Read On the Brink Online

Authors: Henry M. Paulson

Tags: #Global Financial Crisis, #Economics: Professional & General, #Financial crises & disasters, #Political, #General, #United States, #Biography & Autobiography, #Economic Conditions, #Political Science, #Economic Policy, #Public Policy, #2008-2009, #Business & Economics, #Economic History

On the Brink (23 page)

The drafts had included a special reminder that the FHFA had discretionary authority to downgrade that assessment. Even so, for FHFA to reverse and say now Fannie and Freddie had capital holes big enough to justify conservatorship gave the agency pause. Jim had quite a challenge on his hands: his agency had been renamed with the HERA legislation, but it still had the same people and same approach as it had had a month earlier. Only FHFA had the legal power to put the GSEs under, and I was worried about its backsliding.

I arranged to have Lockhart meet with Bernanke and me at Treasury so the two of us could offer him our support and encouragement. I said I understood that looked at narrowly, FHFA’s people might see conservatorship as an indication they hadn’t been sufficiently vigilant earlier, but Fannie’s and Freddie’s problems could not be swept under a rug, and a bold action would put FHFA on the right side of history. I stressed repeatedly that the GSEs needed capital, and I would not put taxpayer money in them in their current form. Any Treasury investment would be conditioned on conservatorship.

There was no time to waste. That day Freddie sold $2 billion of short-term notes at their worst spreads ever. I called Josh Bolten and said, flatly, there was no good alternative to conservatorship.

The next morning I went to the Situation Room on the ground floor of the West Wing of the White House, with its secure communications equipment, to talk to the president, who was at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. There were several video screens on the far wall of this windowless room, and one displayed the president, who was relaxed and wearing a sports shirt. Once the national security briefing was through, I posted the president. I told him straightaway that I was worried about Lehman. It was looking for a solution to its problems, and we had been trying to help, but it didn’t look like any investor was stepping up. We would do what we could, but there was a chance it would go down.

I then took the president quickly through our thinking on the GSEs. As always, he wanted to know what our long-term plan was, because he did not like the underlying structure that had produced profits for shareholders and losses for the taxpayers—and had led to all the problems. I said I thought that when the crisis was over they ought to be downsized, have their missions shrunk, and be recast as utilities, but felt we needed to defer that discussion until well after we had bolstered them financially and markets were stable. The president was completely supportive. He said, as he would frequently: “It won’t always look good, but we are going to do what we need to do to save the economy.”

Through the week the examiners from the Fed and the OCC continued to scrutinize the books of the GSEs, while trying to bring their FHFA counterparts up to speed. Meantime, our teams at Treasury worked double-time to refine our plans. Ken Wilson was running an informal employment agency, drawing on his extensive contacts to line up replacement CEOs and nonexecutive chairs for both Fannie and Freddie.

Just about everyone lived at the Treasury for the three days of the Labor Day weekend. We didn’t know it then, of course, but it was a preview of how we would spend most of the fall, with senior and junior staffers alike surrendering their weekends, weeknights, and just about any trace of a personal life to try to solve problems that kept getting bigger than we had anticipated. All that weekend, we met, broke out into separate teams, reconvened, and ran frequent conference calls.

Ben proved again to be an incredible stand-up guy. He did not miss a meeting the entire weekend—and there were many. He was there to do what he thought was right for the country, even if some at the Fed worried he was getting too involved. Fed vice chairman Don Kohn and governor Kevin Warsh also joined our deliberations, along with the Board’s general counsel, Scott Alvarez. Jim Lockhart was present with his senior staff and Rich Alexander, FHFA’s outside legal counsel from Arnold & Porter, whose work was invaluable in preparing the legal case. Morgan Stanley was on-site, with lawyers from Wachtell plugged in from New York.

It was gratifying to see how everyone cooperated. When I asked for help, FDIC chairman Sheila Bair sent over her most experienced professional, Art Murton. Crucially, no one leaked any word of what we were up to. Everyone understood the stakes.

