Mike Guardia (12 page)

This sounded preposterous, and Volckmann again protested that the surplus equipment needed to be cached. Nothing he could say, however, would alter Kamayong’s decision. A Japanese platoon did make its way to the foot of the hill upon which Volckmann’s camp was located, but miraculously, when the patrol arrived at the very site of the chicken feet, they changed course and moved down into the river valley! Volckmann never again questioned the pagan priests.
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Perhaps the most devastating blow to the North Luzon guerrillas, however, occurred on 1 June 1943: Colonels Moses and Noble were captured just outside of Lubuagan, Kalinga. Returning from Praeger’s hideout in Apayao, they sent word to Volckmann to alert him of their pending return and advise him of the increased Japanese activity. Unfortunately, while traveling back toward Lubuagan, the colonels had taken ill and sought refuge in a cave not far from a native barrio. After sending one of their men into the barrio for food and medical relief, he was intercepted by a Japanese patrol. True to form, the Japanese tortured the man until he broke down and gave the exact location of the colonels’ hiding place.
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Apprehended and beaten, Moses and Noble were sent to Bontoc, where the Japanese garrison commander forged a surrender order with the colonels’ names attached:

Signed Martin Moses [signature]
Martin Moses [typed]
Lt. Col. Infantry, U.S. Army
Commanding
Witness: Arthur Noble [signature]
Arthur Noble [typed]
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, U.S. Army
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Volckmann would not have followed the order even if it were legitimate. Nevertheless, the capture of these two colonels left Volckmann as the senior-ranking officer in North Luzon. The entire guerrilla movement in North Luzon now rested on the shoulders of this 31-year-old-officer.

Throughout the summer of 1943, the guerrilla movement in North Luzon had reached its lowest ebb. The Moses-Noble operation, for all its grand intentions, had done little more than send the Allied resistance into further chaos. Now, as the senior officer in North Luzon, it was up to Volckmann to pick up the pieces of their shattered enterprise. Since Volckmann’s camp in the Haliap highlands was now “General Headquarters,” he devised a numbering system to keep track of his other camps. His current location assumed the title of Camp #1, while Volckmann’s men at his outpost back in the Antipolo territory became Camp #2.
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More numerical designations followed as he brought more camps under his command.

Volckmann would spend the rest of June trying to organize his thoughts.
What do we do now? How are we going to take the fight to the enemy?
But before he could answer any of these questions, this new commander-by-default had a bigger problem to worry about: the Japanese were on their way to Haliap.
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Whether it had been the work of informers or just the tenacity of the Japanese, it didn’t matter—Volckmann had to clear the area. Hopefully Moses and Noble hadn’t broken down under torture and given the guerrillas’ location.

10 June 1943. The news hasn’t changed any. All reports coming in sound bad. Looks like the Japs plan on giving us a good chase. Started spreading rumor that we have left for Benguet. I’m feeling lousy today. They [Haliap] called a couple of witches to pray for me.

14 June 1943. Well, the Japs haven’t come out yet. Don’t know how long it is going to be now.

15 June 1943. Japs placed a garrison at Burnay.

17 June 1943. Another 50 Japs came to Kiangan from Bontoc.

18 June 1943. 80 Japs came to Kiangan from Bontoc.

20 June 1943. About 4 P.M., we were notified that the Japs were in the barrio below us. Hid-out our surplus things and went to our hide-out. Made the last part of the trip in the dark; very hard walking.

21 June 1943. Japs are still around. The shack that we are hiding in is built like a tent. The roof is made of wild gan leaves (each leaf is about three to four feet across).
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When Volckmann evacuated the Haliap camp, he had taken Bruno, Emilio, and Pedro, Bruno’s cousin, with him. On the evening of the 21st, Volckmann and Blackburn sent Pedro back to the Haliap village for any further news. After what seemed like an eternally restless night, Pedro returned in the morning with the news that the enemy patrol had finally moved on. Surprisingly, the Japanese hadn’t asked any questions and refrained from firing a single shot. Volckmann couldn’t be sure what the Japanese were up to—or what they had expected to find in the Haliap lands—but for now, the enemy was gone. Despite the relief, however, Volckmann elected to stay at his “evacuation hut” until he was certain the Japanese were out of range.
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Although the close encounter had turned out to be a minor affair, it stoked his passions to destroy the enemy once and for all.

