Inside the Crosshairs (16 page)

Artillery batteries, usually operating from fixed positions in secured base camps, dealt with the enemy from afar, delivering their destructive power through coordinated trajectories. Even when the fighting shifted to close combat, the artillerymen had stores of ammunition at their disposal and their bases were mutually supporting.

Even further removed from direct combat with the enemy and any need for snipers were most members of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force—except the few sailors who experienced ground combat in Vietnam as SEALs (Sea, Air, Land), small gunboat crews, and pilots providing close air support. The SEAL teams, however, operating primarily in the Mekong Delta region south of Saigon with missions of reconnaissance, prisoner snatching, and ambushing, did not require sniper expertise. At no time during the war did they officially include snipers in their organization.
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Nor did they unofficially claim to do so. Gary Evans, who served in Vietnam with SEAL Team One in 1969, recalls that SEALs of the period were excellent marksmen but received neither sniper weapons nor special marksmanship training. Evans says that in the summer of 1969 he procured an MID with an M82 scope and taught himself to be a sniper. He notes, however, that his team’s missions did not really require a long-range marksman, and he is unaware of any other SEALs’ carrying special scoped rifles.

Likewise, SEAL veteran of the same period Brian W. Curle concurs, “To the best of my knowledge, I am not aware that Seals used snipers per se in Vietnam.” Darryl Young, who served with Team One in 1970 and wrote
The Element of Surprise
about his experiences, supports the fact that no official
SEAL snipers served in southeast Asia. According to Young, “During the time I was in SEAL Team One there were no SEAL snipers.”

Besides the SEALs, a few sailors on gunboats operated on inland waterways and some navy pilots and aircrews engaged in close air support of ground units. Otherwise, navy personnel supported ground operations with large-caliber gunfire from distant offshore positions.

Air force personnel also provided air support for infantry units, but most of their operations took place from high altitudes. While a few (and exceptional) airmen and sailors—specifically, those crewing small boats or guarding in-country airstrips—might have procured sniper weapons, no evidence suggests successful sniper engagements in either of those services.

Even though the U.S. infantry found snipers to be an effective tool against the enemy, that was not the case for combat units from other countries—including South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese soldiers and marines, like their American counterparts, assumed the bulk of that country’s combat missions and casualties. Twelve army divisions consisting of 105 infantry battalions and one marine division of nine battalions composed the ground forces of the Republic of Vietnam. The South Vietnamese army, first organized in 1949, and its marine corps, founded in 1965, were armed primarily with weapons from the United States. During the early 1960s the South Vietnamese infantrymen carried M1 Garands. These were replaced by M14s in the mid-1960s. When the United States implemented “Vietnamization” in 1969 and American units began to withdraw, South Vietnamese soldiers and marines began to receive M16s as their basic rifle.

Prior to the war, gun ownership, hunting, and shooting in general were limited to the small upper class of Vietnamese. Unsophisticated recruits and draftees from the countryside had no experience with firearms. Vietnamese city dwellers were also unfamiliar with weaponry, having seen rifles only in the hands of the military.

Marksmanship can, of course, be taught regardless of a person’s previous experience, and many South Vietnamese soldiers and marines became adequate, if not expert, shots. Long-range, scoped marksmanship, however, was a skill that few South Vietnamese sought or acquired. Sniper training had no high-ranking advocate in the South Vietnamese military or government, and apparently it never received any great amount of consideration despite the results of the American long-range shooting programs. As a result of starting with such unskilled troops, the South Vietnamese army as a whole never reached the level of expertise to merit establishing its own sniper school. The available M1C and M1D rifles and scopes remained largely unused.

Because of the proximity of U.S. sniper training, the number of American advisers assigned to their units, and the reasonable availability of weapon systems, a few South Vietnamese soldiers and marines surely developed and used some sniping skills. But only one reference to these experiences made its way into the official records and correspondence of the war—and it provides information that is not entirely accurate.

