Safe Food: The Politics of Food Safety (39 page)

The FDA is not the only agency that has to deal with questions of labeling; the EPA has its own set of labeling problems related to transgenic foods. The Coordinated Framework makes the USDA and the EPA the primary agencies for deciding whether transgenic plants are safe to grow in fields. Under the framework’s curious division of responsibility, the USDA regulates herbicide-resistant
plants
such as those that are Roundup Ready, but the EPA regulates
pesticides
and, therefore, Roundup itself. The laws that govern EPA actions are designed to deal with the safety of such chemical pesticides. Under those laws, the EPA requires pesticide makers to obtain permits—“registrations”—before releasing the chemicals into the environment. Registrations require safety evaluations.

At issue was what to do about the
Bt
toxin. The toxin is a pesticide, but it is genetically engineered into plant tissues. In 1994, as part of its response to the Coordinated Framework, the EPA proposed to apply the laws governing chemical pesticides to transgenic crop plants containing
Bt
and other such toxins and, by analogy, call them
plant-pesticides
. This expanded definition made sense, according to the agency, because the large-scale application of
Bt
crops “could result in new or unique exposures of nontarget organisms, including humans.”
⁵⁴
As we have seen, however, the primary concerns about transgenic crops containing such toxins are about what they might do to the environment: displace existing crops, create resistant weeds, disrupt ecosystems, reduce crop diversity, or, as the most emotionally charged of such problems, kill monarch butterflies. Furthermore, widespread plantings of transgenic
Bt
crops might undermine the use of this toxin in organic agriculture. Organic growers use
Bt
as a temporary spray that washes off in the rain. The permanent integration of the transgenic
Bt
toxin into widely planted crops could spread the
Bt
trait by pollinating related weeds or organically grown crops and promote
Bt-
resistance in insect pests.
⁵⁵

To monitor such possibilities, the EPA proposed that developers of transgenic plants register them in the same way as conventional pesticides; evaluate their environmental fate, ecological impact, effects on human health, and potential for inducing resistance; and label them as plant-pesticides. Despite EPA’s assurance that the rules would help companies resolve
regulatory uncertainties, inspire confidence, and attract investors, most segments of the industry were not pleased. Some industry groups objected that complying with these regulations would cost companies from $60,000 to $1 million per product. Others called the proposals anachronistic, burdensome, and unnecessary, and said such rules would “exert a profoundly negative effect on agricultural research and on the commercialization of biological pest management strategies.” In 1996, a coalition of 11 professional societies told Congress that the EPA policy was “scientifically indefensible” because it did not require conventional vegetables to undergo such scrutiny, although many contain naturally occurring chemicals that inhibit pests. Still others called the policy an approach to regulation that “flies in the face of everything science has taught us about risk and the scientific basis of plant genetics.” The biotechnology industry’s position on the proposed rules was nowhere near unanimous, however, as some of the larger companies
favored
the regulations because they were likely to force smaller competitors out of business. On this basis, a spokeswoman for the Institute of Food Technologists said, “It is not in the public’s interest to concentrate all of this research in a few multinational companies. . . . We want to keep the playing field level for all participants.” Environmental groups, although “pleased that EPA plans to regulate such crops the way it regulates traditional chemical pesticides,” thought the rules inadequately focused on the overuse of chemical herbicides and too generous with exemptions.
⁵⁶

While these debates continued, the EPA operated as if the rules were in place but refrained from issuing final regulations. In 1999, the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO) challenged the EPA’s use of “plant-pesticides” as a designation. This term, it argued, could reduce confidence in the safety of the crops because “pesticide” connotes “kill.” Instead, BIO argued, the EPA should encourage consumer acceptance of transgenic crops by labeling them “plant-expressed protectants.” Agency officials agreed to consider this demand.
⁵⁷
Two years later, just prior to renewing the registrations of several varieties of
Bt
corn, the EPA dealt with the question of what to call such crops.

