Confronting the Colonies (25 page)

The JIC assessed the risks, limitations and benefits of embarking upon a policy of covert intervention. From the very outbreak of the violence, centralised intelligence assessments expressed caution about the merits of such risky secret policy. Prudence stemmed from two main reasons: firstly, the committee felt that supporting the Royalists would be futile and impose risks for little gain; secondly, the JIC grew concerned about the reliability of intelligence that pushed for an escalation of covert intervention.

Assessing the likely outcome of the Yemeni civil war, the JIC predicted stalemate. This had important ramifications for the use of covert action: assessments of the balance of power impacted upon the level of potential intervention authorised and, crucially, upon its chances of success. Predictions of Republican discontent or future Royalist ascendency fuelled arguments for covert intervention to speed the process along. Yet predictions of Royalist difficulties also generated calls for British aid. In fact at various points in the conflict, proponents of covert action fluctuated between emphasis on both Royalist ascendency and difficulty. Consequently, the JIC's assessment of stalemate placed the committee at loggerheads with those pushing for intervention. Under pressure from Johnston who deemed the JIC view incorrect, the committee held its ground and concisely asserted in December 1962 that ‘so long as Egypt continued its support of the Republicans, there was likely to be a stalemate on the present lines, i.e. the Republicans would control the greater part of the country and of its economic resources but would be unable to extend their control to cover those parts in the north and east at present in Royalist hands'.
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JIC assessments of stalemate were
also criticised by Trevaskis just over a year later who lambasted them as ‘an empty argument for doing nothing'.
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This pattern of tension continued in the early years of the conflict as the JIC's intelligence conclusions were challenged by local authorities pushing for greater intervention. Trevaskis, for example, used the Algerian war of independence as an analogy to argue that ‘persistent skilful and well directed Royalist guerrilla tactics could cause such a degree of wear and tear on Egyptian forces that they could eventually be obliged to withdraw', as had happened to the French forces in Algeria. Building upon this line of thought and citing the tactics that forced Britain out of Palestine and much of Cyprus, Trevaskis called for British help in ensuring an ‘extension, intensification and improvement of guerrilla tactics employed by the Royalists'.
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Once again, however, JIC members stood firm. Burrows dismissed Trevaskis's analogy and argued that the Egyptians would use tougher tactics than had the French.
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The JIC also made important assessments about the third parties to whom aid would be channelled. These would have been the British-backed tribes on the frontier and potentially the Royalists in Yemen. The secret nature of covert action renders it difficult for the sponsoring state to control the actions of third parties—yet unintended consequences of potential third-party action could have negative political or security implications for that state.
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Accurate intelligence assessments of the ability, motivations and loyalty of the third party are therefore essential when planning covert intervention.

Assessing these issues, the JIC doubted the Royalists' ability and determination to fight a more aggressive campaign caused by increased covert intervention. The committee questioned the Royalists' willingness to accept the losses that inevitable Egyptian reprisals would bring. In fact, the JIC dismissed the Royalists as having ‘so far shown little inclination to die for their cause'.
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Whilst seemingly blunt or flippant, assessments of this nature were vital. It would have amounted to an insurmountable risk to offer weapons (with all the negative political consequences entailed) to a third party lacking sufficient motivation to succeed. However, the stance angered more partial observers. Julian Amery, who was feeding Saudi intelligence reports directly to Macmillan in parallel with the joint intelligence system, criticised the JIC for underestimating the coherence and vehemence of Royalist resistance. Amery received reports from unofficial sources that melodramatically romanticised
the Royalist resistance, and that surely would have held little sway in the JIC had they ever reached the committee. For example, one report from a retired British army colonel sent to Amery (and forwarded to Rab Butler, Thorneycroft and Sandys), eulogised the Royalists' ‘determination […] discipline and unity' in standing up to ‘the maniac in Cairo'.
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Interestingly, even Trevaskis admitted that ‘our friends' (by which he meant sympathetic elements within South Arabia) were divided. The high commissioner therefore called for inducements ‘to unite or at least to come to some working arrangement to ensure that they do not cut each others' throats'.
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The JIC was sceptical about the prospects of this, not only regarding Adeni parties but also more broadly regarding the Royalist tribes. Indeed, the JIC expressed reservations about the loyalty of these tribes. Emphasising issues of tribal venality, the committee warned that they were ready to cause trouble for anyone ‘on either side' if given arms, money and encouragement.
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Highlighting the potential dangers of covert action, the JIC felt it was hazardous to place confidence, security, reputation and money into groups vulnerable to counter-bribery. This again was an important judgement when planning covert action. Nonetheless, by the time of this intelligence assessment, the Colonial Office had already authorised £50,000 to be spent ‘on measures to retain the loyalty of Federal tribes'.
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A further important assessment to be made involved considering unintended consequences, future implications and the dangers of mission-creep. To again quote Treverton: ‘Small operations have often begun with grand purposes, objectives incommensurate with the instrument. When the goals could not be achieved, leaders were tempted to take the next step and the next […] Sometimes a more limited objective can be achieved, but its achievement makes it appealing to hope for more'. Therefore at minimum, intelligence must assess whether operations as initially conceived can achieve their purposes.
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Given that those planning or calling for covert action can develop a personal stake or investment in its implementation and success, an objective interdepartmental body is necessary to assess such matters and prevent unchecked escalation. Indeed, the JIC argued that ‘the Royalists cannot be defeated nor can they win even with outside help unless such help went beyond the supply of equipment which they could operate themselves'. The levels of escalation required to aid the Royalists decisively,
including the supply of tanks and aircraft (and men to operate them), would therefore probably lead to Egyptian reprisals.
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It is commonly accepted that ‘the more provocative or threatening the operations, the more apt they are to come to the attention of the target country's internal security service'.
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As such, the JIC warned of dangerous escalation resulting from Egyptian awareness of British interference. It would lead to reprisal attacks against British interests and render covert action counter-productive. For example, the committee warned against increasing the scale of covert action because the ‘provision of heavier weapons might well […] be offset by the effects of reaction to their supply'.
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The JIC blamed external subversion in part on Republican resentment of FSA territory being used as a base and refuge for Royalist and mercenary activity. The Republicans held the British partly responsible for this and therefore subversion in the FSA and Aden was a consequence of British covert action.
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As such the committee performed a useful task in considering the consequences if the first step in covert action was unsuccessful—an important step in successful covert action planning.