In his 1974 monograph
Sharpening the Combat Edge
, written for the Department of the Army Vietnam Studies Program, former 9th Infantry Division commander Lieutenant General Julian J. Ewell mentions training provided the South Vietnamese by the USAMTU from Fort Benning in 1969. Ewell wrote, “One of the factors that gave the Vietnamese units quite a boost was the fact that we were able to help them with marksmanship training. After we had trained a sufficient number of our own snipers we established marksmanship classes attended not only by the 7th South Vietnamese Army Division but by the Vietnamese ranger and airborne troops from other areas of the country.”

Ewell refers to the South Vietnamese graduates of this training as “snipers” but that is euphemistic. Major Willis Powell, who supervised the training, states that the South Vietnamese were taught basic marksmanship techniques with some advanced instruction in long-range shooting. None of the South Vietnamese were trained with or were issued sniper rifles and
scopes. Powell states that while there were some discussions about securing M14 sniper equipment for the South Vietnamese, nothing ever came of them.

No other official U.S. source mentions formal sniper training for the South Vietnamese armed forces, even though there is documented evidence that the Americans did train their allies in the use of Starlight scopes, the light-enhancing devices employed by snipers. But that equipment was not limited to snipers, as infantrymen also used it for observation during hours of darkness.

Members of the USAMTU, who established and conducted the 9th Infantry Division Sniper School, provided instruction on the Starlight scopes to the South Vietnamese when regular sniper classes were not in session. A note in the “Operational Report of the 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 April 1969” states, “Training conducted by the Sniper School has also included instruction given ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) personnel in the use of the Starlight scope. Several more classes of this type are scheduled for the month of May, 1969.”

Members of the USAMTU also trained Vietnamese to return to their units as instructors in the use of Starlight scopes. “Operational Report for 9th Infantry Division for Period Ending 30 June 1969” reported, “The Sniper School also conducted training in the use of Starlight scopes for ARVN cadre from the 9th and 25th (ARVN) Infantry Divisions.”

Despite lack of proof, it seems unlikely that absolutely no South Vietnamese acted as a sniper during the long conflict. Whether self-trained or as unofficial students of army or Marine snipers, at least a few South Vietnamese undoubtedly employed scoped rifles to go gunning for the NVA. Whatever their degree of participation, however, they made no impact and did not merit anything more than the vaguest recollection in the official records.

Of the seven other countries of the Free World Military Assistance Forces supporting South Vietnam, three provided noncombat units: China and Spain sent only small military medical and support sections totaling less than 100 men each;
the Republic of the Philippines sent a 1,500-man military engineering unit complete with its own security element, medical section, and civic action teams. Because of their missions, none of the three countries had any need to train or field snipers during their time in Vietnam.

The other four supporting countries varied in their use of snipers. Beginning in 1962 Australia provided individual advisers as a part of the Royal Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (RAATTV), to the South Vietnamese army, and in 1965 the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (RAR), arrived in-country as a part of the ground combat force. In 1969, at the peak of their commitment, more than 7,600 Australian combat and support troops were in the war zone. During the course of the war, nine RAR infantry battalions totaling more than 35,000 men served in Vietnam, 504 of whom were killed in action and 2,193 wounded.

Unlike the Americans, who replaced individuals after one-year tours, the Australians rotated entire battalions. These Australian units arrived in Vietnam ready after nine months of combat preparation. Australian infantrymen trained at home with the semiautomatic 7.62-mm L1A1 SLR (self-loading rifle) common to all Commonwealth forces in the early 1960s. Upon arrival in Vietnam a few of the rifles were exchanged for the American M16s, but most Australian infantrymen remained armed with the L1A1.

The Australian infantrymen, who performed extremely well in Vietnam, gained renown for their fighting spirit and marksmanship, shooting and hunting being commonplace in Australia. All Australian infantrymen received some long-range shooting training at the Canungra Battle Efficiency Course, in Queensland, or at the Singleton Infantry Training Center, in New South Wales. In addition, each platoon in the Australian regiment arrived in Vietnam with a trained sniper in its ranks. These marksmen served as “special infantrymen” much as U.S. Army soldiers had during World War II.

