Read The Secrets of Station X Online
Authors: Michael Smith
The History of Hut 6, one of the internal GCHQ histories of the work at Bletchley that were written after the war, begins appropriately with the so-called ‘Dodo Bird Verdict’ from
Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland
, a quote that would no doubt have delighted the devoted Carrollian Dilly Knox: ‘Everybody has won and all must have prizes.’ This is perhaps particularly true of Bletchley Park where the work of the brilliant few was only possible because of the hard, often mind-numbing labour of very many others whose names were always less likely to go down in history. More than 10,000 people were working for GC&CS at the highest point in the war, at the beginning of 1945. This included the 2,000 Wrens and mechanics working on the Bombes at the out-stations at Adstock and Gayhurst Manor, in Buckinghamshire, and Stanmore and Eastcote in Middlesex, but not the thousands of intercept operators based at ninety locations in the UK and others around the world. Every one of these people played their part.
Counter-factual history is a very risky undertaking but few could argue that the work at Bletchley did not help to ensure the war ended quicker than it would otherwise have done, saving countless lives on both sides of the conflict. Harry Hinsley, who went on to write the official history of British intelligence in the Second World War, argued that the intelligence produced at Bletchley Park cut at least two years, if not three, off the length of the war. ‘The U-Boats would not have done us in, but they would have got us into serious shortages and put another year on the war,’ Hinsley said. ‘
Operation Overlord
would certainly not have been launched in June 1944 without
Ultra
. Or at least, if it had been launched, it would probably not have been
successful
.’ It was still possible that the Russians might have gone on to capture Berlin in 1945 or that Britain might have been so badly hit by Hitler’s V-weapons that the Allies might have responded by using the atomic bomb, he said. ‘But my own belief is that the war, instead of finishing in 1945, would have ended in 1948 had GC&CS not been able to read the Enigma cyphers and produce the
Ultra
intelligence.’
George Steiner’s judgement on the work of Bletchley Park reflects that achievement but it cannot just be pinned to the
organisation itself. The success of Bletchley Park was the result of a lot of hard work by all of the people who worked there or at the many GC&CS outstations or intercept sites around the world. The recruitment difficulties which provoked the letter to Churchill written by Welchman, Turing, Alexander and Milner-Barry meant that there was no room for passengers at Bletchley Park.
In his history of the work on German Naval Enigma, Alexander said:
The graphs and figures in the appendices give a statistical estimate of our work; it is harder to give a real impression of what we felt about it. Even the people who had the dullest and hardest work (and a great deal of the routine work was very dull and still more of it extremely exhausting) felt that it was worthwhile to an extent that few jobs in peace-time can be and they did not spare themselves in any way – through staff shortage they frequently had far more to cope with than they should ever have been asked to do; they always got it done somehow and I am sure that a number of the breakdowns in health that occurred were caused chiefly by overwork. As for these of us who did the skilled technical work, I think we all felt that it was impossible that we should ever again have a job which would give us in the same way a sense of the greatest importance and urgency combined with the fascination of a highly ingenious and complicated game – we all thought ourselves extremely fortunate to have had the chance to do it.
Although Alexander was talking specifically about Hut 8, it was the same across ‘the Park’. The opinion of an American who worked at Bletchley might be seen as providing as close as we can come to a genuinely unbiased inside view of this truly great British institution.
Bill Bundy, who was in his mid-twenties when he led the US codebreakers working in Hut 6, went on to be a key foreign
affairs adviser for both the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations
, ending his government service as Assistant Secretary of State. Bundy said he never worked with ‘a group of people that was more thoroughly dedicated and with a range of skills, insight and imagination’ than those he worked with at Bletchley.
It was a terrific human experience and I’ve never matched it since. I had other jobs with superb people, important and worthwhile pursuits but certainly for me personally this was the high point. This was a totally dedicated group working together in absolutely remarkable teamwork. Their whole structure was one where you might readily find a major
working
under a lieutenant or under a civilian, somewhat younger. Whoever was in charge was the person who had been judged to be more effective at doing it. It was an extraordinary group, and that was true right across the board in BP, whatever system of selection they used, and I’ve heard lots of narratives and lots of colourful stories about it, the result was an extraordinary group of people in an extraordinary organisation.
