Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (138 page)

Nagaoka was deeply disappointed. He was aware that the emperor’s temperament only rarely permitted him to reveal any emotion—whether joy or anger—in his expression, but the event he reported was so extraordinary that he expected the emperor to look pleased or at least seem relieved. The siege of Port Arthur had cost the lives of many Japanese soldiers, and there had been scenes of appalling carnage during three all-out attacks against the Russian defenders. The whole nation had impatiently waited for months for the news received this day. The victory not only was of key importance to the future conduct of the war but would exert an enormous influence over national policy. Yet the emperor had not shown the slightest change of expression. Nagaoka, embarrassed by his unrestrained excitement, felt the sweat down his back as he left the emperor’s presence.
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The emperor may have seemed unmoved because he had already received word of the victory at Port Arthur. That same day, Yamagata Aritomo had telephoned the chief chamberlain describing the victory. But when the chamberlain conveyed the news to the emperor, his first reaction was not an exclamation of joy but of admiration for General Stoessel’s unwavering loyalty to his country. He ordered Yamagata to make sure that Stoessel was allowed to maintain his dignity as a soldier. Yamagata transmitted the order to General Nogi Maresuke who communicated it to all members of his command. Perhaps the emperor, aware of the display of Japanese brutality at the time of the capture of Port Arthur from the Chinese ten years earlier, feared a recurrence.

Even though the emperor’s joy over the victory was not disclosed to those around him, it was found in this
tanka
:

The emperor had composed war songs in the past, but his poems during the Russo-Japanese War were seldom warlike. Before the first poetry gathering of the year on January 19, 1905, the chief of the poetry bureau, Takasaki Masakaze, had proposed two topics: “The Whole People Rejoice” and “Rejoicing on the Way.” The emperor rejected both, presumably because they related too closely to the war. The topic he finally chose was the innocuous “Mountains at New Year.” Meiji’s poem was

The emperor’s lack of excitement, even after Japan had won a great victory at Port Arthur, may have reflected his caution: Was it fitting to celebrate while a powerful enemy still retained its military capability? Was it fitting to celebrate when so many Japanese soldiers had lost their lives in the effort to take Port Arthur?

If reluctant to show unseemly joy, the emperor did not hesitate to voice concern over the hardships endured by Japanese troops in the bitter cold of North China:

When the emperor learned of the Japanese army’s great victory at Mukden, he issued this rescript to the Manchurian army:

Mukden was the place where the enemy, having constructed strong defense fortifications and manned them with imposing numbers of soldiers ever since last autumn, intended to test which side was the stronger, in the expectation of certain victory. Our Manchurian army, taking the initiative, plunged ahead and, for more than ten days and nights battled valiantly amid numbing cold, snow, and ice, until it at last crushed the stubborn resolve of the enemy to defend the city to the death. The army has taken more than 10,000 prisoners, dealt great destruction, and driven the enemy in the direction of T’ieh-ling. By its unprecedented great victory, it has displayed at home and abroad the authority and might of the empire. We have rejoiced to learn of the untiring patience and tremendous efforts you officers and men have offered, and we urge you to perform even greater deeds.
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This message expressed the emperor’s appreciation of the army’s heroic struggle to take Mukden, but if we imagine the bombast that would have accompanied a proclamation by the German kaiser or Russian czar after a similar victory, we cannot fail to be struck by Meiji’s restraint. We wonder, too, how the emperor would have expressed disappointment if the Japanese army had been defeated.

We know how the czar reacted to the Russian defeat. At a meeting with Minister Takahira, President Roosevelt said that although many Russians had recognized the magnitude of the defeat at Mukden and a majority of the czar’s advisers leaned toward seeking peace, the czar insisted on continuing the war. Despite the series of defeats Russia had suffered during the past year, it seems not to have occurred to the czar to end the war in order to spare the lives of his soldiers. Roosevelt confessed that he could not understand what the czar might be thinking but judged it unlikely he would make the first move for peace. Roosevelt thought it might be a good idea for Japan to find some way to convey to the powers its desire for peace negotiations and, if possible, to state its conditions.
¹³
After the great victory at Mukden, no one would suppose that the Japanese were acting out of weakness.

Not long afterward, Kaneko Kentar
ō
in Washington sent a telegram to T
ō
ky
ō
stating that he had been invited to the White House by President Roosevelt. The president said his sympathies were entirely with Japan because Japan was fighting for civilization. His greatest worry was how he might best help Japan by persuading Russia to enter peace negotiations.
¹⁴

The extraordinary victory of the Japanese fleet in the great naval battle fought on May 27–28 prompted Meiji for the first time to issue a rescript that openly revealed his pleasure:

The joint fleet met the enemy fleet in the straits of Korea and, after several days of fierce fighting, completely annihilated it to achieve an unprecedented success. We rejoice that, thanks to your unswerving loyalty, We are able to report this to the divine spirits of Our ancestors. The road ahead is still long. May you devote ever greater efforts to the war and in this way bring to completion your military achievements.
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Mention of the imperial ancestors may recall the mentions of God that figured so prominently in the czar’s utterances, but Meiji did not assert that it was because the gods of Shint
ō
were on his side that the Japanese had been victorious. President Roosevelt was more direct in his expression of joy: he opened a letter to Kaneko on May 30 with banzai, followed by three exclamation points.
¹⁶

