Confronting the Colonies (34 page)

Reforms in 1968 strengthened the committee. Output proliferated and consumers continued to draw upon JIC conclusions. Enjoying improved Whitehall status and building on experience from previous counterinsurgencies, the JIC maintained its role of monitoring the situation and providing assessments to be used as a basis for policy discussions. Given the post-imperial context, however, the committee's role in overseas intelligence management diminished. As Mockaitis argues, to be successful in the 1960s and 1970s, the British counterinsurgency
approach ‘had to shed at least some of its colonial baggage'.
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This was no different for the JIC.

The JIC continued to oversee reform to the regional British intelligence organisations. By contrast, the committee had little input into local reform despite having acquired increased confidence in this area over previous insurgencies. Instead, local British military actors, supported from London by the Ministry of Defence, took the lead. In the absence of a colonial administration, and particularly following the demise of the regional Joint Intelligence Group, the JIC lacked a mandate to intervene in Oman. There were simply no British joint intelligence organisations with which to engage.

Furthermore, Omani intelligence reform was considered a predominantly military issue, despite the involvement of British intelligence personnel. Oman's non-colonial status decreased the interdepartmental nature of the conflict when compared to previous insurgencies and it consequently fell upon military actors to instigate local reform, not through colonial responsibility but rather as part of counterinsurgency warfare. A combination of these factors, compounded by the JIC's traditional lack of authority to intervene effectively and decisively, limited the committee's role. More broadly, as British influence waned, there was no longer a need for a JIC role in overseas intelligence management. It is ironic that the JIC grew in confidence in its overseas managerial role at the very time it was no longer needed.

That is not to say that the JIC had no role in Oman. The committee maintained its assessment role and was expected to keep the situation under review. However, the central intelligence machinery's organisational culture was such that the committee lacked a formal mechanism to aid warning of irregular threats. Officials relied on good judgement and initiative. With limited resources to monitor the entire globe, it took the accession of the new radical leftist government in South Yemen for the Dhofari conflict, which had been rumbling on for a number of years, to reach the JIC's agenda. From then on the committee began
monitoring the situation. Recognising the external pressures on the various end-of-Pax Britannica manoeuvrings, it did so by examining the threat in the regional context. Interestingly, this largely took the form of British regional interests as opposed to Cold War containment strategy. As the JIC grew in status, however, assessments remained vulnerable to politicisation.

It is important to remember that the committee did not operate in a political vacuum. As a responsible intelligence organisation, it had to disseminate information that may have run contrary to consumer wishes. This led to military actors hampering JIC attempts to predict the sharp increase in violence in 1968. Reluctant to acknowledge the severity of the situation and seemingly unwilling to criticise the performance of their colleagues on the ground, Ministry of Defence officials met the JIC's initial conclusions with scepticism. It took increasing FCO concern to force the issue onto the JIC's agenda as the security situation markedly deteriorated.

Aware of the policy context in which its assessments were written, JIC intelligence continued to impact upon policy discussions. The ability for committee conclusions to be used in this manner illustrates the importance of another fundamental of British intelligence assessment: consensus. This was vital in allowing JIC conclusions to fulfil their function in the policymaking process and be an interdepartmentally agreed basis for policy discussion. Without consensus, policymakers would have not only disagreed about the value or accuracy of intelligence but would have veered into the dangerous territory of being their own intelligence analyst. On the other hand, however, a system based on interdepartmental consensus could have allowed a political department to use JIC assessments to legitimise their views. Regarding the coup in 1970 for example, it appears that FCO officials could have used the perceived objective and collegiate nature of the JIC to help justify contingency plans to ensure Qaboos's accession. This echoes chiefs of staff usage of intelligence regarding covert action in South Arabia.

