Inside the Crosshairs (14 page)

CHAPTER 7
 

T
wo months after the first Marine infantry regiment landed in Vietnam, units of the U.S. Army began arriving in-country. When the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution passed on August 7, 1964, fewer than 24,000 Americans were serving in Vietnam. By the end of 1965 that number had increased to 184,000, and it continued to rise until it reached 536,000 in 1968.

When the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived in Vietnam on May 7, 1965, from its Okinawa base, it represented one of only three U.S. Army units specifically trained for jungle operations.
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The paratroopers of the 173rd, however, shared a deficiency experienced by their Marine counterparts and by every army unit that followed—not a single one arrived in-country equipped or trained as a sniper.

Army units arriving in Vietnam had much to learn in order to successfully combat the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army regulars. In a manner similar to that of the Marines, field commanders quickly recognized the need for accurate, long-range fire with which to engage distant targets and to provide a countersniper capability. A few units requisitioned C- and D-Model M1s with telescopes or acquired M14s to issue to their best marksmen. Some officers and enlisted men had families or friends back home mail them commercial 2X and 3X hunting scopes, which they fitted to the newly issued
M16s. Many of these improvised snipers proved remarkably successful: one lieutenant in the 25th Division accounted for more than fifty individual kills in 1966 with his scoped M16.

More typical, however, were the experiences of James W. Sotherland of Glen Allen, Virginia. An infantryman assigned to the 1st Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, in the Bong Song area of Binh Dinh Province in 1966, Sotherland experienced considerable frustration. He recalls: “There were occasions when enemy personnel were observed several hundred meters away and not successfully engaged by our grunts with their M16s. I attributed this to poor state of the weapons that we had then, inadequate marksmanship training, and the lack of a proper weapon to engage enemy personnel at 300 to 600 meters.”

After six months in the field, Sotherland, then a sergeant and a squad leader, located two M14s recaptured from an enemy weapons cache and on no U.S. unit-property register. Sotherland traded one of the rifles to a quartermaster company in exchange for spare parts, magazines, and cleaning materials for the second rifle. According to Sotherland, “My father sent me a Weaver 6X scope and a mount. I had an armorer install the mount and scope.”

Sotherland quickly found that his homemade sniper rifle had problems. “After only a few weeks in the field my Weaver scope began to fall apart. The horizontal reticle became invisible and the lenses were fogged up most of the time. The mount would not hold zero. I reluctantly had an M16 sent out and abandoned the M14 of which I had been so proud.”

Overall, no army sniper policy or training existed in Vietnam during its initial two years of combat in Vietnam. The first official evidence that the army even considered using snipers in Southeast Asia came in a letter from Brigadier General E. L. Mueller, the director of doctrine and systems of the Department of the Army’s Office of Force Development.

On January 10, 1966, General Mueller wrote to the commandant of the Marine Corps, noting a news release dated the
previous November 3 on the use of snipers in the 3rd Marine Division. Mueller stated, “A survey is being conducted to determine if a review of the army’s current doctrine on sniping and sniping rifles is required in connection with current operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Request your comments on the use of snipers together with any statistical data available on their use in Vietnam.”

The Marine Corps responded on January 28, 1966, with a brief overview of Captain Russell’s efforts to initiate sniper training and the sniper school graduates’ use of Winchester Model 70s and M1D rifles. Despite indications by the Marines that their early sniper efforts were productive, the army moved slowly. For the next twenty-four months the army studied sniper weapon systems for Vietnam service but took no direct measures to provide weapons or training for potential snipers.

The official doctrine for the use of snipers during the early years of the army’s commitment in Vietnam remained that which had been spelled out in a series of field manuals (FMs) and technical manuals (TMs) that dated back to World War II. The 1962 edition of FM 21-75, “Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling,” provided eight pages of sniper doctrine.
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Paragraph 90 noted, “A sniper is an expert rifleman trained in the techniques of the individual soldier and assigned the mission of sniping.” In other words, sniping remained an “extra duty” of an ordinary rifleman in each squad or platoon.

Interestingly, as the need for written guidance about snipers increased and combat intensified in Vietnam, the army produced less on the subject than it had during the years of peace. From the earliest publication in 1944, field manuals on the M1 rifle had included a chapter on the use and care of the C and D sniper models. The 1958 edition of FM 23-5, “U.S. Rifle Caliber .30, M1,” contained more than forty pages of information
and pictures on the employment and care of M1 sniper models. Yet, the next edition of FM 23-5, published in May 1965, the same month the 173rd Airborne Brigade arrived in Vietnam, completely eliminated reference to sniper rifles.

More than a year after army units began combat in Vietnam, official doctrine continued to exclude any requirement for sniper training. The field manuals for rifle platoon and company operations made no allowance for sniper training. The few references that did mention snipers provided conflicting information. ATP (Army Training Program) 7-18-1 stated a requirement for a minimum of three snipers per infantry platoon, but the then-current Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE)—the official document that authorized personnel and equipment for each unit—made no provision for snipers and sniper equipment.

In December 1966, the Department of the Army published FM 23-71. “Rifle Marksmanship,” which repeated much of ATP 7-18-1. The manual included a chapter on “advanced marksmanship” and the employment of snipers, stating that one sniper should be assigned to each infantry squad. Yet, the army provided no actual authorization for sniper personnel, equipment, or training.

