Read The New Nobility of the KGB Online
Authors: Andrei Soldatov
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Russia & the Former Soviet Union, #Political Science, #General, #International Relations, #Security (National & International), #Intelligence & Espionage, #World, #Russian & Former Soviet Union, #Social Science, #Social Classes
The New Nobility of the KGB (35 page)
13
Sergei Mironov, “Spezcluzchbi” [Secret services],
Kommersant
, April 19, 2006.
Sergei Mironov, “Spezcluzchbi” [Secret services],
Kommersant
, April 19, 2006.
14
Zhizn, “Stolknulas s generalom” [Meeting with the general], September 29, 2008.
Zhizn, “Stolknulas s generalom” [Meeting with the general], September 29, 2008.
1
At Lefortovo, the main prison of Stalin’s secret services, peculiar detention methods were employed. In the early 1930s Chekists believed that prison could reeducate, and they even arranged boat trips on the Moscow River for Lefortovo’s inmates. But such ideas were soon abandoned. Writer Yevgenia Ginsburg, who was kept at Lefortovo during Stalin’s Great Terror in the late 1930s, wrote in her book
Into the Whirlwind
that loud tractor engines were often kept running in the prison’s courtyard to deaden the screams of prisoners being shot in the basement. Nobel Prize laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his groundbreaking work
The Gulag Archipelago
, wrote that in the 1940s there were “psychological” cells at Lefortovo—painted black, with an electric light that was never turned off. Inmates were also tortured with the roar of a wind tunnel built at the nearby Central Air and Hydrodynamics Institute.
At Lefortovo, the main prison of Stalin’s secret services, peculiar detention methods were employed. In the early 1930s Chekists believed that prison could reeducate, and they even arranged boat trips on the Moscow River for Lefortovo’s inmates. But such ideas were soon abandoned. Writer Yevgenia Ginsburg, who was kept at Lefortovo during Stalin’s Great Terror in the late 1930s, wrote in her book
Into the Whirlwind
that loud tractor engines were often kept running in the prison’s courtyard to deaden the screams of prisoners being shot in the basement. Nobel Prize laureate Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his groundbreaking work
The Gulag Archipelago
, wrote that in the 1940s there were “psychological” cells at Lefortovo—painted black, with an electric light that was never turned off. Inmates were also tortured with the roar of a wind tunnel built at the nearby Central Air and Hydrodynamics Institute.
2
Yeltsin’s opponents, who staged a violent revolt in October 1993, were sent to Lefortovo. Later prisoners at Lefortovo included diplomat Valentin Moiseev, suspected of spying for South Korea; metals magnate Anatoly Bykov, accused of ordering the murder of a former business partner; Alexander Litvinenko, the FSB officer who later fled to Britain; Platon Lebedev and Alexei Pichugin, senior Yukos managers and partners of the oil oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who fell afoul of the Kremlin by seeking to influence politics; and the scientist Igor Sutyagin, who was convicted of spying for the United States.
Yeltsin’s opponents, who staged a violent revolt in October 1993, were sent to Lefortovo. Later prisoners at Lefortovo included diplomat Valentin Moiseev, suspected of spying for South Korea; metals magnate Anatoly Bykov, accused of ordering the murder of a former business partner; Alexander Litvinenko, the FSB officer who later fled to Britain; Platon Lebedev and Alexei Pichugin, senior Yukos managers and partners of the oil oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who fell afoul of the Kremlin by seeking to influence politics; and the scientist Igor Sutyagin, who was convicted of spying for the United States.
3
Irina Borogan, “Lefortovsky labirint” [Lefortovo labyrinth],
Versiya
, December 2, 2002.
Irina Borogan, “Lefortovsky labirint” [Lefortovo labyrinth],
Versiya
, December 2, 2002.
4
According to Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 10568, “Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation,” “Investigative authority was fully restored by the law, although the FSK, one of its predecessors, had already been conducting criminal investigations on the basis of a presidential decree. Russia’s fourteen investigative detention prisons and several special troop detachments also returned to the control of the security service. Contrary to what was written in the Assembly’s 2002 report, Lefortovo pretrial detention center is not the only one that is in use: indeed, since the FSB is a centralized institution with regional departments, it has at its disposal also SIZOs [detention centers] in the regions.” Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, June 3, 2005.
