Read Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw Online

Authors: Norman Davies

Tags: #Non-Fiction, #War, #History

Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw (58 page)

BOOK: Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw
11.1Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

Whoever penned this choice piece of prose was convinced of two things: the Rising was definitely in progress, and the Soviet Army was going to arrive any day.

Back in London, the Foreign Office officials charged with monitoring these developments were none too happy:

August 13. Mick in Moscow had a series of talks with Stalin, Molotov and the Polish National Committee. They were all friendly and well-disposed . . . The PNC delegation was headed by an entirely new and hitherto unheard-of Pole called Berut – a pseudonym – whom Mick described as a sort of Polish Tito. Finally Mick decided he must come back to London to report. We telegraphed . . . to urge him to stop on . . . But he had already started, and in fact he reached London today.

Meanwhile the Poles in London who control the Underground have set off a general Rising in Warsaw. They had not timed this with Russian plans, and we told them we could accept no responsibility for advising them on operations in the Russian sphere. The Russian forces have been held up outside Warsaw . . . and the Poles are now blaming everybody for not sending them help . . . As usual, they impute sinister motives to the Russians, such as that they are deliberately not helping, and not pressing their assault on Warsaw because they wish the Poles to be exterminated . . .
78

Imputing sinister motives to the Russians was clearly bad form. Impugning the motives of the Poles, in contrast, was fair comment.

At this juncture, both the NKVD and
Myers
were hard at work filtering the population of the Soviet Army’s rear areas. Lt.Gen. Serov was already in Lublin. Judging by the mountain of paper which he sent back to Beria, and which Beria summarized for Stalin, he can only have been aghast at the size of his task. Supporters of the Home Army apparently filled every town and village. Every woman, every priest, every boy scout whom they interrogated was firmly in favour of the exiled Government. Thousands upon thousands of arrests were barely scratching the surface. Stalin could not have been given the impression that it was specially safe to risk an immediate advance in that sector.

The prospect of invading the Balkans, in contrast, offered many rich rewards. In the larger strategic game, it was extremely attractive. It would put a stop to Churchill’s dreams about winning Europe’s ‘soft underbelly’ for the West; and it would open up an alternative route into the Reich via Budapest and Vienna. It did not preclude an offensive against Berlin at a later stage. Hence, at some point in mid-August Stalin gave orders for Marshal Tolbukhin to storm into Romania on the 20th. All other operations would have to fit in with this priority. Rokossovsky’s and Zhukov’s plan was shelved.

By reading the implications of numerous small shifts and signs, historians have reached the conclusion that Stalin issued Warsaw’s death warrant on 13 August.
79
The deduction is not necessarily invalid, but it is unlikely to be accurate in all respects. In particular, the decision may not have been quite as final as has been suggested. It may have left the possibility open for a further change of tack. What is certain: Stalin dismissed the opportunity to help the Rising when assistance would have been most effective. What is more, after a long period of silence, he chose to condemn the Rising in the most callous terms. On 13 August, the TASS agency issued an authoritative communiqué:

In recent days, information has appeared in the foreign press . . . regarding an armed insurrection launched in Warsaw on 1 August on the orders of Polish émigrés in London and continuing to the present time. The press and radio of the Polish émigré Government have made allusions whereby the insurgents are said to have stayed in contact with the Soviet Command and whereby the Soviet Command has denied them suitable assistance.

TASS is authorized to state that these allusions are either the result of a misunderstanding or else are a foul insult against the
Soviet Command. TASS is informed that no attempt was made by the London Poles to inform the Soviet Command of their intentions in good time or to coordinate their actions in Warsaw. In consequence, full responsibility for the events in Warsaw will fall exclusively on Polish émigré circles in London.
80

This communiqué clarified the negative position, which Moscow had now taken and which was reflected in the language of subsequent correspondence both with Churchill and with the Polish Premier. Stalin lost all his inhibitions, ranting openly about ‘the reckless adventure’ in Warsaw and ‘the gang of criminals’ who started it.

More surprisingly perhaps, the Kremlin permitted its underlings to show their teeth to Western representatives. On the night of 15/16 August, in their meeting with Vyshinsky, the British and US Ambassadors in Moscow were treated to a performance of savage delight such as they had never before witnessed. Harriman’s telegram reported: ‘the Soviet Government’s refusal [to help Warsaw] is not based on operational difficulties, nor on a denial of the conflict, but on ruthless political calculations.’ George Kennan, the US chargé d’affaires in Moscow, recalled the moment:

I was personally not present at this fateful meeting with Stalin and Molotov; but I can recall the appearance of the ambassador and Gen. Deane as they returned, in the wee hours of the night, shattered by the experience. There was no doubt in any of our minds as to the implications of the position the Soviet leaders had taken. This was a gauntlet thrown down, in a spirit of malicious glee, before the Western powers. What it was meant to imply was: ‘We intend to have Poland, lock, stock and barrel. We don’t care a fig for those Polish underground fighters who have not accepted Communist authority. To us, they are no better than the Germans; and if they and the Germans slaughter each other off, so much the better. It is a matter of indifference to us what you Americans think of all this. You are going to have no part in determining the affairs of Poland from here on out, and it is time you realized this.’
81

Of course, none of this was known at the time in Warsaw.

