Confronting the Colonies (11 page)

Regardless of Reilly's rhetoric, as part of the chiefs of staff system the JIC was deemed too military-heavy to conduct appreciations involving political implications. It consequently lacked direct input on certain interdepartmental issues, such as the presence of Chinese consuls in Malaya.
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Perhaps its most notable impact on non-defence matters related to the JIC's brief—but ill-fated—advice regarding nomenclature. JIC suggestions to refer to the insurgents as Chinese bandits (the committee thought the term ‘terrorist' held connotations with British defeat in Palestine and that the Soviets would exploit any reference to nationalism) were briefly mirrored by the Foreign and Colonial Offices.
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Ultimately, however, they proved short-lived as Attlee began to recognise communist China at the end of 1949, rendering official reference to Chinese bandits politically infeasible.

Conversely, the JIC, chaired by a Foreign Office official, was deemed too political and interdepartmental for many of the narrow military tasks
involving Malaya. It therefore floundered; suspended between two spheres. Consequently, the JIC's limited policy impact was twofold: coordinating intelligence for the chiefs of staff in an attempt to gradually build up consumers' background knowledge thus making them better informed to fulfil their duties, and secondly in intelligence-related input into broader defence planning. The former was an important JIC peacetime role: the cumulative influence of regular and accurate intelligence increases background knowledge, shapes understanding and helps create well-informed policies.
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There was little direct policy impact, however. The JIC received, and commented upon, local reports from the theatre and ensured that such intelligence was coordinated and disseminated to the chiefs of staff. Indicating the military dominance within the committee, it was often the service directors of intelligence who passed such intelligence on to their respective chief of staff. It was thus the military personnel who provided an important link with the primary consumers.

Regarding defence planning, JIC input became more important as the chiefs of staff increasingly feared a conventional war. In a merging of boundaries symptomatic of Cold War thinking, a combination of threat assessment and defence planning was now required. Therefore, the JIC had to liaise effectively with the Joint Planning Staff, whose role it was to advise the chiefs of staff on defence planning matters. Despite the potential for overlap and role confusion, the two bodies worked effectively together and held regular meetings that fostered personal contact and liaison. The Joint Planning Staff occasionally asked the JIC for specific input and often successfully incorporated JIC conclusions into their own reports, which regularly strayed into the JIC's realm of threat assessment. This allowed the JIC's ideas to be applied to strategic planning considerations and helped the planners assess the specific action required.
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Such coordination allowed the JIC and the Joint Planning Staff to complement each other's roles and expertise, and illustrates how consumers used JIC reports to bring intelligence aspects into broader defence planning appreciations.

Confusion regarding the best use of the JIC reigned, however. It resulted in an underused source with unfulfilled potential and created an ultimate lack of coordinated strategic intelligence reaching the primary consumers. Gerald Templer, then vice chief of the imperial general staff, declared in May 1949 that ‘the Chiefs of Staff were not at present in a position to give an immediate and coordinated appreciation of the
situation in the Far East'. He also admitted that ‘although factual information was available in Whitehall, the situation was constantly changing and it would at any time be difficult to assemble all the available information into a composite appreciation at short notice'.
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This appraisal was significant for this was precisely the role of the JIC: to assemble and appreciate all available intelligence as required to the Chiefs of Staff. It was the JIC's role to take intelligence, including that from Malaya, and appreciate it into a unified and coherent assessment, bringing disparate developments into a regional strategic and political context. It therefore becomes apparent that when it came to setting agendas the JIC was underused, and perhaps under-appreciated by the chiefs of staff.

Intelligence reform was vital from the very start of the Malayan insurgency. Weak intelligence from the theatre severely hampered the ability to predict and respond to the violence. Government officials in the theatre, and by extension in London, received little information about the guerrilla bands and local loyalties. The JIC's involvement in colonial affairs following the Second World War was negligible and, despite increased centralisation, the committee remained passive observers during the all-important formative years of the violence in Malaya. Local actors were clearly of paramount importance, however, and intelligence reform was recognised by Harold Briggs, the new director of operations, as being a crucial aspect in the fight against the guerrillas. He created a Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee at the federal level and appointed a new director of intelligence, William Jenkin (who had enjoyed a distinguished career in the Indian Special Branch and the Indian Intelligence Bureau).
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As a result of the overarching communist threat, reforms became increasingly centralised. Officials in London sought to ‘give Colonies the lead which they now required'.
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Regarding colonial security and intelligence, both a lead agency (MI5) and a lead department (the Colonial Office) existed to implement and oversee reform from London where necessary. For example, MI5, whose jurisdiction included British colonies, aided reform by pressuring the Malayan Security Service to disband and by setting up the new Special Branch, whilst Alex Kellar, MI5's leading colonial expert, was sent out to head SIFE.
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Similarly, the Colonial Office adopted a more active and centralised approach to colonial security following the various imperial crises of 1948. For example, Arthur Creech Jones, the colonial secretary, dispatched William Nicol Gray to Malaya as commissioner of police. Gray had been inspector general in Palestine and, according to some, came with a brusque manner and a dangerous tendency to militarise the police.
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More broadly, Creech Jones also attempted to coordinate a review of colonial security and intelligence organisations in the summer of 1948. Following the violence in Malaya and unrest in the Gold Coast, this came about as a result of pressure from Bevin and Attlee at the very top of government. In August 1948 he sent a circular despatch to governors stressing the need to review the efficiency of intelligence and security structures. He also took steps towards an appointment of an inspector general of colonial police to advise on police and intelligence matters.
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Thinking about imperial security brought with it an increased focus on interdepartmental coordination. Creech Jones liaised with his counterparts in the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence, whilst other ministers also impressed upon the Colonial Office the need to enhance its own internal intelligence organisation. Senior colonial officials thus discussed, in October and November 1948, measures to ‘improve the machinery […] for the collation of political intelligence, and for advising ministers on the political, economic, and other repercussions in Colonies of events in Foreign and Commonwealth countries'. This was to include ‘some kind of central intelligence department' designed to ‘forecast probable developments' and ‘draw attention in advance to the possible effect in colonies of outside events which on the surface have no direct relevance to Colonial Affairs and prepare “appreciations” for Ministers' information and guidance'.
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How then did the JIC fit into this framework? Once again there existed confusion over the committee's role and supposed level of input. The JIC's charter instructed the committee to ‘keep under review the organisation of intelligence as a whole and in particular relations of its component parts so as to ensure efficiency, economy, and a rapid adaptation to changing requirements'.
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This has management and oversight connotations but is vague in terms of the committee's actual role, particularly given the lack of explicit jurisdiction over colonial territories—where the Colonial Office and MI5 were active and understandably
took the lead role. These managerial functions were a lesser priority than the production of intelligence assessments and, as Michael Herman has explained, the JIC's responsibility for the ‘review of intelligence as a whole' was interpreted with some tacit limitations, resulting in cultural rather than direct management.
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Potential reforms to centralised Colonial Office intelligence structures recognised the need for interdepartmental coordination regarding the impact of external events on colonial territories. But surprisingly they ignored any use of the JIC. There was no mention of greater liaison with the committee, which was already in existence to enhance interdepartmental coordination of intelligence, except for the possibility of showing Logan's fortnightly reviews on communism to the JIC. Instead, the Colonial Office looked towards internal (and somewhat insular) changes such as the possible creation of a broader intelligence and research department within the Colonial Office.
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Clearly, the Colonial Office's reforms did not enhance interdepartmental intelligence liaison adequately enough as an Intelligence and Security Department was deemed necessary seven years later along with further integration with the central intelligence machinery.