According to Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 10568, “Honoring of Obligations and Commitments by the Russian Federation,” “Investigative authority was fully restored by the law, although the FSK, one of its predecessors, had already been conducting criminal investigations on the basis of a presidential decree. Russia’s fourteen investigative detention prisons and several special troop detachments also returned to the control of the security service. Contrary to what was written in the Assembly’s 2002 report, Lefortovo pretrial detention center is not the only one that is in use: indeed, since the FSB is a centralized institution with regional departments, it has at its disposal also SIZOs [detention centers] in the regions.” Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, June 3, 2005.
5
Assembly debate on January 25, 1996 (6th and 7th Sittings). See Doc. 7443, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mr. Muehlemann; and Doc. 7463, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr. Bindig. Text adopted by the assembly on January 25, 1996 (7th Sitting).
Assembly debate on January 25, 1996 (6th and 7th Sittings). See Doc. 7443, report of the Political Affairs Committee, rapporteur: Mr. Muehlemann; and Doc. 7463, opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, rapporteur: Mr. Bindig. Text adopted by the assembly on January 25, 1996 (7th Sitting).
6
Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 10568: “We were told in November 2004, during our meeting in Moscow with the Deputy Director of the FSB, Mr. Ushakov, that the Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations were not binding and that, given the investigative powers afforded to the FSB by the relevant legislation, they absolutely needed a high security detention centre to hold and interrogate suspects.”
Parliamentary Assembly Doc. 10568: “We were told in November 2004, during our meeting in Moscow with the Deputy Director of the FSB, Mr. Ushakov, that the Parliamentary Assembly’s recommendations were not binding and that, given the investigative powers afforded to the FSB by the relevant legislation, they absolutely needed a high security detention centre to hold and interrogate suspects.”
7
Decree of the President, Russian Federation, no. 796, December 7, 2005.
Decree of the President, Russian Federation, no. 796, December 7, 2005.
8
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Kak FSB sdelala vid chto vernula turmi Minustu” [How the FSB pretended to return the prisons to the Ministry of Justice],
Ezhednevny Journal
, January 12, 2006.
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Kak FSB sdelala vid chto vernula turmi Minustu” [How the FSB pretended to return the prisons to the Ministry of Justice],
Ezhednevny Journal
, January 12, 2006.
9
Natalya Matveeva and Pyotr Orlov, “Vzyatka pod grifom sekretno” [Bribe under the secret stamp],
Rossiskaya Gazeta
, March 25, 2008.
Natalya Matveeva and Pyotr Orlov, “Vzyatka pod grifom sekretno” [Bribe under the secret stamp],
Rossiskaya Gazeta
, March 25, 2008.
10
Decree of the President, Russian Federation, no. 602, June 12, 2006.
Decree of the President, Russian Federation, no. 602, June 12, 2006.
11
It is impossible to establish how many special detention centers are now at the disposition of the Lubyanka, as the strength and composition of FSB units are a state secret.
It is impossible to establish how many special detention centers are now at the disposition of the Lubyanka, as the strength and composition of FSB units are a state secret.
1
This account of the activities of the terrorists is drawn from materials of Criminal Case no. 229133 and “Decision on Ceasing the Criminal Investigation,” October 16, 2003, and appendix no. 133.
This account of the activities of the terrorists is drawn from materials of Criminal Case no. 229133 and “Decision on Ceasing the Criminal Investigation,” October 16, 2003, and appendix no. 133.
2
On November 1, 2002, Shamil Basayev published on the rebels’ Web site, Kavkazcenter, his letter “Abdullah Shamil vzyal otvetstvennost na sebya” [Abdullah Shamil takes responsibility], claiming responsibility for the hostage taking in Nord-Ost.
On November 1, 2002, Shamil Basayev published on the rebels’ Web site, Kavkazcenter, his letter “Abdullah Shamil vzyal otvetstvennost na sebya” [Abdullah Shamil takes responsibility], claiming responsibility for the hostage taking in Nord-Ost.
3
See details on Budennovsk’s hostage crisis in Andrew Higgins, “Chechens ‘Release Human Shields,’”
The Independent
, June 21, 1995.
