Pearl Harbor Betrayed (57 page)

41
. Fuchida, “Air Attack,” p. 952.

42
. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate,
The Army Air Forces in World War II,
vol. 1,
Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942
(University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 200.

43
. Prange,
At Dawn We Slept,
p. 539.

44
. Craven and Cate,
Early Operations,
pp. 198–200.

45
. KC, Box 4, Memorandum from Admiral Pye, Interim CINCPAC, to Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder of the Roberts Commission, on “Naval Airplanes on the Island of Oahu on the Day of the Japanese Air Raid, 7 December 1941”; 27 December 1941. Cf. PHA, Pt. 12, Item 12. Only one PBY at Pearl managed to get airborne, from the northwest side of Ford Island, at about 0830; Captain James R. Ogden, USN (Ret.), “Airborne at Pearl,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings,
vol. 119/12/1 (December 1993), pp. 60–62. Kaneohe, home to PBY Patrol Wing 1, was the first air station of either service to be struck, at 0745; PHA, Pt. 23, p. 741.

46
. KC, Roll 4, Kimmel to Knox, Narrative of Events, 21 December 1941, pp. 48, 54. The observation that “red circles” were on the undersides of Japanese fuselages was also made by Comdr. Harold Montgomery Martin, commanding officer, Kaneohe Naval Air Station; PHA, Pt. 23, p. 739.

47
. KC, Roll 4, Pye to Howe, “Naval Airplanes,” 27 December 1941, p. 1. There are minor discrepancies in the secondary sources as well as in the original action reports as regards both the number of SBDs that formed the flight and the fate of individual planes. See Morison,
Rising Sun,
pp. 120–21, and n. 52; Prange,
At Dawn We Slept,
p. 520; Slackman,
Target: Pearl Harbor,
pp. 143, 149–50.

48
. KC, Roll 4, Interrogation of Captain Fuchida Mitsuo, Tokyo, 10 October 1945, p. 2.

49
. Tanner, “One Hour Before the War,” in Crocker,
Black Cats and Dumbos,
pp. 3–5.

50
. PHA, Pt. 36, p. 59.

51
. Ibid., Pt. 23, p. 1038.

52
. Ibid., Pt. 10, p. 5035.

53
. Ibid., p. 5033.

54
. Ibid., p. 5079–80.

55
. Ibid., p. 5035.

56
. Ibid., p. 5080. For their actions on 7 December Lockard was awarded a Distinguished Service Medal and Elliott a Letter of Commendation. Lockard was later given a commission.

57
. Ibid., Pt. 29, p. 2122.

58
. Ibid., Pt. 18, p. 3015.

59
. Morison,
Rising Sun,
p. 101.

60
. PHA, Pt. 32, p. 444.

61
. KC, Roll 4, Messages and Orders, 7 December 1941, p. 1.

62
. PHA, Pt. 22, p. 499.

63
. Ibid., Pt. 32, p. 308.

64
. Ibid., Pt. 32, p. 57.

65
. Ibid.

66
. Ibid., Pt. 26, p. 210.

67
. Ibid., Pt. 23, p. 898; Prange,
At Dawn We Slept,
p. 507; Kimmel,
Admiral Kimmel's Story,
p. 8.

68
. KC, Roll 4, Messages and Orders from Headquarters of the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, December 7, 1941, p. 1.

69
. PHA, Pt. 8, p. 3829.

70
. Quoted in Robert E. Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), pp. 430–31.

71
. Ibid., p. 431.

72
. PHA, Pt. 11, pp. 5438–39, Stimson diary entry, 7 December 1941.

73
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 5, Col. J. R. Deane, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. W. B. Smith, June 8, 1941.

74
. Hull,
Memoirs,
pp. 1095–96; Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins,
p. 431.

75
. See Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, Signed at the Hague, October 18, 1907, Article 1; in
Hague and Geneva Conventions
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Navy Department, 1911), p. 42.

76
. Howard W. French, “Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show,”
New York Times,
9 December 1999.

77
. Hull,
Memoirs,
p. 1096.

78
. Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins,
p. 431.

79
. Ibid., p. 432; NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 17, Lt. Comdr. Baecher to Mr. Seth W. Richardson, Time Table of Japanese Attacks, 4 April 1946.

80
. Frances Perkins,
The Roosevelt I Knew
(New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1946), pp. 379, 368–69.

81
. PHA, Pt. 11, pp. 5438–93; Stimson diary entry, 7 December 1941.

82
. Ibid., p. 5439.

83
. Ibid., Pt. 19, p. 3506.

