Confronting the Colonies (23 page)

This leads to the issue of why the JIC began to recognise the (violent as opposed to political) Egyptian threat in spring 1964. New evidence was certainly a factor in this—illustrating the ability to adapt to incoming intelligence. In addition to increasingly belligerent speeches made by Nasser, by April 1964 evidence of Egyptian-directed violence began to pile up on JIC desks. For example in one meeting the JIC pointed
to a number of new pieces of intelligence including a CIA assessment that the ‘UAR was likely to continue strong pressure against the Federation of South Arabia', an unspecified report which quoted ‘an alleged UAR plan to involve Saudi Arabia in protecting the regime in Yemen while leaving UAR free to attack Aden and the “Arab South”' and continued intelligence from local sources in Aden reporting an aggressive UAR policy.

‘In light of all this', Burrows urged the JIC to reassess its own assumptions ‘which did not, perhaps, give sufficient weight to the U.A.R. threat'.
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In a subsequent report on Egyptian policies towards Aden, the JIC concluded that Nasser wanted the British out of the region and that ‘evidence indicates that an organised campaign of terrorism, including assassination, particularly in the state of Aden, is under active consideration'. By the end of 1964, the JIC confirmed that ‘UAR subversive activities in South Arabia are directed by the Egyptian Intelligence Service'. At one point the JIC surprisingly even went further than Trevaskis, who criticised the committee for placing too much emphasis on sabotage and terrorism as the main instruments of Egyptian subversion as opposed to what he saw as the ‘chief danger' of subversion through bribing tribes and suborning their allegiance from federal rulers.
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This illustrates JIC receptiveness to adapt committee conclusions to new intelligence and counters charges of perseverance. However, despite new intelligence reaching the committee, as late as 1966 the JIC acknowledged a ‘marked lack of internal political and military intelligence on the U.A.R'.
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In addition to new evidence filtering into the joint intelligence assessment process, it is also important to consider other factors. It is not unlikely that JIC scepticism of colonial sources and initial alignment with the Foreign Office contributed in some degree to its caution and over-emphasis of the political subversive threat. Psychologically, it would have been easier for the official mind to blame the escalating violence in early 1964 on external instigation, as had been the case in Malaya, than face up to failures in colonial policy and the realities of imperial decline. Interestingly, and unlike earlier insurgencies, this is evidence of a shift in JIC thinking in the early years of the conflict: violence (if not political subversion) was initially deemed not to be externally instigated.

Political pressures were also a factor and engulfed the atmosphere in which intelligence was centrally assessed. This, however, most likely
worked subtly, intangibly and in terms of degrees of emphasis regarding the Egyptian threat—as opposed to the deliberate and direct manipulation of intelligence, which is rare. The shift in emphasis of strategic intelligence assessments implies newfound receptiveness within the joint intelligence organisation to local sources. Doubts, however, can be raised about the accuracy of certain local intelligence reports. Before reforms ended the dual intelligence organisation, Local Intelligence Committee conclusions subtly differed from their JIC(ME) counterparts in that they placed more emphasis on the active Egyptian threat. The differences in opinion and assessments between the two bodies caused ‘general concern' amongst certain Colonial Office figures and Bernard Burrows.
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The LIC's subtle emphasis of the Egyptian threat was caused by what Jack Morton described as its ‘deplorable' operating procedures and its ‘failure to marshal evidence and to assess it'.
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The LIC's place within the high commissioner's administrative structure also shaped conclusions. After all, according to some Foreign Office accounts Trevaskis was biased and ‘convinced that the Egyptians have a great plot' against the FSA and therefore ‘tends to interpret any incident […] according to his theory'. This, according to John Bushell, a political officer at Middle East Command, hindered the ability to conduct accurate and objective intelligence assessments in Aden. Trevaskis was a ‘forceful personality', with whom his staff and officials did ‘not care to argue', despite interpreting intelligence differently.
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As one former CIA analyst argues, intelligence analysts are aware of their consumers' policy preferences and it is this awareness that can potentially lead to subconscious politicisation.
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Even some Colonial Office personnel agreed. Trevaskis had a tendency ‘to regard volume of evidence as being more important than the sifted evidence'. In one instance, he had used a detailed catalogue prepared by his senior officials to back his arguments when a more considered assessment by the LIC would have been preferable. Other colonial officials feared outright bias.
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Sometimes such bias occurred subtly through indirect politicisation arising from the proximity of the LIC to the high commissioner. Other times it was far more direct. Trevaskis had a low opinion of the intelligence services and was prone to acting as his own intelligence assessment officer. On occasions he edited the local intelligence reports unilaterally. This was appalling intelligence practice. Trevaskis bypassed the objective assessments available to him from the JIC in London and other sources.
Moreover, he did not always inform the JIC that he had manipulated the intelligence, and so the central intelligence machine in London ended up mistaking his personal opinion for LIC reports.
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Meanwhile, although the Colonial Office found some of Trevaskis's practices dangerous, certain officials (including John Higham, the department's JIC representative) sought greater LIC input into the central intelligence machine.
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Biased intelligence shaped by Trevaskis's prejudices was allowed to seep into JIC assessments and therefore partly explains the committee's shift in outlook.

The conclusions of the JIC(ME) and LIC weekly intelligence output subtly differed. Local Intelligence Committee reports emphasised the coordinated Egyptian threat slightly more consistently than their regional counterparts. Intelligence assessments of the grenade attack at Aden airport on 10 December 1963 provide an interesting example. Unlike the LIC (and indeed the Federal Intelligence Committee), the JIC(ME) actively downplayed both any external Egyptian involvement and suggestions that the attack formed the start of a coordinated campaign.
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This then fed back to the intelligence machine in London and goes some way to explain the JIC's initial caution.

