From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (14 page)

In the absence of a settlement, tensions flared. When nervous British officials in Canada learned that the United States was preparing another military expedition to be commanded by General "Mad Anthony" Wayne of Revolutionary War fame, they feared attacks on their frontier posts. Without London's approval, they incited the Indians to resist American advances. As a "defensive" measure, they sent troops to the Maumee River near present-day Detroit. What the British viewed as defensive, Americans regarded as further evidence of British perfidy and provocation. As Wayne moved north and British forces south, there was much loose talk of war.

Conflicts over issues of neutrality posed even more difficult problems. From its birth as a nation, the United States had claimed the right to trade with belligerents in non-contraband and defined contraband narrowly to include only specifically military items such as arms and ammunition. It also endorsed the principle that free ships make free goods, meaning that the private property of belligerents aboard neutral ships was immune from seizure. The United States insisted that these "rights" had sanction in international law and incorporated them into treaties with several European countries. But they served the national interest as well. Desperately in need of U.S. foodstuffs, France purchased large quantities of grain and permitted American ships to transport supplies from its West Indian colonies to its home ports, a right generally denied under mercantilist doctrine. Hundreds of American ships swarmed into the Caribbean and across the Atlantic to "fatten on the follies" of the Old World.

Americans' quest for profits ran afoul of Britain's grand strategy. Recognizing France's dependence on external sources of food, the British government set out to starve its enemy into submission, blockading French ports, broadening contraband to include food, and ordering the seizure of American ships carrying grain to France. The British did not want to drive the United States into the arms of France and thus agreed to purchase confiscated grain at fair prices. Preoccupied with the European war, increasingly alarmed at the burgeoning American trade with France, and badly misjudging the Washington administration's handling of Genet, they implemented their strategy in a high-handed and often brutal manner that threatened to provoke war. Without any warning and frequently exceeding their instructions, overzealous British officials in the West
Indies seized 250 ships. Egged on by a system that permitted the captors personally to profit from such plunder, ship captains boarded American vessels, stripped them of their sails, and tore down their colors. Hastily assembled kangaroo courts condemned ships and cargoes. Captains and crews were confined, often without provisions. Some Americans were impressed into the Royal Navy; others died in captivity. Britain justified its efforts to curtail trade with France through its so-called Rule of 1756 declaring that trade illegal in time of peace was illegal in time of war. British officials later admitted, however, that the ship seizures of 1794 far exceeded the bounds of this rule.
³⁶

London's actions stirred powerful resentment in the United States. What seemed to Britons essential acts of war appeared to Americans a threat to their prosperity and a grievous affront to their dignity as an independent nation. Angry mobs in seaport cities attacked British sailors. In Charleston, a crowd tore down a statue of William Pitt the Elder that had survived the Revolution. Congress assembled in early 1794 in a mood of outrage. Madison's proposals in the House of Representatives for discrimination against British commerce failed in the Senate by the single vote of Vice President John Adams. Even Federalists spoke of war. An angry Congress proceeded to impose a temporary embargo on all foreign shipping and to discuss even more drastic measures such as repudiation of debts owed Britain and creation of a navy to defend American shipping.

The crisis of early 1794 posed a dilemma for the Washington administration. Most top officials regarded a British victory as essential to the preservation of stable government in Europe and hence to the well-being of the United States. On the other hand, they appreciated and indeed shared the rising public anger toward Britain and perceived that their political foes might use it to discredit them. Acquiescence in British high-handedness was unthinkable. Should Madison's quest for economic retaliation succeed, on the other hand, it might provoke a disastrous war. Without precedent to guide him, Washington took the initiative in addressing the crisis, agreeing to Hamilton's proposal to send a special mission to London to negotiate a settlement that might avert war and silence the opposition. Chief Justice John Jay, an experienced diplomat and staunch Federalist, was selected for the mission.
³⁷

Washington and his advisers perceived that an agreement might be costly. As was customary in a time when communications were slow and uncertain, Jay was given wide latitude. The only explicit requirements were that he agree to nothing that violated the French treaty of 1778 and that he secure access to trade with the British West Indies, both regarded as essential to appease the domestic opposition. He was also instructed to seek compensation for the recent seizures of vessels and cargoes, to settle issues left from the 1783 treaty, particularly British retention of the Northwest posts, and to conclude a commercial treaty that would resolve sticky questions of neutral rights. The administration appears not to have expected major concessions on matters concerning neutrality. It hoped rather to win enough in other areas to make concessions to the British palatable to its critics.

The British too were in a conciliatory mood, although within distinct limits. Preoccupied with events in Europe and with a political crisis at home, officials were caught off guard by the furious American reaction to ship seizures in the West Indies. Their military position on the Continent precarious, they had no need for war with the United States. Even before Jay arrived in London, they revoked the harsh orders that had led to the West Indian ship seizures. The government received Jay cordially. Its chief negotiator, Lord Grenville, sought to establish an effective working relationship with him. British leaders were prepared to make concessions to avoid conflict with the United States. To have given in on neutral rights would have denied them a vital weapon against France at a critical time, however, and on such issues they stood firm.

The settlement worked out during six months of sporadic and tedious but generally cordial negotiations reflected these influences. The British willingly abandoned an untenable position, agreeing to evacuate the Northwest posts. The treaty was silent on their relations with the Indians. To the annoyance of southern planters, it said nothing about compensation for slaves carried off during the Revolution. A boundary dispute in the Northeast and the question of pre-Revolutionary debts owed by Americans to British creditors were referred to mixed arbitral commissions.
³⁸

In view of its long-standing opposition to commercial concessions of any sort, Britain was surprisingly liberal in this area. In fact, the home island and especially the colonies depended on trade with the United States. The British Isles were opened to Americans on a most-favored-nation basis. American ships were permitted into British India with virtually
no restrictions and also gained access to the much-coveted West Indian trade, although vessels were restricted to less than seventy tons and the Americans were forbidden to reexport certain products including even such items produced in the United States. On balance, for a nation still committed to mercantilist principles, the concessions were generous.