We reviewed all of our alternatives in a thorough and systematic way. My staff wanted to be sure we had an airtight case for conservatorship, given the GSEs’ reputation as the toughest street fighters in town. I was less worried about the details than my colleagues were: I didn’t think they completely recognized the awesome power of government and what it would mean for Ben and me to sit across from the boards of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and tell them what we thought was necessary for them to do.

Bob Scully of Morgan Stanley and Dan Jester had come up with the idea of using a version of a keepwell agreement, which is a contract between a parent company and a subsidiary in which the parent guarantees that it will provide necessary financing for the subsidiary. It was an inspired idea: Treasury’s authority was good for 18 months, and guaranteeing debt for 18 months wasn’t going to do much for investors in long-term debt. The keepwell, which became known as the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement, allowed us to maintain a positive net worth at the companies no matter how much they lost long into the future. By entering into that agreement before December 31, 2009 (when our temporary authority expired), we would be acting within our authority, while providing investors the necessary long-term assurances. As losses were realized in the future, we could dip into the keepwell and increase the amount of financial support by purchasing preferred shares.

We had to decide how big to make the keepwells. We wanted a big number to send a message, and the only constraint was the debt ceiling, which had been increased by $800 billion. We initially set the size at $100 billion for each GSE. (The Obama administration would eventually increase the keepwells to $200 billion each as losses soared at the companies.)

It was crucial to win over FHFA’s examiners because it would be next to impossible to put the GSEs into conservatorship without their support. They wanted to base their argument for doing so on Fannie’s and Freddie’s unsafe and unsound practices. But we knew, and the Fed and OCC agreed, that we couldn’t take Fannie and Freddie down on a technicality—and besides, there were gross inadequacies in the quality and quantity of their capital.

A lot of work had to be done. Fed and OCC examiners scouring the portfolios had come up with estimates of embedded losses that were multiples of what the GSEs said they thought the losses were. The Fed and the OCC took FHFA through their models and assumptions, and finally persuaded Lockhart’s people to change their minds.

The companies were struggling to solve their problems. Fannie was more diligent and more helpful. It had in fact raised $7.4 billion, while Freddie, despite its assurances, hadn’t raised any equity. At one point, Fannie executives came in and gave a PowerPoint presentation, in which for the first time they made it clear they had no access to capital markets. Even so, their projections of losses were below what the examiners were coming up with.

Fannie’s cheekiness was breathtaking. The essence of the presentation was: We’re in deep trouble unless you do something to help us. But since we are clearly compliant with our regulatory capital requirements, you can’t touch us other than to do what the statute allows you to do, which is inject capital on terms we agree to. Fannie even tried to make it seem that their plight was our fault, that our having gotten the bazooka had caused everyone to lose confidence in them. Hence, we should fix things on terms favorable to them.

But the problem wasn’t the bazooka. It was that the market realized before the GSEs did that they were doomed. And Fannie was living in a world that the markets were declaring was dead and over.

As the Fannie team went through its slides, I said very little. I just sat there, and they thought I was being positive. Normally I’m the hammer: I challenge, I push to get the best possible result. Now I just looked on and nodded. As my staff said afterward, it was a classic example of people taking away the message they were looking for.

Right up to the end, Lockhart had quite a task trying to move his people to where he and we wanted them. They needed to be led to the conclusion they knew was right. Doing so would in effect overturn the work they’d done for years. But they were moving forward slowly. On September 1, FHFA wrote the GSEs to suspend the August 22 letter that had said their capital was adequate and informed them that the agency was conducting a new review of the adequacy of their reserves.

The clock was ticking. We would need a weekend with the markets closed to put the GSEs into conservatorship, but we were running out of weekends before Lehman was scheduled to report its second-quarter earnings, which were going to be disastrous.

By midweek FHFA had written up its semiannual review letters for Fannie and Freddie. These they sent on September 4 in draft form. They were tough letters, accompanied by affidavits from their examiners, that dissected capital and management deficiencies and noted all the corrections the companies had been asked to make and hadn’t. Management was asked to share these with their boards. Then Jim called the CEOs to say that he wanted to meet with them and that he would be joined by the chairman of the Fed and the Treasury secretary. They had to know something was wrong.