Strategic intelligence assessments placed local developments in the broader picture. Unlike in earlier insurgencies when violence was seen as part of the Cold War's overarching threat framework, developments
in Oman were contextualised as part of a policy framework involving British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. Close links with policy requirements ensured that intelligence assessments were sensitive to the policy context and therefore relevant, timely and useful. The internal threat was externalised to an extent, but instead of being placed within an all-embracing international prism it was done so in relation to the external support offered by a specific country. Importantly, intelligence assessments proved more nuanced and sophisticated. Analysis was better able to examine both internal agency and external support without conflating the two or painting a foreign regime as a malevolent puppeteer. This evolution in intelligence assessments most likely stems from two factors. Firstly, there was no longer an overarching Cold War mindset to automatically create misunderstanding of the role and autonomy of local actors. Secondly, Oman was not a colony. It was therefore easier for intelligence to criticise the internal governance of the state and recognise the legitimate grievances of the internal population.

Building on previous experiences, the committee continued to monitor the situation and provide threat assessments as a basis for policy discussion. The key difference from previous insurgencies, however, was that the JIC's overseas intelligence management role had declined. In this sense, Oman forms an important part of a transition in the JIC's role in counterinsurgency from those in colonial territories to modern conflicts in ‘host' states. As Alex Marshall has argued, post-modern counterinsurgencies face a quagmire between imperial intervention and issues of sovereignty and legitimacy. Counterinsurgency intervention, which has imperialist overtones, is limited by the inability to use imperialist tactics due to constraints over the rhetoric of official sovereignty and modern liberal peace theory.
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In the decades immediately following the Second World War, insurgencies acquired a heightened significance along the corridors of Whitehall. They became increasingly central to British national and strategic interests. This transformation can be understood within the context of two overarching frameworks. The burgeoning Cold War created the perception that colonial territories had become a front line in an international ideological conflict. The empire was therefore vulnerable to both externally-directed communist subversion and conventional military threats. In certain cases, such as Cyprus, this was compounded by the belief that the territories concerned were strategically vital to Britain's ability to wage a potential global war.

The second framework involved the strategic management of the moribund empire. Whitehall sought to maintain some semblance of international prestige against the backdrop of nationalist uprisings and the simultaneous efforts of transnational networks of non-aligned states, civil society groups and the media to expose the flaws of imperialism and the excesses of British counterinsurgency. The interplay between these two frameworks was both fascinating and complex. As has been demonstrated, they were at times conflated by policymakers and intelligence assessments. At other times, however, tension between the two, or the perceived subjugation of one by the other, created dispute within the
central intelligence machinery and Whitehall more broadly. The heightened significance of overseas security propelled a trend of centralisation in the handling of local intelligence and security matters, thereby creating a greater role for Whitehall. The JIC was no exception. From 1948, the committee gradually evolved to acquire greater jurisdiction over colonial matters and found a role in countering insurgencies.

The JIC is not, and has never been, a static committee frozen in time, space and terms of reference. As such, an important theme throughout the ‘end of empire' years was the successful evolution of the British central intelligence machinery to meet these challenges. Engaged in what Philip Davies has described as ‘pragmatic improvisation',
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the committee broadened its output beyond the narrow conventional military considerations of the Second World War. In doing so, the JIC gradually challenged orthodox conceptualisations of security and pushed towards a more inclusive understanding of what constituted a threat. Whilst assessing the Soviet military remained imperative, the JIC increasingly acknowledged the growing importance of unconventional threats not directly related to traditional defence matters. This included political security, subversion and the moods of overseas populations—all associated with insurgency.

The de-militarisation of the JIC is indicative of broader shifts in the British psyche post-1945. As Britain ceased to be a truly global power, it gradually became apparent that the government could no longer rely on military might to secure national interests. Instead, Britain was forced to make its way in the world by influence. As a result, according to Cabinet Secretary Burke Trend, ‘political intelligence would henceforth be as important as military intelligence, if not more so'.
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Accordingly, and to its credit, the committee gradually evolved from an inherently military committee in 1948 to a more genuinely interdepartmental committee better able to consider broader matters, including irregular threats and colonial security, by 1975.