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1
–
2
Bletchley beginnings: The National Archives, Public Record Office (hereafter TNA PRO) HD 3/15. Mystery of its future use:
Bletchley District Gazette
, 28 May 1938.
Pages
3
–
4
Bletchley purchase: interview with former MI6 officer who managed the service’s archives, 17 October 1995. The official MI6 history cites evidence in the Land Registry files that ‘strongly suggests’ Sinclair was reimbursed, but these documents, the details of which were already known, do not in fact strongly suggest anything. They show that Sinclair left the Park to his sister Evelyn who signed it over to MI6. If he had been reimbursed it would be unlikely that he would have left it to his sister; he could have signed it over to MI6 himself. It may have been of course that she was reimbursed after her brother’s death but there is certainly no evidence of this. The only money exchanged when she signed the Park over was a 10-shilling legal fee. The Sinclair family wealth was such at the time that Evelyn did not need the money and having spent the last years of his life with her brother she would certainly have known what he wanted done with the Park before he left it to her. Without any further evidence, and there is none in the MI6 archives, it is unlikely that the truth will ever be known. The words of the MI6 archivist, reflecting the absence of any evidence of repayment in the MI6 archives, are the closest we can come to an answer: ‘We know he paid for it, we’re not even sure if he was ever repaid. He died soon afterwards, so he probably wasn’t.’
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5
Evelyn Sinclair worked at GC&CS: TNA PRO HW 14/147, Temporary Staff, 5 March 1941, p.5.
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6
Move of various sections to Bletchley: TNA PRO HW 62/21, Move of Service Sections to War Station, 15 August 1939, dated 2 August 1939.
Page
7
Walsingham: TNA PRO HD 3/15.
Page
8
Secret Man and Secret Decyphering Branch: TNA PRO HD 3/14; HD 3/15; HD 3/16; HD 3/17; HD 3/22; HD 3/35.
Pages
9
–
10
Gill and Christmas message: TNA PRO WO 32/10776, History of Military Intelligence Directorate 1920–21.
Pages
11
–
12
Members of Room 40: TNA PRO HW 3/182, Records of W. F. Clarke of Room 40 and Head of Naval Section, Government Code and Cypher School.
Page
13
Zimmermann telegram: TNA PRO HW 3/177, Nigel de Grey account of decyphering of the Zimmermann telegram, January 1917.
Page
14
Denniston on rivalry: A. G. Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’,
Intelligence and National Security
, vol. 1 (January 1986), pp.58–9.
Page
15
Post-war amalgamation: TNA PRO HW 3/33, Record of Conference held at the Admiralty on 5 August 1919 on amalgamation of MI1b and NID25; HW 3/33, Nigel de Grey, Notes on Formation and Evolution of GC&CS, p.1.
Page
16
Public and private roles: Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, pp.58–9.
Page
17
Curzon on need for secrecy: Keith Jeffery (ed.), ‘The Government Code and Cypher School: A Memorandum by Lord Curzon’,
Intelligence and National Security
, Vol. 1, No. 3 (October 1986).
Page
18
Supply of material: J. Johnson,
The Evolution of British Sigint 1653–1939
, HMSO, Cheltenham, 1997, pp.45,50.
Pages
19
–
20
Sinclair takeover and lack of funds: TNA PRO HW 3/182, Records of W. F. Clarke of Room 40 and Head of Naval Section, Government Code and Cypher School.
Pages
21
–
22
Cooper recruitment: TNA PRO HW 3/83, J. E. S. Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, p.1.
Pages
23
–
24
‘Devotee of his art’: TNA PRO HW 3/12, translation of German newspaper article by former Russian codebreaker.
Page
25
Role in capture of the Magdeburg codebook: Christopher Andrew,
Secret Service, The Making of the British Intelligence Community,
Sceptre, London, 1992, pp.143, 376.
Page
26
Details of Fetterlein’s flight from Russia: P. William Filby, ‘Bletchley
Park and Berkeley Street’,
Intelligence and National Security
3(2) (1988), p.272.
Page
27
Fetterlein’s wartime work: TNA PRO HW 3/35, Work Done by Staff of ID25 During the War, Summary, 15/5/1919.
Page
28
Fetterlein’s working practice: Filby, ‘Bletchley Park and Berkeley Street’.
