Pearl Harbor Betrayed (56 page)

70
. NARA, RG 180, PHLO, Box 5, Miles, Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, Subject: Sunday Morning, December 7, 1941; 15 December 1941.

71
. PHA, Pt. 9, p. 4518.

72
. Ibid.

73
. PHA, Pt. 5, pp. 2132–33.

74
. Ibid., Pt. 14, p. 1334.

75
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 5, Miles, Memorandum, 15 December 1941. French's remark is in PHA, Pt. 34, p. 32; Pt. 23, p. 1105.

76
. Ibid.

77
. Ibid., Box 5, Memorandum for Record: Log of the Message; signed by Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff, Washington, D.C., 15 December 1941.

78
. PHA, Pt. 36, pp. 55–56.

79
. Crocker,
Black Cats and Dumbos,
“Bill Tanner: One Hour Before the War,” pp. 1–2.

80
. For 14P1 and Tanner see ibid., p. 2. The flight procedures and engine numbers given in this narrative were standard for the PBY-5's takeoff, climb, cruise, and PBY-5 glide attack, as learned by the writer from flight manuals and interviews with former PBY-5 pilots. For
Ward
and Outerbridge see PHA, Pt. 36, pp. 56–57. Outerbridge made no mention of 14P1 in his testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry.

81
. A shorter message sent two minutes earlier mentioned depth charges only; ibid., p. 57. The sending times are verified in the radio log of Section Base, Bishop's Point, Oahu, where they are recorded in equivalent Greenwich Mean Time: 1721 and 1723. Ibid., Pt. 37, p. 704. That the 0653 message was sent in
uncoded voice
is clearly stipulated in ibid., Pt. 36, p. 278, during the interrogation of Lieutenant Underkofler by Admiral Hewitt. It should be noted that the 14ND Control Post Watch Officer's Log (War Diary, Fourteenth District Naval Base Defense Force) logs in
Ward
's message at 0654 and states next: “0712. Message decoded and delivered to Duty Officer, Lt. Comdr. Kaminski.” Pt. 24, p. 1649. If this is the accurate record of events, it would account for the delay in its passage to Kaminski. Either scenario is possible. But Hewitt's report, dated 12 July 1945, concluded: “The evidence indicates that the reports by the WARD were in plain language but that a request for verification by the WARD was later sent in code by the ComFOURTEEN Communication Officer at the direction of the ComFOURTEEN Duty Officer.” NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 5, OT, Report of Further Investigation into the Facts Surrounding the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941, by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, U.S. Navy, p. 46. Outerbridge's official report to Commandant 14ND, dated 13 December 1941, is in PHA, Pt. 24, p. 1290.

82
. For Kaminski see ibid., Pt. 23, pp. 1035–38; for Murphy see Pt. 26, pp. 209–10; for Earle see Pt. 23, pp. 1051–52; for Bloch and Momsen see Pt. 22, p. 499 and Pt. 32, p. 308; for the radio log see Pt. 37, pp. 704–05; for Ramsey see Pt. 32, p. 444; for Kimmel see Pt. 26, pp. 209–10, Pt. 23, pp. 1192–93. On the last-cited page, Kimmel is recorded as saying that, at the time of the Japanese air attack, he “had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine;” he learned of it only “sometime later.” The action report from PBY 14P1 was sent coded at 0715 and was decoded by 0735; ibid., Pt. 26, p. 135.

83
. For Kaminski see ibid., Pt. 23, pp. 1035–37; for Earle ibid., pp. 1051–52; for Bloch ibid., Pt. 22, pp. 498–99; for Murphy ibid., Pt. 26, pp. 209–10; for Ramsey ibid., Pt. 32, p. 444; and for Kimmel ibid., Pt. 23, pp. 1125, 1193.

84
. Ibid., Pt. 28, p. 1554.

