Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang (7 page)

This was the first letter that I sent to him after the May 17 meeting at his house that decided upon the imposition of martial law. As I’d expected, there was no reply.

On the evening of May 17, the Central Committee General Office made arrangements for leaders of the Central Committee to visit the hunger-striking students who were in the hospital. Li Peng initially said he would not go, but just as the van started up to leave, he showed up. It turns out that he had changed his mind after hearing that I was going.

The same thing happened on the early morning of May 19 when I went to visit the students in Tiananmen Square. He opposed my going and urged the General Office to stop me. I felt that with so many students on hunger strike for as many as seven days, it had become indefensible that none of the leaders of the Central Committee had paid a visit. I insisted on going, saying that if no others went, I would go alone. Once he saw that I was intent upon going and could not be deterred, he changed his mind. But he was terrified and fled very soon after we arrived at the square.

Besides greeting the students, I improvised a speech that ended up being printed in all the major newspapers in the capital. When I spoke, I was merely trying to persuade them to end the hunger strike, telling them they were still young and must treasure their lives. I knew all too well that though their actions had won widespread sympathy both across the country and abroad, it was of no use against the group of elders who had taken a hard-line position. It would not matter if the hunger strike continued or if some people died; they [the elders] would not be moved. I felt it was a waste for these young students to end their lives like this.

However, the students did not understand what I meant. Even less could they imagine the treatment in store for them. Of course, I was later the target of harsh criticisms and accusations for this speech to the students.

After the meeting at Deng’s home on May 17, Li Peng and his associates acted abnormally in many ways. Whether I was going to the hospital or to the square to visit students, he repeatedly attempted to block me. When I arrived and I exited the van, he rushed out in front of me, which was contrary to custom. Someone later told me that he instructed people to hint to the cameramen not to include images of me, because it would become “inconvenient” in the case of future leadership changes.

From the evening of May 17 to May 19, none of the issues regarding martial law were imparted to me. I only learned about Li Peng’s dialogue with the students on the 19th from seeing it on television.

On the afternoon of the 19th, however, I was suddenly delivered a notice for the meeting that would announce the imposing of martial law and given the text of his [Li Peng’s] speech, and was asked to chair and speak at the meeting. Yet I was not notified about how this meeting was to proceed, where it would be held, who would attend, or what other items were to be on the agenda.

His speech even included the statement, “The student demonstrations escalated after May Fourth.” Later, they must have felt that the statement too blatantly placed the blame on my May Fourth speech, so when it was published in the newspapers, it was changed to “The student demonstrations escalated in early May.” This was an open implication that my May Fourth speech had caused the escalation of demonstrations. Li Peng also announced to members of the State Council that I had made a big mistake. They also held an exclusive meeting prior to the larger meeting to announce martial law.

All of this added to my realization that I had been excluded from decision making. To this day, I still don’t know when that decision was made. On the 17th at Deng’s place, when deciding to impose martial law, even though Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, and Qiao Shi were appointed to conduct the affair, Deng also noted that “Zhao is still the General Secretary.” But in fact, in the several days that followed, I was entirely pushed aside.

On the 19th, I applied for a three-day leave from the Politburo. I suggested that Li Peng chair the Politburo Standing Committee and refused to attend the mobilization meeting to announce martial law.

At the time, the number of demonstrators supporting the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square had become much smaller. The hunger strike was abandoned and turned into a sit-in. Many of the Beijing university students had already returned to their schools. Those who remained in the square were mostly students from other cities.

The announcement of martial law on May 19 [actually May 20] was another stimulant, once again mobilizing the masses. Participants of the sit-in increased and supporters from other social groups crowded the streets. Beijing residents were particularly aggrieved by the decision to call troops to Beijing to execute martial law. Troops that received their orders were blocked along their way, everywhere. Groups of old ladies and children slept on the roads. Troops were stopped in the suburbs of Beijing, unable to enter the city. The standoff lasted more than ten days.

On May 21, Qiao Shi came to my house to discuss the situation. He said, “Quite a number of people are feeling like they are ‘riding a tiger, unable to get off.’ If it were not for Deng’s insistence and his decision to call more troops to Beijing, a great tragedy might be avoided. But now the troops have been blocked from entering, martial law is ineffective, and millions of students, residents, workers, and cadres from government organizations are out on the streets or gathered on Tiananmen Square. If this continues, the capital is in danger of becoming paralyzed.”