84
. Winston S. Churchill,
The Second World War
, vol. 3,
The Grand Alliance
(Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977), pp. 606, 608.

85
.
Congressional Record
87: 95045 (December 8, 1941).

Epilogue

1
. Fuchida and Okumiya,
Midway
, p. 42.

2
. Quoted in ibid., p. 43. See another translation in Fuchida, “Air Attack,”
Proceedings,
p. 952.

3
. Ugaki diary, 9 December 1941 (Japan time), cited in Prange,
At Dawn We Slept,
p. 584.

4
. Ibid., p. 550.

5
. Ibid., p. 543.

6
. Quoted in Agawa,
Reluctant Admiral,
p. 265.

7
. Statement by Ozawa, 22 December 1948, quoted in Prange,
At Dawn We Slept
, p. 550.

8
. Ogden, “Airborne at Pearl,”
Proceedings,
pp. 60–62.

9
. KC, Roll 4, CINCPAC, “Disposition of Task Forces,” 20 December 1941, pp. 7–8.

10
. Layton,
“And I Was There,”
p. 317.

11
. Vice Admiral Richardson, in Winkler and Lloyd,
Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy,
p. 24.

12
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 5, “Statement of Evidence,” p. 660.

13
. Ibid., p. 665.

14
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 25, Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet to Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, Pearl Harbor, T.H., 7 January 1942, pp. 1–2.

15
. Ibid., Box 48, CINCPAC, “Surprise in Attacks by U.S. Carrier-Based Planes,” 3 pp., n.d. but after 13 August 1945. Examples of complete surprise were the raids on the Marshalls (29 January 1944); Jaluit (20 February 1944); Aitape-Hollandia (21 April 1944); the Marianas (11 June 1944); Iwo Jima (24 June, 3 July, and 4 August 1944); Palaus (25 July 1944); Volcanoes-Bonins (31 August 1944); Mindanao (9 September 1944); Nansei Shoto (10 October 1944); Luzon (11 October, 5 November, and 14 December 1944); Yap (22 November 1994); Formosa–Nansei Shoto (3 January 1945); Indo-China (12 January 1945); Nansei Shoto (22 January 1945); Tokyo (16 February 1945); Kyushu (15 April 1945); Tokyo (10 July 1945); and northern Honshu–Hokkaido (14 July 1945). U.S. naval air raids before 1944 achieved only partial or no surprise.

16
. Ibid., Box 22, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to Major Correa, Subject: Pearl Harbor, 26 August 1945, p. 2.

17
. PHA, Pt. 22, p. 99. Given the Army's No. 1 Alert, where air attack was not expected, the Japanese first wave met Army return fire from .50- and .30-caliber machine guns as well as from small arms. But the men manning the larger, more effective 3-inch guns had to travel varying distances for their ammunition, as Short explained:

For instance, down at De Russy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not right alongside of the guns. There were four batteries that had to go farther for their ammunition.… The first one of those batteries started drawing its ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, where we had our ammunition in caves, at 8:15, to show how promptly that they got into action. And by 10:15 they had all drawn what we call a day of fire which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. So there was no lost motion. (Ibid., p. 57.)

No lost motion, perhaps, but there was much lost time. With “ammo at the guns”—Kimmel's orders in violation of Naval Regulations—the battleships' AA batteries were firing as early as four minutes into the attack, while the four Army batteries were just starting to draw ammo twenty minutes into the attack; and by the time they had “a day of fire” the
second
wave attack was a half hour old. Four first-wave strafing aircraft were shot down by Army gunners, but they were wielding handheld Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR) or short-range machine guns. The commander of the first wave, Fuchida, remarked on the delay of shore-based AA to engage his aircraft. The Army's fixed 3-inch AA batteries at Fort De Russy and Sand Island on the other side of Honolulu from Pearl Harbor eventually went into action, as did a fixed 3-inch battery at Fort Kamehameha, adjacent to Hickam Field. But the Army's main AA strength lay in its mobile 3-inch AA guns, none of which were manned and deployed during the battle. Not until afternoon was the first mobile unit removed from the gun park and set in battle position. Ibid., Pt. 32, pp. 395–96. Prior to 7 December an Army AA company held tactical exercises on Ford Island with 37-mm guns, for which there were permanent emplacements. Neither the company nor the guns were present on the seventh. Army times of fire are given in ibid., Pt. 24, pp. 1831–32.