Despite the marginalisation of the JIC machinery by the Colonial Office, the joint intelligence organisation was expected in some quarters to suggest reform in Malaya. Exhibiting parallels with the committee's perceived warning role, local authorities, this time Malcolm Macdonald, staunchly criticised London actors (probably including the JIC) for failing to appreciate the inadequacy of intelligence regarding communism and colonial territories in the Far East.
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Yet both the JIC and JIC(FE) did point out a number of weaknesses regarding Malayan intelligence. The problem, however, was that the JIC lacked the authority and legitimacy to implement changes and the committee's calls fell on deaf ears. Conscious of the dangers stemming from lack of continuity in intelligence analysis, the JIC(FE) criticised the short terms of office of intelligence appointments that hampered ‘efficiency and continuity'.
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Demonstrating the importance of all source assessment, the JIC(FE) further warned that political intelligence must be balanced against information received from military or security sources. Concerned that the JIC(FE) was not receiving enough intelligence, particularly from the MSS and police, chairman Patrick Scrivener urged an increased coordination of the activities of the police and Criminal Investigation Department
and advocated the setting-up of a Local Intelligence Committee (LIC) in Malaya to supply intelligence to the JIC(FE).
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These JIC(FE) recommendations ran coeval with Creech Jones's security and intelligence review. It is unclear, however, whether Whitehall authorities specifically charged the JIC(FE) with recommending reform or managing intelligence. Creech Jones's review acknowledged that the JIC(FE) did have a role in reforming Malayan intelligence, noting how the committee was ‘considering urgently what steps can be taken to improve our intelligence system, including collection of what may be described as “Battle-Intelligence”'.
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At the very least, this suggests that the JIC(FE) worked in parallel to the colonial system. At most, however, it suggests that the colonial secretary utilised the intelligence management functions of the regional JIC system as part of his imperial review—but this did not apparently extend to the JIC in London.

In London, the JIC itself also recommended reforms and was aware from the outbreak of the Malayan violence that ‘the overriding requirement was an efficient intelligence organisation'. At the same time as Creech Jones's imperial security review, the committee drew attention to ‘the non-existence of a Combined Intelligence Organisation capable of providing adequate warning of the present Communist campaign, and intelligence on which the prosecution of counter measures could be based'.
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Discussion of this issue arose out of JIC(FE) minutes, however, and it appears that the JIC itself was not tasked with involvement by the Colonial Office in the imperial security review.

In October 1949 the JIC commented on intelligence in Malaya and on imperial security more broadly. This time, however, it was invited to do so by the cabinet's Oversea Defence Committee as part of a memorandum covering guidance for colonial governors facing ‘Cold War' threats. The JIC passed comment on the appraisal of political intelligence, the role of regional JICs and the role of Local Intelligence Committees. On the former point, the JIC disagreed with Gurney's view that Special Branches should appraise political intelligence, and instead recommended that when such appraisal is required for the formulation of policy, responsibility should rest with the governor advised by the colonial secretariat and LIC (if established). On regional JICs, the committee suggested that where such a regional committee covered colonial territories, its membership should include somebody ‘competent to advise on and to assess political intelligence collected from these territories'.
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The JIC advised colonial governments to set up a Local Intelligence Committee. Echoing JIC(FE) advice from eight months earlier, the committee argued that an LIC would allow improved coordination of all intelligence and would be a body with which the JIC and its regional outposts could exchange views.
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Although marginalised by Creech Jones in 1948, with hindsight it is apparent that this invitation by the Oversea Defence Committee formed the beginnings of the committee's attempts at a nascent overseas intelligence management role, yet given its structural constraints and lack of authority, the committee struggled to rise beyond a passive observer to local intelligence reform.