Although chaired by a Foreign Office representative throughout this period, the composition and structure of the JIC changed over time. Three key years were central in the committee's general evolution and specifically in the broadening of its agenda: 1948, 1955 and 1957. The
year 1948 saw the JIC upgraded from sub-committee to full committee status and acquire its first Colonial Office representative. However it remained imprisoned within the chiefs of staff committee structure, was dominated by military personnel and lacked a colonial mandate. The year 1955, in which Gerald Templer published his hugely influential report on colonial security, saw progress in terms of the JIC's ability to consider imperial matters. Significantly its charter was re-issued to include the authority of the colonial secretary and the committee's terms of reference were subtly adapted to make an overseas role more explicit.

Influential reforms in 1957 then saw the committee's transition into the Cabinet Office. The JIC was very much a product of its environment and these reforms significantly contributed to its ability to consider a broader range of threats. Reflecting the changing priorities within Whitehall, the JIC then gradually increased its coverage of non-military issues, extended its status and increased the civilian influence within the committee. Reforms of the Ministry of Defence in 1964 and the creation of the Assessments Staff in 1968 served to aid this development. The evolution of the committee therefore reflects the changing understandings of security, threats and intelligence within Whitehall.

The 1957 reforms were undoubtedly significant. As displayed in the JIC's initial response to the violence in Cyprus, conventional military issues dominated much committee thinking prior to 1957, before broadening out. Despite this, it would be an oversimplification to present 1957 as a turning point in the committee's history. Change was evolutionary and the JIC did possess a theoretical ability to stray into broader matters whilst a chiefs of staff committee: it had Foreign Office chairmanship and representation from the Colonial Office and the heads of the intelligence agencies. However, with its peacetime scope and role unclear, consumers became confused. Aware of the JIC's inherently military nature, they resisted committee input into non-defence matters. Malayan High Commissioner Henry Gurney's refusal to accept JIC advice on colonial intelligence reform partly on the grounds that it was too much of a military committee provides a good example.

The military remained keen consumers of JIC products after 1957, particularly within the field of counterinsurgency. Indeed, in practice consumers did not become less military-based until after the 1964 Ministry of Defence reforms. Similarly regarding counterinsurgencies at least, defence intelligence continued to provide much input into the JIC
machine. For example, as late as 1968 evidence suggests that military influence skewed a JIC assessment on the violence in Dhofar.

The Foreign Office's influence has also created certain problems in terms of objective assessment. For example, the post-Falklands Franks Report recommended in 1983 that the JIC chairman be appointed by the prime minister to ‘facilitate a more critical and independent role'.
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Little changed after the Franks recommendation, however, and several subsequent prime ministers chose to appoint chairs from the Foreign Office.
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On the whole, however, FCO dominance after the move to the Cabinet Office was not quite as prominent as the military had been previously.

The JIC's evolution also involved an impressive ascent up the Whitehall hierarchy. By 1975 its output had proliferated and included weekly reviews, short-term assessments, current intelligence assessments and longer-term memoranda. Moreover, the committee had achieved a greater status, relevance and a more prominent place at the foundation of the policymaking process. Such successful evolution was the product of a long struggle to achieve prominence firstly within military circles and later across the whole of Whitehall. Keith Jeffery has aptly described SIS's bureaucratic history as having endured ‘a kind of Whitehall Darwinian jungle, where the survival of the fittest was the order of the day'.
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This metaphor can easily be applied to the JIC. Muddling through, the committee successfully navigated the transition from the Second World War to the Cold War, adapted its remit to ensure relevance to changing threats and rose through the Whitehall ranks. This was driven by a combination of four inter-connected factors: reactions to external events; individual personalities; tension and debate; and sensitivity to the policy context. The committee's evolution reveals that it was at times both reactive and proactive regarding the broadened agenda and the challenging of orthodox notions of security.