitorous hearts?

They sold the country to the dirty foreigners

And ordered us to give up our weapons and swords

A decree never heard before or since….

The conclusion of the song, expressing the fascination that death exerted over these samurai, contrasts with the triumphant note typical of the war songs of other countries:

We’ve reached a point we can take no more

We warriors can only do our utmost

To save tens of thousands of people,

Today our last, on the road to the other world.
¹²

Even after the fighting had begun in earnest, Saig
ō
still insisted that his only objective was to proceed to T
ō
ky
ō
in order to ask the government some questions. He maintained that there was nothing secret about his plans: the prefectures and garrisons he would pass on his way had long since been informed. But the troops of the Kumamoto garrison had tried to block his passage, and he therefore had no choice but to resist.

On February 28 Governor
Ō
yama of Kagoshima sent a petition to Sanj
ō
and Iwakura explaining why Saig
ō
’s troops had opened fire. He expressed astonishment that the government had ordered that Kagoshima be pacified. He insisted that Saig
ō
’s purpose in opening the private schools was to inculcate loyalty and filial piety in the young men of his prefecture. When Saga, Kumamoto, and Yamaguchi had been torn by disturbances, absolute calm had reigned in Kagoshima. What suspicions of his motives had induced the government to order his assassination? It is true that his followers were carrying arms on their journey to T
ō
ky
ō
, but after all, Saig
ō
’s execution had been ordered, and so he had to prepare for any untoward event on the way. He asked that imperial instructions be issued immediately to reassure the people of Kagoshima.
¹³

By the time this letter reached Iwakura, however, a new ultimatum had been issued. Saig
ō
, enraged, sent a letter to Prince Taruhito, announcing that if his arguments continued to be ignored, he would have no choice but to employ military force in passing Kumamoto.

The siege of Kumamoto Castle dragged on for fifty-four days until it was relieved on April 14. In the meanwhile communications between the defenders and the outside were almost completely severed, although on occasion a courier slipped through enemy lines to report on conditions inside the castle. On March 4 Kido, who had spent several days at headquarters in
Ō
saka, returned to Ky
ō
to and gave a detailed report to the emperor on the progress of the war and future objectives. The emperor was relieved to hear that the situation was turning in the government forces’ favor. At the same time, imagining Saig
ō
’s grief over having been branded as a traitor, the emperor felt sympathy for him. Kido was moved to tears at the depth of the emperor’s affection for a subject who had previously served him well.
¹⁴

Judged in terms of how a European monarch would probably have reacted under the circumstances, Meiji’s compassion was remarkable. A European monarch, learning that a man whom he had trusted and favored was now leading a rebellion, would probably have fulminated against the man’s ingratitude, never once giving a thought to the pain it might have cost the man to rebel. Meiji’s affection for Saig
ō
Takamori may have led him to hope that the confrontation between Saig
ō
’s forces and the government forces might still be averted. Indeed, Saig
ō
, Kirino, and Shinohara were not stripped of their court ranks and posts until March 9.

Conversely (and contrary to typical European examples of leaders of rebellions), absolutely nothing suggests that Saig
ō
was dissatisfied with Emperor Meiji or that he hoped another form of government might replace the monarchy. Far from it—Saig
ō
seems to have believed that direct rule by the emperor, even authoritarian rule, was the ideal form of government.
¹⁵
This belief was shared by the samurai who fought under him. For them, the ultimate objective of the Satsuma Rebellion was to rid the emperor of the corrupt officials surrounding him so that he might rule undisturbed by their evil influence.

For that matter, men close to the emperor, like Kido Takayoshi, did not (as often in wartime) paint the leader of the enemy as a traitor or an ingrate. Kido said of Saig
ō
that he was definitely not an evil man like Ashikaga Takauji, who had raised the standard of rebellion against the emperor Godaigo; rather, he was ill informed on conditions and had unfortunately allowed momentary anger to destroy himself and harm his country. Saig
ō
’s action was to be hated, but the government should consider whether it had made mistakes that had inspired his revolt.
¹⁶

The battle for Kumamoto Castle was crucial. If the castle fell to the rebels and they entered Hizen Province, all Ky
ū
sh
ū
would fall into their hands.
¹⁷
But if they were defeated in Kumamoto, the war would end in the foreseeable future, for the rebel leaders were not likely to prolong the war by withdrawing to Kagoshima.
¹⁸
The relief army was, however, slow in reaching the castle. After overcoming their initial surprise at the fierceness of the resistance of the peasant-soldiers, the rebels settled down to a siege, modeling their tactics on those of the Prussians during the siege of Metz during the Franco-Prussian War.
¹⁹

The government army’s first victory was won by a unit of 100 handpicked policemen who, with drawn swords, stormed a fortified place that regular soldiers had failed to take in several days.
²⁰
On March 15 government troops launched an offensive on the enemy stronghold at Tabaruzaka. The most intense fighting of the war caused many casualties on both sides. On the twentieth, the government army, scoring a breakthrough, took the fort at the crest. It is recorded that the corpses of rebel dead were so numerous that they blocked the road and the waters of the moat ran red. The enemy fled. The siege of Kumamoto Castle was not lifted for another three weeks, and the war continued until late September, but the victory at Tabaruzaka foreshadowed the end. Sooner or later, the government army’s matériel and numerical superiority would defeat the Satsuma samurai, fierce fighters though they were.

From the outbreak of hostilities, the emperor seems to have been unable to think of anything but the war. He rarely went to his study except to give audiences, but he listened every day to Sanj
ō
Sanetomi give the latest news of the war. He spent most of his time surrounded by women in the residential palace. The emperor’s chief officers—Sanj
ō
, Iwakura, Kido, and the rest—had exerted every effort to foster the emperor’s moral excellence, and they were deeply concerned about his behavior at a time of national crisis. Sanj
ō
and Kido again and again begged him to appear in his study, but without effect. On March 20 after a meeting with Kido to discuss what should be done, Sanj
ō
went to the palace and remonstrated with the emperor, who finally agreed to mend his ways. Beginning on the twenty-first he would appear every other day in the study to hear reports on progress of the war. He summoned his tutor, Motoda Nagazane, from T
ō
ky
ō
and questioned him (Motoda was a native of Kumamoto) about the geography. He also asked Motoda to deliver lectures on famous battles of Japanese and Chinese history.
²¹