Confronting the Colonies (32 page)

Intelligence assessments were, however, more nuanced than regarding previous insurgencies. There is a difference between external instigation and external support of an existing insurgent movement. Unlike assessments of earlier conflicts, the JIC broadly ascribed the growth of violence to internal factors and local conditions. This was a clear and important development from Malaya (when international communism was blamed) and Aden (when Egypt was seen to be pulling the strings politically and then violently). Instead, the JIC concluded in 1970 that:

the growing rebellion in Dhofar, combined with the evident unpopularity of the present Sultan of Muscat and Oman among many of his subjects in Oman gives cause for concern. It is largely the result of the Sultan's refusal, despite persistent advice, to speed up the development of the country dramatically, to improve his Government radically and above all to demonstrate to his people that development plans are going forward and that he cares for their welfare and improved standard of living.
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The JIC, therefore, appears to have been of the impression that local actors organised the rebellion in response to the internal situation. The uprising was then adopted and publicised by the PFLOAG, which was seen as a South Yemen-based organisation.
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Likewise in 1972, intelligence speculated that a future increase in violence could be a result of either external influence ‘or of internal disillusionment'.
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Oman pre-1970 was underdeveloped and, according to the JIC, had almost none of the infrastructure of a modern state. Communication was limited, economic activity was depressed and ultra-conservative restrictions impeded social behaviour. Consequently, intelligence warned that lack of progress in political and economic development ‘could lead to increased security problems'.
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Regarding the nature of the rebels, the JIC cautiously acknowledged the ideological shift and increasing influence of South Yemeni communism. The committee noted the rebels' change of name from the nationalist DLF to the PFLOAG. Its emphasis on the ‘Popular Front' strengthened communist connotations. Intelligence recognised the Yemeni hand in this and the JIC appreciated that ‘ideologically there has probably been some shift to the left since 1968'. Taking a more nuanced approach, however, the committee added that the rebels ‘tend to adapt the doctrines of others to their own particular needs'. Regardless of the name change, the JIC maintained that the ‘overriding concern' of the rebels remained ‘the liberation of the province from the Sultan's rule'.
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Combined with assessments playing down international communist influence, it was this conceptualisation of nationalist unrest, rather than global Cold War strategy, which predominantly characterised JIC thinking. Indeed, intelligence deemphasised ideological commitments and argued that ‘economic and social development is the critical requirement […] Political measures to attract Dhofaris [sic] loyalties will remain fundamental'.
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As has been seen in earlier insurgencies, available strategic intelligence was unable to give particularly detailed and sophisticated analysis of the various exploitable schisms in the insurgent group, notably between nationalists and communists. The assessments, however, do indicate a more realistic balance between internal and external, nationalist and communist factors than previously.

On the whole, the JIC assessed Dhofar in the regional context reasonably effectively. Placing the violence in the broader policy context ensured that intelligence assessments were relevant, timely and useful. Assessing the conflict in relation to external support proved more sophisticated than previous attempts to force developments into a preconceived mindset, denying local agency in the process. The greater focus on internal factors driving the insurgency (than had happened in Aden for example) is likely because Oman was not a British colony. Therefore, it was easier for officials to criticise local conditions and recognise legitimate grievances that instigated revolt. Unlike earlier insurgencies, such observations did not imply any criticisms of the British imperial model and therefore there was little political capital to be gained from portraying external actors as puppeteers.

Overall, this regionalisation of internal events suited the JIC's strengths. Owing to the committee's composition of generalists not
necessarily expert in Oman (or even in intelligence), the JIC was far better suited to examining the bigger strategic picture than challenging departmental specialists on narrower tactical developments. That said, however, both Stewart Crawford and his successor as chair, Geoffrey Arthur, had served in the region, giving them a greater understanding than most. Additionally, this function suited its interdepartmental remit. The input of the JIC was important in broadening intelligence so as to ensure a wider range of policy practitioners and ministers understood the regional implications.

Strategic intelligence assessments on Dhofar were used as an all-source and consensus-based foundation to guide policy discussion. They complemented other non-intelligence reports such as papers from the commander of SAF and the consul-general in Muscat. Policy discussions included broad military planning, such as for British withdrawal, as well as more specific policies regarding precise short-term military assistance to the Sultanate. Despite the civilianisation of the JIC, the military remained a primary consumer regarding Oman, where the Ministry of Defence held important interests.
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Intelligence assessments were also used by political consumers. This included at the most senior levels of government. Despite (or because of) his alarming descent into paranoia about the secret world, Harold Wilson was extremely interested in receiving intelligence and was accused of giving too much credence to information received through secret channels.
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Similarly, Edward Heath was also a keen consumer. He felt that JIC reports were ‘an essential part of the information reaching [him]'.
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Meanwhile, Foreign Office consumers also attested that JIC output was ‘all of equal and high value'.
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British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf was an issue for which military planners required JIC assessments. Accordingly, there are numerous examples of requirements set by the Ministry of Defence, tasking the committee with assessments in this field. In 1970, Harold Maguire called upon the JIC to produce an ‘appropriate intelligence assessment' to aid military planning staff re-examining the military withdrawal. Three months later the director of service intelligence in the DIS called for a similar assessment to be used by the Defence Policy Staff in considering alternative policy options.
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Such requests were met
by the JIC and were used as part of the defence review into the British military withdrawal. Burke Trend, the tall, serious and experienced cabinet secretary who had served under four prime ministers, summed up the JIC's policy input well. He informed Dick White that JIC papers on the Persian Gulf ‘constitute the background against which ministers should consider the means by which we prepare to withdraw our military presence […] but also to retain a capability of intervening, if necessary, in the future'.
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Even after British withdrawal, the JIC maintained input into broader military planning regarding Oman. Threat assessments, in conjunction with non-intelligence sources, formed a foundation for policymaking discussions during annual reviews of British defence policy in Oman. For example, Lord Carrington, the defence secretary, used JIC assessments in discussions regarding British defence assistance in May 1972.
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The following year, the directors of defence policy built on JIC conceptualisations of the nature of the threat when reviewing levels of assistance to Oman.
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More directly, Geoffrey Arthur, JIC chairman, met with key military figures including the chiefs of staff and the commander of the SAF in November 1973 to discuss military assistance.
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This pattern was repeated in policy reviews during 1974, with the Defence Policy Staff again drawing on JIC special assessments when considering long-term military assistance.
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In addition to broader defence planning and military assistance, policy practitioners used JIC threat assessments relating to more specific issues. The rest of this chapter will focus on two of them: Omani air defence and the coup to replace Sultan Sa'id with Qaboos.