See details on Budennovsk’s hostage crisis in Andrew Higgins, “Chechens ‘Release Human Shields,’”
The Independent
, June 21, 1995.
4
See details about Kobzon’s and Khakamada’s visits to the theater in Michael Wines, “Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Moscow Front—Chechens Kill Hostages in Siege at Russian Hall,”
New York Times
, October 25, 2002.
See details about Kobzon’s and Khakamada’s visits to the theater in Michael Wines, “Hostage Drama in Moscow: The Moscow Front—Chechens Kill Hostages in Siege at Russian Hall,”
New York Times
, October 25, 2002.
5
See the obituary of Shamil Basayev published in
The Times of London
, July 11, 2006.
See the obituary of Shamil Basayev published in
The Times of London
, July 11, 2006.
6
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
7
See dossier on Department V at agentura.ru.
See dossier on Department V at agentura.ru.
8
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
9
Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov,“Mertvie budut za zhivikh” [The dead will replace the living],
Versiya
, October 27, 2002.
Irina Borogan and Andrei Soldatov,“Mertvie budut za zhivikh” [The dead will replace the living],
Versiya
, October 27, 2002.
10
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
Andrei Soldatov, “Ot Pobedi do Beslana” [From victory to Beslan],
Moscovskie Novosti
, October 2004.
11
Testimony of Boris M. Blokhin,
Nord-Ost: Unfinished investigation, a collection of documents published by victims and their families
(Moscow: Organization of Victims of Nord-Ost, 2006), p. 178.
Testimony of Boris M. Blokhin,
Nord-Ost: Unfinished investigation, a collection of documents published by victims and their families
(Moscow: Organization of Victims of Nord-Ost, 2006), p. 178.
12
The number of victims derived from the Web site
nord-ost.org
, supported by relatives of victims. The Web site referred to the decision of the Moscow prosecutor’s office on October 16, 2003.
The number of victims derived from the Web site
nord-ost.org
, supported by relatives of victims. The Web site referred to the decision of the Moscow prosecutor’s office on October 16, 2003.
13
Irina Borogan, “Vragi gosudarstva” [The enemies of the state],
Versiya
, June 14, 2003.
Irina Borogan, “Vragi gosudarstva” [The enemies of the state],
Versiya
, June 14, 2003.
14
Odnako
, Leontiev’s program on Channel One, October 24, 2002.
Odnako
, Leontiev’s program on Channel One, October 24, 2002.
15
Telechannel Rossia Vesti, “Interview s Alexandrom Zdanovichem” [Interview with Zdanovich], October 26, 2002.
Telechannel Rossia Vesti, “Interview s Alexandrom Zdanovichem” [Interview with Zdanovich], October 26, 2002.
16
Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva, and Anna Stavitskaya,
Journalisti i terrorism
[Journalists and terrorism] (Moscow: Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 2008).
Andrei Soldatov, Irina Borogan, Marina Latysheva, and Anna Stavitskaya,
Journalisti i terrorism
[Journalists and terrorism] (Moscow: Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, 2008).
17
Giulietto Chiesa,“Da Mosca due giornalisti testimoni dell’attcco ‘La versione ufficiale non corrisponde ai fatti’‘Il gas e’ immeso alle 6,15 gli Alfa sono entrati 15 minuti dopo. L’attaco deciso prima dell’esecuzione degli ostaggi,”
La Stampa
, October 28, 2002.
Giulietto Chiesa,“Da Mosca due giornalisti testimoni dell’attcco ‘La versione ufficiale non corrisponde ai fatti’‘Il gas e’ immeso alle 6,15 gli Alfa sono entrati 15 minuti dopo. L’attaco deciso prima dell’esecuzione degli ostaggi,”
La Stampa
, October 28, 2002.
18
See also the OSCE press release “OSCE Media Watchdog Concerned over Increased Pressure on Media in Russia,” November 3, 2002.
See also the OSCE press release “OSCE Media Watchdog Concerned over Increased Pressure on Media in Russia,” November 3, 2002.
