Mike Guardia (16 page)

Vacationing in Virginia Beach, 1949. Pictured from left to right are: Helen Volckmann, Russell Volckmann, Ann Blackburn, and Donald Blackburn. The two families remained lifelong friends after the war.

The Donald D. Blackburn Collection.

North Luzon had been without radio contact since Ralph Praeger went off the air in March 1943. Now, some fifteen months later, Volckmann still had no feasible way of communicating with MacArthur. Under the reorganization plan of the previous year, Volckmann had ordered all district commanders to scavenge any radio equipment they could find. His orders also called for finding radio technicians to build and operate the device. These efforts eventually produced an assortment of radio parts and two technicians from Manila. Volckmann made every effort to provide them the tools they needed, but many integral parts of the radio were still missing, which necessitated all missing pieces to be crafted by hand. The final product, however, was a homemade 75-watt transceiver with enough power to communicate directly with SWPA! To compensate for the lack of electricity, Volckmann secured the device to a water wheel on a nearby stream, thus providing 220 volts of hydroelectric power.
²⁵⁸

Morale in USAFIP-NL surged to an all-time high. Volckmann’s first message to SWPA emphasized the need for arms, ammunition, and medical supplies. When SWPA replied a few days later, they confirmed that:

ONE OFFICER AND FIFTEEN MEN TOGETHER WITH FIFTEEN TONS OF SUPPLY HAVE LANDED BY SUBMARINE ON LUZON. PARTY IS PROCEEDING NORTH OVERLAND TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS.
²⁵⁹

As it were, the submarine
USS Stingray
had landed on the northern shore of Ilocos Norte near Bangui. Units within Volckmann’s Third District (15th Infantry) intercepted the landing party near Highway 3 but recovered only half the tonnage of supplies promised by SWPA. Lieutenant Valera, the officer in charge of the landing party, explained that while consolidating their materiel on the beach, a Japanese naval detachment came within shooting range of the submarine. Fearing detection, the sub commander made an emergency dive and vacated the inlet.
²⁶⁰
This left Valera and his men with half the anticipated supplies and without any means to navigate through the treacherous jungles. How fortunate that the 15th Infantry intercepted Valera before the Japanese did!

Even with half the material that was originally promised, it was nonetheless a boon to Volckmann and his guerrillas. Re-supply meant relief from chronic shortages that had plagued them since Bataan. If the supply train remained unbroken from now until the Allied invasion of Luzon, Volckmann and his men would no longer have to rely on scavenging from the Japanese or continue borrowing from the local civilians.

On 29 August 1944, Volckmann sent a communiqué to SWPA outlining the directives he had given to USAFIP-NL.
²⁶¹
His command policies called for:

1. Harassment and destruction of all enemy lines of communication.
2. Delay and destruction of all enemy troop and supply movements.
3. Destruction of enemy supply dumps.
4. Prevent the enemy from securing food supplies, construction materials, civilian labor assets, and means of transportation.
²⁶²

The message was an indirect effort to discover any tentative dates for the Allied invasion and, hopefully, give MacArthur an incentive to expedite the process. At this point, Volckmann had no idea of when it might come, but he anticipated it happening sometime within the next twelve months. Reports over KGEI confirmed that the Allied push toward Tokyo was gathering steam. Volckmann received no direct answer to the message but instead got a radiogram asking for the locations of principal and alternative rendezvous points for the next incoming submarine. Volckmann consulted with Barnett, commander of the Second District, and radioed SWPA with the coordinates for Darigayos, La Union, and San Esteban, Ilocos Sur, as the respective primary and alternate points. SWPA radioed confirmation of the rendezvous points and set an ETA for 19 October 1944.
²⁶³

On the day of the 19th, however, the submarine was nowhere to be found, and neither rendezvous point had reported any contact. Frustrated, Volckmann again radioed SWPA and demanded an explanation. The answer he received was a vague and apologetic pronouncement that there had been a slight misunderstanding.
²⁶⁴

A
misunderstanding
? A misunderstanding of
what
? SWPA had already confirmed the location of the rendezvous points and Volckmann had followed the contact procedures perfectly. Nonetheless, Volckmann could do nothing more than negotiate another contact date and hope for better luck. The next submarine,
USS Gar
, had embarkation orders for November. Years later, Volckmann found out that the “misunderstanding” had been between the submarine and the Army Air Forces; the submarine was sunk by friendly fire.
²⁶⁵
On a brighter note, the following day, 20 October, brought news that Allied forces had landed at Leyte Gulf, only 400 miles to the southeast.

