Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (30 page)

The bolting of the horse was an accident, but the imperial forces were also helped by a secret weapon, the brocade pennant carried by imperial forces when doing battle with traitors. On October 10, 1867,
Ō
kubo Toshimichi and Shinagawa Yajir
ō
(1843–1900, a Ch
ō
sh
ū
leader) visited Iwakura Tomomi at his place of exile to discuss the stratagem of restoring imperial rule. Iwakura showed the others the design of a pennant conceived of by his “brain” Tamamatsu Misao, and asked them to have some made. In Ky
ō
to,
Ō
kubo bought red and white damask, which Shinagawa took to Yamaguchi to be made into pennants. Half the pennants were kept in Yamaguchi; the other half, at the Satsuma residence in Ky
ō
to.
⁴¹

On January 28 the emperor bestowed on Yoshiaki, the prince of the Ninnaji, a brocade pennant and the
sett
ō
⁴²
as a sign that he had been appointed as “great general, conqueror of the east.”
⁴³
Those opposing Prince Yoshiaki’s forces were condemned not merely as enemies but specifically as “enemies of the court” (
ch
ō
teki
). Although Tokugawa Yoshinobu had been at pains to insist that he was fighting not the court but Satsuma, the brocade pennant gave the Satsuma troops the status of authorized defenders of the emperor. The brocade pennant was a powerful factor in the defeat of the ex-shogun’s army, for it not only bolstered the morale of the Satsuma forces but also made the shogunate army hesitate over the propriety of attacking the emperor’s forces.
⁴⁴

Prince Yoshiaki was a strange choice as the commanding general.
⁴⁵
Apart from his lineage as a member of the imperial family, he had no qualifications for the post. He entered the Ninna-ji in 1858 as a boy of twelve, and neither while at the temple nor afterward did he receive military training. His position of commanding general was undoubtedly symbolic, real command being left to men like Saig
ō
Takamori, an eager participant in battle.
⁴⁶
Perhaps it did not make much difference who was in command—warfare in Japan still retained many of the medieval traditions of individual combat.

Regardless of who deserves credit for the victory at Toba, it was decisive. The shogunate army fled the field. They sought to regroup at Yodo Castle, the stronghold of a member of the Council of Elders, only to be refused admission, to their intense surprise and consternation. This betrayal by forces presumed to be loyal to the shogun was only the first. The second came two days later when the Tsu domain, assigned to guard the Yamazaki area, the gateway to
Ō
saka, turned its guns on the shogunate forces. On the previous day a messenger from the court (with the help of the brocade pennant) had persuaded the domain to desert the shogun and offer its allegiance to the court.
⁴⁷

On the evening after this disaster Yoshinobu gathered advisers and military leaders in
Ō
saka Castle to plan strategy. Voices were raised asking Yoshinobu to raise morale by assuming personal command of the shogunate forces. He agreed, much to the delight of all present. That night he slipped out of
Ō
saka Castle, planning to board the shogunate warship
Kaiy
ō
maru
. The ship had not arrived, and while waiting, he went aboard the American warship
Iroquois
.
⁴⁸
He sailed for Edo the next morning on the
Kaiy
ō
maru
, taking with him only a few high officials. When the remnants of the shogunate army learned the next morning that Yoshinobu had escaped, they abandoned
Ō
saka Castle and fled. Yoshinobu later said that he had never intended to take arms against the court, that once the brocade pennant appeared, he lost all desire to fight.
⁴⁹

The war had not ended, but the victory of the imperial forces at Toba meant that they now controlled all of western and southern Japan. Although they still had to gain control of Edo and the northern regions, the emperor’s regime had scored a major success.

Chapter 15

On February 9, 1868, just a week after the capture of
Ō
saka Castle, Emperor Meiji finally had his
gembuku
ceremony. In honor of this event, an amnesty was proclaimed, and nineteen nobles who for various offenses had been forbidden to attend court were pardoned. It was on this occasion that the imperial message was delivered to the ministers of six countries, informing them that the emperor would henceforward exercise supreme authority in both the internal and external affairs of the country.

Behind the stiff, formal language and the insistence on the emperor’s new authority, the message contained the implication that although his father had bitterly opposed the treaties that the shogun signed with the foreign powers, the present emperor recognized their validity. It was an indirect admission by the court that relations with foreign countries were inevitable and a recognition that it was desirable for them to be friendly.
¹

After the emperor’s envoy, Higashikuze Michitomi, had shown to all the ministers the translation of the emperor’s message, “a fire of questions was directed against the envoy, who answered them well.”
²
The atmosphere was surprisingly like that of a modern press conference. The questions from Léon Roches, the French minister, revealed that he was still committed to supporting the shogun, but the other ministers merely promised to report the message to their governments.

