Read On the Brink Online

Authors: Henry M. Paulson

Tags: #Global Financial Crisis, #Economics: Professional & General, #Financial crises & disasters, #Political, #General, #United States, #Biography & Autobiography, #Economic Conditions, #Political Science, #Economic Policy, #Public Policy, #2008-2009, #Business & Economics, #Economic History

On the Brink (10 page)

By law, the Federal Reserve operates independently of the Treasury Department. Though we took care to observe this separation, Ben, Tim Geithner, and I developed a spirit of teamwork that allowed us to talk continually throughout the oncoming crisis without compromising the Fed’s independence.

Ben was always willing to cooperate and a pleasure to work with. He is, easily, one of the most brilliant people I’ve ever known, astonishingly articulate in his spoken word and in his writing. I read carefully his speeches—on a wide range of subjects, from income inequality to globalization. And he was kind enough to look over some of my speeches before I gave them. He explained complex issues clearly; a chat with him was like a graduate school seminar.

Ben shared my concern with the developments in Europe. We agreed to keep our staffs in close contact, while I would talk directly to bankers and relay to Ben what they thought of the problem. That morning the Fed loaned $24 billion to banks via the New York Fed; on Friday it followed with an additional $38 billion even as the ECB lent out another 61 billion euros, or $83.4 billion.

When I returned to my office, I found Treasury on full alert. Bob Steel, the undersecretary for domestic finance, briefed me on the markets and possible responses. Keith Hennessey phoned from the White House to find out what was going on. I immediately started making calls to see how Wall Street was responding: Dick Fuld at Lehman, Stan O’Neal at Merrill Lynch, Steve Schwarzman at Blackstone, and Lloyd Blankfein at Goldman Sachs. All these CEOs were on edge. I also called Tim Geithner and Chris Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Throughout the crisis, in fact, I would keep in constant touch with Wall Street CEOs, while Bob Steel and other members of my team talked with traders, investors, and bankers around the world. To know what was really going on, we had to get behind the numbers we monitored on Bloomberg screens. We knew, of course, that we were dealing with self-interested parties, but getting this practical market knowledge was absolutely essential.

Beginning that morning, we went into high gear. Bob Hoyt, our general counsel, asked his team in the legal department to begin examining the statutes and historical precedents to see what authorities the Treasury—or other agencies—might have to deal with market emergencies. Earlier in the summer I’d asked Bob Steel to begin developing solutions for our mortgage problems, though at the time we didn’t realize how far-reaching those problems would become. Now I asked him to speed up his efforts. On Monday, after a long weekend of work, Bob and I would lay out the problem in detail to the president, agreeing to roll out a plan of action by Labor Day.

It was pretty clear from what I gleaned from my conversations that the market was in for a bad patch. That Friday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which had passed 14,000 for the first time in mid-July, fell nearly 400 points, its second-biggest one-day drop in five years. I could sense a big storm coming.

In retrospect, the crisis that struck in August 2007 had been building for years. Structural differences in the economies of the world had led to what analysts call “imbalances” that created massive and destabilizing cross-border capital flows. In short, we were living beyond our means—on borrowed money and borrowed time.

The dangers for the U.S. economy had been obscured by an unprecedented housing boom, fed in part by the low interest rates that helped us recover from the downturn that followed the bursting of the late-’90s technology bubble and the impact of the 9/11 attacks. The housing bubble was driven by a big increase in loans to less creditworthy, or subprime, borrowers that lifted homeownership rates to historic levels. By the time I took office in July 2006, fully 69 percent of U.S. households owned their own homes, up from 64 percent in 1994. Subprime loans had soared from 5 percent of total mortgage originations in 1994 to roughly 20 percent by July 2006.

Encouraging high rates of homeownership had long been a cornerstone of U.S. domestic policy—for Democrats and Republicans alike. Homeownership, it’s commonly believed, helps families build wealth, stabilizes neighborhoods, creates jobs, and promotes economic growth.