Meanwhile, Art Murphy and Parker Calvert had re-emerged on the western end of Benguet and were now sending messages to Camp #2. In other news, Bando Dagwa and Dennis Molintas had likewise reemerged from the wilderness. Dagwa, who had owned a transportation company before the war, had reacquired a few of his buses and offered any mobility that he could to the guerrillas.
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Other reports flowing into Camp #2 included an update on the 14th Infantry Regiment. When Manuel Enriquez surrendered the regiment, the 14th found itself under the command of Major Romulo Manriquez. Major Manriquez had since herded his elements of the 14th Infantry into small camps throughout the Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya provinces.
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By the end of July, the fury of the anti-guerrilla campaign began to die down. Apparently, with the capture of Moses and Noble and the recent failures to apprehend any other high-value targets, the Japanese concluded that the guerrilla movement had lost its momentum and could do no serious harm to the occupation force. Russell Volckmann, however, was about to prove them wrong.

With enemy activity at an all-time low, Volckmann made his move. As commanding officer of the Allied resistance, the first thing he decided to do was reorganize the entire North Luzon command structure. At this point, the guerrillas had only operated within a few isolated bands. Too many guerrillas operating independently of one another had produced many of the problems that Volckmann recognized: there was no effective communication network, no intelligence sharing, no feasible system to protect against informers, and no standard dispositions against the enemy.
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To have any impact on the Japanese, USAFFE guerrillas in North Luzon had to form a united front. A centralized command structure would establish operating guidelines and synchronize combat operations to have the most devastating effect on the Japanese.

With the “Reorganization Plan of 1943,” Volckmann established guidelines covering the organization, communication, supply, and operating principles of his guerrilla force.
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From what he could estimate, there were four regimental commands left in the area. These included remnants of the 121st, 15th, 14th, and 11th Infantry Regiments.
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Determining the whereabouts of these regiments, Volckmann divided North Luzon into five military “districts.” The Regimental assignments were as follows:

District 1 — 66th Infantry

District 2 — 121st Infantry

District 3 — 15th Infantry

District 4 — 11th Infantry

District 5 — 14th Infantry

The 66th Infantry was a composite unit that Volckmann created especially for the occasion. It consisted of three battalions that had previously belonged to other regiments prior to the invasion. During the retreat, 1st Battalion, 43rd Infantry (Philippine Scouts), 2nd Battalion, 11th Infantry (Philippine Army), and 3rd Battalion, 12th Infantry (Philippine Army) were separated from their parent units along the western coast of Luzon. Now within Volckmann’s command, he organized the lost battalions into one regiment. Adding together the numerical designations of their former regiments—43, 11, and 12 for a total of 66—he designated them as the 66th Infantry.
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Consolidating the five “districts” under one command, Volckmann established the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines—North Luzon (USAFIP-NL). One commander would be assigned to each district, with all units and personnel operating therein reporting directly to that commander. To assist Volckmann in his command duties, he established the General Headquarters, USAFIP-NL, in the Ifugao subprovince. Operating along the same lines as a divisional headquarters, he created staff functions to oversee the administrative needs of his guerrilla force. Each staff section was designated by an alphanumeric code indicating its area of responsibility. The Adjutant (G-1) and his staff were responsible for the maintenance of personnel records and contact rosters; the Intelligence staff (G-2) oversaw matters of intelligence, espionage, and interrogations; G-3 referred to the Office of Operational Planning—the staff with which Volckmann had the most interaction; and supply was the responsibility of G-4. In addition, the general staff also included a section for civil affairs (G-5).
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Each district commander was directed to organize a regiment consisting of three rifle battalions with four companies each. Regimental camps would be dispersed throughout each district with no camp larger than company-size.
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This way, if a camp were raided or compromised, the unit could easily disperse and the damage would be localized to only that camp—not the entire regiment. Volckmann directed that all camps be established away from populated areas and main routes of travel. This dispersion method facilitated secrecy and mobility.

As a corollary, knowledge of the location of each camp was restricted only to members of that unit, those authorized to deal with that unit, and the USAFIP-NL General Headquarters. In giving this order, it appears that Volckmann wanted to create an additional safeguard against the possibility of his guerrillas being captured by limiting the amount of information that the enemy could extract from them. This principle applied to all USAFIP-NL command, technical, and support installations.
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As the senior ranking officer in North Luzon, Volckmann had full legal authority to assert command over the remaining USAFFE forces in the area. It was a simple concept in theory, but it did not come without its setbacks and frustrations. Some of the units that Volckmann tried to bring under USAFIP-NL solidly rebuffed him—including Robert Lapham’s raiders. Many of them, however, did not. Given the urgency of the war, the guerrilla campaign had to make inroads—and quickly.