The
Federal Register
notice on this burning question takes up 46 pages of fine print. Parts of it are wonderfully academic and professorial, as respondents to the request for public comment paid close attention to the precise meanings of words. Some, for example, argued that “plant-pesticide” is inappropriate and inaccurate because it means “pest killer,” and this meaning is wrong because genetic modifications do not kill pests but, instead, make the plants undesirable to pests or invulnerable to
attack. Furthermore, plants labeled as pesticides “might be poorly received by the public, and the public perception of a promising branch of science could be tarnished.” Others asked why the agency would attempt to fix something that was not broken; if the EPA changed the name “plant-pesticide” to “a more euphemistic name to satisfy one interest group, other interest groups will soon be urging it to change the names of other types of pesticide products to have better marketing potential.” Others suggested alternatives such as “Frankenplants,” “Pandora pesticides,” or “alien pesticides.” Still others contended that use of
plant-expressed protectants
“obscures the legal issues and attempts to mislead the public into believing that these pesticides are not pesticides at all.” The EPA’s explanation of the reasons for its eventual decision to choose “plant-incorporated protectants” is worthy of an advanced college text in postmodern English:

EPA believes the adjective “plant-incorporated” more accurately conveys the sense that these pesticides are produced and used in the plant. EPA will therefore utilize this adjective in concert with the term “protectant” to describe this type of pesticide. EPA chose the adjective “plant-incorporated” rather than the adjective “plant-expressed,” because the word “expressed” represents a technical term of art, and in this instance it appeared preferable to use the term “incorporated” which also encompasses a meaning found in the common English dictionary . . . i.e., “joined or combined into a single unit or whole.” The term “plant-incorporated” may thus be better understood by the general public than the term “plant-expressed.
⁵⁸

With this euphemism firmly in place, the EPA could conclude its evaluation of the health and environmental risks of five types of
Bt
corn and renew their registrations for seven years. During these years, companies would have to collect data to demonstrate that these corn varieties did not lead to insect resistance or unexpected health or environmental consequences. The renewed registrations did not include StarLink corn.
⁵⁹

This example is not the only time that EPA has altered the use of terms in response to the political goals of industry. EPA registers pesticides in four categories based on their level of toxicity. All carry warning labels—or used to. Late in 2001, the agency agreed that makers of pesticides registered in the least toxic category did not need to place the word
caution
on their labels. The public, said officials, had difficulty understanding the hierarchy of warnings about regulated pesticides, which ranged from “caution” at the low end to “poison” (accompanied by a skull and crossbones) at the high end. The agency was unable to think of a milder word than “caution,” so it chose to use nothing at all.
⁶⁰

Such examples may seem trivial—humans are not much affected by the
Bt
toxin and the least toxic pesticides are, by definition, not very toxic—but they indicate the degree to which federal agencies respond to the commercial and political concerns of the regulated industries rather than to the health or safety concerns of the public. They also reveal the lack of transparency—the openness of federal processes to public scrutiny and debate—in decision-making processes that affect this industry. Overall, they raise serious questions about inequities in the political process and the effects of such inequities on democratic institutions. The inequitable distribution of political power illustrated here is at the root of public distrust of genetically engineered foods, as we will see in the next chapter.

DISTRUST, DREAD, AND OUTRAGE

WE HAVE SEEN HOW SCIENTISTS AND FOOD BIOTECHNOLOGY COM
panies promote transgenic projects by focusing on technical achievements, safety, and visions of improving the world’s food supply, as expressed by the often repeated phrase “biotechnology—and only biotechnology—can help the world produce the food necessary to meet the population needs of the 21st century.” This statement, however, immediately raises credibility issues. Can biotechnology really solve world food problems? What is the industry doing now to address such problems? Are there other methods—perhaps less technical—for solving them?