Pages
29
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Cooper recollections of Fetterlein: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, paras 2–3.
Page
31
Cooper on lack of training. TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, para 6.
Pages
32
–
33
Intercept sites: Johnson,
The Evolution of British Sigint
, pp.50–53; TNA PRO HW 3/81, H. C. Kenworthy, A Brief History of Events Relating to the Growth of the Wire Service; HW 3/33, de Grey, Notes on Formation and Evolution of GC&CS, pp.1–2; C. L. Sinclair-Williams, H. C. Kenworthy (unpublished paper kindly provided by Mrs Hazel Sinclair-Williams).
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34
Cooper on lack of work on German cyphers: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Personal Notes on GC&CS 1925–39, paras 25–6.
Page
35
Germans begin using machine cyphers: Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, p.54.
Page
36
Foss asked to test Enigma machine for British use: TNA PRO HW 25/10, H. R. Foss, Reminiscences on the Enigma, p.2.
Pages
37
–
38
Working of Enigma and results of Foss test: ibid; Johnson,
The Evolution of British Sigint
, p.55.
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39
Wehrmacht starts using Enigma: TNA PRO HW 25/10, de Grey, Enigma History, p.2.
Page
40
Knox success against Italian machine: ibid; TNA PRO HW 25/10, Cooper handwritten memo on de Grey’s Enigma History.
Page
41
Knox knowledge of Stecker-board: Robin Denniston,
Thirty Secret Years: A. G. Denniston’s Work in Signals Intelligence 1914–44
, Polperro Heritage Press, Clifton-upon-Terne, Worcestershire, 2007, p.107; TNA PRO 62/21, Tiltman memo dated 9 September 1938.
Page
42
Move to Bletchley Park for ‘rehearsal’: TNA PRO HW 43/1, F. L. Birch, History of Sigint, p.49.
Page
43
Atmosphere at GC&CS: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Reminiscences on GC&CS at Bletchley Park, para 5.
Pages
44
–
45
Barbara Abernethy recruitment: interview with Barbara Eachus, 23 March 1998.
Page
46
Timings of rehearsal: TNA PRO HW 43/1, Birch, History of Sigint, p.49.
Pages
47
–
48
Clarke memories: TNA PRO HW 3/16, W. F. Clarke, History of GCCS and its Naval Section, 1919–45, BP Reminiscences, pp.49–51.
Page
49
Cooper memories: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, pp.12–13.
Page
50
Meeting with Bertrand: TNA PRO HW 25/12, AGD to the Director, 2 November 1938.
Page
51
Hans Thilo Schmidt: Mavis Batey,
Dilly: The Man Who Broke Enigmas
, Dialogue, London, 2009, p.64.
Pages
52
–
53
Denniston on main reason for liaison with French: TNA PRO HW 25/12, AGD to the Director, 2 November 1938.
Page
54
Cooper memories: ibid; TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, pp.16–17.
Pages
55
–2 January 1939 meeting in Paris: TNA PRO HW 25/10, H. R. Foss, Reminiscences on the Enigma, p.3.
Pages
56
–3 Turing and Twinn recruitment: interviews with Twinn, April 1998.
Pages
57
–4 Dilly eccentricities: Batey, Dilly. Vincent memories: Corpus Christi Archives, Cambridge, Professor E. R. P. Vincent, Unpublished Memoirs, p.107.
Page
58
Peter Twinn: interviews with Twinn, April 1998; F. H. Hinsley & A. Stripp,
Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Bletchley Park,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993, pp.125–7.
Pages
59
–6 Polish work on Enigma: Ralph Erskine & Michael Smith (eds),
The Bletchley Park Codebreakers,
Biteback, London, 2011, p.42; Batey,
Dilly
, pp.74–9.
Pages
60
–6 Mayer quoted in J. Stengers, ‘Enigma, the French, the Poles and the British’, in C. M. Andrew & D. N. Dilks (eds),
The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century,
Macmillan, London, 1984, pp.130–32.
Page
61
Knox reaction: TNA PRO HW 25/12, A. G. Denniston, How News was brought from Warsaw at the end of July 1939.
