THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES (136 page)

5
. Jean Bodin,
Six Books of the Commonwealth
(B. Blackwell, 1955 [1606]).

6
. Georg Wilhelm Hegel,
The Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807)
, trans. A. V. Miller and J. N. Findlay (Oxford, 1979). Also see Roger Kimball, “The Difficulty with Hegel,”
New Criterion
19 (September 2000): 4.

7
. William A. Owens, “The Wrong Argument about Readiness,”
New York Times
(September 1, 2000): A27.

8
. See, e.g., Thomas Friedman, “It's Harder Now to Figure Out Compelling National Interests”
New York Times
(May 31, 1992): E5.

9
. See A. J. P. Taylor,
The Origins of the Second World War
(Penguin, 1961) for a related argument.

10
. U.S. Department of the Army,
Decisive Victory: America's Power Projection Army
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1994). See also the
Quadrennial Defense Review
(May 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil.pubs/qdr/) and the
Bottom-Up Review
(October 1993, http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/).

11
. Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in
The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order
, ed. Bernard Brodie (Harcourt, Brace, 1946), 76.

12
. Thomas C. Schelling,
Arms and Influence
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

13
. Michael Howard, “Lessons of the Cold War,”
Survival
36 (1994 – 1995): 165.

14
. Philip Bobbitt,
Democracy and Deterrence
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 286.

15
. Fred Ikle, “The Next Lenin: On the Cusp of Truly Revolutionary Warfare.”
The National Interest
47 (1997): 9.

16
. Bobbitt,
Democracy and Deterrence
, 19 – 96.

17
. But see Ashton Carter and William Perry,
Preventive Defense
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).

18
. Paul Bracken, “The Military after Next,”
The Washington Quarterly
16 (1993): 157.

19
. Fred Iklé, “The Next Lenin.”

20
. See also Robert D. Kaplan, “Fort Leavenworth and the Eclipse of Nationhood,”
Atlantic Monthly
(September 1996), and Martin van Creveld,
The Transformation of War
(Free Press, 1991); see also van Creveld's
The Rise and Decline of the State
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

21
. Jean-Marie Guehenno,
The End of the Nation-State
(University of Minnesota Press, 1995).

22
. Kenichi Ohmae,
The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies
(New York: Free Press, 1995).

23
. Martin van Creveld,
The Rise and Decline of the State
(Cambridge, U.K., 1999). See also
Empire
.

1
.
On Justice, Power, and Human Nature: The Essence of Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War
, ed. and trans. Paul Woodruff (Hackett, 1993).

2
. The term
Hundred Years' War
appears first to have been used in 1821 by Charles Desmichels. During this period of Anglo-French détente, Desmichels labeled the hundred years of animosity—often punctuated by long periods in which there was no actual fighting—as the Hundred Years' War. The term was picked up in Germany in 1829, and by English historians in 1870. P. J. Winter, “Sur l' origine de l' appellation de la guerre de cent ans,”
Information History
37 (1975): 20 – 24.

3
. In contrast to the Hundred Years' War, the Thirty Years' War was named almost instantly, once the Westphalian Peace actually seemed to deliver a general settlement. The term
Thirty Years' War
was used as early as 1648 in an anonymous outline of the main events of the war, and in three other works about the war printed in 1649, 1650, and 1657. See Guenther H. S. Mueller,
Journal of Modern History
50 (1978): iii.

4
. The Punic Wars, for example, fit this pattern: although the participants thought, more than once, that hostilities had ended, and significant periods without fighting did occur, historians came to view the various Carthaginian wars as engagements in a single war because the peace settlements failed to resolve the conflicts over which the wars were fought.

5
. Geoffrey Parker,
The Thirty Years' War
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984); see also C. V. Wedgwood,
The Thirty Years' War
(J. Cape, 1938); P. Limm,
The Thirty Years' War
(1984); and J. H. Elliott,
Richelieu and Olivares
(Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

6
. P. Brightwell, “Spanish Origins of the Thirty Years' War,”
European Studies Review
(1979).

7
. Parker,
The Thirty Years' War
, xiv.

8
. Supra, n. 2.

9
. Egon Friedell,
A Cultural History of the Modern Age
, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (Knopf, 1930 – 1932), 15.

10
. Kenneth Fowler,
The Age of Plantagenet and Valois
(Putnam, 1967), 13.

11
. Anne Curry,
The Hundred Years War
(London: Macmillan, 1983).

12
. Hunter R. Rawlings III,
The Structure of Thucydides' History
(Princeton University Press, 1981); Simon Hornblower,
Thucydides
(Duckworth, 1987).

1
. Kurt F. Reinhardt,
Germany 2000 Years
, rev. ed.,
Vol. I, The Rise and Fall of the “Holy Empire”
(Frederick Ungar, 1961).