Yet the story was worse than even Kennan knew. For, unbeknown to the Western Allies, Soviet policy towards the Rising had moved from a passive to an actively hostile stance. On 22 August, the NKVD was ordered to arrest and disarm all captured insurgents who fell into its hands.
82
In
the last week of the month, after Rokossovsky had rebuffed the German counterattack, he was not merely ordered to resume defensive positions, he was ordered to transfer his Forty-Eighth Tank Army to the neighbouring sector facing East Prussia. Henceforth, unless new dispositions were made, he would find great difficulty in storming Warsaw, even if he had wanted to do so.

Some of the tensions of the moment were reflected in an off-the-record interview which Rokossovsky gave to a Western correspondent on 26 August:

ROKOSSOVSKY
: I can’t go into any details, but I’ll tell you this. After several weeks of heavy fighting . . . we finally reached the outskirts of Praga about the 1st of August. At this point, the Germans threw in four armoured divisions, and we were driven back.

WERTH
: How far back?

ROKOSSOVSKY
: I can’t tell you exactly, but let’s say nearly 100km [sixty miles].

WERTH
: Are you still retreating?

ROKOSSOVSKY
: No – we are now advancing – but slowly . . .

WERTH
: Wasn’t the Warsaw Rising justified in the circumstances?

ROKOSSOVSKY
: No, it was a bad mistake . . .

WERTH
: There was that broadcast from Moscow calling on them to rise.

ROKOSSOVSKY
: That was routine stuff . . .

WERTH
: What prospect is there of your getting back to Praga in the next few weeks?

ROKOSSOVSKY
: I can’t go into that. All I can say is that we shall try to capture both Praga and Warsaw, but it won’t be easy . . .

WERTH
: Why can’t you let British and American planes land behind Russian lines . . . There’s been an awful stink in England and America about your refusal.

ROKOSSOVSKY
: The military situation is more complicated than you realize. And we just don’t want any British and American planes mucking around here at the moment . . .

WERTH
: Isn’t all this massacre and destruction in Warsaw having a terribly depressing effect on the Polish people here?

ROKOSSOVSKY
: Of course it has. But a fearful mistake was made by the AK leadership.
We
[the Soviet Army] are responsible for the war in Poland:
we
are the force that will liberate the whole of the country within the next few months. And [Gen. Boor] and the people round him have
butted in
kak ryzhy v tsirke
– like the clown in the circus who pops up at the wrong moment and only gets wrapped up in the carpet . . . If it were only a piece of clowning, it wouldn’t matter, but the political stunt is going to cost hundreds of thousands of lives. It is an appalling tragedy, and they are now trying to put the blame on us . . .
83

‘And do you think’, Rokossovsky concluded, ‘that we would not have taken Warsaw if we had been able to do it? The whole idea that we are in any sense afraid of the AK is too idiotically absurd.’

Such was the Soviet attitude towards the workings of the Allied coalition. No one in the outside world had ever suggested that the Home Army was something of which the Soviets might be afraid. [
WARD
, p. 324]

The inconclusive operations in Warsaw in August were largely determined by the contrasting objectives of the combatants. The Germans’ top priority was to prevent the insurgents from interfering with the front. The Home Army’s only priority was to keep going for as long as possible until relief arrived.

One reason why von dem Bach took so long to mount a concerted assault on the insurgent enclaves lies with his protracted failures to close down attacks on the west–east thoroughfares. In one particular spot on the Jerusalem Avenue, for example, a company led by Capt. ‘Roman’ repeatedly invested a strategic building which overlooked the traffic on the boulevard. Roman, who was one of the very few people to have escaped from Auschwitz, was an unusually determined soldier. Almost every day during the first two weeks of the month, he captured, lost, and recaptured this building. Repeatedly driven out, he repeatedly returned and with deadly cunning repeatedly expelled the German defenders. He lived to fight elsewhere. But so long as he threatened this one vital pressure point, the German command was constantly made to feel insecure. One is tempted to suggest that a single company could have won the Rising a fortnight’s reprieve.
84

Having exceeded the Rising’s expected duration by 200 per cent, Gen. Boor then called in his reserves. On 15 August, he summonded all Home Army units within reach of Warsaw to march to the capital’s aid.
85
It was a tall order. For no one could join Gen. Boor without first crossing either the German lines or the Soviet lines or both.