Page
62
Twinn on QWERTZU: Michael Smith,
Station
X, Decoding Nazi
Secrets
, TV Books, New York, 1999, pp.30–31; Hinsley & Stripp,
Codebreakers,
p.127.
Page
63
Delivery of Enigma machine to Menzies: Gustave Bertrand,
ENIGMA ou La Plus Grande Enigmé de la Guerre 1939–45
, Plon, Paris, 1973, p.60.
Pages
64
–8 Recruitment of staff: TNA PRO HW 62/21, Denniston to Howard Smith, 25 November 1938; Undated memo on ‘Available Emergency Staff’; TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, pp.17–18.
Pages
65
–
66
Wilkinson recruitment: Hinsley & Stripp,
Codebreakers
, p.61.
Page
67
Vincent recruitment: Andrew,
Secret Service
, p.452.
Pages
68
–2 Diana Russell Clarke: interview with Diana Barraclough, May 1998.
Page
69
Orders for move to Bletchley: TNA PRO HW 62/21, Move of Service Sections to War Station 15 August 1939, dated 2 August 1939.
Pages
70
–3 De Grey memories: TNA PRO HW 3/95, History of Air Sigint, Chapter II, Sitz and Blitz: 1939–1940, pp.76–7.
Pages
71
–4 Lack of German coverage: TNA PRO HW 43/1, Birch, History of Sigint, pp.68–69.
Pages
72
–5 Green memories: TNA PRO HW 3/146, Edward Green, Memories of Naval Section.
Page
73
Cooper on secrecy and staff put up in hotels: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, p.22.
Page
74
Diana Russell Clarke: interview with Diana Barraclough, May 1998.
Pages
75
–6 Senyard memories: TNA PRO HW 3/135, The History of Miss Senyard’s Party, German Naval Section BP 1939, p.3.
Page
76
Rounders and attitude of academics: Smith,
Station X
, pp.35–6.
Page
77
Abernethy: interview with Barbara Eachus, May 1998.
Page
78
Dryden: Hinsley & Stripp,
Codebreakers
, p.195
Page
79
Cooper on start of war: TNA PRO HW 3/83, Cooper, Air Section GC&CS and the Approach to War 1935–39, p.22.
Page
80
Denniston on overcrowding at Bletchley: TNA PRO HW 14/1, Denniston to Menzies, 12 September 1939.
Page
81
Construction of the huts: TNA PRO HW 3/95, de Grey, History of Air Sigint, pp.77,91; HW 14/1, Denniston to Sinclair, 16 September 1939; Denniston, 29 September 1939.
Page
82
Abernethy memories: interview with Barbara Eachus, May 1998.
Pages
83
–
84
Senyard memories: TNA PRO HW 3/135, The History of Miss Senyard’s Party, p.33.
Page
85
Attempts to get Polish codebreakers to Britain: TNA PRO HW 14/3, Denniston to Menzies, 9 January 1940; Menzies to Rivet, 10 January 1940; Menzies to Denniston, 25 January 1940.
Page
86
Poles’ treatment in Bucharest: Stephen Budiansky,
Battle of Wits
, Viking, New York, 2000, p.121.
Page
87
Dryden memories: Hinsley & Stripp,
Codebreakers
, p.198.
Pages
88
–2 Turing: TNA PRO HW 25/3, A. M. Turing, Mathematical theory of ENIGMA Machine, p.136.
Pages
89
–3 Cillies: TNA PRO HW 43/70, History of Hut 6, pp.53–4;
interviews
with Susan Wenham and Mavis Batey, May 1998.
Page
90
Knox resignation threat: TNA PRO HW 14/3, Knox to Denniston, 7 January 1940.
Page
91
Turing visit to France: TNA PRO HW 43/70, History of Hut 6, pp.53–5; HW 3/95, de Grey, History of Air Sigint, p.90
Page
92
Creation of Hut 6: TNA PRO HW 3/95, de Grey, History of Air Sigint, p.91.
Pages
93
–6 Need to find a way of reporting and protecting Enigma decrypts: TNA PRO HW 3/95, de Grey, History of Air Sigint, p.97.
Page
94
GCHQ covername: TNA PRO HW 14/3, CSS Memo dated 21 February 1940.
Page
95
Barred Zones: TNA PRO HW 3/95, de Grey, History of Air Sigint, p.99.