The Assessments Staff provide ‘assessments which would form an agreed inter-departmental basis for subsequent policy decisions'.
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Although pinpointing the exact policy impact of intelligence is one of the most difficult tasks facing the historian, close analysis of myriad archival files demonstrates direct input into policy relating to Omani air defence. As SAF operations drove the Dhofari rebels west, Qaboos grew concerned about South Yemeni air strikes in aid of the rebels. To alleviate these fears, the Sultan hoped to acquire an air defence system from the British but was met with reluctance from London, where officials sought to keep UK involvement to a minimum.
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JIC assessments of the air
threat posed by South Yemen were instrumental in British policy discussions from 1972 to 1974. For example, in October 1972 the Defence Operational Planning Staff drew heavily upon two JIC special assessments covering the air threat to Salalah. A few months earlier, the Omani air force compiled an assessment of the South Yemeni air threat to Salalah. This report, however, merely considered capabilities rather than intentions. It provided a dry and detailed technical overview of South Yemeni capabilities and the lack of Omani defences.

Using its interdepartmental expertise and all-source assessment, the JIC was subsequently able to build on this limited local report and consider intentions. Consequently, the JIC's conclusions differed from those of the Omani air force. The local report, assessing only capabilities, deemed an air attack ‘possible'.
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By contrast, the JIC, considering intentions, was able to conclude that, whilst the South Yemenis had the theoretical capability to do so, ‘an overt air attack on Oman would probably cause serious political difficulties for the PDRY'. It was therefore ‘considered most unlikely that the PDRY would risk the penalties'. Instead a ‘single high level bombing attack, responsibility for which could be denied, was assessed as more likely', but the JIC explained that the ‘chances of it inflicting serious damage would be slight'. Owing to political constraints on South Yemen, the JIC informed the Ministry of Defence that the threat to Salalah had not increased. Based on this assessment the planning staff consequently recommended that ‘it is considered that the threat does not justify the deployment of UK air defence forces to Salalah at present and that the contingency plans in hand are adequate for the time being'.
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This again illustrates the benefit of placing the issues into the bigger picture. Strategic intelligence was able to balance South Yemeni capabilities against broader political and military constraints affecting their intentions: tension on the borders with North Yemen and Saudi Arabia lessened the South Yemeni threat to Oman.
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A similar use of intelligence material occurred again in late 1973 during a review of Omani air defences. Drawing on a JIC note from November 1973, a report by the Directors of Defence Policy asserted that ‘the assessment of the air threat remains broadly as previously stated; that isolated attacks are possible, that a sustained attack on Salalah is very unlikely, and that there is some risk of further attacks on border positions […] particularly if they were demonstrably in retaliation for
SAF incursion into the PDRY'.
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Illustrating use at the senior policy-making level, this later formed part of a chiefs of staff report on future British defence activity in Oman. Although they upgraded the threat of sustained air attack from ‘very unlikely' to ‘unlikely', the chiefs used JIC conclusions to assert that although Qaboos wanted an air defence scheme, such expenditure ‘was not justified'.
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By tracing the genesis of this document, the JIC's position in the policymaking process becomes apparent. The committee assessed the air threat to Oman and defence planners then built on JIC conclusions so as to formulate policy recommendations. These were drafted into a chiefs of staff document, before being sent to ministers. A similar pattern existed when the question was again reviewed in February 1974. In addition to quoting a JIC note on the subject, the Defence Policy Staff also drew on a JIC Weekly Survey of Intelligence, which stated that ‘a number of constraints exist which militate against a PDRY attack on Oman: the risk of escalation and the fear of drawing British retaliation and the unfavourable attitude to such action by PDRY of other Arab countries and of the Soviet Union'. Using the JIC's threat assessments, and having considered the various implications for SAF and for British manpower, the Defence Policy Staff recommended that from a defence viewpoint the Sultan should not be sold any of the air defence equipment under consideration. Not only did the threat posed from South Yemen not warrant the expenditure, but it would have been difficult to find the British manpower to maintain the system without undermining the UK's own air defences.
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Intelligence assessments were therefore used as a basis for policy discussion at the highest levels of government. Intelligence's ability to impact upon the policy debate was in no small part due to the importance of consensus in British intelligence assessment. Without consensus, the policy community would have continued to bicker over the accuracy of intelligence and would in effect have had to become their own intelligence analysts, thus raising important questions regarding politicisation. For this reason the committee had previously described the consensus principle as ‘fundamental' and urged that the JIC should ‘issue jointly-agreed interdepartmental assessments and should not therefore indulge in the system of minority reporting which was common in the United States'.
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As former JIC secretary Michael Herman has argued, ‘If the assessment is interdepartmentally produced and
agreed, it helps to keep different ministers and their departments in step'.
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The fundamental British principle of consensus allowed policy practitioners to use JIC assessments as a standard, objective and agreed basis for policy discussion.