Under Volckmann’s reorganization plan, Parker Calvert became the commander of the 66th Infantry. Calvert had quite a reputation as a guerrilla. After the Moses-Noble debacle, Calvert directed his small group of Philippine Scouts into Benguet and began conducting raids on Japanese outposts. The anti-guerrilla campaign of 1942, however, destroyed much of his momentum. Like many units operating in Benguet, the Calvert posse was badly dispersed. However, unlike many of his comrades, Calvert was fortunate to have evaded capture and remained alive. Now in command of the newly formed 66th Infantry, Calvert appointed new commanders for each of his battalions.
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The 121st Infantry was one of the few regiments in the area that remained intact. In February 1942, Colonel John P. Horan received authorization by radiogram from Corregidor to organize the 121st Infantry. The designation applied to the mishmash of units Horan commanded through Balete Pass.
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After his surrender, however, the 121st refused to follow suit and continued to hold the Bontoc-Kalinga area until the Fall of Bataan.
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After Horan’s retreat, the fragmented units fell to the command of Captain William Peryam, an American Army officer. He aligned his unit with Moses and Noble but Peryam himself was captured in January 1943.
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By the end of that year, however, George M. Barnett had assumed command and was now reporting to Volckmann.

Inspecting the regimental camps, Volckmann found the 121st to be among the most well-organized units still operating in Luzon. Despite several setbacks over the previous year, the regiment still retained a moderate degree of operability. The Second District’s field hospital, for instance, included a fully functioning dental office.
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Since Barnett had already been at the helm, Volckmann apparently saw no need in appointing another commander. Barnett was left to command the Second District, USAFIP-NL.

The Third District, encompassing the provinces of Abra and Ilocos Norte, was among the slowest to materialize. Previously, civilian agents enlisted by Volckmann reported a small guerrilla force operating near Laoag, the capital of Ilocos Norte. But Volckmann noticed something peculiar about these supposed “guerrillas”: each time that his men made contact with them, the Japanese would come out in force. To Volckmann, this made absolutely no sense—all the appropriate countermeasures were taken to ensure that no information had been leaked ahead of the agents’ arrival. Furthermore, Volckmann had regular, uninterrupted contact with guerrilla units in other areas where the concentration of enemy troops was much higher. Concluding that there must have been either an informant or a double agent at work, Volckmann sent Barnett to investigate the area.
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Barnett, in turn, detailed the task to one of his lieutenants, John O’Day. An Irish-American, O’Day had worked as a miner before the war. Establishing a patrol base in Laoag, O’Day made contact with the same guerrilla leader whose communications with USAFIP-NL always preceded a Japanese crackdown. A few days after making contact, the situation progressed in the same pattern that it had before: the Japanese came out in force.
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This time, however, O’Day would not let his guerrillas be driven from the area.