Just as before, SWPA confirmed the location of Darigayos and San Esteban as the rendezvous points. This latest submarine carried a party of fifteen men and some twenty-five tons of equipment. Volckmann dispatched Barnett to the alternate rendezvous point while he and Blackburn oversaw the principal site. The situation required much more oversight than Volckmann had originally anticipated: in the overlapping time since the previous submarine, a Japanese garrison had sprung up less than five miles away from the primary rendezvous point. Worse, a Japanese naval base lay fifteen miles to the south and its patrol boats were regularly sighted along the coast.
²⁶⁶

Beginning ten days prior to the submarine’s intended arrival, units of the 121st Infantry kept a close watch over both rendezvous points. Volckmann ordered his men to watch for any unusual changes in the enemy’s dispositions. Measures were taken to ensure that every man knew the location of the rendezvous points, the appropriate security measures, signal procedures, and the organization of carrying parties. Two days before contact, Volckmann established outposts surrounding both rendezvous points and ordered one combat battalion to occupy each area. Civilian agents provided some 50 native canoes to ferry supplies to the shore. Finally, the combat battalions covering both rendezvous points were given clear instructions on what to do if either point were compromised by enemy activity.
²⁶⁷

Yet, despite these efforts, there was still no word from SWPA concerning the protocol for making contact with the submarines. With three days remaining until the anticipated contact date—and still no word from MacArthur—Volckmann decided to travel to the primary rendezvous point himself. Leaving Calvert behind to man the GHQ, Volckmann instructed him to forward any updates received from SWPA during his absence.
²⁶⁸

Using one of the USAFIP-NL messenger routes, Volckmann began his trip under the fury of a raging typhoon. The torrential rain was certainly enough to impede his movement, but the real trouble began when the deluge turned an otherwise peaceful stream into a raging rapid. With no feasible way to ford it, he had no choice but to sit and wait for the current to subside. During the unexpected layover, Volckmann discovered that things were about to get worse. A runner from GHQ relayed the following message from Calvert:

A CARABAO WASHED OVER WATERFALL AND LANDED ON WATER WHEEL POWERHOUSE. DUE TO NO POWER OUT OF RADIO CONTACT. EVERY EFFORT MADE TO GET BACK ON AIR.
²⁶⁹

Two days from the submarine’s arrival with no official guidance on contact procedures, and now communication with SWPA was lost! Volckmann was terrified at the thought of losing another opportunity to make contact with the submarines. When the storm finally subsided, two days had elapsed since his departure from GHQ. Desperately hoping that another chance had not been lost, Volckmann pushed through the mountain passes and the highland jungles at breakneck speed, finally arriving at Darigayos Cove in the predawn hours of 20 November. Greeted by Major Cubas of the 121st Infantry, Volckmann received up-to-the minute information on activity around the rendezvous points. He was satisfied with the control measures already in place but Volckmann still had no way of determining the submarine’s whereabouts.
²⁷⁰
Relief finally came in the form of another messenger from GHQ: Calvert had somehow managed to fix the radio and was once again trading wires with SWPA. Confirming the submarine’s arrival date on 21 November, SWPA indicated that between 0600 and 0800, USAFIP was to:

DISPLAY ON BEACH TWO HUNDRED METERS APART TWO WHITE DISC TWO METERS IN DIAMETER WITH A SMOKE SMUDGE FIRE MIDWAY BETWEEN DISC. REPEAT SAME SIGNALS FROM 1600 TO 1800. AT 1630 COMMANDER SHORE PARTY PUT TO SEA IN A SMALL SAILING BOAT FLYING A CHINESE FLAG. IF NO CONTACT IS MADE PRIOR TO DARK DISPLAY THREE LIGHTS VERTICALLY FROM THE MAST OF THE SAIL BOAT STOP.
²⁷¹

What?!
Volckmann could hardly fathom the utility behind these measures. Nothing could be more conspicuous or certain to get the enemy’s attention.
²⁷²
Although he hated these instructions, Volckmann knew that they were the only means to coordinate with his outside supplier. The unexpected radio damage had undoubtedly cost him any possible buffer time to protest. An ETA on 21 November meant that the submarine was already en route and its skipper would not be expecting any deviation from SWPA guidelines. Volckmann had no choice but to follow the signal procedures, although it remains unclear what prompted these contact procedures or why SWPA assumed that Volckmann would have two white discs and a Chinese flag in his possession. Volckmann had a makeshift Chinese flag sown together but how he obtained the white discs remains a mystery. It is possible that the supplies recovered from the first submarine included kits for signaling future skippers.