WARD

Britain’s Foreign Secretary tells the Prime Minister about their only direct source of information in Warsaw

Printed for the War Cabinet. August 1944

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited. It is issued for the personal use of the Prime Minister.

TOP SECRET

Copy No 2

W.P. (44) 461

22nd August, 1944

WAR CABINET.
SITUATION IN WARSAW.
MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I circulate to my colleagues herewith (1) a translation of the latest message received by the Polish Government . . . together with (2) the text of the six latest messages from an escaped British R.A.F. prisoner of war, Sergeant Ward, who is . . . in Warsaw.

A.E.

Foreign Office, 22nd August, 1944
(1) Telegram from Warsaw

The lack of effective help, with the exception of a few droppings, is the main reason why Warsaw has become a beleaguered city and the Home Army is forced to a defensive position. The liquidation of the numerous points which the Germans hold in the capital is impossible in view of the lack of offensive weapons and ammunition . . . The Soviet Army is again standing again inactive at the gates of Warsaw.

The breaking of the deadlock . . . is not possible without serious droppings of arms and ammunition. The prolongation of the present phase leads to the total obliteration of Warsaw . . .

(2)
(No. 625.) • 18th August, 1944 • From J. Ward, No. 542939.

The main situation has not changed. In the centre fighting continues to be very heavy. The enemy continues with the ruthless destruction by air bombardment, by 75 mm. tank artillery, and by mine throwers. About 40 per cent. of the city centre is already completely destroyed and another 20 per cent. badly damaged . . . The Germans are carrying out their attempt to destroy Warsaw. Loss of life among civil population and the A.K. is very high.

(No. 626.) • 19th August, 1944 • From J. Ward.

The people of Warsaw call the Germans’ minethrower ‘the moving cupboard’ on account of the fact that it gives a sound like that of a heavy piece of furniture being moved, followed a few seconds later by a number of terrific explosions. The Prudential Building on Sq. Napoleon, the highest building in Warsaw, was hit three times by mines and once by bombs [and] completely burnt out. The pavements in Warsaw have been turned into graveyards . . .

(No. 627.) • 19th August, 1944 • Addressed to Espe. From J. Ward.

Sir, reply to my telegram received. I was born in Birmingham. Maiden name of mother Anne Elizabeth Margewws [sic], father’s John Ward. Address, 54 Madison Avenue, Wardend, Birmingham, 8.

Sir, I beg for more detailed orders. For three years I have worked in Polish underground army. Now, acting on advice of the Polish staff here, am combining my military duties as acting lt. in A.K. with that of War Correspondent. All my telegrams are without censure.

(No. 634.) • 20th August, 1944 • From J. Ward, No. 542939, R.A.F.

Thousands of people are each day rendered homeless in Warsaw and hundreds killed . . . There are thousands of wounded men, women and children suffering from the most horrible burns and in some cases from shrapnel and bullet wounds. Each day battle . . . is prolonged the cost mounting higher. But the determination of the population to fight to the last man is only strengthened by this German barbarism.

(No. 635.) • 20th August, 1944 • From J. Ward, No. 542939, R.A.F.

On practically every open piece of ground . . . wells are being dug. Shortage of water is starting to be serious. If in ten days the city receives no relief then the (?) food will also give out. Rations are already very short. Situation Warsaw desperate. On the outskirts, huge concentration camps full of women and children living in the open air without food or help. They are dying of hunger and disease . . . The Germans show no mercy . . . The men were shot when the women and children were taken prisoners.

(No. 636.) • 20th August, 1944 • From J. Ward, No. 542939, R.A.F.

The Germans have in many areas got over from the defensive to the attack. The high school on Novakovski street was taken by Germans at 5 hours on the 19th. The attack was carried out under a heavy artillery barrage . . . Despite these drawbacks, the troops of A.K. continue to fight with magnificent courage. Other attacks from the German forces on the night of the 19th August south of Av. Sikorski were firmly held.
1

BOOK: Rising '44: The Battle for Warsaw
11.1Mb size Format: txt, pdf, ePub
ads

Other books

The Reckoning by Kate Allenton
Thanks a Million by Dee Dawning
The Professional by Kresley Cole
The Horns of Ruin by Tim Akers
The Thing Around Your Neck by Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie
The High-Life by Jean-Pierre Martinet


readsbookonline.com Copyright 2016 - 2024