2
. “It is usual, in analysing the constitution of 1871, to emphasize its federal character, pointing out that it betrays in every paragraph the conflicts of a thousand years of German history. But the reality is otherwise. The federal rights… were illusory….Prussia had sufficient votes to veto constitutional changes, but more important was the fact that the Chancellor was under no necessity of consulting the council on any question of major political importance….The system contrived in 1871 included a Reichstag elected by universal and equal franchise; but its powers were nugatory…. [I]t had no power of voting or refusing to vote taxes… since imperial revenue was provided partly from permanent fixed duties, partly by
pro rata
contributions from the individual federal states….Finally, the Reichstag had no control over executive ministers, who were responsible only to the Prussian king who was also German emperor…. The German labour leader, Wilhelm Liebknecht, was therefore not wide of the mark in dubbing the Reichstag ‘the fig-leaf of absolutism‘; the system of government established in 1871 was, in fact, a veiled form of the monarchical absolutism vested in the king of Prussia.” Geoffrey Barraclough,
Factors in German History
(B. Blackwell, 1946). It is important to note, in the debate as to whether Wilhelmine Germany was a proto-fascist state, that while many parliamentary nation-states allowed for the suspension of constitutional provisions in an emergency, the Kaiserrech and Nazi Germany permitted the chancellor to remain in office and to rule by decree even when he had lost his parliamentary majority.

3
. Barraclough,
Factors in German History
, 116.

4
. Fritz Fischer,
Germany's Aims in the First World War
(Norton, 1967). This is the English translation of his
Griff nach der Weltmacht
(Droste, 1961); Fritz Fischer,
World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany's Aims in the First World War,
trans. Lancelot Farrar, Robert Kimber, and Rita Kimber (Norton, 1974); Fritz Fischer,
War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914,
trans. Marian Jackson (Norton, 1975); see
Krieg der Illusionem
(1969).

5
. “Analysis of the origins of the First World War has therefore been profoundly influenced by the ‘Fischer revolution.’” Norman Stowe,
Europe Transformed, 1878 – 1919
(Harvard University Press, 1984), 196, comments that “Not many historians nowadays dissent from the proposition that the German government, egged on by its generals, deliberately provoked the war of 1914.” John Moses,
The Politics of Illusion
(George
Prior, 1975), 48, says that “Even Fischer's most persistent opponents such as Gerhard Ritter (1888 – 1967) and Golo Mann, for example, were forced to agree with him that Imperial Germany's policies unleashed the war; however, they imputed to Germany's leaders defensive rather than offensive motives.” “As Fischer has forcefully stated, ‘there is not a single document in the world which could weaken the central truth that in July 1914 a will to war existed solely and alone on the German side and that all arrangements on the side of the
Entente
served the defensive security of their alliance. And that will to war had been crystallising for many years previously.’” Some historians, while not disputing this, emphasize the opportunistic nature of German policy. “James Joll,
The Origins of the First World War
(Longman, 1984), 235, feels that by December 1912 German rulers had ‘accepted war as inevitable' but were concerned to wage it at the most opportune time.” Ruth Henig,
The Origins of the First World War
(Routledge, 1989; reprinted 1991), 43.

6
. For the current status of the Fischer controversy, compare Bernd-Jurgen Wendt, “Zum Stand der ‘Fischer-Kontroverse' um den Ausbruch des ersten Weltkrieges,”
Annales Universitatis Scientarium Budapestinensis de Rolando Eotvos Nominatae: Section Historica
24 (1985): 92 – 132 (concluding that Fischer's theses regarding the Riezler papers, the role of Bethmann Hollweg, and the continuity of German policies leading to both world wars remain unrefuted) with Wayne C. Thompson, “The September Program: Reflections on the Evidence,”
Central European History
11 (1978): 348 – 354 (arguing that the Riezler paper was only “a provisional catalog of possible war aims drawn up for negotiating purposes”).

7
. See Roger Fletcher, introduction to Fischer,
Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History
, 1871 – 1945 (Allen & Unwin, 1986; reprinted Routledge, 1991).

8
. Ian Kershaw, “1933: Continuity or Break in German History?”
History Today
33 (1983): 13 – 18.

9
. Fletcher, Introduction to Fischer, 10.

10
. Edward Acton,
State and Society under Lenin and Stalin
, in
Themes in Modern European History, 1890 – 1945
, ed. Paul Hayes (London: Routledge, 1992).

11
. Ibid., 156 – 157.

12
. William G. Rosenberg, “Russian Labor and Bolshevik Power after October,”
Slavic Review
(1985): 222 – 223.

13.
Condoleezza Rice, “The Making of Soviet Strategy,”
Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age,
ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1986), 648.