Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (28 page)

Chapter 14

Restoration of imperial rule, the dream of many Japanese ever since cries of
sonn
ō
j
ō
i
were first raised around the country, had at last been achieved. Political power was (at least in principle) in the hands of the court, but the court still had no organs of administration or legislation. On November 27, 1867, senior members of the Court Council met at the house of the regent Nij
ō
Nariyuki to determine basic policies but failed to reach a decision.
¹
Proponents of rule by the emperor had not given adequate consideration to the problems they were likely to encounter when they assumed responsibility for running the government.

By imperial decree, major state decisions and policies with respect to foreign countries were to be determined by a council consisting of daimyos with incomes of more than 100,000
koku
.
²
However, it was clear that it would take time for these men to assemble in Ky
ō
to, and in the meantime decisions were urgently needed in order to dispose of the mountain of accumulated major national and international problems. The court seemed powerless to act; indeed, this period has been characterized as one during which there was no government in Ky
ō
to.
³

Despite the earnestness of the shogun’s words and actions when he returned power to the court, many daimyos, in both Edo and Ky
ō
to, were indignant over Yoshinobu’s decision. They held meetings to discuss what the return of power to the emperor signified, and some personally visited Yoshinobu to express their discontent. He patiently explained the inadvisability of divided allegiances within a country and urged them to return to their domains. Above all, he warned them not to do anything rash. But daimyos living in Edo, regardless of whether they were allies or enemies of the Tokugawa family, ignored his plea for caution. They supported the shogunate against the court, some so strongly that they refused to obey commands issued by the court. Many samurai, angered by the change in the government, advocated increasing military preparations in order to seize control by main force. Some urged Prince Asahiko, perpetually lurking behind the scenes, to restore shogunate authority.
⁴

Restoration of the emperor had not brought peace and order to the capital. Tension was heightened by incessant rumors. On November 14 Iwakura Tomomi went incognito to the Satsuma residence in Ky
ō
to to inform the samurai of an urgent matter. According to a former official with whom he was in close contact, a samurai of the
Ō
gaki domain had proposed that the Council of Elders order soldiers to set fire to the Satsuma residence; then, taking advantage of the confusion, they would abduct the emperor and spirit him off to
Ō
saka Castle. This rumor, though probably groundless, seemed so serious to Iwakura that he felt obliged to warn the Satsuma retainers to take emergency precautions.
⁵

Assassinations—a conspicuous a feature of the period—also contributed to the tension. On December 10, 1867, Sakamoto Ry
ō
ma and Nakaoka Shintar
ō
, who had played a major role in arranging the alliance between Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
, were assassinated in Ky
ō
to.
⁶

Restoration of imperial rule had yet to be formally proclaimed, but the court in Ky
ō
to was already faced with practical problems now that the shogunate was no longer administering the country. When the regent and other members of the court met with Tokugawa Yoshinobu and senior retainers of resident daimyos on December 16, the following were some of the problems brought up for consideration: What arrangements should be made for soldiers from different domains to take turns in guarding the city of Ky
ō
to and the grounds of the imperial palace? How would money to be raised for building the
Ō
miya Palace?
⁷
What would the functions of the
shoshidai
and lesser officials be? How would the issuance of paper currency be regulated?
⁸

In principle, such matters were to be decided by an assembly of senior daimyos, but very few of them had yet appeared in the capital, as they were waiting to see the way the wind was blowing before leaving their domains. The court finally decided to leave everything as in the past, at least for the time being. We can all but see the smile of amusement on Yoshinobu’s face as he contemplated from a distance the spectacle of the nobles helplessly floundering in their new and unfamiliar tasks.
⁹

On December 17 the emperor issued an edict to three nobles who had taken a prominent part in the restoration movement—Nakayama Tadayasu,
Ō
gimachisanj
ō
Sanenaru, and Nakamikado Tsuneyuki—instructing them to direct Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
to discontinue for the time being their attacks on the shogunate.
¹⁰
On December 20 Yoshinobu again formally requested permission to resign his post, but the regent Nij
ō
Nariyuki rejected his petition, commanding him to remain in office until the assembled daimyos could decide on his future. Obviously the court still had not made up its mind how to deal with this man, powerful even in defeat.

Some historians have even suggested that Yoshinobu used the return of power to the emperor as a means of strengthening his position. Foreigners in Japan suspected that Yoshinobu had some ulterior motive for giving up his office. Sir Ernest Satow recalled that when the English were informed that Yoshinobu had long been intending “to surrender the government to the Mikado,” they were skeptical:

This of course we did not believe, our view being that he was tired of being badgered by Satsuma, Ch
ō
sh
ū
, Tosa and Hizen, and that in order to give unity to his own party, he had resolved to call a general council, which possibly might reinstate him by a majority of votes, and thus establish his authority more strongly than ever.
¹¹

As far back as July 23, 1867, Itakura Katsukiyo and Nagai Naoyuki, two highranking officials of the shogunate, had hit on the plan of having the shogun serve as regent during the emperor’s minority, in this way preventing any division between the court and the shogunate.
¹²
Nothing seems to have come of this proposal, but toward the end of that year, Nishi Amane (1829–1897), the “brain” of Yoshinobu, drew up the first bill to be presented to the Assembly of Daimyos dealing with the form of the future government.