On Friday afternoon, September 5, we met with management of the companies; on Saturday, September 6, we met with their boards, which agreed to the takeover; and on Sunday, we announced that we had placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into conservatorship. Asian markets rallied on the news.

The next day they opened for business with new CEOs: Herb Allison, former CEO of TIAA-CREF, at Fannie; and David Moffett, former chief financial officer of U.S. Bancorp, at Freddie. Treasury’s administrative head, Peter McCarthy, organized a remarkably smooth transition. Common shareholders had lost nearly everything, but the government had protected debt holders and buttressed each entity with $100 billion in capital and generous credit lines. Fannie and Freddie would have to shrink their massive portfolios and would no longer be allowed to lobby the government.

Working nearly nonstop to stave off disaster for the crippled housing markets and U.S. economy, we had, within a few months, managed to force massive change at these troubled but powerful institutions that had stymied reformers for years.

I was concerned about explaining to Congress why we’d been forced to use our new authorities, and I also worried that I’d be criticized for turning temporary powers into a permanent guarantee. As it turned out, the bigger issue was that the government had been forced to “bail out” Fannie and Freddie, putting the taxpayers at risk. This was an indicator of things to come.

The GSE crisis left me dead tired. But my staff worked even harder, hammering out the details of this extraordinary government rescue. I told Josh Bolten that solving the GSE crisis was the hardest thing I had ever done.

I had no idea.

C
HAPTER 8

Monday, September 8, 2008

I
began Monday, September 8, with an early round of television interviews, part of my plan to spend much of the week reassuring taxpayers, the markets, and the institutions’ employees that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had been stabilized. The initial reaction to our weekend moves to seize control of the two big mortgage companies had encouraged me. Asian and European markets had surged, and Japanese and Chinese central bankers had applauded. The U.S. government had essentially guaranteed the GSEs’ debt, but I knew it would take time and a focused effort to communicate that clearly to all investors.

By 8:00 a.m. I’d talked to CNBC, CBS, and Bloomberg. I was careful to emphasize that Fannie’s and Freddie’s employees were not responsible for the housing decline or their companies’ problems. “This was created by Congress a long time ago. It was a system that shouldn’t have existed,” I told CNBC’s Steve Liesman.

When U.S. markets opened, Fannie’s and Freddie’s stocks fell like stones, as expected, but the Dow shot up 330 points at the start of trading. I had little time to exult, though, as the disaster that had loomed all summer began to unfold.

Ken Wilson came into my office to tell me that talks between Lehman Brothers and the Korea Development Bank were going nowhere. The week before, news leaks had prompted speculation that KDB would buy up to 25 percent of Lehman. But Ken, who was on the phone with Lehman CEO Dick Fuld every day—and had talked with him the night before—downplayed the possibility of a deal. Lehman shares were up at the opening, but if the talks failed they would plummet, just as the firm was about to announce a big third-quarter loss.

Lehman’s plight wasn’t the only troubling news. Late Monday morning, General Electric CEO Jeff Immelt called to tell me that his company was having problems selling commercial paper. This stunned me. Although GE’s giant financial unit, GE Capital, had faltered along with the rest of the industry, the company as a whole was an American business icon—one of the few with a triple-A credit rating. If GE couldn’t sell its paper, what did that mean for other U.S. companies?

Monday afternoon belonged to the GSEs. I gave interviews to the
Washington Post
and
Fortune
magazine and met with Chris Dodd, who was close to Fannie and Freddie, and had gotten upset with me over the weekend. I sat down with him and his staff at his office and explained our thinking, telling him that his leadership, and that of Barney Frank and Richard Shelby, had been critical to helping us avoid a disaster. He seemed much more comfortable after the meeting.

The market stayed strong through the day, with the Dow closing up 290 points, or 2.6 percent, at 11,511. But Lehman’s shares dropped $2.05, to $14.15, while its credit default swaps edged up to a worrisome 328 basis points. And the markets still did not know that Lehman’s talks with KDB were collapsing.

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