After setting up the specified signals, Volckmann returned to the rendezvous point at Darigayos Cove. In the distance, he noticed a large Japanese naval convoy heading south. This convoy was soon picked up by a group of what appeared to be dive-bombers. Since the Far East Air Force had been demolished three years earlier, Volckmann thought that the planes, too, were Japanese. But suddenly, the bombers swooped down in unison and began pounding the ships—
the planes were American
! Volckmann was ecstatic as he watched six Japanese cruisers sink beneath the waves. The excitement, however, was short-lived; within a few hours, the Japanese had dispatched a network of patrol boats to scan the area for any survivors of the ill-fated convoy.
²⁷³
This increased activity surrounding the primary rendezvous point was no doubt aggravating for Volckmann. Conspicuous signals and enemy garrisons on either side of their position certainly gave Volckmann enough to worry about. The last thing he needed now was an increased naval presence to further jeopardize their chances of contacting the submarine. Unfortunately, Volckmann had no other option than to wait and see what the Japanese would do. It was still possible that the activity may die down before the
Gar
would come within sight of Darigayos. For the time being, however, Volckmann decided to stay put.

By the following morning, it seemed as though the enemy patrols had dispersed. Volckmann was about to order his men to occupy the beach when, all of a sudden, a Japanese patrol boat came in from the south! At first it appeared as though it might bypass their position, but then suddenly it made a sharp turn straight for the cove. Volckmann tried to keep his composure: perhaps the boat would not stay long; patrol boats normally carried no more than 20 men, so this was likely just a foraging party.
²⁷⁴

Volckmann’s assessment proved correct: sixteen men dismounted the patrol boat and scavenged the native huts beyond the shore. The party left after only an hour and, once out of sight, Volckmann ordered his signal crew to occupy the beach. It appeared that the mission was to be a success, but his men had no more than reached the shoreline when the sound of rifle fire broke through the quiet air. Startled by the sudden burst of automatic rifles, Volckmann’s shore party scrambled for cover. Volckmann was staggered.
Who could be firing on his men?
The answer came as a Japanese patrol emerged from the jungle and established a beachhead right on top of the rendezvous point.
²⁷⁵
He could hardly believe his eyes.
How did an entire patrol slip past his observation posts?
Bristled with anger, Volckmann decided to wait the Japanese out.

The afternoon hours came and went. As daylight turned to dusk, the Japanese began settling down for the night. Dejected, Volckmann sent a radiogram to SWPA indicating the primary point had been compromised. He ordered his units surrounding Darigayos to stand down and return to their base camps.
²⁷⁶
Now, all Volckmann could do was hope that Barnett would have better luck at the alternate rendezvous point. One failed attempt at contacting the submarine was aggravating enough, but two consecutive failed attempts might discourage SWPA from sending any more submarines entirely.

Arriving back at GHQ, however, Volckmann’s despair over the submarine issue was put to rest by news that Barnett had made contact with the
Gar
at the alternate point. Overjoyed by the success, Volckmann radioed the news to the other USAFIP-NL stations.
²⁷⁷
The impact of the submarine’s arrival spread beyond Volckmann’s network. For the first time since the beginning of the war, civilians were coming out in droves to assist Volckmann any way they could.
²⁷⁸
Indeed, a newfound sense of enthusiasm ripped through the echelons of USAFIPNL. From this, it was evident that the second stage of Volckmann’s enterprise was reaching critical mass. Now that help had arrived from the outside world, USAFIP-NL would have the means to effectively stand “toe-to-toe” with the Japanese.

Barnett arrived at GHQ only a few days after Volckmann, with the
Gar
’s landing party in tow. Giving a full account of the skipper’s story, Volckmann learned firsthand just how troublesome the enemy beachhead had been. As it were, the submarine had initially surfaced off Barnett’s point at San Esteban. The skipper, thinking that he had correctly surfaced at the primary rendezvous point, made contact with Barnett assuming him to be Volckmann. Politely informing the errant skipper that he had missed his mark, Barnett climbed aboard the submarine and guided them farther south to Darigayos Cove. Arriving shortly after nightfall, Barnett spotted the campfires set by the Japanese on the beach. Assuming the fires had been set by Volckmann, Barnett and two of the submarine’s crew landed on the side of the cove. Only yards from the beachhead, however, they realized that the fires were manned by the Japanese. While en route back to San Esteban, they received the radio message from SWPA indicating that the primary point had been compromised. Volckmann recalled that “the skipper had been tempted to radio back: WE FOUND THAT OUT FOR OURSELVES.”
²⁷⁹