From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (32 page)

threat of war eased in the Northeast, the United States could turn its attention to the Pacific Northwest and the Southwest.
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Oregon was a major exception to the budding Anglo-American accord. The joint occupation had outlived its usefulness by the mid-1840s. The
Pacific Northwest became the focal point of a dangerous conflict sparked largely by bungling diplomacy and exacerbated by domestic politics in both countries and especially by the intrusion of national honor. The Oregon crisis brought out old suspicions and hatreds, nearly provoking an unnecessary and costly war.

In the 1840s, a long-dormant conflict in the Pacific Northwest sprang to life. British interests remained essentially commercial and quickened with the opening of China through the 1842 Treaty of Nanking. The ports of Oregon and Mexican California were perfectly situated for exploiting the commerce of East Asia, and merchants and sea captains pressed the government to take possession. Americans too saw links with the fabled commerce of the Orient, but their major interest in Oregon had shifted to settlement. Missionaries first went there to proselytize the Indians but established the permanent settlements that provided the basis for U.S. occupation. Driven from their homes by the depression of 1837 and enticed west by tales of lush farm lands, thousands of restless Americans followed in making the rugged, costly, and hazardous two-thousand-mile, six-month trek from St. Louis across the Oregon Trail. The return of the Great United States Exploring Expedition in June 1842 after an eighty-seven-thousand-mile voyage around the world stirred the American imagination and drew special attention to Oregon, "a storehouse of wealth in its forests, furs and fisheries," a veritable Eden on the Pacific.
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Oregon "fever" became an epidemic. By 1845, some five thousand Americans lived in the region and established a government to which even the once mighty Hudson's Bay Company paid taxes. They talked of admission to the Union, a direct challenge to the 1827 agreement with Britain. The "same causes which impelled our population . . . to the valley of the Mississippi, will impel them onward with accumulating force . . . into the valley of the Columbia," Secretary of State John C. Calhoun informed the British minister in 1844. The "whole region . . . is destined to be peopled by us."
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Along with Texas, Oregon became a volatile issue in the hotly contested presidential campaign of 1844. Western expansionists advanced outrageous claims all the way to 54° 40', the line negotiated with Russia in 1824 but far beyond the point ever contested with Britain. The bombastic Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri even threatened war, proclaiming that "30–40,000 rifles are our best negotiators." Expansionist
Democrats tried to link Texas with Oregon, trading southern votes for Oregon with western votes for Texas. The Democratic platform thus affirmed a "clear and unquestionable" claim to all of Oregon. The dark horse candidate, ardent expansionist James K. Polk of Tennessee, campaigned on the dubious slogan of the "re-annexation of Texas" and "reoccupation of Oregon."
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A crisis erupted within months after Polk took office. The forty-nine-year-old Tennessean was short, thin, and somewhat drab in appearance with a sad look, deep piercing eyes, and a sour disposition. Vain and driven, he set lofty expansionist goals for his administration, and by pledging not to seek reelection he placed self-imposed limits on his ability to achieve them. He was introverted, humorless, and a workaholic. His shrewdness and ability to size up friends and rivals had served him well in the rough-and-tumble of backcountry politics, and he had an especially keen eye for detail. But he could be cold and aloof. Parochial and highly nationalistic, he was impatient with the niceties of diplomacy and lacked understanding of and sensitivity to other nations and peoples.
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Polk's initial efforts to strike a deal provoked a crisis. Despite his menacing rhetoric, he realized that the United States had never claimed beyond the 49th parallel. Thus while continuing publicly to claim all of Oregon, he professed himself bound by the acts of his predecessors. He privately offered a "generous" settlement at the 49th parallel with free ports on the southern tip of Vancouver Island. An experienced and skillful diplomat, British minister Richard Pakenham might have overlooked Polk's posturing, but he too let nationalist pride interfere with diplomacy. Infuriated by Polk's pretensions of generosity, he refused to refer the proposal to London. The Foreign Office subsequently disapproved Pakenham's action, but the damage was done. Stung by the rejection of proposals he believed generous, Polk was probably relieved that Pakenham had taken him off the hook. He defiantly withdrew the "compromise," rejected British proposals for arbitration, reasserted claims to all of Oregon, and asked Congress to abrogate the joint occupation provision of the 1827 treaty. The "only way to treat John Bull is to look him straight in the eye," the tough-talking Tennessean later informed a delegation of congressmen.
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Polk's ill-conceived effort to stare down the world's greatest power nearly backfired. In the United States, at least momentarily, the breakdown of diplomacy left the field to the hotheads. "54-40 or fight," they shouted, and O'Sullivan coined the phrase that marked an era, proclaiming that the U.S. title to Oregon was "by the right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to possess the whole of the continent which Providence has given us for the development of the great experiment of Liberty." Conveniently forgetting his earlier willingness to compromise, Massachusetts congressman John Quincy Adams now found sanction in the Book of Genesis for possession of all of Oregon.
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Its future imperiled by domestic disputes over trade policy, the Peel government wanted to settle the Oregon issue, but not at the price of national honor. American pretensions aroused fury in London. Foreign Minister Lord Aberdeen retorted in Polk's own phrase that British rights to Oregon were "clear and unquestionable." Peel proclaimed that "we are resolved—and we are prepared—to maintain them."
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Responding directly to Adams, the
Times
of London sneered that a "democracy intoxicated with what it mistakes for religion is the most formidable apparition which can startle the world."
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Hotheads pressed for war. The army and navy prepared for action. Some zealots welcomed war with the United States as a heaven-sent opportunity to eliminate slavery. Whigs stood poised to exploit any sign of Tory weakness. In early 1846, the government emphasized that its patience was wearing thin. Revelation of plans to send as many as thirty warships to Canada underscored the warning.