On the same day a public proclamation was issued notifying the people that conditions had changed so greatly that friendly relations with foreign countries, the cause of so much grief to the previous emperor, had now been approved. The people were enjoined to do their best to accord with the emperor’s wishes, a warning that incidents of violence against foreigners would not be tolerated. In addition, in order to increase respect for Japan abroad, military preparations would be speeded up, and inequalities in the treaties would be revised in accordance with international law.
³

During the pause before the war against the shogunate army was resumed, this time east of the barrier of Hakone, Princess Chikako, the former Kazunomiya, sent a messenger to the commander of the eastern sea circuit, Hashimoto Saneyana (a relative on her mother’s side), asking that the Tokugawa family be spared the stigma of being called “enemies of the court” (
ch
ō
teki
). She pointed out that the outbreak of war had been completely unforeseen by Yoshinobu and that he had returned to Edo once he had been branded as a
ch
ō
teki
. In view of his mistakes, probably nothing could be done for him, but she begged that out of pity for her the Tokugawa family be spared the label of enemies of the court. If the imperial army crushed the Tokugawa family, she doubtless would kill herself. Her life meant nothing to her, but the thought of dying together with
ch
ō
teki
was too painful to bear. She implored the court to grant her plea.
⁴
She now had come to identify herself with the Tokugawa family.

A request from Princess Chikako could not be totally ignored, but it had little effect in Ky
ō
to. Various daimyos asked that Yoshinobu be forgiven, providing he made a formal apology. This course was favored by Iwakura, who sent an envoy to Edo urging Yoshinobu to agree. But the answer, which struck Iwakura as lacking in sincerity, set him on a course of uncompromising opposition to the former shogun. By this time tens of thousands of Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
soldiers were pressing on Edo Castle from land and sea.

Yoshinobu himself vacillated between submission to the imperial army and a policy of resistance to the end. On February 9 he sent a letter to Sir Harry Parkes, the British minister, announcing that the Tokugawa regime was still in control of foreign relations. He declared that Parkes would be violating the treaties if he met with a representative of the imperial government. Two days after asserting his authority in this manner, Yoshinobu dismissed Oguri Tadamasa, the most uncompromising advocate of resistance among his advisers, suggesting that he was ready to seek peace. On February 11 Yoshinobu sent a letter to Matsudaira Yoshinaga and Yamauchi Y
ō
d
ō
, the two members of the imperial government most disposed to show him leniency, insisting that the fighting at Toba and Fushimi had occurred without his permission. He expressed bewilderment as to why he was being pursued and asked them to intercede on his behalf.
⁵

On February 13 Yoshinobu had the first of three meetings in Edo Castle with Roches. The French minister still supported the Tokugawa government and believed that despite the setback at Toba and Fushimi, it would eventually be victorious. Yoshinobu informed Roches that he would do everything in his power to keep the Tokugawa family’s ancestral lands. He asserted that the emperor was now a prisoner, unable to do anything of his own volition, that the so-called imperial government was actually in the hands of Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
.

At their second meeting Yoshinobu declared his intention of retiring from active life and of yielding his position to Tokugawa Mochitsugu, the daimyo of Kish
ū
. On February 15 Yoshinobu again wrote to Yoshinaga and Y
ō
d
ō
, this time informing them (as he had informed Roches) that he intended to retire, both because he had been stigmatized as a
ch
ō
teki
and because he was in poor health. He asked the two daimyos to clear his name of the charge of being an enemy of the court.

On February 23 Yoshinobu had his final meeting with Roches. He gave Roches a statement of his position, defending his actions since returning power to the emperor. He insisted that he had intended not only to observe the treaties with the various governments but also to “improve” them, suggesting that when revised, the treaties would be even more advantageous to foreign countries. Perhaps he planned to authorize the introduction of Christianity.
⁶
However, Yoshinobu added, there was a limit to what he could endure, and he appealed to the foreign countries for their understanding. This may have been an indirect way of saying that although he would compromise on many issues, he would not tolerate intrusion into his domains. Yoshinobu’s statement could not have surprised Roches, as he had prepared the rough draft.

Roches, alone among the foreign diplomats, clung to the judgment that a stable government under the tycoon offered the best possibility for trade with the West. Parkes, much quicker to realize that the imperial regime in Ky
ō
to would eventually become the government of the whole country, wrote off Yoshinobu as a failure who was now no more than the ruler of a single domain.
⁷
On March 4 Yoshinobu left Edo Castle to enter a life of seclusion at the Daijiin, a subtemple of the Kan’ei-ji in Ueno. He stated that he would henceforth give himself exclusively to submission and penance. He took full responsibility for having incurred the emperor’s wrath and said he was prepared to accept divine punishment. His only request was that the priest Prince K
ō
gen come to Edo and pray for his salvation.
⁸
K
ō
gen, until this time an obscure priest whose only distinction was that he was a member of the imperial family, would before long emerge as a rival for the throne of Emperor Meiji.

While Yoshinobu was vacillating over the proper course of action, dissension of another kind arose within the government in Ky
ō
to concerning the future site of the capital.
Ō
kubo Toshimichi proposed that the capital be moved to
Ō
saka. Moving the capital would be a sign that the ways of the old regime, associated with the Ky
ō
to nobility, had been rejected in favor of a new and enlightened government.
Ō
saka was well suited to commerce with foreign countries, and this would promote a “rich country and strong army” (
fukoku ky
ō
hei
). Most important, moving the emperor from the Gosho would end the isolation from his people. He would, like monarchs abroad, mingle with the common people in the new capital, accompanied by a mere one or two attendants.
⁹