This assessment aligned the JIC with Foreign Office officials who argued that the Royalists could only win as a result of drastic British intervention. This, they argued, was impossible.
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It also echoed the views of SIS Chief, and influential JIC member, Dick White who was reluctant to become embroiled in a covert war.
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The JIC's argument, however, had earlier been dismissed by Trevaskis, who accused the committee of having been misled by the Egyptians. Trevaskis lamented to Duncan Sandys how officials in London had not taken local complexities into account and had ‘overlooked the comparative ineffectiveness of sophisticated weapons even when used with calculated ruthlessness against an unsophisticated enemy in wild and sparsely inhabited country'. When Trevaskis received the JIC's conclusions in March 1964 he again disagreed with the point that Royalists could not win without heavy equipment, privately noting in his diary that guerrilla tactics alone would suffice.
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He therefore seemingly overlooked the dangers of escalation associated with such covert action.

Egyptian action against British interests was not, of course, solely a reaction to British covert action. Nasser (and indeed the Yemeni Republicans) had their own agendas. As has already been discussed, Nasser sought to remove British influence from the region and irregular strikes
provided him with a means of achieving this. Similarly, Yemen had long demonstrated a tendency to try and extend political influence over the border and dominate the south. The border itself was contested and Yemen had engaged in numerous raids into South Arabia since the late 1940s.
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Whilst these motivations would have continued regardless of British activity, it was wise for the JIC to assess the provocative impact covert action may have had.

In addition to analysing the risks of covert action, JIC assessments also considered the accuracy of intelligence received from the theatre. Before embarking on covert intervention, it was (and remains) crucial to ensure that sources were accurate and that action was not being instigated under false pretences. All source intelligence analysis by an interdepartmental body operating at the apex of the intelligence structure was therefore a useful tool in evaluating and corroborating incoming information.

Fearing bias and exaggeration, the JIC was wary about intelligence reports emanating from local British authorities in the region. As previously argued, local Foreign Office officials felt that Trevaskis interpreted any new information according to his pre-disposed theory that Nasser was determined to force the British to withdraw and was doing so through violent subversion. Governor Charles Johnston was perceived in a similar way and reports from Aden regularly suggested that the Royalist cause was strong, that Egyptian morale was low, that Nasser was anxious to withdraw and that with some covert assistance from Britain, Royalist tribesmen would be victorious in the civil war. This, in turn, would decrease the threat to Aden.
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Yet the JIC treated such reports with caution.

Instead the committee placed far greater value on signals intelligence acquired by GCHQ. Signals intelligence, or SIGINT, provided intercepts revealing a detailed picture of Egyptian troop deployments that did not necessarily corroborate Johnston's reporting. As a result, the JIC chairman Hugh Stephenson dismissed Johnston's reports. He told the prime minister directly that Egyptian morale was high and that sources in Aden had ‘clearly […] exaggerated' reports of Egyptian defeats. Contradicting reports from Aden, Stephenson personally informed Macmillan that rather than being on the verge of success, the weak Royalists were ‘confined to their own areas', and were engaged only in ‘sporadic guerrilla activity'. Stephenson followed this up by pointing out
that tensions existed between Republican ministers and the chief of staff of the Egyptian armed forces.
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A similar instance occurred six weeks later when the JIC again emphatically dismissed Johnston's views by stating ‘there was at present no evidence available to support the Governor's contention that Nasser was anxious to pull his forces out of the Yemen, and indeed there were some indications to the contrary'.
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At other points in the conflict, local intelligence reports emphasised Royalist difficulties and their imminent defeat, with all the consequences this would have had for British regional interests. Again, however, the JIC sensed bias and suspected an agenda designed to encourage increased British covert assistance. Questions were consequently raised over the reliability of the reports. For example, tribal rulers and indigenous intelligence officers loyal to those rulers had much to gain in misrepresenting the threat to induce further assistance from the British. In spring 1964, the committee assessed that ‘we have no evidence that the Royalists are seriously short of ammunition and spares for their present scale of equipment (the various tribal and Royalist complaints of shortage probably reflect maldistribution and in any case have to be judged against determination to retain adequate reserves for purely sectional reasons)'.
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Similar issues were raised regarding reports from mercenary sources close to the Royalist tribes. These also pressed for deeper British covert involvement in the Yemeni civil war. The JIC was dismissive of mercenaries, although members only made this view explicit retrospectively. The committee criticised them as a ‘source of political embarrassment to the British government' and for ‘sometimes put[ting] British interests at risk'.
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Throughout the conflict, the JIC treated pro-Royalist intelligence with caution and it is highly likely that such information was weeded out at the assessment phase. The committee would most likely have looked upon the mercenaries and their sources as an inconvenience. For example, the committee stressed the distinction between intelligence obtained via unprejudiced sources and that obtained ‘from persons favourable to [the] Royalist Cause'. Likewise the JIC was wary of assessments being exaggerated so as to indicate the levels of Royalist requirements should their activities become more ambitious, as advocated by the mercenaries, as opposed to their present requirements.
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