Chapter Nine: This Is No Drill

1
. Since 27 November the AWS daily schedule required the mobile radar sets to operate from 0400 to 0700 and to conduct training from 0700 to 1100 every day
except
Sundays. KC, Roll 2, Memorandum, Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer, to General Short, 19 December 1941; also Capt. W. H. Tetley, Signal Corps, to Lt. Col. Powell.

2
. KC, Roll 20, Changes Made in Pearl Harbor Defenses During the Period 1 February to 7 December 1941.

3
. The other mobile radar emplacements were at Kawailoa, Wai'anae, Ka'a'awa, Koko Head, and Fort Shafter.

4
. PHA, Pt. 27, pp. 531–32. The center was also called Interception Control Center.

5
. Ibid., pp. 569, 532; Pt. 10, p. 5041.

6
. Ibid., Pt. 32, p. 342; Pt. 22, p. 223.

7
. Ibid., Pt. 27, p. 568. The Opana handwritten “Record of Readings” is given in ibid., Pt. 10, opposite p. 5058. A simplified drawing of the graphic plot is given on p. 137 of Morison,
Rising Sun
. On p. 138 of the same work Morison asserts, on the strength of information given him by Rear Admiral Inglis, that within a half hour prior to their 0702 radar sighting of the air fleet Lockard and Elliott made a radar sighting of one of the two Japanese reconnaissance floatplanes; that they “reported it properly”; and the “the watch officer heard but did nothing.” Morison's copy of the plot depicts the track of an incoming flight, at 200 miles per hour, recorded from 0645 to 0700. A photograph of the actual plot is given as an exhibit in PHA, Pt. 25, item 123. As Morison put it, the matter was “glossed over” in the JCC; see ibid., Pt. 1, pp. 39–40. But this writer has found no corroborating evidence that such a report was sent in to the information center or that the watch officer, presumably Lieutenant Tyler, “did nothing” about it.

8
. Ibid., Pt. 7, p. 3075.

9
. Ibid., Pt. 22, p. 223.

10
. Ibid., Pt. 27, p. 569.

11
. Ibid.

12
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Lt. Comdr. Baecher to William D. Mitchell, Condition of Water-Tight Integrity of Major Vessels, 11 December 1945: “Only one vessel did not have an equivalent of the condition ‘all water-tight openings below the third deck closed' at the time of the attack. That vessel, the USS
California
, had ten inner and outboard voids open for maintenance work.”

13
. PHA, Pt. 3, p. 1213.

14
. Ibid., Pt. 29, p. 2313.

15
. Ibid., Pt. 32, p. 294.

16
. Ibid.

17
. Dyer,
Amphibians,
pp. 192–93.

18
. Richardson,
Treadmill,
p. 450. According to an oral history recorded years later by then Rear Admiral McCollum (Ret.) for the U.S. Naval Institute, Wilkinson asked Stark, “Why don't you pick up the telephone and call Kimmel?” McCollum stated that he saw Stark pick up the telephone, then place it back in its cradle, saying, “No, I think I will call the President.” But he could not get through because Roosevelt was occupied on another call. Cited in Costello,
Days of Infamy,
p. 219 and n. 19.

19
. R. V. Jones,
The Wizard War: British Scientific Intelligence, 1939–1945
(New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1978), p. 150.

20
. PHA, Pt. 32, p. 99; Layton, “
And I Was There,”
p. 321.

21
. In developing this attack sequence, the writer has relied on the essential source, Fuchida, “Air Attack,”
Proceedings
, pp. 945–52; as well as on Agawa,
Reluctant Admiral
, pp. 255–58. Contrary to the scout plane's report, the major vessels in harbor were eight battleships, two heavy cruisers, and six light cruisers; NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 24, List of Ships Present at Pearl Harbor at the Time of the Japanese Attack December 7, 1941, 3 pp.

22
. Agawa,
Reluctant Admiral,
p. 258.

23
. Lieutenant Goto, quoted in “Air Raid, Pearl Harbor. This Is No Drill,” a map published by O.S.B. Map Mania Publishing, Phoenix, AZ, 1999.

24
. Fuchida, “Air Attack,” pp. 948–49.

25
. Ibid., pp. 949–50.