The bill called for a division of power into three branches—the government, the court, and the daimyos. By “government” was meant administrative authority. The head of the Tokugawa family, known as the
taikun
(tycoon), would be the chief of this branch. He would establish his government in
Ō
saka and rule the whole country through officials appointed unilaterally by himself with the exception of the presiding officer, who would be selected by the tycoon from among three candidates proposed by the daimyos.

The “daimyo” branch of the government was the legislature. It would consist of two houses, the upper house composed of daimyos and the lower house, of samurai, one from each domain. The legislature was authorized to debate important matters such as the laws, the budget, foreign policy, and issues of war and peace. The tycoon would be the presiding officer of the upper house. In cases when the upper and lower houses failed to reach agreement on some item of legislation, the tycoon was entitled to cast three votes, as opposed to one each for the upper and lower houses, thus ensuring him always of the decisive vote. The tycoon also had the right to dissolve the lower house.

The third branch of the government—the court—was of only nominal significance. The emperor was expected to affix his seal of approval to laws passed by the legislature, but he did not possess the power of the veto.
¹³

If this bill had been approved by the Assembly of Daimyos, it would have given Yoshinobu far greater power than he had ever possessed. His authority would have been further enhanced by impoverishing the daimyos, for they would be required to give two-thirds of their income for national defense and much of the rest for education, exploitation of mines, a telegraph system, and railway lines. Nishi Amane wrote at the time, “Just as in Turkey people call [the ruler] the sultan, and in Russia they call him the czar, there is no reason why in our country we should not call him the tycoon.”
¹⁴
Yoshinobu probably expected to be supported by a majority of the daimyos, enabling him to rule as an absolute monarch. Even Fukuzawa Yukichi, the apostle of Japanese enlightenment, wrote favorably of “the tycoon monarchy.”
¹⁵
It is not clear what Yoshinobu himself desired. Some scholars believe that he was aiming at an absolute dictatorship; others, that he sought to establish a government based on a league of the different domains in which he would have the principal role.
¹⁶

On January 4, 1868, the restoration of imperial rule was formally proclaimed. Early that morning, the chamberlain Chigusa Arit
ō
was sent to inform Iwakura Tomomi that he had been released from house arrest. He was commanded to attend court immediately in full regalia. Iwakura must have presented a rather strange appearance, wearing his court cap perched on a head that had been completely shaven (in the manner prescribed for a person doing penance under house arrest). He arrived at the court bearing a box containing the proclamation of the Restoration and other documents. Ushered into the presence of the emperor, Iwakura offered him the proclamation that, he declared, was based on the emperor’s own views. Iwakura then withdrew. Presently the young emperor moved to his study, where princes of the blood and high dignitaries had assembled, and (probably behind a screen that kept the assemblage from seeing him) read aloud the proclamation announcing the restoration of imperial rule, the abolition of the office of chancellor or regent and that of the shogunate, and the establishment of a new form of government consisting of a
s
ō
sai
(Prince Arisugawa Taruhito), ten
gij
ō
, and twenty
san’yo
.
¹⁷

That night an important meeting was held in the presence of the emperor. Nakayama Tadayasu, the presiding officer, explained that the session was being held to place the imperial government on a firm footing by effecting thoroughgoing reforms. No sooner was it announced that the session was open to discussion than Yamauchi Y
ō
d
ō
got up to propose that Yoshinobu be allowed to participate in the deliberations.
Ō
hara Shigetomi disagreed, whereupon Y
ō
d
ō
launched into the praises of the peace and prosperity the Tokugawa family had brought to Japan for more than 200 years. He expressed admiration for Yoshinobu’s willingness to relinquish powers inherited from the long line of his ancestors solely in order to bring about a better, lasting government; and he criticized the sinister activities of a handful of nobles who, in the name of the emperor, a mere child, were attempting to obliterate Yoshinobu’s achievements.
¹⁸

Iwakura was not one to take criticism calmly. He demanded to know how Y
ō
d
ō
had the effrontery, at a meeting held in the presence of the emperor, to make such accusations. He asserted that the glorious success of the Restoration was due to the emperor’s extraordinary ability and that every single action of that day originated in the emperor’s judgments. He declared that Y
ō
d
ō
had been guilty of grave disrespect in suggesting that persons were taking advantage of the youth of the emperor to steal power.
¹⁹

Taken aback by the accusation, Y
ō
d
ō
apologized profusely for his impropriety of speech,
²⁰
but his slip did not immediately cause others to support Iwakura. Matsudaira Yoshinaga (1828–1880), the daimyo of Echizen (who had just been named a
gij
ō
of the new government), also spoke on behalf of Yoshinobu, invoking the centuries of Tokugawa achievements. Iwakura interrupted Yoshinaga to declare that if Yoshinobu had any sense of responsibility, he would at once resign his rank
²¹
and return to the government his land and people; this was how he could assist the great achievement of the Restoration and entitle himself to a place in the assembly. When Yoshinobu returned his powers to the government, Iwakura continued, he surrendered no more than an empty name; but there was no indication he would yield his title and land, his real power. Iwakura concluded by asking rhetorically how a man like Yoshinobu could be forgiven and allowed to participate in the deliberations.
²²