But it’s also essential to match the right person to the right house: people should have the means to pay for the homes they buy, and lenders should ensure that they do. As the boom turned into a bubble, this disciplined approach fell away. Far too many houses were bought with little or no money down, often for speculative purposes or on the hope that property values would keep rising. Far too many loans were made or entered into fraudulently. Predatory lenders and unscrupulous brokers pushed increasingly complex mortgages on unsuspecting buyers even as unqualified applicants lied to get homes they couldn’t afford. Regulators failed to see, or stop, the worst excesses. All bubbles involve speculation, excessive borrowing and risk taking, negligence, a lack of transparency, and outright fraud, but few bubbles ever burst as spectacularly as this one would.

By the fourth quarter of 2006, the housing market was turning down. Delinquencies on U.S. subprime mortgages jumped, leading to a wave of foreclosures and big losses at subprime lenders. On February 7, 2007, London-based HSBC Holdings, the world’s third-largest bank, announced that it was setting aside $10.6 billion to cover bad debts in U.S. subprime lending portfolios. The same day, New Century Financial Corporation, the second-biggest U.S. subprime lender, said it expected to show losses for fourth-quarter 2006. By April 2, 2007, it was bankrupt. Two weeks after that, Washington Mutual, the biggest savings and loan in the U.S., disclosed that 9.5 percent of its $217 billion loan portfolio consisted of subprime loans and that its 2007 first-quarter profits had dropped by 21 percent.

The housing market, especially in the subprime sector, was clearly in a sharp correction. But how widespread would the damage be? Bob Steel had organized a series of meetings across government agencies to get on top of the problem, scrutinizing housing starts, home sales, and foreclosure rates. Treasury and Fed economists concluded that the foreclosure problem would continue to get worse before peaking in 2008. Of perhaps 55 million mortgages totaling about $13 trillion, about 13 percent, or 7 million mortgages, accounting for perhaps $1.3 trillion, were subprime loans. In a worst-case scenario we thought perhaps a quarter, or roughly $300 billion, might go bad. Actual losses would be much less, after recoveries from sales of foreclosed homes. They would, unfortunately, cause great pain to those affected, but in a $14 trillion diverse and healthy economy, we thought we could probably weather the losses.

All of this led me in late April 2007 to say in a speech before the Committee of 100, a group promoting better Chinese-American relations, that subprime mortgage problems were “largely contained.” I repeated that line of thinking publicly for another couple of months.

Today, of course, I could kick myself. We were just plain wrong. We had plenty of company: In mid-July, in testimony before Congress, Ben Bernanke cited estimates of subprime losses reaching $50 billion to $100 billion. (By early 2008 losses from subprime lending had reached an estimated $250 billion and counting.)

Why were we so off? We missed the dreadful quality of the most recent mortgages, and we believed the problem was largely confined to subprime loans. Default rates on subprime adjustable-rate mortgage loans (ARMs) from 2005 to 2007 were far higher than ever; ARMs made up half of subprime loans, or about 6.5 percent of all mortgages, but they accounted for 50 percent of all foreclosures. Even worse, the problems were coming far more quickly. In some cases, borrowers were missing their very first payments.

Homeowner behavior had also changed. More borrowers chose to do the previously unthinkable: they simply stopped paying when they found themselves “underwater,” meaning the size of their loan exceeded the value of the home. This happened quickly in cases where there was little or no down payment and housing prices were falling sharply. These homebuyers had no skin in the game.

The housing decline would have been a problem in its own right. It might even have caused a recession—though I doubt one as deep or as long lasting as what we would experience later. But what we did not realize then, and later understood all too well, was how changes in the way mortgages were made and sold, combined with a reshaped financial system, had vastly amplified the potential damage to banks and nonbank financial companies. It placed these firms, the entire system, and ultimately all of us in grave danger.

These changes had taken place inside of a generation. Traditionally, U.S. savings and loan institutions and commercial banks had made mortgage loans and kept them on the books until they were paid off or matured. They closely monitored the credit risk of their portfolios, earning the spread between the income these loans produced and the cost of the generally short-term money used to fund them.

But this “originate to hold” approach began to change with the advent of securitization, a financing technique developed in 1970 by the U.S. Government National Mortgage Association that allowed lenders to combine individual mortgages into packages of loans and sell interests in the resulting securities. A new “originate to distribute” model allowed banks and specialized lenders to sell mortgage securities to a variety of different buyers, from other banks to institutional investors like pension funds.