With the destruction of the Russian fleet, it was generally agreed that the time was ripe for peace talks. On May 29, the day after the victory, Roosevelt discussed with Minister Takahira the possibility of peace negotiations with the Russians. On May 31 Foreign Minister Komura telegraphed Takahira, instructing him to request Roosevelt’s aid in arranging such negotiations. Komura’s message, formally presented to Roosevelt on the following day, asked him “directly and entirely of his own motion and initiative to invite the two belligerents to come together for the purpose of direct negotiations.”
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Roosevelt was entirely willing to undertake this responsibility, but he warned Takahira that the Russians were unlikely to respond to peace overtures if the Japanese demanded an indemnity. He reminded him also that even though the Japanese army and navy had been everywhere successful, they had not penetrated Russian territory. He told Takahira that if the Japanese hoped for an indemnity of the kind Germany had received after the Franco-Prussian War, it would not happen until Japanese troops surrounded Moscow.

Roosevelt was even blunter with the Russians. He summoned the Russian ambassador, Count Arturo Cassini, and declared that the war was absolutely hopeless for the Russians.
¹⁸
Cassini expressed concern over the merciless demands the Japanese were likely to make but promised to transmit to St. Peters-burg the president’s message advising peace. At this juncture, to Roosevelt’s surprise, the kaiser supported his efforts. We know the kaiser’s mood from a letter he sent his cousin, the czar, on June 3:

From the purely military strategic point of view the defeat in the straits of Corea ends the chances for a decided turn of the scales in your favour: the Japanese are now free to pour any amount of reserves, recruits, ammunition, etc. into Manchuria for the siege of Vladivostok, which will hardly be able to resist very long without a fleet to support it…. Formally it is of course possible, even under these adverse circumstances, to continue the war for any amount of time. But then on the other hand the
human
part must not be overlooked. Your country has sent thousands of its sons to the front, where they died, or were taken ill and were left crippled for the rest of their lives…. Is it compatible with the responsibility of a ruler to continue to force a whole nation against its declared will to send its sons to be killed by hecatombs only for his sake?
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The kaiser offered to do what he could to bring about peace but added toward the close of his letter:

I may perhaps turn your attention to the fact that no doubt the Japanese have the highest regard for America before all other nations. Because this mighty rising Power with its tremendous fleet is next to them. If anybody in the world is able to influence the Japanese and to induce them to be reasonable in their proposals, it is President Roosevelt.
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The reason for the kaiser’s change of attitude was suggested by remarks he made to the American ambassador, who reported to Washington: “He looks upon continuation of the war, from the Russian side, as hopeless. The people are strongly opposed to it, they will not sustain it longer, and unless peace is made, they will kill the Tsar.”
²¹
Roosevelt was pleased by this unexpected communication from the kaiser, who had not previously been known as a peacemaker. For all his bluster, the kaiser no doubt feared that an uprising by the Russian people against the czar would represent a danger to all monarchs.
²²

The kaiser’s letter may have had an effect on the czar. Although the czar’s message to Roosevelt, delivered by Ambassador Cassini on June 6, said that Russia did not seek peace or mediation, on the same day, during the discussions with high-ranking nobles and military officers, the czar finally agreed to negotiate for peace. The next day, he told the American ambassador that he would consent to the president’s suggestion that Russia and Japan have a meeting without intermediaries “in order to see if we can make peace.”
²³

On June 8 President Roosevelt sent identical letters to the American ambassadors in T
ō
ky
ō
and St. Petersburg. asking them to convey to the two governments his willingness “to do what he properly can if the two Powers concerned feel that his services will be of aid in arranging the preliminaries as to the time and place of meeting” of negotiations to end the war. The Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs on June 10 sent a reply stating its readiness to “appoint plenipotentiaries of Japan to meet plenipotentiaries of Russia at such time and place as may be found to be mutually agreeable and convenient for the purpose of negotiating and concluding terms of peace directly and exclusively between the two belligerent Powers.”
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The Russian reply, conveyed to the American ambassador, stated, “With regard to the eventual meeting of Russian and Japanese plenipotentiaries, ‘In order to see if it is not possible for the two Powers to agree to terms of peace,’ the Imperial Government has no objection in principle to this endeavour if the Japanese Government expresses a like desire.”
²⁵
However, the word “like” was not in either the original French text or the Russian translation. Without this word, the Russian reply meant that they were willing to participate if the Japanese first expressed the desire for a meeting. In order not to upset the Japanese by the arrogance of the Russian note, the Americans had deliberately softened the expression.
²⁶

The haughtiness of Foreign Minister Lamsdorf (although he was a supporter of Count Witte and favored peace) would continue to try the patience of President Roosevelt, whose irritation with the Russians mounted until on June 16 he wrote to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, “Russia is so corrupt, so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I’m utterly unable to say whether or not it will make peace, or break off the negotiations at any moment.”
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Roosevelt many times voiced similar sentiments. Even though these were not publicly expressed, his hostility to the Russian government was surely sensed. It is difficult to understand why the Russians were willing to attend a peace conference called by a president who was so obviously anti-Russian.
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