At that moment, I thought that perhaps if we held the National People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting ahead of schedule we could allow the NPC, the organization with proper authority, to use the means of democracy and law to turn the situation around. On May 21, I spoke to [Central Committee Secretariat member] Yan Mingfu about this idea, and asked him to speak with [Yang] Shangkun to see if it was feasible.

Before this, [NPC vice chairman] Peng Chong had come over to talk. He said that since Wan Li was abroad, he [Peng Chong] had held a meeting with the heads of the NPC committee. They all felt that an NPC Standing Committee meeting should be held. He also went to Yuquanshan [Jade Spring Mountain, west of Beijing] to visit [influential Party elder] Peng Zhen, who also agreed that this should be done. They had already written a report to the Central Committee requesting that Wan Li return from abroad ahead of schedule.

In the afternoon of the 21st, [PSC member] Hu Qili came to my house to report that no one had responded to the request to have Wan Li return. It was in limbo. I asked Hu Qili to tell Peng Chong to telegram Wan Li directly in the name of the Party Group of the NPC to request his return. Hu Qili asked if he could say that I had agreed to this, and I said, “Yes.”

I then phoned [Vice Premier] Wu Xueqian and asked him to find a way to send the telegram. I later learned that Li Peng sent another telegram to Wan Li to tell him
not
to return. It is possible that he had Deng’s prior approval, so Wan Li was unable to make an early return.

On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all.

I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now.

First, it was determined then that the student movement was “a planned conspiracy” of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were “black hands” within the Party. Then who were they?

Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system.

After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they?

Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Party could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Party as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Party back then, why hadn’t they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn’t it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it’s obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process.

Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was “counterrevolutionary turmoil,” as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People’s Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic?

Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.

I
want to raise another issue here, that is, the unfair treatment that I received because of the political unrest in Beijing.

I had refused to attend the meeting of May 19 that announced martial law. This made Deng and the other elders extremely angry. On the 20th, Deng called Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin for a meeting at his house. Of course, I was not informed. They did not notify Hu Qili, either, so he did not attend.

I hear that in the meeting, Wang Zhen furiously vilified me as being counterrevolutionary. Li Xiannian accused me of setting up “second headquarters.” In the end, Deng decided to remove me from the post of General Secretary, but added that the announcement to the public should be delayed until after the completion of some necessary procedures. I was brushed aside just like that.

This was not a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, since only three of its five members were in attendance. Neither Hu Qili nor I had been removed from our posts before the meeting began, so we were still members of the PSC. In my opinion, it cannot be considered legal to have made such a decision when two members of the PSC had not even been notified.

I took a three-day leave, from the 19th to the 21st. Nobody actually told me that I had been removed from my position. Of course, nobody contacted me on any work-related issues, either. Essential communication channels had been cut off, and I had been isolated. I heard through other channels that Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Yao Yilin, and [Director of Organization Department] Song Ping each held meetings with various departments announcing my “crime.” They also organized working groups and drafted documents to prepare for an upcoming Central Committee meeting at which they planned to announce my case. Meanwhile, they assembled in Beijing the first-and second-rank leaders of all the provinces and municipalities to brief them.

Through all these important arrangements, the Politburo did not hold a single meeting; nor did the Politiburo Standing Committee make any decisions. The Standing Committee was made up of five members; with Hu Qili and me excluded, there could be no legitimate PSC meeting. All these arrangements were lacking in legal authority.

The Party Charter lays out these rules: “When the Central Committee is not in session, the Politburo assumes power on its behalf…. Meetings of the Politburo are to be chaired by the General Secretary.” It is obvious that none of these arrangements were made through Politburo meetings, and of course they were not chaired by me. Therefore, no matter what organization held meetings, or who chaired them, they were all in violation of the Party Charter.

Under these circumstances, in which no one had announced that I had been removed from my post, yet I was unable to use my authority, I worried that I would ultimately be accused of having abandoned my post. Therefore, I talked to [director of the Party’s General Office] Wen Jiabao to suggest a Politburo meeting. Wen Jiabao replied that, in fact, the Central Committee General Office had been brushed aside as well. All arrangements had been made by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, bypassing the General Office. He said that if I really wanted to call a meeting, the General Office would send out the notice, but he believed that the consequences would not be good and hoped I would carefully reconsider.