Food biotechnology first developed bovine growth hormone,
Bt
corn, and Roundup Ready soybeans, all possessing
agronomic
traits designed to help food producers. The industry also worked on
processing
traits, such as insertion of the reversed gene for ripening into tomatoes. More recently, the industry began developing foods with
quality attributes
(such as nutrient content) that might benefit consumers directly. Until such foods become available, the public has little to gain from genetically modified foods—in price, nutritional benefit, or convenience. Evidence for benefits to the environment or to people in developing countries is also uncertain. In this situation, any risk—no matter how remote—seems pointless, especially when food biotechnology raises so many other issues of concern.

This chapter examines the politics of consumer concerns about genetically modified foods, particularly as focused on issues that extend beyond safety and most inspire distrust: labeling, “biopiracy,” genetic “pollution,” and globalization. These are “outrage” issues. They emerged in
response to the industry’s conduct of business in its own interests and the government’s collusion in promoting those interests. They are connected to “dread” issues of human and environmental
safety
, but in complicated ways. When people object to food biotechnology by focusing on safety issues, they often do so because they have no other choice. Scientists, federal regulators, and biotechnology companies dismiss outrage considerations out of hand and only permit debate about safety issues. Safety is, as we have seen, a matter of interpretation, highly political, and difficult to separate from the “who decides” factors listed in
table 2
(
page 17
).

In part, the passion that underlies arguments about the safety of genetically modified foods derives from the lack of opportunity to debate their politics and their implications for society. What, for example, does it mean for us as a democratic society that more than half the foods on supermarket shelves contain genetically modified ingredients, but their presence is not labeled? Perhaps it makes no difference whatsoever, but without a formal venue for discussing such questions, people concerned about democratic values will focus on safety questions and use them to generate outrage. This chapter examines the societal issues that underlie public distrust and the reasons why they need to be included in dialogue, if not consensus, about the future of food biotechnology.

We have seen that the narrowing of debate about food biotechnology to questions of safety has produced two unanticipated effects. The first is to induce outrage. When scientists and companies say, as they often do, “All we have to do to gain public support for food biotechnology is to educate the public that our products are safe,” they frustrate anyone who cares about democracy in decision making. Such statements miss a key point: other issues also matter. A second effect, ironically, is to force the debate to focus on a greater range of safety issues, none of them easily resolved. Advocates say: You refuse to hear my concerns about the effects of food biotechnology on rural life, access to seeds, or corporate control of the food supply? Fine, let’s talk about
safety
. Let’s look at unintended consequences, toxins, allergens, superweeds,
Bt
resistance, antibiotic resistance, and effects on monarch butterflies and (as discussed below) on native corn growing in Mexico. Although most scientists might dismiss such hazards as remote or of little consequence, they cannot prove the concerns insignificant. Just enough evidence exists to fuel ongoing debate and discredit any scientist or regulator who categorically states
that genetically modified foods are safe. Safety matters, but so do the other issues to which we now turn.

Labeling continues to be a political issue rather than a simple matter of consumer information, largely because the industry opposes it so strongly and the government supports the industry’s position. The public consistently demands disclosure, but the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) insists that labels would be
misleading
. The agency’s logic: labels would erroneously imply that genetically modified foods differ from conventional foods and that conventional foods are in some way superior. Although the FDA justifies this position as science based, the policy is clearly political: “Don’t ask, don’t tell.”
¹
Whether genetically modified foods differ from conventional foods depends on how one views the construction methods. Based on a review of the steps needed to construct Golden Rice, for example, it is quite possible to make the opposite argument: the foods significantly differ (see tables on
pages 158
and
280
). Whether labeling implies inferiority also is debatable. If genetically modified foods offer significant advantages, why not flaunt them? Calgene intended to advertise its transgenic tomato as
superior
, and British supermarkets had no problem selling products prominently labeled as genetically modified (
pages 212
and
215
). Alternatively, if the foods offer no advantages to consumers, the issue boils down to one of choice at the marketplace. Overall, the lack of labeling suggests that something about transgenic foods is best hidden.