Securitization took off in the 1980s, spreading to other assets, such as credit card receivables and auto loans. By the end of 2006, $6.6 trillion in residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were outstanding, up from $4.2 trillion at the end of 2002.

In theory, this was all to the good. Banks could make fees by packaging and selling their loans. If they still wanted mortgage exposure, they could hold on to their loans or buy the MBS of other originators and diversify their holdings geographically. Pension funds and other investors could buy securitized products tailored for the cash flow and risk characteristics they wanted. The distribution of the securities beyond U.S. banks to investors around the world acted as a buffer by spreading risks wider than the banking system.

But there was a dark side. The market became opaque as structured products grew increasingly complex and difficult to understand even for sophisticated investors. Collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs, were created to carve up mortgages and other debt instruments into increasingly exotic components, or tranches, with a wide variety of payment and risk characteristics. Before long, financial engineers were creating CDOs out of other CDOs—or CDOs-squared.

Lacking the ability of traditional lenders to examine the credit quality of the loans underlying these securities, investors relied on rating agencies—which employed statistical analyses rather than detailed studies of individual borrowers—to rate the structured products. Since investors typically wanted higher-rated securities, the structurers of CDOs sometimes turned to so-called monoline insurance companies, which would for a fee guarantee the creditworthiness of their products, many of which were loaded with subprime mortgages. Savvy investors seeking protection often bought credit default swaps on the CDOs and other mortgage-backed products they owned from deep-pocketed financial companies like American International Group (AIG).

As financial companies scrambled to feed the profit machine with mortgage-backed securities, lending standards deteriorated badly. The drive to make as many loans as possible, combined with the severing of the traditional prudential relationship between borrower and lender, would prove lethal. Questionable new loan products were peddled, from option adjustable-rate mortgages to no-income-no-job-no-assets (NINJA) loans. By the end of 2006, 20 percent of all new mortgages were subprime; by 2007, more than 50 percent of subprime loans were originated by mortgage brokers.

All of this was complicated by the rapidly growing levels of leverage in the financial system and by the efforts of many financial institutions to skirt regulatory capital constraints in their quest for profits. Excessive leverage was evident in nearly all quarters.

This leverage was hardly limited to mortgage-related securities. We were in the midst of a general credit bubble. Banks and investment banks were financing record-size leveraged buyouts on increasingly more lenient terms. “Covenant-lite” loans appeared, in which bankers eased restrictions in order to allow borrowers, like private-equity firms, increased flexibility on repayment.

Indeed, I recall a dinner at the New York Fed on June 26, 2007, that was attended by the heads of some of Wall Street’s biggest banks. All were concerned with excessive risk taking in the markets and appalled by the erosion of underwriting standards. The bankers complained about all the covenant-lite loans and bridge loans they felt compelled by competitive pressure to make.

I remember Jamie Dimon, the JPMorgan chairman and CEO, saying that such loans, made mostly to private-equity firms, did not make sense, and that his bank wouldn’t be making any more of them. Lloyd Blankfein said Goldman, too, would not enter into any such transactions. Steve Schwarzman, the CEO of Blackstone, a dominant private-equity firm, acknowledged he had been getting attractive terms and added that he wasn’t in the business of turning down attractive money.

Chuck Prince, the Citigroup CEO, asked whether, given the competitive pressures, there wasn’t a role for regulators to tamp down some of the riskier practices. Basically, he asked: “Isn’t there something you can do to order us not to take all of these risks?”

Not long after, I remember, Prince was quoted as saying, “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance.”

It was, in retrospect, the end of an era. The music soon stopped. Two of the CEOs at that dinner—Prince and Jimmy Cayne of Bear Stearns—would be gone shortly, their institutions reeling.

Leverage works just great when times are good, but when they turn bad it magnifies losses in a hurry. Among the first to suffer when housing prices fell were a pair of multibillion-dollar hedge funds set up by Bear Stearns that had made leveraged investments in mortgage-related securities that subsequently went bad. By late July both funds had effectively shut down.

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