The two nations steadied themselves in mid-1846 just as they teetered on the brink of war. Polk perceived that his bluster had angered rather than intimidated the British and that more of the same might lead to war. Congressional debates in early 1846 made clear that despite the political bombast a war for
all
of Oregon would not have broad support. Also on the verge of war with Mexico, the United States was not prepared to fight one enemy, much less two. Polk thus set out to ease the crisis he had helped to provoke by putting forth terms he might have offered earlier. Shortly after Congress passed the resolution giving notice of abrogation of the 1827 treaty, he quietly informed London of his willingness to compromise. Reports from Oregon that American settlers were firmly entrenched and that Britain should cut its losses reinforced Peel's eagerness
for a settlement. London thus responded with terms nearly identical to those earlier outlined by the United States. Ever cautious, Polk took the extraordinary step of securing Senate approval before proceeding. Already at war with Mexico, the United States approved the treaty as drafted in London, a mere nine days passing between its delivery to the State Department and ratification. "Now we can thrash Mexico into decency at our leisure," the
New York Herald
exclaimed.
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The Oregon settlement accorded reasonably well with the specific interests of each signatory. It extended the boundary along the 49th parallel from the Rockies to the coast, leaving Vancouver Island in British hands and Juan de Fuca Strait open to both countries. Against Polk's wishes, it also permitted the Hudson's Bay Company to navigate the Columbia River. The United States had no settlements north of the 49th parallel and had never claimed that area before the 1840s. Despite the sometimes heated rhetoric, few Americans thought all of Oregon worth a war. Britain had long sought a boundary at the Columbia River, but the fur trade in the disputed area was virtually exhausted. Possession of Vancouver Island and access to Juan de Fuca Strait adequately met its maritime needs.

In each nation, other crises put a premium on settlement. The war with Mexico and Britain's refusal to interfere there made peace both urgent and expedient for the United States. Strained relations with France, problems in Ireland, and an impending political crisis at home made a settlement with the United States desirable, if not absolutely essential, for the British. Both sides recognized the importance of commercial ties and a common culture and heritage. In the United States, respect for British power and a reluctance on racial grounds to fight with Anglo-Saxon brethren made war unthinkable. Most important, both sides realized the foolishness of war. Often praised for his diplomacy, Polk deserves credit mainly for the good sense to extricate the nation from a crisis he had helped provoke.
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The Oregon treaty freed the United States to turn its attention southward. It also provided the much-coveted outlet on the Pacific as well as clear title to a rich expanse of territory including all of the future states of Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and parts of Montana and Wyoming. Along with the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, it eased a conflict that had been a fact of life since the Revolution. Americans generally agreed that their "Manifest Destiny" did not include Canada. Having contained U.S. expansion in the North, Britain increasingly learned to live with the upstart republic.

Conflict would continue, but only during the American Civil War would it assume dangerous proportions. Increasingly, the two nations would find that more united than divided them. Despite the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny, the United States and Britain had reached an agreement on the sharing of North America.
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"No instance of aggrandizement or lust for territory has stained our annals," O'Sullivan boasted in 1844, expressing one of the nation's most cherished and durable myths.
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Dubious when it was written, O'Sullivan's affirmation soon proved completely wrong. The Mexican-American conflict of 1846–48 was in large part a war of lust and aggrandizement. The United States had long coveted Texas. In the 1840s, California and New Mexico also became objects of its desire. With characteristic single-mindedness, Polk set his sights on all of them. He employed the same bullying approach used with the British, this time without backing off, provoking a war that would have momentous consequences for both nations.

The United States government did not orchestrate a clever conspiracy to steal Texas, as Mexicans charged, but the result was the same. Lured to the "New El Dorado" by the promise of cheap cotton land, thirty-five thousand Americans with five thousand slaves had spilled into Texas by 1835. Alarmed by an immigration it once welcomed, the newly independent government of Mexico sought to impose its authority over the newcomers and abolish slavery. To defend their rights—and slaves—the Texans took up arms. After a crushing defeat at the Alamo, the subject of much patriotic folklore, they won a decisive victory at San Jacinto in April 1836.

An independent Texas presented enticing opportunities and vexing problems. Americans had taken a keen interest in the revolution. Despite nominal neutrality—and in marked contrast to the strict enforcement of neutrality laws along the Canadian border—they assisted the rebels with money, arms, and volunteers. Many Americans and Texans assumed that the "sister republic" would join the United States. From the outset, however, Texas got entangled with the explosive issue of slavery. Politicians handled it gingerly. Jackson refused to recognize the new nation until his successor, Van Buren, was safely elected. Eager for reelection, Van Buren warily turned aside Texas proposals for annexation.