Following the grenade incident, both the JIC(ME) and LIC highlighted the increasing Egyptian threat. However, the Local Intelligence Committee highlighted the specific threat to the FSA more starkly than its regional counterpart. Similarly, LIC reports consistently emphasised to a greater extent than the JIC(ME) the detrimental effect of failing to react to Egyptian air strikes against the FSA and the positive impact of retaliatory air strikes once completed. In August 1964, the LIC stressed the need for better intelligence on Cairo, for ‘most of the important decisions are undoubtedly reached there'.
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Consequently, subtly flawed or biased local intelligence entered the centralised intelligence assessment machine via the LIC. This danger was enhanced once the LIC was given sole responsibility for these assessments at the expense of the JIC (Middle East) in May 1964. A further factor creating bias was the potential identity of interest between federal intelligence officers loyal to the local rulers and colonial officials. Federal intelligence had the motive to over-emphasise the Egyptian threat so as to force the British to stay in the region and defend the FSA. Local biases therefore remain one potential factor in the JIC's change of emphasis in spring 1964.

The government's political need to deflect blame towards external aggression and away from accusations of colonialism also influenced strategic intelligence assessments. At around the same time as the JIC's recognition of concerted Egyptian involvement in violent subversion, Britain was under intense pressure in the UN and domestic media following the bombing of a Yemeni fort in retaliation to air strikes on FSA territory. The UN Security Council, in fact, on 9 April 1964 explicitly condemned the British reprisal attack.
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Whitehall officials therefore required intelligence that could be used in the UN to publicly support the government's case by implicating the Egyptians as well as the Yemenis. This would have alleviated international diplomatic pressure on Britain. Consequently, the JIC was commissioned by the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee to compile a list of publishable material on UAR and Yemeni activities in the FSA ‘for propaganda use in the U.N. and elsewhere'.
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Expressing no disquiet in the minutes about the potential misuse of intelligence to support a policy position, the JIC complied but did warn that publicising the extent of dissident activity could be misrepresented and used against British interests.
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This raises further questions about politicisation, this time relating to the public use of intelligence.

The dossier, drafted by the Joint Intelligence Staff, was issued by the JIC at the end of April. It recorded evidence of UAR air attacks against Yemeni Royalists as well as UAR and Yemeni aggression and subversion in the FSA. However, on closer examination it appears that intelligence was used to support a pre-conceived policy objective. To meet its brief the JIC tried to find as many examples of Egyptian intervention as possible. Therefore much of the intelligence contained within the dossier was merely a replication of a single source or newspaper report, seemingly lacking thorough assessment or validation. Regarding subversion, the dossier provided forty-one pieces of evidence of Yemeni and Egyptian activity in the FSA, but sources ranged from captured letters or propaganda leaflets to examples beginning ‘it was fairly reliably reported that…' and ‘a source reported that…' leaving the general impression that in an attempt to implicate the Egyptians as far as possible, the JIC resorted to uncorroborated intelligence.
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It was very difficult for the JIC to avoid politicisation in such circumstances. The committee was directly serving the political masters who had to sell the policy in the United Nations.

The intelligence was used explicitly for political purposes: to implicate the Egyptians and relieve pressure on Britain at the UN. As more states acquired independence, international condemnation of imperialism gathered momentum. Transnational networks of non-aligned states, civil society groups and the media sought to point out the anachronistic nature of Britain's imperial model and to expose the more brutal side of British colonial counterinsurgency. By commissioning a list solely of Egyptian and Yemeni incidents, the product naturally emphasised external incidents at the expense of internal activity and local agency. As argued in the previous chapter, agenda setting was crucial and the questions asked impacted upon the answers received. By considering only one side of the argument, the assessment automatically portrayed all violence and subversion as being externally instigated by the Egyptians directly or indirectly through the Yemenis. Issuing such a request indicated a shift in Foreign Office thinking, as officials had initially been reluctant to emphasise the Egyptian threat. This is perhaps explained by UN pressure on the British following the Harib strikes and the consequent need for a pragmatic Whitehall to defend British interests.

A further potential political factor was the election of the Labour Government in 1964. There was a strong anti-colonial lobby within the Labour Party, which could conceivably have shifted the parameters of the debate and challenged the political neutrality of JIC assessments. It has already been noted that senior Labour ministers were in favour of withdrawal once they became aware of the political realities. Despite this, the JIC began to change emphasis around six months before the election of Wilson. Potential pressure from the Labour Party did not therefore stimulate the JIC's reassessment. But did any such pressure subtly encourage the JIC after it had changed route? Anti-colonialism within the party would have related more to withdrawal than to emphasis of the Egyptian threat. Consistently highlighting Nasser's involvement, however, would probably have increased the incentive to withdraw. That said, there is no tangible evidence within the files that the Labour government put undue pressure on the JIC after its election. Indeed, there was a good deal of continuity between the Labour and Conservative administrations. Spencer Mawby has put it well: ‘although the former were less sympathetic than the latter to the federation and keener to appease the nationalists in Aden, the goals of British policy and even some tactics remained unchanged'. The Wilson government
‘employed a variety of means, many of them familiar, to combat Egyptian influence and construct a stable state in which their interests could be guaranteed'.
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JIC intelligence assessments shifted their emphasis in spring 1964, bringing them more in line with Colonial Office and military thinking. Whilst there may have been an element of politicisation, Egypt did become increasingly involved in active and violent subversion around this time. Although this was not clear-cut, the JIC, after initial caution and based on the available evidence, was broadly correct in increasing the emphasis on the Egyptian threat. In fact, JIC assessments balanced the political pressures and inflammatory rhetoric from figures such as Trevaskis reasonably well. The committee initially expressed caution and moderation before adjusting its threat assessments without resorting to scare mongering and hyperbole.