26
. KC, Roll 4, Summary of Damage Sustained by Ships of Pacific Fleet from Enemy Attacks At Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941; CINCPAC, 21, December 1941, p. 1.

27
. Fuchida, “Air Attack,” p. 951.

28
. By carrier and type the aircraft launched in the second wave were:

29
. See Commander John Rodgaard, USNR, Peter Hsu, Carroll Lucas, and Captain Andrew Biache, USNR (Ret.), “Attack from Below,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings
, vol. 126/12/1, 174 (December 2000), pp. 64–67. The authors mention “antisubmarine and torpedo nets” at the harbor channel entrance. But Admiral Bloch, among whose responsibilities was the entrance defense, testified during the month after the attack: “The net is not an anti-submarine net proper. It is an anti-torpedo net.… It is our opinion—I refer to my opinion and the Navy Department's opinion—that any … regular-sized submarine could not come into the harbor without showing her periscope.… So we felt that there was no reason to put in anti-submarine nets, that an anti-torpedo net was sufficient.” PHA, Pt. 22, p. 472. That the antitorpedo net was left open from 0458 to 0840 is confirmed in the net tender's log, PHA, Pt. 38, Items 133, 134. Excellent reproductions and a discussion of the photograph in question appear in Burl (William G., Jr.) Burlingame,
Advance Force—Pearl Harbor
(Kailua, Hawaii: Pacific Monograph, 1992), pp. 198–99.

30
. Michael Slackman,
Target: Pearl Harbor
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), pp. 155–57; Morison,
Rising Sun,
pp. 115–16.

31
. KC, Roll 4, Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary Knox, Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941; 21 December 1941, pp. 47, 50, 56–57.

32
. Ibid., pp. 44–85. A number of the ships that cleared the entrance channel did so in response to an order from Vice Admiral Pye, Commander, Battle Force, at 0921:
TO ALL SHIPS PRESENT: GET UNDERWAY IMMEDIATELY
; p. 54. At 1002, however, CINCPAC ordered:
TO ALL SHIPS PRESENT: BATTLESHIPS REMAIN IN PORT PROBABLE CHANNEL MINED
; and at 1015 CINCPAC ordered the commander, Task Force 1:
DO NOT SEND ANY MORE CRUISERS TO SEA;
KC, Roll 4, Messages and Orders from Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, December 7, 1941.

33
. Ibid., pp. 62, 71, 78.

34
. Rodgaard et al, “Attack from Below,”
Proceedings,
p. 66.

35
. The survivor was the commanding officer, twenty-four-year-old Sub-Lieutenant Kazuo Sakamaki, from Okayama Prefecture, who was promptly designated by his capturers “Prisoner Number One” of the Pacific War. During his interrogation he stated: “My greatest mistake was being captured. This is the first time I have failed. Please do not advise Japan about this. Please kill me.” NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 16, Report of Interrogation, 8 December 1941.

36
. Ibid., Box 48, Interrogation of Captain Watanabe Y., Meiji Building, Tokyo, 15 October 1945, p. 3.

37
. Interview with Fuchida conducted on 10 December 1963 by Prange;
At Dawn We Slept,
p. 536. Prange is also the source for the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter; p. 540.

38
. Slackman cites statements of signal tower personnel as source for the grounding order;
Target: Pearl Harbor,
p. 167 and n. 36.

39
. Fuchida, “Air Attack,”
Proceedings,
p. 951.

40
. The other first attack was made against
Raleigh.
See De Virgilio, “Japanese Thunderfish,” p. 64. This is the best source for the effects of the torpedo-plane attacks. De Virgilio dismisses the notion that the Japanese pilots thought that
Utah
was an aircraft carrier because she occupied the berth (F-11) normally filled by
Enterprise. Utah
was equipped with AA armament, but all ammunition was secured in magazines and all guns were either covered with steel housings or were dismounted and stowed below decks. See KC, Roll 4, Kimmel to Knox, Narrative of Events, 21 December 1941, p. 23.