Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (142 page)

The emperor replied that he was grateful for Meiji’s solicitude, and he was not unwilling to have Japan run Korean foreign affairs. But he asked that the form, if not the reality, be left in his hands, meaning that he hoped negotiations with foreign powers would continue to be carried out in his name, even though Japan in fact decided them. It
ō
denied this request, saying that in foreign affairs, form and substance could not be divorced. If the Koreans insisted on running foreign affairs, it would certainly lead to trouble in East Asia, and Japan could not tolerate this. That was why Japan wanted to act for Korea in foreign affairs. The Japanese had evolved this policy after considering every possible alternative and in the light of past experience; it was not to be altered. It
ō
had brought a copy of the treaty and asked the emperor to examine it.

After reading through the treaty, the emperor expressed his appreciation for It
ō
’s efforts, saying he relied more on It
ō
than on his own ministers. However, if he were not to be allowed even the semblance of being in command of foreign affairs, would not Korea be in the same position as Hungary with respect to Austria or the countries of Africa to their European conquerors?

It
ō
insisted that the treaty was indeed intended to benefit both the Korean monarchy and Korea itself. He denied that the Japanese had any intention of deceiving the emperor or of reaping profits for themselves. The analogy with Hungary did not apply: Hungary had no monarch of its own, but Japan and Korea each has its own monarch, and both preserve their independence. As for Africa, hardly a single country had ever in its history been an independent state. Comparing the relations between Japan and Korea with such examples was misleading. All Japan was asking in the interests of eradicating a possible source of calamity was to manage external affairs; everything else would be left untouched.

The emperor pleaded again and again to be allowed at least a modicum of authority, but It
ō
replied each time that there was absolutely no room for flexibility. All he needed to know was the emperor’s decision. He was free to accept or reject the treaty, but he should be aware that the Japanese government had decided what it would do if he rejected it.

Emperor Kojong pleaded that this was an extremely serious matter and he could not make a decision on the spot. It was customary in such cases to consult his ministers and to determine the will of the people. He begged for time. It
ō
agreed to allow the emperor to consult his cabinet, but he was suspicious of any plan to ascertain public opinion. He commented, “Your country does not have a constitutional government. Is it not true that it is an absolute monarchy where everything is decided by Your Majesty?” It
ō
feared that the real purpose of ascertaining public opinion was to stir up the people against Japan. The Korean people were easily swayed because they were ignorant of foreign affairs, and that was why Japan felt compelled to act in Korea’s place. The emperor protested that he did not mean a poll of public opinion but a consultation with the Chungch’uwon (Privy Council). It
ō
was willing to allow the emperor to consult the Chungch’uwon but warned that Japan would not tolerate delay.

The emperor asked that the treaty be sent through diplomatic channels, but It
ō
refused. He demanded that the emperor summon his cabinet that very night and get them to consider the treaty. The emperor promised to do as It
ō
commanded. He had one final request: that his plea for token recognition in foreign affairs be communicated to the emperor and the Japanese government. It
ō
advised him to abandon any such hope.

The discussion between Emperor Kojong and It
ō
Hirobumi lasted for four hours.
²⁶
The emperor must have felt humiliated, but he had no choice but to yield: It
ō
had made it clear that if he refused, the Japanese would intervene militarily and overthrow his dynasty. In descriptions of It
ō
in other situations, he is usually portrayed as an urbane, highly civilized man, but he now demonstrated he had an iron fist inside his velvet glove. His refusal to allow the emperor even the barest modicum of self-respect—by pretending that orders actually issued by the Japanese had originated with the emperor—was couched in suitably polite language, but Kojong recognized the seriousness of the threat. Kojong himself, hitherto described in most sources as a nonentity, especially in contrast with his consort, Queen Min, showed dignity and strength in this great crisis of his reign.

On November 16 It
ō
invited members of the Korean cabinet and senior statesmen to his hotel for a friendly chat which turned into a fierce argument that lasted until midnight.
²⁷
According to one Korean account: “The ministers, before coming to the hotel, had sworn to one another that they would not yield to the Japanese demands under any circumstances. The Japanese used every kind of reasoning, offered them immense bribes, cajoled them, and finally threatened to kill them if they refused to yield.”
²⁸

On the following day a meeting between the Japanese (It
ō
, Minister Hayashi Gonsuke, and General Hasegawa Yoshimichi) and the Korean cabinet took place at the Japanese legation. Members of the cabinet continued to voice their opposition to the treaty, and no decision could be reached. The emperor appealed to It
ō
for a delay, lest forcing the issue lead to disorder, but It
ō
refused. Instead, the Japanese army and military police were called out. The same Korean account states, “Machine guns were everywhere in the streets, and even field guns were brought out to command the strategic points of the city. They made feint attacks, occupied gates, put their guns into position, and did everything short of actual violence to prove to the Koreans that they were prepared to enforce their demands.”
²⁹

That night another conference took place, this time in the palace. It
ō
demanded an audience with the emperor, but he refused on the grounds that he had a painfully sore throat. It
ō
, paying no attention to the emperor’s wishes, forced his way into Kojong’s presence. The emperor, refusing to discuss the treaty with It
ō
, asked him to consult members of his cabinet. Returning to the conference room, It
ō
announced, “Your emperor has commanded you to confer with me and settle the matter.”
³⁰
He ordered the acting prime minister, Han Kyu-sol, to ask each member to state whether he approved of the treaty; he wanted to know the reasons of those who opposed it. In the end, all but three—one ambiguously—were persuaded or intimidated into voting in favor of the treaty.
³¹