19
Andrei Soldatov, “Geroy Rossii. Sistema Nikolaya Patrusheva: posle teraktov chekistov ne otpravlayut v otstavku, a nagrazdayut i povichayut” [The heroes of Russia: System of Nikolai Patrushev: After the terrorist attacks, the officers of the FSB are not fired, but awarded and promoted],
Moskovskie Novosti
, September 2, 2004.
Andrei Soldatov, “Geroy Rossii. Sistema Nikolaya Patrusheva: posle teraktov chekistov ne otpravlayut v otstavku, a nagrazdayut i povichayut” [The heroes of Russia: System of Nikolai Patrushev: After the terrorist attacks, the officers of the FSB are not fired, but awarded and promoted],
Moskovskie Novosti
, September 2, 2004.
1
Interview with General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov,
Echo Moskvy
, July 6, 2004.
Interview with General Prosecutor Vladimir Ustinov,
Echo Moskvy
, July 6, 2004.
2
For details see agentura.ru.
For details see agentura.ru.
3
The list of victims was published by the opposition Web site ingushetia .ru on July 26, 2004.
The list of victims was published by the opposition Web site ingushetia .ru on July 26, 2004.
4
In March 2004, Putin launched an overhaul of Russia’s state machinery. All federal bodies were ordered to conform to a standard hierarchy: At the top was a ministry, then a service, and lastly an agency. The state bodies were to change their internal structure as well, with departments being renamed services. The FSB, as a federal service, fell into the middle spot in the order, and Putin duly signed the decree on July 11, 2004. Putin had given the FSB’s leadership three months to make the changes. Those three months were filled with violence, including the attack on Ingushetia on June 21-22, two planes blown out of the air near Moscow by female suicide bombers on August 24, a suicide bomb attack in Moscow on August 31, and finally the capture of the Beslan School on September 1-3, 2004. According to a 1998 statute, the FSB, Interior Ministry, foreign intelligence (SVR), Federal Protective Service, and Ministry of Defense were all tasked with fighting terrorism. However, the FSB, which has a counterterrorism department inherited from the KGB, had the primary role in counterterrorism until 2003, when the MVD became more heavily involved, taking over management of the Regional Operations Staff responsible for counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus. In August 2003, the Interior Ministry further strengthened its anti-terrorism capabilities with the creation of “Center T,” which was integrated into the organized crime division. The situation was further confused, however, when following the Interior Ministry’s takeover of the Regional Operations Staff for the North Caucasus, it also took control of the Combined Group of Forces in the North Caucasus, responsible for military actions in the region. See also the
PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2008).
In March 2004, Putin launched an overhaul of Russia’s state machinery. All federal bodies were ordered to conform to a standard hierarchy: At the top was a ministry, then a service, and lastly an agency. The state bodies were to change their internal structure as well, with departments being renamed services. The FSB, as a federal service, fell into the middle spot in the order, and Putin duly signed the decree on July 11, 2004. Putin had given the FSB’s leadership three months to make the changes. Those three months were filled with violence, including the attack on Ingushetia on June 21-22, two planes blown out of the air near Moscow by female suicide bombers on August 24, a suicide bomb attack in Moscow on August 31, and finally the capture of the Beslan School on September 1-3, 2004. According to a 1998 statute, the FSB, Interior Ministry, foreign intelligence (SVR), Federal Protective Service, and Ministry of Defense were all tasked with fighting terrorism. However, the FSB, which has a counterterrorism department inherited from the KGB, had the primary role in counterterrorism until 2003, when the MVD became more heavily involved, taking over management of the Regional Operations Staff responsible for counterterrorist operations in the North Caucasus. In August 2003, the Interior Ministry further strengthened its anti-terrorism capabilities with the creation of “Center T,” which was integrated into the organized crime division. The situation was further confused, however, when following the Interior Ministry’s takeover of the Regional Operations Staff for the North Caucasus, it also took control of the Combined Group of Forces in the North Caucasus, responsible for military actions in the region. See also the
PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2008).
5
Decision of the President, Russian Federation, no. 352-rps, August 2, 2004.
Decision of the President, Russian Federation, no. 352-rps, August 2, 2004.
6
In Budennovsk (June 1995), when terrorists captured the hospital, the operational staff was headed by Sergei Stepashin, director of the FSB, and Victor Erin, Minister of Internal Affairs. The dual leadership is explained by the policy that when hostage takers have asked, or might ask, for money, they should be dealt with as common criminals. Under these circumstances the FSB steps back and is replaced by the ministry of internal affairs. See details in
PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2008).