As Hamilton and Jay had feared, Britain stood firm on neutral rights. Grenville readily agreed to compensate the United States for ships and cargoes seized in the West Indies but would go no further. Jay conceded the substance, if not the principle, of British definitions of contraband and the Rule of 1756. For all practical purposes, he scrapped the principle of free ships and free goods and agreed to admit British privateers and prizes to American ports, a direct violation of the 1778 treaty.

Critics then and later have argued that Jay gave up more than was necessary and secured less than he should have in return. He was too eager for a settlement, they claim, and refused to hold out, bargain, or exploit his strengths and British weaknesses. Some scholars have also contended that Hamilton undercut Jay's position by confiding in the British minister to Washington, George Hammond, that the United States would not join a group of nations then forming an armed neutrality to defend their shipping against Britain.
³⁹
As in earlier cases, Hamilton's machinations cannot be condoned, but, in this instance, their practical effects appear limited. The armed neutrality lacked support from major European neutrals such as Russia. In any event, the United States had little to contribute or gain from it. Hamilton's assurances reached London only after the negotiations were all but concluded and told the British little they did not know. Jay was indeed anxious for a settlement. He might have gained a bit more by dragging out the negotiations. But on neutral rights Britain could not be moved. Their backs to the wall on the Continent and in the Caribbean, London officials could not relinquish their most effective weapon. Without an army or navy and standing to lose huge revenues from war with England, the United States could not make them do so.

Although desperate for peace, Hamilton and Washington were themselves keenly disappointed with the terms. For a time, the president hesitated to submit the document to the Senate, but he eventually rationalized that a bad treaty was better than none at all. He sent Jay's handiwork to the upper house without any recommendation, but he was so concerned with possible public reaction that he insisted it be considered in
secret. The Senate approved the treaty by the barest majority, 20–10, and then only after the article on West Indian trade was excised because the limits on tonnage effectively eliminated American ships from the trans-Atlantic trade.

No other treaty in U.S. history has aroused such hostile public reaction or provoked such passionate debate, even though, ironically, the Jay Treaty brought the United States important concessions and served its interests well. The explanation must be sought not only in rampant political partisanship but also in ideology and the insecurities of a new and fragile nation.
⁴⁰
The treaty provoked such anger because it touched Americans in areas where they were most sensitive. The mere fact of negotiations with Britain was difficult for many to accept. To some Americans, Jay's concessions smacked of subservience. Moreover, to an extent that was not true in Europe, foreign policy in the United States was subject to debate by a public whose understanding of the issues and mechanisms was neither sophisticated nor nuanced, that sought clear-cut and definitive solutions, and defined outcomes in terms of victory and defeat. By the very nature of diplomacy, such high expectations were bound to be disappointed and the results to be received with something less than enthusiasm. American insecurity thus manifested itself in a frenzy of anger and an outpouring of patriotic fervor.

When the text of the treaty was published by a Republican newspaper less than a week after approval by the Senate, popular indignation swept the land. The aura of secrecy that had shrouded the treaty and its disclosure on the eve of emotional July 4 celebrations heightened the intensity of the reaction. Even in Federalist strongholds, the document and its author were publicly condemned. In towns and villages across the country, incensed citizens lowered flags to half mast and hangmen ceremoniously destroyed copies of the treaty. Burning effigies of that "damned arch traitor Jay" lit the night. The British minister was publicly insulted by a hostile crowd. When Hamilton took the stump in New York to defend the treaty, he was struck by a stone. Once again, the venerable Washington came under attack, irate critics labeling him a dupe and a fool and even accusing him of misusing public funds.

Outraged by the terms of the treaty and smelling political blood, Republican leaders fanned the popular indignation. Southerners and westerners, suspicious of Jay since his negotiations with Spain a decade earlier, saw their worst fears confirmed in the obnoxious document. Failure to
deal with the issue of confiscated slaves and submission of the debt controversy to an arbitral commission touched southern interests directly. From the Republican point of view, the commercial treaty and the cave-in on neutral rights totally undermined the principles essential for a truly independent status for the United States. By prohibiting interference in Anglo-American trade for ten years, it surrendered the instrument—commercial discrimination—needed to attain that end. It represented a humiliating capitulation to the archenemy Britain and a slap in the face to France. Madison and Jefferson saw treaties as a means to reform the balance-of-power system and international law. To them, the Jay Treaty represented an abject retreat to the old ways. It was "unworthy [of] the voluntary acceptance of an Independent people," Madison fumed.
⁴¹
Jefferson was more outspoken, denouncing the treaty as a "monument of folly and venality," an "infamous act," nothing more than a "treaty of alliance between England and the anglomen of this country against the legislature and people of the United States." Those who had been "Samsons in the field and Solomons in the council," he privately exclaimed, "have had their heads shorn by the harlot England."
⁴²

The treaty survived the storm. Hamilton, now a private citizen, joined Jay in mounting a vigorous and generally effective defense of their handiwork. Despite their compunctions about mobilizing a presumably ignorant public, the Federalists effectively rallied popular support, highlighting the concessions made by Britain and emphasizing that, whatever its deficiencies, the treaty preserved peace with the nation whose friendship was essential to U.S. prosperity and well-being.
⁴³
Perhaps persuaded by Hamilton and Jay, Washington overcame persistent reservations about ratifying the treaty. The bitter personal attacks on him by foes of the treaty probably contributed to his decision. A harried president finally signed the Jay Treaty in August 1795.