In a shrewd play of tactical ingenuity, O’Day arranged for a meeting between himself and the local guerrilla leader. When the unit arrived, O’Day’s men surrounded them at gunpoint and demanded an explanation for the continuous Japanese harassment. Rather than “play dumb” or attempt to make any excuses, the leader made a run for it. O’Day followed in hot pursuit and shot down the leader, and afterwards the surviving members confessed what they had being doing: the Japanese, in attempt to protect their air base at Laoag, had paid a few locals to pose as guerrillas. Under these auspices, they patrolled Ilocos Norte searching for other guerrillas attempting to organize the region. Whenever contact was made with a FilipinoAmerican outfit, the Japanese were promptly notified.
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It was a clever trick and it worked effectively until O’Day broke the cycle. With the pseudo-guerillas eliminated, and the Japanese without their indigenous spies, the entire area began to organize rapidly. Borrowing Companies K and M from the 121st, O’Day laid the groundwork for what would become the 15th Infantry. Rob Arnold, a signal officer who had earlier trained Walter Cushing’s guerrillas, was appointed commander of the Third District. After Cushing’s death, Arnold continued to make his way south. He eventually found his way into the 14th Infantry, which at the time was under Lieutenant Colonel Guillermo Nakar, before joining GHQ, USAFIP-NL in 1943. Together with John O’Day, Arnold expanded the 15th Infantry into a fully operational regiment.
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Fourth District belonged to the 11th Infantry. It was among the most troublesome districts to organize because the units were the most widely scattered of any regiment in North Luzon. Furthermore, Ralph Praeger—the man that Volckmann had wanted to command the district—was already in Japanese custody. Before Praeger’s capture, the anti-guerrilla campaign of 1942 had been especially fierce in Apayao. Praeger’s men emerged from the debacle relatively unscathed, but the local civilians had born the brunt of the enemy’s brutality. Eager for revenge, Filipinos in the Fourth District provinces poured out of the countryside to enlist as guerrillas.
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Since Praeger was no longer available, Volckmann turned to Blackburn—a man whose loyalty and capabilities were beyond reproach. Blackburn had heretofore been Volckmann’s Executive Officer. Now, he was entrusted with the command of a regiment. As he awarded Blackburn his new command, Volckmann announced his intention to relocate General Headquarters from Ifugao to the La Union province near the western coast of Luzon.
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With his departure, Volckmann left the task of organizing the 11th largely to Blackburn, his prime directive being to coordinate matters of personnel, supply, and training within the Apayao, Bontoc, and western Cagayan provinces.
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It came to pass that the Antipolo and the Haliap—including Tamicpao and Kamayong themselves—provided the backbone of the 11th Infantry’s manpower. In fact, more native tribesmen were represented in the 11th Infantry than in any other regiment under Volckmann’s command. Organizing the far reaches of the Fourth District proved to be an arduous and time-consuming task—for it was not until three days before D-Day in North Luzon that the regiment was
officially
activated as the 11th Infantry, USAFIP-NL. Its operational area consisted of the Cagayan, Apayao, and Mountain provinces, exclusive of the Benguet sub-province.
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The fifth and final district went to Romulo Manriquez and the 14th Infantry. It was the smallest of the USAFIP-NL regiments, but it still covered a sizeable area in the Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya provinces. Rufino Baldwin, who had commanded the largest segments of the regiment, remained in Japanese custody. Major Enriquez—who had previously commanded the 14th—surrendered his command as a “bargaining chip” when the Japanese seized his wife. Romulo Manriquez had been rebuilding the 14th Infantry ever since.
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Covering some 15,000 square miles, Volckmann connected the five districts through a synchronized network of intelligence and communication to coordinate strikes on enemy positions. To maintain consistency within USAFIP-NL operations, Volckmann needed an effective communication network. Two things, however, complicated a network created in this environment: the geography and the endless ring of spies. To correct this problem, Volckmann devised a system similar to the one he had operated amongst his small camps in Ifugao. Three east-west and three north-south messenger routes were laid down, linking General Headquarters to each of the district commands. Relay stations were located every four to six hours’ hiking distance along the trail. At each relay station, a non-commissioned officer would inspect the documents and credentials of the messenger. If satisfied, he would task someone on his staff to carry the message to the next closet station. Volckmann also devised a series of alternate routes that were ready to use in the event that a primary route was compromised. In addition to handling the flow of information, these routes also moved supplies among the districts. In all, Volckmann’s relay system accomplished in two days what would have taken one week with a single messenger. For the remainder of Volckmann’s time in the Philippines, nothing along these routes ever fell into enemy hands.
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Central to the guerrilla campaign—and perhaps its most critical asset—was the support it received from the local civilians. Even in light of the Japanese brutality, promoting the cause for a resistance movement still required a fair amount of diplomacy. If the Japanese caught a civilian collaborating with guerrillas, it meant certain death not only for the culprit, but for his entire family as well. Also, the Filipinos were collectively a people of limited resources. The wealthy plantation owners and businessmen had much to spare, but these Filipinos were in the minority and the Japanese had already seized most of their assets. Urban Filipinos, for example those who lived in Manila and Baguio, could offer some assistance, but the high concentration of spies, Japanese troops, and Kempai Tai agents meant that these city-dwellers would have to be excessively discreet.

Ultimately, to win the civilians’ support, Volckmann had to guarantee two things: (1) that the United States Government would properly compensate them; and (2) that they would be safe from any Japanese reprisal. As mentioned earlier, Volckmann produced handwritten receipts for everything that he received. Later, he retained a Financial Officer on the USAFIP-NL staff whose sole responsibility was to document receipts for all goods and services provided by civilians. After the war, Volckmann made it a priority to ensure that the Army compensated all receipt holders for the assistance they had given him.
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Throughout most of the war, Volckmann’s records referred to individual persons not by name, but by numeric call signs, for example Volckmann’s call sign was “1122.” Assigning call signs to nearly everyone in contact with USAFIP-NL, Volckmann guaranteed their anonymity if ever his records fell into enemy hands.
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A centerpiece of the Japanese war effort was their intensive propaganda. In the spring of 1943, while Volckmann remained in hiding from the previous fall’s anti-guerrilla campaign, the Japanese began an amnesty drive. Utilizing such phrases as
Asia for the Asiatics
and
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
, the program’s objective was to induce the local population to cease giving aid to the guerrillas and, in return for cash rewards, supply information about specific individuals and their activities.
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Meanwhile, the Japanesecontrolled media continued circulating denouncements of all things American: America’s economy had failed, the United States military had been defeated, and they would never be able to return to the Philippines.
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