Since I could not call for a meeting, I asked my secretary to phone Yang Shangkun to ask him over for a talk. My intention was to ask him to clarify whether I had already been removed from my position. I also wanted to explain to him why I had talked to Gorbachev about Deng Xiaoping’s position within the Party [Zhao expounds on this in Chapter 7].

On June 2, [Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Wang Renzhong and [Vice Minister of State Planning] Ding Guan’gen came to my house and said that in response to my request to speak to Yang Shangkun, the two of them had been sent by the Central Committee and entrusted with this discussion. They said that the Central Committee was soon to hold Politburo and Central Committee meetings to deal with my case and that I should carefully consider preparing a self-criticism.

I started off by explaining to them my discussion with Gorbachev. Then I raised the issue of how the Central Committee’s organizations could be functioning when two of the five members of the Standing Committee had been pushed aside. Who was participating in the meetings? Wang Renzhong said there had been no Standing Committee reelections, nor had there been any meetings held of late.

I said that having taken three days’ sick leave, I could understand if I was not permitted to resume work. I had no problems with being asked to stand aside, but I should not later be accused of having neglected my work and abandoning my post. That was the reason I had asked to talk with Yang Shangkun. With regards to preparing a self-criticism, I said that I had not been told anything. Criticisms of me were being made everywhere without attempts to check with me about the facts. Documents of criticisms were circulating all over the place, but none had been shown to me. How could I write a self-criticism under such conditions? If I were to be given a chance to speak in the future on issues that I admitted had been in error, I would make a self-criticism.

It was a long talk, lasting more than two hours. I did most of the talking. I spoke about the conditions and my views on the April 26 editorial, the speech on May 3 to the youth delegates, the May Fourth speech at the ADB meeting, and my refusal to attend the May 19 meeting to announce martial law.

And lastly, I strongly protested the way in which they had detained Bao Tong. On May 28, Bao Tong had been called in by the Department of Organization for a talk, from which he never returned. Meanwhile, they searched his office. I had immediately asked my secretary to call [Director of Organization Department] Song Ping to voice my protest. To Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen I said, “If they believe Bao Tong has done anything wrong, the appropriate Party organization should conduct an investigation, but they must proceed according to the Party Charter and the law. Party organizations, much less the Department of Organization, have no authority to deprive him of his personal freedom. We are now in the 1980s; we cannot use these old methods of past political campaigns.” I demanded that they relay my message to the Central Committee.

In their assessment of this talk, they deemed my attitude to have been very bad indeed. Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen returned to my home on June 17. They said that on June 19 the Central Committee would hold a Politburo meeting to deal with my case, and they requested that I appear modest, show restraint, and keep calm even if some of the elders used harsh words. I could choose to speak or remain silent, but I was not to argue excessively.

I replied, “If this is a meeting to deal with my case, I must be given the chance to speak freely.”

Ding Guan’gen also asked me to reflect seriously on my faults and adopt a proper attitude for the meeting. Wang Renzhong revealed that internally they had decided to maintain my Central Committee membership and Hu Qili’s Politburo membership.
*
He also said that they had already relayed my opinion of Bao Tong’s “isolation and investigation” to the Central Committee; Bao Tong was now under “surveillance and house arrest,” which [they said] conforms with proper legal procedures.

It seems the purpose of their visit was: one, to notify me about the upcoming meeting, and two, to persuade me not to stage a challenge, or to keep my arguments to a minimum. When Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen first came to my house on June 2 to inform me of the meeting arranged to deal with my case, they said that Deng Xiaoping had mentioned that the handling of Hu Yaobang’s case had resulted in criticisms both at home and abroad, so this time with Zhao’s case, we must follow proper procedures. He directed them to prepare proper documentation; as soon as these documents were ready, a meeting would be held.

It was all a terrific irony. In fact, I had already been detained and isolated by them without justification or legality. First they illegally deposed me from my position as General Secretary, then they claimed to be in accordance with procedures. This shows that they were apprehensive; afraid of criticism from others.

They would have held the meeting earlier, but it was delayed by the events of June Fourth.