It
ō
declared that only two members of the cabinet were irrevocably opposed to the treaty and that the will of the majority should be respected. He called on the prime minister to follow the established procedures for signing the treaty. He realized that the acting prime minister (one of the two unyielding opponents) was loath to approve of the treaty but said that in his capacity as a representative of the emperor, he would not remain silent if he thought anyone was taking him lightly.
³²

The acting prime minister assured It
ō
that he was by no means anti-Japanese. He well knew that Korean independence could not have been preserved without Japanese help. But he was unable to change his mind concerning the treaty. This was perhaps a case of the proverb “Even a lowly man will not abandon his principles.” His inadequate intelligence was no doubt responsible for his inability to accommodate himself to the times, and as a result he had defied the wishes of his sovereign and held views at variance with those of the rest of the cabinet. He could only await his punishment. “Try to imagine what is in my heart!” he cried, bursting into uncontrollable weeping and sobs. It
ō
urged him to wipe away the tears and show greater courage.
³³

Emperor Kojong was willing to approve the treaty, but he wanted a statement inserted that the present treaty would cease to be valid when Korea became rich and strong enough to maintain its independence by itself. To please the emperor (and perhaps privately sure that such a day would never arrive), It
ō
with his own brush wrote in the clause the emperor had requested.
³⁴

On November 18, 1905, the treaty of protection was signed.
³⁵
It was in five articles:

1. Japan would henceforth conduct foreign relations for Korea and, through its diplomatic and consular personnel abroad, protect Korean subjects and their interests.

2. Japan would carry out the provisions of treaties already concluded by Korea with foreign countries, but Korea would promise henceforth not to conclude international treaties without the prior consent of the Japanese government.

3. Japan would station in Korea as its representative a resident general who would be concerned exclusively with foreign affairs. He would have the privilege of audiences with the emperor. The Japanese government would station “residents” at opened ports and such other places in Korea as it deemed essential.

4. All existing agreements between Japan and Korea would remain in force, providing they did not conflict with the provisions of the present treaty.

5. Japan guaranteed it would preserve the safety and dignity of the Korean imperial household.
³⁶

There was naturally bitter resentment in Korea over the treaty imposed by Japan. Word of how the ministers had voted soon leaked out to the press, and newspapers courageously published editorials denouncing the treaty and those ministers who had betrayed their country by yielding to the Japanese demands. The following days were marked by “howls of grief” and mass demonstrations in the square in front of the palace. Shops and schools closed in protest, and Christian churches were filled with the sounds of lamentation.
³⁷

It
ō
Hirobumi was appointed as the first resident general on December 21, 1905.
³⁸
His activities in Korea, despite his assurances to Emperor Kojong, were by no means restricted to foreign affairs. He determined, for example, to rid the palace of corruption in order to end its protection of banditry and uprisings elsewhere in the country. With the permission of the Korean emperor, It
ō
took personal command of the palace guards.
³⁹

On the surface Emperor Kojong welcomed the new relationship with Japan, but in a letter to President Roosevelt, smuggled out of the country, he declared that he had never sanctioned the new treaty, that it had been forced on the Koreans by bayonets, and that it was without validity.
⁴⁰
The letter did not stir Roosevelt into action, perhaps because he had already written off Korea as an area of Japanese domination.

Emperor Kojong had no choice but to continue playing the role of a loyal ally of Japan. When a celebration and review of the troops was held in April 1906 to celebrate the Japanese victory over Russia,
⁴¹
Kojong sent Lieutenant General Prince Ui to attend the review. The prince carried a message of congratulations from the emperor and his prayer for eternal friendship between the two countries. Kojong mentioned in particular his joy over It
ō
Hirobumi’s appointment as resident general. This praise contradicted the extreme dislike he always displayed toward It
ō
, especially after being informed of his appointment as the first governor general,
⁴²
but Meiji, probably unaware of the Korean emperor’s real feelings, expressed pleasure that Kojong was satisfied with It
ō
’s administration.

Messages were exchanged from time to time between the emperors of Japan and Korea, always expressing joy over the ever-deepening friendship between the two countries.
⁴³
When Meiji was informed that the Korean crown prince was to be married, he sent the imperial household minister to the wedding with presents for everybody. Perhaps Meiji actually believed in the pledges of friendship he exchanged with Kojong, but It
ō
’s report to the emperor in April 1907 painted a gloomy picture of unrest. He mentioned assassination plots directed against cabinet ministers who had voted for the treaty and hinted that the Korean emperor might be deeply involved. People suspected of implication had been arrested and questioned, and many had confessed, but the investigation continued.
⁴⁴

Kojong last attempted to resist the Japanese by sending a three-man delegation to the Second International Peace Conference held in The Hague in June 1907. The delegates were Yi Sang-sol, the former vice prime minister; Yi Chun; and Yi Wi-jong, all men who had resigned in protest against the Convention of 1905. They secretly made their way from Seoul to Vladivostok, where they met the missionary Homer Hulbert. They traveled together on the Trans-Siberian Railway to St. Petersburg and from there to The Hague. The Koreans’ attempts to get a hearing at the conference were largely rebuffed, although Yi Wi-jong was invited to present his case before a meeting of journalists that took place at the same time. He claimed that (1) the Convention of November 15, 1905, had never been agreed to by the Korean emperor and was therefore invalid; (2) Japan consequently had no authority to control Korea’s foreign relations; and (3) Korea therefore had the right to send delegates to international conferences.