In the midst of combat operations, field commanders in Vietnam had little time for authors of manuals or the developers of doctrine back in the States. They continued to field the few sniper weapons available and worked them into their tactical operations on the basis of trial and error. As the war expanded, however, the need for trained, properly armed snipers became more evident to army commanders at all levels.

Considering the fragmentation and lack of focus on sniper personnel and equipment during the first two years of the war, the army approached the matter in a remarkably organized manner when it finally undertook official action. On February 23, 1967, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Vietnam (USARV), issued a “Letter of Instruction” to the Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) to “determine the organizational, doctrinal, and material requirements for sniper operations by U.S. Army units in the Republic of Vietnam.”

The ACTIV immediately began to question field commanders and gather data, quickly documenting that several units were conducting limited sniping operations despite a lack of proper equipment. They also determined that sufficient data on which to determine future material and organizational requirements was not available. To provide additional information on which to make their recommendations, the ACTIV contacted the U.S. Army Marksmanship Training Unit (USAMTU) at Fort Benning, Georgia, for assistance in securing additional sniper equipment, reference material, and advice.
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On April 19, 1967, USARV Headquarters issued a message prepared by the ACTIV to major combat units throughout the country announcing plans to conduct an evaluation of sniper operations and weapons in Vietnam. The units were informed that they would receive two models of scoped M14 along with Model 70 Winchesters and Realist telescopes for M16s to conduct the evaluation. The message also directed each unit to develop its own sniper training programs, organization, and concepts of employment.

In April and May, sniper equipment arrived for the 1st, 4th, 9th, and 25th Infantry Divisions; the 1st Cavalry Division; the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division; and the 196th and 199th Light Infantry Brigades. Training took place in June and July.

The 173rd Airborne Brigade received sniper equipment but did not issue it or conduct any training during the data-collection period. In a message to USARV, the commander of the 173rd explained that operational commitments, personnel turnover, and the nature of their area of operations precluded training and employment of snipers.
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Data collection took place from July through October 1967, with monthly summaries of sniper activities forwarded to the ACTIV from each of the divisions and separate brigades. In the final month of the test, the ACTIV distributed questionnaires and received written responses from twelve brigade commanders, fourteen battalion commanders, forty-eight company commanders, forty-three platoon leaders, and eighty-seven individual snipers.

The results of this extensive test—remarkable in its scope, especially considering it was conducted in the midst of combat—were analyzed and assembled by the ACTIV staff with Lieutenant Colonel David S. Moore heading the study as its project officer. On February 23, 1968, exactly a year after the USARV letter directed the study, the ACTIV issued its findings in a classified report, “Sniper Operations and Equipment.”

According to the report, the combat units participating in the test committed 7,512 man-days to actual sniper operations. This resulted in 124 engagements producing forty-six dead enemy and another nine wounded. “The highest KIA to man-days ratio,” the report stated, “occurred in units that were operating primarily in the central highlands, coastal plain, and southern portion of the northern highlands of RVN. The lowest ratio of KIA to man-days occurred in units employed primarily in the lowlands area north of Saigon and south of the Central Highlands.”

The report noted that the primary influences on sniper success were terrain and vegetation. Sniper engagements varied from an average of only 200 meters in units serving in jungle areas to 900 meters in those deployed in the more open coastal plains. The report concluded that most American units in Vietnam could benefit from assigned snipers and that nearly 80 percent of the interviewed officers supported the program. The report also assessed the M14 to be an adequate sniper weapon and said that the tested telescopes had proven satisfactory. In the final analysis, the ACTIV reported, “an adequate U.S. Army sniper-training program does not exist,”
and “there is a lack of definitive doctrine on employment of snipers.”

Combining more than thirty-five pages of interview analysis, field summaries, and test results, the ACTIV recommended: “(1) Divisions and separate command brigades be authorized sniper equipment in addition to TOE weapons; (2) organization for sniper operations be tailored by divisions and brigades in accordance with their requirements; (3) the accurized M14 be designated as the standard sniper rifle in Vietnam; (4) a standard sniper telescope be designated; (5) a sniper-training program be provided for units in Vietnam; and (6) expanded doctrine for employment of snipers be developed and included in appropriate field manuals.”

Headquarters, USARV, endorsed the ACTIV report and forwarded it to the commander in chief, U.S. Army, Pacific. The USARV endorsement also requested that the Department of the Army take the responsibility for developing “doctrine, to be included in appropriate field manuals, for employment of snipers” and for providing a sniper-training program that included lesson outlines.

During the weeks before USARV forwarded the report, the Tet Offensive exploded all across South Vietnam in the enemy’s largest offensive to date. The official paper trail of “Sniper Operations and Equipment” stopped at the U.S. Army Pacific Command Headquarters in Hawaii despite the fact that the document’s distribution list indicated that copies went to various offices in the Department of Defense; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and every major U.S. Army command, school, and center, as well as the navy, air force, and Marine Corps. There is no evidence that any official action took place beyond the report’s delivery to Hawaii.

Obviously, the Tet Offensive occupied the primary attention of all U.S. military commands for the next several months. Many of the participants in the sniper study either became casualties of the offensive or rotated to other assignments before additional action could take place. Those factors, combined with the fact that snipers had no senior ranking officer to
champion their cause, resulted in the erosion of the foundation for precision shooting specialization that had been made during the ACTIV evaluation.