In Budennovsk (June 1995), when terrorists captured the hospital, the operational staff was headed by Sergei Stepashin, director of the FSB, and Victor Erin, Minister of Internal Affairs. The dual leadership is explained by the policy that when hostage takers have asked, or might ask, for money, they should be dealt with as common criminals. Under these circumstances the FSB steps back and is replaced by the ministry of internal affairs. See details in
PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2008).
7
RIA Novosti
, “U boevikov v Beslane bylo oruzhie, pokhishennoe so sklada v Ingusehetii” [The fighters in Beslan had weapons seized in Ingushetia], September 10, 2004.
RIA Novosti
, “U boevikov v Beslane bylo oruzhie, pokhishennoe so sklada v Ingusehetii” [The fighters in Beslan had weapons seized in Ingushetia], September 10, 2004.
8
Anna Politkovskaya,“Poisoned by Putin,”
The Guardian
, September 9, 2004.
Anna Politkovskaya,“Poisoned by Putin,”
The Guardian
, September 9, 2004.
9
“According to the report of the head of the Special Purpose Center of the FSB, there were enough forces. Eight assault groups were formed. It was enough,”Valery Andreev stated at the trial.
Pravda Beslana
, December 15, 2005. There were forty-seven hearings in the Supreme Court of North Ossetia on the case of Kudaev, December 15, 2005; transcripts are available at the Web site
www.pravdabeslana.ru
.
“According to the report of the head of the Special Purpose Center of the FSB, there were enough forces. Eight assault groups were formed. It was enough,”Valery Andreev stated at the trial.
Pravda Beslana
, December 15, 2005. There were forty-seven hearings in the Supreme Court of North Ossetia on the case of Kudaev, December 15, 2005; transcripts are available at the Web site
www.pravdabeslana.ru
.
10
Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the Beslan events, 2006, available at agentura.ru and pravdabeslana.ru.
Report of the Parliamentary Commission on the Beslan events, 2006, available at agentura.ru and pravdabeslana.ru.
11
Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Peterburg Novosti
, Television Channel TRK, September 1, 2004.
Peterburg Novosti
, Television Channel TRK, September 1, 2004.
13
Pravda Beslana. Forty-seven hearings in the Supreme Court of North Ossetia on the case of Kudaev, December 15, 2005,
www.pravdabeslana.ru
.
Pravda Beslana. Forty-seven hearings in the Supreme Court of North Ossetia on the case of Kudaev, December 15, 2005,
www.pravdabeslana.ru
.
14
Pravda Beslana,
Account of the meeting of Vladimir Putin and members of the committee “Mothers of Beslan,” September 2, 2005.
Pravda Beslana,
Account of the meeting of Vladimir Putin and members of the committee “Mothers of Beslan,” September 2, 2005.
15
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Beslan: den shturma” [Beslan, the day of the storming],
Moscow News
, September 6, 2004.
Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, “Beslan: den shturma” [Beslan, the day of the storming],
Moscow News
, September 6, 2004.
1
Yelena Tregubova, “Prioritet Kremlya zhizn zalazhnikov” [The priority of the Kremlin—the life of the hostages],
Kommersant
, October 25, 2002.
Yelena Tregubova, “Prioritet Kremlya zhizn zalazhnikov” [The priority of the Kremlin—the life of the hostages],
Kommersant
, October 25, 2002.
2
Itar-Tass
, “Dumskie centristi chtitayut nesvoevremennoi sosdanie parlamentskoy komissii po rassledovaniyu obstoyatelstv terakta v Moskve” [Duma centrists consider “untimely” the creation of a parliamentary commission on investigation of circumstances of the terrorist attack in Moscow], October 29, 2002.
Itar-Tass
, “Dumskie centristi chtitayut nesvoevremennoi sosdanie parlamentskoy komissii po rassledovaniyu obstoyatelstv terakta v Moskve” [Duma centrists consider “untimely” the creation of a parliamentary commission on investigation of circumstances of the terrorist attack in Moscow], October 29, 2002.
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