Australian snipers carried L42A1 rifles, which were 7.62-mm modifications of the United Kingdom Rifle No. 4, Mk1, first fielded in 1942. Weighing 9.7 pounds and measuring 46.5
inches long, each bolt-action L42A1 came with a ten-round box magazine and a 3X Mk 32 scope. In trained hands the L42A1 was extremely accurate at ranges up to 850 meters.

Most of the Australian infantry operations in Vietnam, however, were in extremely thick jungle areas and rubber plantations that did not permit long-range shooting. Also, the RAR never emphasized or supported sniping to the extent that the U.S. Marine Corps and army did. Australia considered its snipers as part of the platoons, and special shooters received neither the attention nor the publicity of their American counterparts.

New Zealand sent its first support troops to Vietnam in 1964 and followed with two infantry companies in 1967. Those two units, integrated into the Australian Task Force, served until withdrawn in 1971. Like the Australians, the New Zealand infantrymen operated specially trained snipers assigned to most platoons and armed with L42A1s. Also like the Australians, a few of the other New Zealand infantrymen traded their L1A1 SLRs for M16s shortly after arriving in-country.

New Zealand never had more than 350 infantrymen in Vietnam at any one time. Their sniper numbers were never more than half a dozen, and like the Australians they made little or no impact on the conflict.

The Kingdom of Thailand supported South Vietnam by allowing U.S. air bases on its territory and by dispatching support and combat troops to the war zone. Its ground troops served in the Queen’s Cobras—the Royal Thai Army volunteer regiment—which arrived in 1967 and operated from Fire Base Bearcat, near Bien Hoa. They were replaced in 1968 by the Black Panther Division, composed of two infantry brigades, three artillery battalions, and an armored cavalry battalion. At its peak, Thailand had more than 11,500 combat troops in Vietnam.

Early plans called for the United States to issue 1,000 M16s per month from March through June 1967 to the Thai infantry in Vietnam. Theoretically, it would have been more effective
to have issued the rifles to the Thai infantrymen for training before their deployment to Vietnam. However, U.S. logistic officers knew that any M16s delivered to Thailand tended to remain there to combat an insurgency in the country’s northern provinces rather than being deployed with units to Vietnam.

Compounding the problem of delivering the authorized M16s was the need for rifles to supply the increasing number of U.S. units committed to Vietnam. Ultimately, only 900 M16s were made available to the Thais. To make up the shortfall, the United States planned to supply the Thais with M14s until U.S. officials realized that the Koreans, who were receiving M1 rifles from the United States, would be insulted if the Thais were first issued the more modern M14s. Instead the United States issued the Thais M1 (semiautomatic) and M2 (full-automatic) .30 caliber carbines that lacked the fire and stopping power of the other U.S. rifles. The Thai soldiers, however, were comfortable with the smaller, lighter carbines.

U.S. officials were correct in considering the feelings of the Koreans and making efforts to keep them happy. South Korea provided more than 300,000 men to the war effort and was second only to the United States in its commitment to assist the South Vietnamese. In addition to support units, Korea sent two infantry divisions and a marine brigade to the combat zone. More than 4,400 South Koreans died during their operations, which occurred mostly in the Central Highlands.

Although never available in any quantity, a small number of M1Cs, M1Ds, and M14s were accessible to both the Thais and the Koreans, and there is little doubt that at least a few soldiers from each country acquired scopes and mounts to assume the role of sniper. A few Korean officers visited the U.S. Marine Corps’s sniper schools as observers but neither they nor the Thais established a formal sniping school, nor did their soldiers officially attend
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the U.S. training. Snipers simply did not play a role in the operational planning or execution of those two allies during their service in the Vietnam War.

With the exception of the sniper training and employment by U.S. soldiers and Marines, the use of the special marksmen in Vietnam by South Vietnam and its allies was nearly non-existent. The Australians and New Zealanders did have official, trained snipers, and the other Free World countries had a few unofficial snipers who acquired sniper rifle systems and training on their own. At best, however, usage of snipers by our allies in Vietnam was symbolic rather than significant.