Naval AA shore batteries at Pearl performed only slightly better. At the air station on Ford Island there was a trained seaman guard of 200 men and a Marine detachment of approximately 100 men and two officers. Their heaviest weapons were .50- and .30-caliber machine guns. They were unusable throughout the first-wave attack because their ammunition was locked in armories. Unlike Kimmel's orders to the battleships, no orders had been issued requiring ammunition to be kept at or near the guns. Such orders would have come from Admiral Bloch or from the air station commander, Capt. James M. Shoemaker. The reaction of ground personnel at Kaneohe and Ewa was much faster and more effective.

18
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 17, Lt. Comdr. Baecher, “Time Table of Japanese Attacks—Source of Material,” 4 April 1946.

19
. See the various time intervals given in NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 17, “Time Table of Japanese Attacks—Source of Material,” p. 2; Costello,
Days of Infamy
, pp. 17, 32; Larrabee,
Commander in Chief
, p. 316; Spector,
Eagle Against the Sun,
p. 107, Pogue,
Ordeal and Hope
, pp. 233–34.

20
.
Remembering Pearl Harbor
[pamphlet], The Pearl Harbor History Associates, Inc., 1990. Cf. Nimitz's remarks in 1962 quoted in Costello,
Days of Infamy,
p. 241.

21
. PHA, Pt. 32, p. 593; Morison,
Rising Sun,
p. 133 and n. 75.

22
. NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 25, Nimitz to King, 7 January 1942, p. 1.

23
. Morison,
Rising Sun,
p. 132.

24
. Vice Admiral Frank E. Beatty, “The Background of the Secret Report,”
The National Review
, 13 December 1966, p. 1263.

25
. Layton,
“And I Was There,”
p. 331.

26
. Ibid.

27
. Ibid. On 22 January 1946, Capt. Joseph R. Redman, chief of Naval Communications, wrote to the judge advocate general: “All appropriate files of the Naval Communication Service have been searched for any dispatches of a war-warning nature from the Navy Department to naval commanders in the field between noon, Eastern Standard Time, on 6 December 1941 and 2:30 p.m., Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941, inclusive. This will certify that no such dispatches are contained in those files.” NARA, RG 80, PHLO, Box 17.

28
. Beatty, “Background,”
National Review,
p. 1263.

29
. Ibid., p. 1264.

30
. KC, Roll 4, Extracts from Secret Letters, Kimmel to Stark, 18 April 1941.

31
. Brownlow,
The Accused,
p. 139 and n. 32; interview with Kimmel, Groton, CT, 13 February 1966.

32
.
The New York Times,
11 December 1941, p. 11.

33
. Brownlow,
The Accused
, p. 140 and n. 33; interview with Anderson, New York City, 29 April 1966.

34
. PHA, Pt. 5, pp. 2338–45, Report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President.

35
.
The New York Times,
16 December 1941.

36
. Ibid., 18 December 1941. At the aforementioned Colloquium on Pearl Harbor and the Kimmel Controversy, held in Washington, D.C., on 7 December 1999, one of the speakers was Professor Robert W. Love, of the Department of History, U.S. Naval Academy. Among his various critical remarks about Admiral Kimmel on that occasion were the following: “Kimmel himself was on short tether and was scheduled to go ashore anyway once war broke out.… Stark explained in June 1941 to Admiral King … that Kimmel was completing the unexpired portion of his predecessor's [Richardson's] two-year tour as commander in chief, U.S. Fleet.… If the war broke out either in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, Stark intended … to send Admiral Nimitz to relieve Admiral Hart in command of the Asiatic Fleet and to replace Kimmel with Admiral Royal Ingersoll.… In effect, losing the Battle of Pearl Harbor merely hastened Kimmel's departure from Hawaii, which was scheduled to take place anyway.” Audiotape with the writer. The source of that asseveration appears to be an undocumented footnote in King and Whitehill,
Fleet Admiral King
, p. 357, n. 4. The asseveration was repeated by Thomas B. Buell in his biography of King,
Master of Sea Power
, p. 155. Commander Buell told the writer in a telephone interview on 2 May 2000 that he could not immediately recall the source for his repetition of that story. Stark's biographer B. Mitchell Simpson III told the writer in a telephone interview on 13 November 2000 that in his research he encountered no document attesting to that story. Absent an original document, the most telling witness is Mr. David W. Richmond, who as an attorney and lieutenant USNR in 1945–46, served as Admiral Stark's counsel in the JCC In a telephone interview conducted by the writer on 11 June 2000, Mr. Richmond said that, in the many mentions of Kimmel during his days of conference with Stark, during the JCC hearings, and during the years of friendship with Stark afterward, he never heard Stark speak of any plan to relieve Kimmel from his command upon the outbreak of war. So what was described as “Stark's idea” in King-Whitehill seems, upon investigation, to have been a chimera.